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Summary 
This thesis analyses the consistency of WTO law with international environmental law 
and general international law in the field of trade and environment. GATT obligations 
require trade measures to comply with national treatment (Article III) and most -favoured-
nation treatment (Article I) and to prohibit import and export restrictions (Article XI). 
GATT exceptions permit measures to protect human, animal or plant life or health 
(Article XX(b)) and to conserve exhaustible natural resources (Article XX(g). This thesis 
analyses the consistency of unilateral and multilateral environmental measures with these 
GATT obligations and exceptions. It argues that the Article XX exceptions should be 
interpreted according to the proximity of interest between the country using trade 
restrictions and the environmental problem. It argues further that Article XX should be 
interpreted in accordance with customary international law regarding sovereign equality, 
non-intervention and the doctrine of necessity. Applying the principle of sovereign 
equality to WTO rights, this thesis proposes that WTO provisions be designed and 
interpreted to compensate for the economic inequality of WTO members in order to 
ensure equal access to WTO rights. Moreover, the principle of non-intervention should be 
applied in the WTO context to prohibit economic coercion. Unilateral environmental 
trade restrictions fail both tests. They use economic coercion to intervene in the internal 
affairs of sovereign States and are available in practice only to countries with significant 
market power. However, the doctrine of necessity may be invoked to excuse the non-
observance of WTO and other international obligations to permit the use of trade 
restrictions to address urgent environmental problems with which the enacting country 
has a jurisdictional nexus.
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Chapter 1 
Trade, Environment and the Evolution of WTO Law 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The academic debate in the field of trade and environment is a relatively recent 
phenomenon. The early 1970s saw significant international legal developments regarding 
the intersection of trade and environmental issues, notably the 1973 Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (‘CITES’).1 
International efforts to address environmental concerns on a global basis also began in 
this period, the most notable being the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on 
the Human Environment.2 Prior to this period, international environmental protection 
efforts generally took the form of agreements to conserve exhaustible natural resources 
for their economic value, rather than their ecological value. 3 Thus, in 1947, the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (‘GATT’)4 made room for the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources by providing a general exception to GATT obligations in 
                                                
1 Convention on Intern ational Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora  (Washington), 
opened for signature 6 March 1973, 993 UNTS 243 (entered into force 1 July 1975). 
2 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment  (Stockholm), (1972) UN Doc. 
A/CONF/48/14/REV.1. 
3 See for example Convention for the Protection of Birds Useful to Agriculture (Paris), (1902) 102 BFSP 
969 (entered into force 20 April 1908); Treaty for the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals 
(Washington), (1911) 104 BFSP 175 (entered into force 15 December 1911); and International Convention 
for the Regulation of Whaling (Washington), (1946) 161 UNTS 72 (entered into force 10 November 1948). 
4 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results  of the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —Results of the Uruguay Round, 
Annex 1A, 33 ILM 1197 (1994). 
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Article XX(g). However, the wording of this GATT provision did not limit the exception 
to conservation for economic value alone.   
 
Article XX(g) was not tested in a modern environmental context until a GATT dispute 
occurred between Mexico and the United States over an American ban on Mexican tuna 
imports that was meant to protect dolphins from Mexican tuna fishermen. 5 This case 
raised a host of issues regarding the proper interpretation of GATT Article XX(g), as well 
as Article XX(b) (which permits measures necessary to protect humans, animals and 
plants). The GATT panel struck down the American measure as a violation of GATT 
obligations and ruled that it did not fit either exception. This 1991 decision, together with 
the numerous academic articles the dispute spawned,6 marks the beginning of sustained 
academic interest in the trade and environment debate. 7 
                                                
5 United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD, 39th Supp, 155, GATT Doc DS21/R 
(1991) 30 ILM 1594 (Report by the Panel not Adopted). 
6 The following research on trade and environment was published from 1990 to 1992: K Anderson and R 
Blackhurst (eds), The Greening of World Trade Issues (1992); J Adcock and J Kildow, ‘Environment and 
the Trading System’ (1992) 16 Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 55; Barr, Honeywell and Stofel, ‘Labor 
and Environmental Rights in the Proposed Mexico-United States Free Trade Agreement’ (1991) 14 
Houston Journal of International Law 1; P Bergeijk, ‘International Trade and the Environmental 
Challenge’ (1991) 25 Journal of World Trade 105; S Charnovitz, ‘Exploring the Environmental Exceptions 
in GATT Article 20’ (1991) 25 Journal of World Trade 37; E Christensen and S Geffin, ‘GATT Sets Its 
Net on Environmental Regulation: The GATT Panel Ruling on Mexican Yellowfin Tuna Imports and the 
Need for Reform of the International Trading System’ (1991-92) 23 University of Miami Inter-American 
Law Review 569; GATT Secretariat, Trade and the Environment  (1992); J Jackson, ‘Dolphins and 
Hormones: GATT and the Legal Environment for International Trade after the Uruguay Round’ (1992) 14 
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Journal 429; S Kass and M Gerrard, ‘International Trade 
(Environmental Developments)’ (1992) 207 New York  Law Journal 3; C F Knight, ‘Effects of National 
Environmental Regulation on International Trade and Investment - Selected Issues’ (1991) UCLA Pacific 
Basin Law Journal 212; J McDonald, Greening the GATT: Harmonizing Free Trade and Environmental 
Protection in the New World Order (LL M Thesis, Faculty of Law, Lewis & Clark University, Oregon); T 
McDorman, ‘The GATT Consistency of U.S. Fish Import Embargoes to Stop Driftnet Fishing and Save 
Whales, Dolphins and Turtles’ (1991) 24 George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics 
477; T McDorman, ‘The 1991 U.S.-Mexico GATT Panel Report on Tuna and Dolphin: Implications for 
Trade and Environment Conflicts’ (1992) 17 North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial 
Regulation  461; M McKeith, ‘The Environment and Free Trade: Meeting Halfway at the Mexican Border’ 
(1991) 10 UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal 183; K McSlarrow, ‘International Trade and the Environment: 
Building a Framework for Conflict Resolution’ (1991) 21 Environmental Law Reporter 10589; P Menyasz, 
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A central issue in the trade and environment debate concerns the use of trade barriers by 
one country to induce changes in the environmental policies of another. Such trade 
barriers might be used in the context of a multilateral environmental agreement (‘MEA’), 
such as CITES, which requires restrictions on trade in endangered species, or the 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,8 which requires 
signatories to restrict trade in ozone-depleting chemicals.9 When such trade barriers are 
applied to other signatories of the same MEA, their use is not controversial. However, 
when trade barriers are imposed unilaterally by one country to induce another country to 
                                                                                                                                            
‘Trade Law as Environmental Weapon Stirs Controversy’ (1992) 3 Environmental Policy and Law 20; E 
Patterson, ‘International Trade and the Environment: Institutional Solutions’ (1991) 21 Environmental Law 
Reporter 10599; E-U Petersmann, ‘Trade Policy, Environmental Policy and GATT: Why Trade Rules and 
Environmental Rules Should Be Mutually Consistent’ (1991) 46 Aussenwirtschaft  197; C F Runge, ‘Trade 
Protectionism and Environmental Regulations: the New Nontariff Barriers’ (1990) 11 Northwestern 
Journal of Intern ational Law and Business 47; J O Saunders, ‘Legal Aspects of Trade and Sustainable 
Development’ in J O Saunders (ed), The Legal Challenge of Sustainable Development (1990) 370; S 
Shrybman, ‘International Trade and the Environment: An Environmental Assessme nt of the General 
Agreement on Tarriffs and Trade’ (1990) 20 The Ecologist 30; S Shrybman, Paying the Price: How Free 
Trade is Hurting the Environment, Regional Development, Canadian and Mexican Workers (1991); J 
Tobey, ‘The Effects of Domestic Environmental Policies on the Patterns of World Trade: An Empirical 
Test’ (1990) 43 Kyklos 191; D Wirth, ‘A Matchmaker’s Challenge: Marrying International Law and 
American Environmental Law’ (1992) 32 Virginia Journal of International Law 377; and P Low (ed), 
International Trade and the Environment, World Bank Discussion Papers No. 159 (1992). 
7 In the 1980s, relatively little was published on the topic of trade and environment. See Canadian 
Environmental Advisory Committee, Freer Trade and the Environment (1986); D Hunter, ‘The 
Comparative Effects of Environmental Legislation in a North American Free Trade Agreement’ (1986-87) 
11-12 Canada-United States Law Journal 271; W Lang, ‘Environmental Protection: The Challenge for 
International Law’ (1986) 20 Journal of World Trade Law 489; O Lomas, ‘Environmental Protection, 
Economic Conflict and the European Community’ (1988) 33 McGill Law Journal 506; L Lones, ‘The 
Marine Mammal Protection Act and International Protection of Cetaceans: A Unilateral Attempt to 
Effectuate Transnational Conservation’ (1989) 22 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 997; M Prieur, 
‘Environmental Regulations and Foreign Trade Aspects’ (1987) 3 Florida International Law Journal 85; 
and S Rubin and T Graham (eds) Environment and Trade: The Relation of International Trade and 
Environmental Policy (1984). 
8 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer , opened for signature 16 September 1987, 
UKTS 19 (1990) (entered into force 1 January 1989). 
9 For a complete summary of MEAs that contain trade measures, see, Matrix on Trade Measures Pursuant 
to Selected MEAs , WTO Doc WT/CTE/W/160 (2000). See below n 42 for a summary of these MEAs. 
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change its domestic environmental law, the matter becomes much more complicated, 
both in terms of international politics and international law.  
 
Two rulings of the WTO Appellate Body in United States – Import Prohibition of 
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (‘Shrimp I’ and ‘Shrimp II ’)10 have tackled this 
issue by interpreting Article XX(g) so as to allow the United States to unilaterally impose 
trade barriers to pressure Malaysia to change its domestic environmental regime for the 
protection of sea turtles.  These rulings have been described as a ‘revolution in WTO 
jurisprudence’.11 Given previous interpretations of Article XX(g) in the Mexican tuna 
cases12 (which occurred under the old GATT dispute resolution system13), the 
conventional view held by many trade experts before the Shrimp rulings,14 and the lack of 
consensus on this issue among the WTO membership, 15 a revolution has indeed occurred. 
The Shrimp rulings raise important questions regarding the proper interpretation of 
Article XX, the relationship between trade law, environmental law and the general 
                                                
10 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,  WTO Doc WT/DS58 
(1998) (Report of the Panel), WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, AB-1998-4 (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body) 
and United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 
by Malaysia, WTO Doc WT/DS58/RW (2001) (Report of the Panel); WTO Doc WT/DS58/AB/RW (2001) 
(Report of the Appellate Body). 
11 Louise de La Fayette, ‘Case Report: United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products’ (2002) 96 American Journal of International Law  685, 685. 
12 United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD, 39th Supp, 155, GATT Doc DS21/R 
(1991) (Report by the Panel not adopted), 30 ILM 1594 (1991) and United States – Restrictions on Imports 
of Tuna, GATT Doc DS29/R (1994) (Report by the Panel not adopted), 33 ILM 839 (1994). 
13 Under the GATT system, consensus was required to adopt the recommendations of dispute panels, 
effectively giving each member a veto. Under the WTO system, consensus is required to reject the 
recommendations of panels or the Appellate Body, making it difficult to prevent adoption. Understanding 
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying the 
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments—Results of the 
Uruguay Round, Annex 2, 33 ILM 1197 (1994), art 16(4) and 17(14). 
14 See Robert Howse, ‘The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal Baseline for 
the Trade and Environment Debate’ (2002) 27 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 491. 
15 See Hakan Nordstrom and Scott Vaughan, WTO Special Studies, Trade and Environment (1999). 
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principles of public international law, and the role of the WTO judiciary in the 
development of international law. As such, these rulings have important implications not 
only in the field of trade and environment, but more generally in the realm of public 
international law and global governance. 
 
The Shrimp ‘revolution’ suggests that the interplay between trade law and public 
international law will have significant consequences for the future evolution of both. 16 In 
recent years WTO jurisprudence17 has increasingly turned to non-WTO sources of 
international law to interpret the provisions of the WTO Agreements. 18 The rulings in 
Shrimp I and Shrimp II, which examined several MEAs in the course of interpreting 
Article XX(g), are perhaps the most dramatic example of this trend. The ruling in favour 
of the use of trade measures to induce changes in the internal laws of a sovereign country 
challenged widely held views regarding principles of public international law such as the 
sovereign equality of states and the principle of non-intervention. At the same time, the 
WTO Appellate Body has taken the view that principles of public international law must 
                                                
16 Recognizing this reality, Sands made the following comment: ‘It is astonishing…how many international 
lawyers have not heard of the Appellate Body of the WTO, never mind read any of its judgments. And how 
many of the traditional treatises on public international law simply exclude trade law altogether?’ Philippe 
Sands, ‘Turtles and Torturers: The Transformation of International Law’ (Inaugural Public Lecture as 
Professor of Public International Law, University of London, 6 June 2000) 
<http://www.nyu.edu/pubs/jilp/main/issues/33/pdf/33p.pdf> pp 527-559, 558, at 19 February 2003. With 
respect to the latter, he cites Jean Comacau and Serge Sur, Droit International Public (2d ed 1995); Mario 
Giuliano et al, Diritto Internazionale (3d ed 1991); David Ruzie, Droit International Public (14th ed 1999); 
and Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law   (4th ed 1997). 
17 See United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products , WTO Doc WT/DS58 
(1998) (Report of the Panel), WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, AB-1998-4 (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body) 
and United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 
by Malaysia, WTO Doc WT/DS58/RW (2001) (Report of the Panel); WTO Doc WT/DS58/AB/RW (2001) 
(Report of the Appellate Body); United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
WTO Doc WT/DS2/9 (1996) (Report of the Panel) and WTO Doc WT/DS2/AB/R, AB-1996-1 (1996) 
(Report of the Appellate Body). 
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influence the interpretation of the WTO agreements. However, the relationship between 
international trade law and other branches of international law remains anything but 
clear.19 
 
The potential impact of decisions rendered by the WTO judiciary on the evolution of 
different branches of international law raises the important issue of how best to allocate 
decision making authority between the legislative and judicial branches of the WTO and 
well as the limits of the WTO’s authority vis -à-vis other international institutions. While 
many mechanisms are available to WTO members to clarify the relationship between 
WTO law and other sources of international law, the size and diversity of the WTO 
membership makes it increasingly difficult to achieve the necessary degree of consensus 
to make this happen through the legislative process.20 Indeed, lack of progress in the 
WTO Committee on Trade and Environment on its mandate to clarify the relationship 
between international trade law and international environmental law was one of the 
elements that set the stage for the rulings in Shrimp I and Shrimp II.21 In the absence of 
clear guidance from the legislature, the judiciary was left to fill in the gaps. 
                                                                                                                                            
18 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying 
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —Results of the 
Uruguay Round, Annex 1A, 33 ILM 1125 (1994). 
19 One author that has made an outstanding effort to put a dent in the monumental task of clarifying this 
relationship is Joost Pauwelyn. See Joost Pauwelyn, ‘The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: 
How Far Can We Go?’ (2001) 95 American Journal of International Law 535. Also see Donald McCrae, 
‘The WTO in International Law: Tradition Continued or New Frontier?’ (2000) 3 Journal of International 
Economic Law 27 and Donald McCrae, ‘The Contribution of International Trade Law to the Development 
of International Law’ (1996) 260 Recueil des Cours 111. 
20 For a discussion of the international legislative process in the realm of public international law, see Paul 
C Szasz, Selected Essays on Understanding International Institutions and the Legislative Process (2001) 
(Edith Brown Weiss, ed), especially chapters 1 and 2. 
21 See United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 
by Malaysia, WTO Doc WT/DS58/AB/RW (2001) (Report of the Appellate Body), para 155. The WTO 
Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) was established by the Decision on Trade and Environment , 
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In recent years, the difficulty of achieving consensus among the WTO membership has 
become increasingly evident. At the Third Ministerial Conference in Seattle in 1999, the 
members could not even agree on a negotiating agenda for what was to be the Millenium 
Round negotiations. At the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha in 2001, they barely 
managed to agree on the negotiating agenda. Among the more controversial items were 
agricultural subsidies and affordable access to patented medicines in the developing 
countries.22 With respect to the latter issue, the severity of the AIDS crisis in many 
developing countries prompted a coalition of developing countries to insist on the 
resolution of this issue before they would agree to launch a new negotiating round.23 
Even so, one item—how to ensure countries that lack pharmaceutical manufacturing 
capacity have the same access to generic drugs as othe r WTO members—was left to be 
resolved by the end of 2002.24 All but one WTO member (the United States) managed to 
agree on a solution by the due date, leaving unresolved an issue that had the potential to 
derail negotiation on the rest of the agenda at the Fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancun 
                                                                                                                                            
adopted by Ministers at the Meeting of the Trade Negotiations Committee in Marakesh on 14 April 1994, 
in GATT Secretariat, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1994), 469. 
Working papers, reports and summaries of deliberations of the CTE are available at <www.wto.org>. 
Another multilateral forum for the analysis of trade and environment issues is the Joint Session of Trade 
and Environment Experts at the Organization for Economic Co -operation and Development. See 
<www.oecd.org>. 
22 Ministerial Declaration, Fourth Ministerial Conference , Doha, Qatar, adopted November 14, 2001, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November 2001, available at 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm> at 30 June 2002. 
23 Steven Chase, ‘Drug patent skirmish threatens WTO talks’, Globe and Mail (Toronto), 9 November 
2001, B6. 
24 World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Adopted on 14 
November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 20 November 2001, paragraph 6, <http://www.wto.org> at 28 
November 2001. 
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in 2003.25 Fortunately, the matter was resolved shortly before the Cancun Ministerial.26 
However, the Cancun meeting met the same fate as the Seattle meeting, with WTO 
members failing to reach the consensus needed to move forward. 
 
Another item placed on the negotiating agenda at the Doha Ministerial Conference is the 
issue of the relationship between the WTO and MEAs.27 The controversy that erupted 
among the WTO membership over this issue in the wake of the Shrimp II ruling28 
apparently made the clarification of the relationship between the WTO Agreements and 
international environmental law a higher priority item for the members. It is an issue that 
tends to divide the membership along North-South lines, like the issues of  access to 
medicine and agricultural subsidies. Combined with the complexity of the issues at stake, 
                                                
25 Jeffrey Sparshot, ‘United States’ Refusal Thwarts WTO Drug-Patent Talks’, Washington Times, 25 
December 2002. 
26 Decision of 30 August 2003, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health, WTO Doc IP/C/W/405, 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm> at 10 September 2003. 
27 See Ministerial Declaration, Fourth Ministerial Conference, Doha, Qatar, Adopted 14 November 2001, 
WTO Doc WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November 2001, paragraph 31, 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm> at 30 June 2002. The WTO 
website states: 
Multilateral environmental agreements.  Ministers agreed to launch negotiations on the relationship between existing WTO 
rules and specific trade obligations set out in multilateral environmental agreements. The negotiations will address how 
WTO rules are to apply to WTO members that are parties to environmental agreements. 
There are approximately 200 multilateral environmental agreements in place today. Only 20 of these contain trade 
provisions. They are discussed in the WTO’s Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE). 
For example, the Montreal Protocol for the protection of the ozone layer applies restrictions on the production, 
consumption and export of aerosols containing chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). The Basel Convention which controls trade or 
transportation of hazardous waste across international borders and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species are other multilateral environmental agreements containing trade provisions. 
The objective of the new negotiations will be to clarify the relationship between trade measures taken under the 
environmental agreements and WTO rules. 
So far no measure affecting trade taken under an environmental agreement has been challenged in the GATT-WTO system. 
Information exchange. Ministers agreed to negotiate procedures for regular information exchange between secretariats of 
multilateral environmental agreements and the WTO. Currently, the Trade and Environment Committee holds an 
information session with different secretariats of the multilateral environmental agreements once or twice a year to discuss 
the trade-related provisions in these environmental agreements and also their dispute settlement mechanisms. The new 
information exchange procedures may expand the scope of existing cooperation. 
Observer status. Overall, the situation concerning the granting of observer status in the WTO to other international 
governmental organizations is currently blocked for political reasons. In the Trade and Environment Committee itself, 
seven requests are pending, including one by a multilateral environmental agreement. The negotiations will aim at 
developing criteria for observership in WTO. 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dohaexplained_e.htm#environment> at 30 June 2002. 
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this political reality raises doubts about the prospects of making any significant progress 
in this area during the Doha negotiating round. 
 
Moreover, the boundaries of the negotiations in this area are narrowly restricted. The 
Doha Ministerial Declaration provides: 
31.  With a view to enhancing the mutual supportiveness of trade and environment, we agree to 
negotiations, without prejudging their outcome, on : 
  
(i) the relationship between existing WTO rules and specific trade obligations set out in 
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). The negotiations shall be limited in scope to the 
applicability of such existing WTO rules as among parties to the MEA in question. The 
negotiations shall not prejudice the WTO rights of any Member that is not a party to the MEA in 
question;29 
 
The narrow scope of the WTO negotiations on this issue reflects a lack of consensus 
regarding the proper interpretation to give to WTO obligations with respect to global 
environmental issues and what actions may be required, if any. 
 
This thesis will analyse the relationship between GATT, international environmental law,  
and public international law. 30 The central issue is whether the WTO needs to legislate 
clarifications in the wake of the Shrimp  rulings, what changes are necessary, if any, and 
how to implement any decisions that might be taken. Unlike the Doha agenda, this thesis 
is not limited to examining the effect of WTO obligations among parties to MEAs. I also 
will examine the consistency of MEA measures applied to non-parties and unilateral 
measures taken in the absence of international agreement. While trade and environment is 
                                                                                                                                            
28 See de La Fayette, above n 10. 
29 Ministerial Declaration , Fourth Ministerial Conference, Doha, Qatar, Adopted 14 November 2001, 
WTO Doc WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November 2001, para 31, 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm> at 30 June 2002. 
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the subject of this thesis, the aim is to make a contribution to developing further 
coherence between WTO law and the wider body of general international law.31 The 
trade and environment debate serves as a vehicle for this analysis. 
 
WTO agreements focus overwhelmingly on non-environmental issues among an 
economically diverse and geographically dispersed membership. 32 A relatively small 
number of disputes have arisen over the years regarding the application of GATT Article 
XX exceptions to trade measures to achieve health or environmental goals.33 Some of 
                                                                                                                                            
30 I will refer to public international law and general international law interchangeably, to denote the 
general body of international law that consists of treaty law and customary international law. 
31 None of the WTO agreements refer to the task of developing greater coherence between WTO law and 
the g eneral body of international law. Art III(5) of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 1A, 33 ILM 1125 (1994) directs 
the WTO to cooperate with the International Monetary Fund (‘IMF’) and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (‘World Bank’) ‘with a view to achieving greater coherence in global 
policy-making’. At their first Conference in Singapore in December 1996, WTO Ministers adopted the 
Comprehensive and Integrated WTO Plan of Action for the Least-Developed Countries, WTO Doc 
WT/MIN(96)/14, which ‘envisaged a closer cooperation between the WTO and other multilateral agencies 
assisting least-developed countries’ in the area of trade. The organizations involved are the IMF, ITC, 
UNCTAD, UNDP, the World Bank and the WTO. In United States—Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline , WTO Doc WT/DS2/AB/R, AB-1996-1 (1996) (Report of the Appellate Body), 17, 
the Appellate Body stated: ‘[The] general rule of interpretation [of Vienna Convention art 31] has attained 
the status of a rule of customary or general international law. As such, it forms part of the “customary rules 
of interpretation of public international law” which the Appellate Body has been directed, by Article 3(2) of 
the DSU, to apply in seeking to clarify the provisions of the General Agreement and the other “covered 
agreements” of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (the “WTO 
Agreement”). That direction reflects a measure of recognition that the General Agreement is not to be read 
in clinical isolation from public international law.’ Also see India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical 
and Agricultural Chemical Products, WTO Doc WT/DS50/AB/R (1997) (Report of the Appellate Body), 
para 46; Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO Doc WT/DS8/10/11/AB/R (1996) (Report of the 
Appellate Body), 10-12; and United States—Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access Memory 
Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above from Korea , WTO Doc WT/DS99/R (1999) (Report of 
the Panel), para 6.13. 
32  See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, Final Act 
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —
Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 1A, 33 ILM 1125 (1994).  While the Preamble recognizes 
sustainable development and environmental protection as concerns that should be taken into account in the 
pursuit of trade liberalization, these references apply to the interpretation of the WTO Agreements, rather 
than impose obligations to protect the environment. 
33 Under GATT (1948–94), there were six disputes involving environmental measures or human health-
related measures under GATT Article XX. Of the six panel reports that resulted, three were not adopted. 
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these involved measures ostensibly aimed at protecting the environment inside the 
enacting country. 34 Others involved measures aimed at changing the environmental 
policies of other WTO members.35  Significantly, the Appellate Body has now interpreted 
the GATT to permit WTO members to use trade restrictions to influence environmental 
policy outside the importing nation’s territory. 36  
 
                                                                                                                                            
See United States — Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada, GATT Doc 29S/91 
(Report of the Panel Adopted 22 February 1982); Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed 
Herring and Salmon, GATT BISD, 35th Supp, 98, GATT Doc 35S/98 (1988)  (Report of the Panel Adopted 
22 March 1988); Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, GATT BISD, 
37th Supp, 200, GATT Doc DS10/R (1990) (Report of the Panel Adopted 7 November 1990), 30 ILM 1122 
(1991); United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD, 39th Supp, 155, GATT Doc DS21/R 
(1991) (Report of the Panel not Adopted), 30 ILM 1594 (1991); United States – Restrictions on Imports of 
Tuna, GATT Doc DS29/R (1994) (Report of the Panel not Adopted), 33 ILM 839 (1994); United States — 
Taxes on Automobiles  (1994), (Report of the Panel not Adopted), 33 ILM 1399 (1994). Under the WTO 
(since 1995), there have been three such disputes. In all three, the panel reports were appealed to the 
Appellate Body, whose rulings were adopted. See United States – Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline , WTO Doc WT/DS2/9 (1996) (Report of the Panel), WTO Doc WT/DS2/AB/R, 
AB-1996-1 (1996) (Report of the Appellate Body); United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products,  WTO Doc WT/DS58 (1998) (Report of the Panel), WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, AB-
1998-4 (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body) and United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 by Malaysia, WTO Doc WT/DS58/RW (2001) (Report of 
the Panel); WTO Doc WT/DS58/AB/RW (2001) (Report of the Appellate Body); and European 
Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WTO Doc WT/DS135/R 
(2000) (Report of the Panel); WTO Doc WT/DS135/AB/R (2001) (Report of the Appellate Body). 
34 Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Un processed Herring and Salmon, GATT BISD, 35th Supp, 98, 
GATT Doc 35S/98 (1988)  (Report of the Panel Adopted 22 March 1988); United States – Standards for 
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc WT/DS2/9 (1996) (Report of the Panel), WTO Doc 
WT/DS2/AB/R, AB-1996-1 (1996) (Report of the Appellate Body); and European Communities – 
Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products , WTO Doc WT/DS135/R (2000) (Report 
of the Panel); WTO Doc WT/DS135/AB/R (2001) (Report of the Appellate Body). 
35 United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD, 39th Supp, 155, GATT Doc DS21/R 
(1991) (Report of the Panel not Adopted), 30 ILM 1594 (1991); United States – Restrictions on Imports of 
Tuna, GATT Doc DS29/R (1994) (Report of the Panel not Adopted), 33 ILM 839 (1994); United States – 
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,  WTO Doc WT/DS58 (1998) (Report of the 
Panel), WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, AB-1998-4 (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body); and United States – 
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 by Malaysia, WTO 
Doc WT/DS58/RW (2001) (Report of the Panel); WTO Doc WT/DS58/AB/RW (2001) (Report of the 
Appellate Body). 
36 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc WT/DS58 (1998) 
(Report of the Panel), WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, AB-1998-4 (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body) and 
United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 by 
Malaysia, WTO Doc WT/DS58/RW (2001) (Report of the Panel); WTO Doc WT/DS58/AB/RW (2001) 
(Report of the Appellate Body). 
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The central objective of the WTO—trade liberalization—restricts the use of trade 
barriers, primarily through obligations regarding non-discrimination (national treatment37 
and most-favoured-nation treatment38) and the prohibition of import and export 
restrictions.39 However, the GATT (and other WTO agreements) creates no general right 
of market access, but rather prohibits specific types of trade barriers. 40 Sustainable 
development is another objective of the WTO,41 but it is not clear what that means nor 
how this objective fits in relation to trade liberalization. Key WTO provisions affecting 
the use of trade barriers to address environmental issues are found in GATT Article XX, 
the WTO Preamble, and the Decision on Trade and Environment. However, the limits 
these provisions place on the use of trade measures to achieve international 
environmental goals remain ambiguous. 
 
                                                
37 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —Results of the Uruguay Round, 
Annex 1A, 33 ILM 1197 (1994), art III. 
38 Ibid, art I. 
39 Ibid, art XI. 
40 This is a key point, since it means that WTO members may deny market access as long as they do so in a 
way that does not violate their obligations or that fit exceptions to those obligations. On this point, see 
Robert Howse and Donald Regan, ‘The Product/Process Distinction – An Illusory Basis for Disciplining 
“Unilateralism” in Trade Policy’ (2000) 11 European Journal of International Law  249, 257, Sanford E 
Gaines, ‘Processes and Production Methods: How to Produce Sound Policy for Environmental PPM-Based 
Trade Measures?’ (2002) 27 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 383, 412, and Steve Charnovitz, 
‘Solving the Production and Processing Methods Puzzle’ (2001) Graduate Institute of International Studies 
51, 29-31. 
41 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying 
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —Results of the 
Uruguay Round, 33 ILM 1125 (1994), Preamble. 
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II. Issues Addressed in Thesis 
The central issue in this thesis is to define the legal relationship between international 
institutions and agreements in the context of the international legal system to avoid 
conflicts between trade liberalization and global environmental protection. Once the legal 
relationship is defined, the need for law reform can be assessed. These topics in turn raise 
more general issues regarding the procedures and forums that should be used to achieve 
legal reforms in this field. The division of responsibility between the WTO judiciary and 
the ‘legislative branch’ is influenced by the (in)ability of the members to reach agreement 
and the legal effect of decisions taken by each. The link between WTO law, international 
environmental law and general international law raises issues regarding the appropriate 
international institution in which to resolve issues that involve all three fields of 
international law.  
 
GATT limits the use of trade restrictions. Several MEAs require trade restrictions.42 This 
raises the possibility that a trade restriction imposed under a MEA might be challenged 
                                                
42 See Matrix on Trade Measures Pursuant to Selected MEAs, WTO Doc WT/CTE/W/160 (2000). This 
document lists the following MEAs that contain trade-related measures: (1) International Convention for 
the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, opened for signature 14 May 1966, TIAS 6767 (entered into force 21 
March 1969) (The Resolution by ICCAT Concerning an Action plan to Ensure Effectiveness of the 
Conservation Program for Atlantic Bluefin Tuna, 1994, Article f, recommends non-discriminatory trade 
restrictive measures; other recommendations relate to the import ban of specific products or products from 
specific countries.); Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora  
(Washington), opened for signature 6 March 1973, 993 UNTS 243 (entered into force 1 July 1975) (CITES 
regulates trade in endangered species by defining the conditions under which import and export permits 
may be issued for three categories of protected species that are affected by trade: Appendix I (species 
threatened with extinction); Appendix II (species  that may become threatened with extinction if trade is not 
controlled); and Appendix III (species subject to regulation in the jurisdiction of an individual party that 
requests co-operation in the control of its trade); (3) Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources, opened for signature 20 May 1980, 19 ILM 837 (1980) (tracking trade flows of certain 
species); (4) Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer , opened for signature 16 
September 1987, UKTS 19 (1990) (entered into force 1 January 1989) (Requires parties to ban trade in 
certain substances with non-parties that do not comply with the Protocol.); (5) Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (Basel), opened for signature 22 March 
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under the WTO. What if a party to the MEA challenges the trade restriction of another 
party to the MEA, at the WTO? What if a non-party challenges the trade restriction of a 
party to the MEA, at the WTO? Under what circumstances should a WTO member be 
allowed to unilaterally impose trade restrictions to persuade another WTO member to 
adopt a particular environmental policy? Who has jurisdiction to resolve such disputes 
and what should the outcomes be? 
 
This thesis will assess the need for WTO reform as follows: 
1. Are the current rules adequate to resolve conflicts between the GATT and MEA 
provisions, given interpretations by dispute panels and state practice? 
2. Do the current rules support interpretations that obviate the need for reform?  
3. If the current rules are inadequate, what changes are necessary? 
                                                                                                                                            
1989, UN Doc EP/IG.80/3, 28 ILM 649 (1989) (Entered into force 24 May 1992) (Inter alia, requires 
export bans to countries that have import bans on specific types of hazardous waste and prohibits trade in 
certain waste with non-parties.); (6) Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5 June 1992, 
UNEP/bio.Div./CONF/L.2, 31 ILM 818 (1992) (entered into force 29 December 1993) (Article 10(b) 
requires parties to adopt ‘measures relating to the use of biological resources to avoid or minimize adverse 
impacts on biological diversity’, but parties are free to choose the specific measures they will use and they 
are not required to use trade measures. Article 22 provides that the CBD shall not affect the rights and 
obligations of any party under existing international agreements, except when those rights and obligations 
would cause serious damage or threaten biological diversity. This provision could be interpreted as 
permitting trade measures.) (7) Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety , 29 January 2000, 
UNEP/CBD/ExCop/1/3, <http://www.biodiv.org/biosafe> at 23 October 2003 (Regulates procedures for 
the transboundary movement of Living Modified Organisms, without changing the rights and obligations of 
parties under other international agreements, including the WTO.); (8) United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 4 June 1992, (1992) 31 ILM 849 (entered into force 
21 March 1994) (Does not require trade measures, but they might be used to implement the agreement. 
Article 3.5 provides that ‘measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international 
trade’, which mirrors the language in the preamble (chapeau) of GATT Article XX.); (9) Kyoto Protocol, 
opened for signature 16 March 1998, <http://unfccc.int/resource/convkp.html>, at 4 November 2003 (Does 
not require trade restrictions, but provides for emissions trading and requires parties to implement policies 
and measures to minimize adverse effects on trade.); (10) International Tropical Timber Agreement, 
opened for signature 26 January 1994, 33 ILM 1014 (1994). (While the agreement does not authorize trade 
restrictions, it has trade-related objectives.); (11) Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent 
Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade , 1998. (Permits non-
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4. How should those changes be implemented? 
5. Where should those changes be implemented? 
 
III. The Scope of the Thesis 
 
While there are several WTO agreements that may affect MEAs, this thesis will focus 
primarily on the WTO Agreement, the GATT, and the Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes.43 While many of the arguments 
developed in this thesis may be applicable to the interpretation and application of the 
Agreement on Technical Barrier to Trade44 and the Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,45 those agreements affect primarily domestic, 
rather than international, environmental protection. 46 Thus, they will be discussed only 
insofar as they inform the analysis of the GATT provisions that are relevant to 
international environmental issues. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
discriminatory import and export restrictions.); (12) Draft Persistent Organic Pollutants Convention, 
reproduced in 37 ILM 505 (1998). (Requires trade bans on prohibited substances).  
43 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 15 April 1994, Final Act 
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —
Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 2, 33 ILM 1197 (1994). 
44 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —Results of the Uruguay Round, 
Annex 1A, 33 ILM 1197 (1994). 
45 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 15 April 1994 , Final Act 
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —
Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 1A, 33 ILM 1197 (1994).  
46 For a useful discussion of the differences in the kinds of measures addressed in these agreements, see 
Gaines, above n 40, 390-397. 
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It is beyond the scope of this thesis to consider the relationship between MEAs such as 
the Convention on Biological Diversity 47 and Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (‘TRIPS’),48 as important as that issue may be. The 
obligations contained in TRIPS are different in nature from those regarding trade in 
goods. Thus, TRIPS will be considered only in so far as it serves as a precedent for 
agreeing to minimum standards of global environmental protection in a possible WTO 
agreement on ‘Trade-Related Aspects of Environmental Protection’ or ‘TREPS’. 
 
It is also beyond the scope of this thesis to consider the relationship between MEAs and 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 49 While trade in environmental 
services and the movement of natural persons have relevance to global environmental 
cooperation, the structure of GATS and its progress on these issues make GATS a poor 
fit, given the focus of this thesis on the use of trade measures to enforce MEA obligations 
and to provide incentives to participate in MEAs. 
 
Another field that lies beyond the scope of this thesis is the relationship between MEAs 
and foreign investment.  The threat of claims for compensation for expropriation under 
foreign investment protection agreements may affect the cost of implementing MEA 
                                                
47 Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5 June 1992, UNEP/bio.Div./CONF/L.2, 31 
ILM 818 (1992) (entered into force 29 December 1993). 
48 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994, Final Act 
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —
Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 1C, 33 ILM 1197 (1994).  
49 General Agreement on Trade in Services, 15 April 1994, Final Act Emb odying the Results of the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —Results of the Uruguay Round, 
Annex 1B, 33 ILM 1197 (1994). 
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obligations. Moreover, the WTO does not have an agreement on foreign investment 
protection. 
 
This thesis will not consider the relationship between safeguard measures, trade remedy 
laws and MEAs.50 Instead, this thesis focuses on the trade measures that are more likely 
to be used in enforcing international environmental obligations, rather than measures 
designed to protect domestic industry from ‘unfair’ foreign competition. 
 
With respect to international environmental law, this thesis will focus on general 
principles, rather than provide a detailed discussion of the provisions of MEAs. Specific 
provisions of MEAs will only be discussed insofar as they inform the analysis of the 
compatibility of  WTO law with international environmental law. Similarly, with respect 
to general international law, this thesis will not enter into theoretical debates such as the 
appropriateness of the principle of sovereign equality as an organizing principle of global 
governance. Rather, I will focus on the state of the law as it stands currently and the 
relationship between the fundamental principles of international law, international 
environmental law and WTO law. 
 
                                                
50 Anti-dumping and countervailing duties could potentially be used to enforce MEAs. 
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IV. The Relationship between the WTO and Other Rules of International Law 
 
WTO panels are directed to interpret the WTO agreements ‘in accordance with 
customary rules of interpretation of public international law’51 and, except as otherwise 
provided, ‘the WTO shall be guided by the decisions, procedures and customary practices 
followed by the Contracting Parties to GATT 1947 and the bodies established in the 
framework of GATT 1947.’52  
 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘Vienna Convention’)53 codifies the 
customary rules of treaty interpretation54 and applies to the interpretation of WTO 
agreements. Customary international law is developed by the common practices of 
countries and is to be distinguished from conventional international law, which is 
                                                
51 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 15 April 1994, Final Act 
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —
Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 2, 33 ILM 1197 (1994), art 3(2) states : ‘The dispute settlement 
system of the WTO…serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered 
agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules 
of interpretation of public international law’. 
52 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying 
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —Results of the 
Uruguay Round, vol. I, 33 ILM 1125 (1994), art XVI(1).  
53 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered 
into force 27 January 1980). 
54 The key rules of treaty interpretation in the Vienna Convention , ibid, are: 
Article 31: General Rule of Interpretation 
1. A treaty is to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and 
annexes… 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its 
provisions; 
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding 
its interpretation; 
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 
Article 32: Supplementary means of interpretation 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the 
circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning when the interpretation according to Article 31: 
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
(b)  leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 
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constituted by treaties.55  The Appellate Body has consistently taken the view that the 
rules of treaty interpretation in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention have 
‘attained the status of a rule of customary or general international law’ and form ‘part of 
the “customary rules of interpretation of public international law”’.56 
 
The first rule of treaty interpretation requires that the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. The key 
point is that the ordinary meaning of the words cannot be divorced from the context in 
which they are used nor the purpose they aim to serve. ‘Ordinary meaning’ does not 
require a superficial or literal reading of the treaty terms. 
                                                                                                                                            
(emphasis added) 
55 This distinction is important because it can influence the interpretation of treaty obligations. For 
example, in The United Mexican States v Metalclad Corporation  (2001) BCSC 664, the requirement to 
treat foreign investors in accordance with international law was interpreted to exclude the concept of 
transparency, an obligation contained in many treaties, on the grounds that no evidence had been 
introduced to show that the concept of transparency formed part of customary international law. The 
NAFTA Commission subsequently adopted a formal interpretation confirming the court’s interpretation to 
ensure that future arbitration panels would not read a transparency obligation into the minimum standard of 
treatment for foreign investors under NAFTA Chapter 11. NAFTA Free Trade Commission adopted the 
following interpretation of Article 1105(1): 
1. Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum 
standard of treatment to be afforded to investments of investors of another Party. 
2. The concepts of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection and security’ do not require treatment in addition to or 
beyond that which is required by the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens. 
3. A determination that there has been a breach of another provision of NAFTA, or of a separate international agreement, 
does not establish that there has been a breach of Article 1105(1).  
See NAFTA – Chapter 11 – Investment, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions (NAFTA 
Free Trade Commission, 31 July 2001), <http://www.dfait -maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NA FTA-Interpr-e.asp> at 
15 October 2001. 
56 United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc WT/DS2/AB/R, AB-
1996-1 (1996) (Report of the Appellate Body), 16. See also Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO 
Doc WT/DS8/10/11/AB/R (1996) (Report of the Appellate Body), 104; India – Patent Protection for 
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS50/AB/R (1997) (Report of the 
Appellate Body), para 46; European Communities—Customs Classification of Certain Computer 
Equipment , WTO Doc WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R, WT/DS68/AB/R (1998) (Report of the 
Appellate Body), para 84;  and United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products , 
WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, AB-1998-4 (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body),  para  114; and European 
Communities—Trade Description of Sardines, WTO Doc WT/DS231/R (2002) (Report of the Panel), para 
7.12. Also see John H Jackson, The Jurisprudence of GATT and the WTO: Insights on Treaty Law and 
Economic Relations (2000), 162, 181: ‘The Appellate Body…has made reference to general international 
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Lord McNair sums up the task of interpretation as, ‘the duty of giving effect to the 
expressed intention of the parties…as expressed in the words used by them in light of the 
surrounding circumstances.’57  
 
The approach taken by the Appellate Body has been to first examine the context of the 
provision in which the language is expressed, then proceed to examine the context of the 
particular agreement in which the provision is found, and lastly to examine the context of 
the Uruguay Round Agreements as a whole. 58 However, the Appellate body has also gone 
beyond the immediate context of the Uruguay Round Agreements to consider the 
provisions of MEAs and principles expressed in documents such as the Rio 
Declaration.59 
                                                                                                                                            
law principles, particularly as embodied in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which the 
Appellate Body calls upon for principles of treaty interpretation.’ 
57 Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties (1961), 365. He provides a vivid example (taken from another area of 
legal interpretation) of how the context can significantly alter the ‘ordinary meaning’ of a word, at 367: 
A man, having a wife and children, made a will of conspicuous brevity consisting merely of the words ‘all for mother’. No 
term could be ‘plainer’ than ‘mother’, for a man can have one mother. His widow claimed the estate. The court, having 
admitted oral evidence which proved that in the family circle the deceased’s wife was always referred to as ‘mother’, as is 
common in England, held that she was entitled to…the whole estate. ‘Mother’ is, speaking abstractly, a ‘plain term’, but, 
taken in relation to the circumstances surrounding the testator at the time when the will was made, it was anything but a 
‘plain term’….while a term may be ‘plain’ absolutely, what a tribunal adjudicating upon the meaning of a treaty wants to 
ascertain is the meaning of the term relatively, that is, in relation to the circumstances in which the treaty was made, and in 
which the language was used….If the words used are not clear in the light of the circumstances in which they were used, it 
is permissible for a tribunal to examine the question whether the intention of the parties is different from that which the 
words in their natural and ordinary sense express. 
58 In European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WTO Doc 
WT/DS135/AB/R (2001) (Report of the Appellate Body), the Appellate Body examined the meaning of 
‘like products’ in the context of all the paragraphs of Article III in order to determine how to interpret the 
same provision as it was used specifically in Article III:4. In United States—Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, AB-1998-4 (1998) (Report of the Appellate 
Body), para 114, in its interpretation of the chapeau of Article XX, the Appellate Body stated, ‘It is in the 
words constituting that provision, read in their context, that the object and purpose of the states parties to 
the treaty must first be sought. Where the meaning imparted by the text itself is equivocal or inconclusive, 
or where confirmation of the correctness of the reading of the text itself is desired, light from the object and 
purpose of the treaty as a whole may usefully be sought’, citing in support, Ian Sinclair, The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties  (2nd ed, 1984), 130-131. 
59 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, adopted 14 June 1992, Report of the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development 3, Rio de Janeiro 3-14 June 1992, UN GAOR, 47th Sess., 4 
 21 
 
Vienna Convention Articles 31 and 32 set out a hierarchy of methods and sources of 
interpretation. Article 32 provides a secondary means of interpretation that, in theory, 
only comes into play in situations where Article 31 proves inadequate.60 In contrast to the 
historical context laid out in Article 32, Article 31(3) emphasizes the importance of the 
subsequent evolution of the law. Thus, the contemporary legal context may have greater 
influence than the historical context surrounding the creation of treaty obligations. 
Indeed, the Appellate Body has taken this approach with respect to the interpretation of 
GATT Article XX(g), a provision drafted over fifty years ago. In Shrimp I, the Appellate 
Body stated:  
The words of Article XX(g), ‘exhaustible natural resources’,…must be read by a treaty interpreter 
in the light of contemporary concerns of the community of nations about the protection and 
conservation of the environment….From the perspective embodied in the preamble of the WTO 
Agreement, we note that the generic term ‘natural resources’ in Article XX(g) is not ‘static’ in its 
content or reference but is rather ‘by definition, evolutionary’.61 
                                                                                                                                            
UN Doc A/Conf 151/5/Rev.1 (1992) 31 ILM 874. See United States—Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, AB-1998-4 (1998) (Report of the Appellate 
Body), paras 129-134. 
60 See Jackson, Jurisprudence, above n 56, 426: ‘Under typical international law, elaborated by the Vienna 
Convention…, preparatory work history is an ancillary means of interpreting treaties. In the context of 
interpreting the GATT, we have more than forty years of practice since the origin of GATT…Thus,…it is 
this author’s view that one cannot rely too heavily on the original drafting history.’ See Jackson, at 145, 
note 37: ‘…the Vienna Convention…is generally considered to relegate preparatory history (Article 32) to 
a subsidiary role in interpretation, to be used only when the means specified in Article 31 do not resolve an 
interpretive problem.’ In support, Jackson cites United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc 
DS29/R (1994) 33 ILM 839 (Report by the Panel not Adopted) and Ian Brownlie, Principles of 
International Law  (4th ed, 1990), 630. Jackson notes the case of former negotiators who have received fees 
from an interested party to testify as to the negotiating history based on their own experience, noting that 
such testimony cannot always be given full credibility. However, Schwebel argues that Article 32 must be 
interpreted to give preparatory work a greater role in the interpretation of treaties than the words 
(particularly ‘confirm’) would suggest. The practice of using preparatory work to either confirm or to 
contest the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the treaty terms favours an interpretation that allows this practice to 
continue. If Article 32 may only be used to confirm, but not to contest, the interpretation that results under 
Article 31, then Article 32 would be redundant. See Stephen M. Schwebel, ‘May Preparatory Work be 
Used to Correct Rather than Confirm the ‘Clear’ Meaning of a Treaty Provision?’, in Jerzy Makarczyk (ed), 
Theory of International Law at the Threshold of the 21st Century (1996), 541. 
61 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, 
AB-1998-4 (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body), para 129-130. The Appellate Body cited Namibia 
(Legal Consequences) Advisory Opinion  [1971] ICJ Rep 31, in which the ICJ stated that where concepts 
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However, there is some debate regarding the ‘evolutionary’ or ‘evolutive’ interpretation 
of treaties.62  
 
A. The ‘Evolutionary’ Interpretation of Treaties 
The rule of inter-temporal law sprang from the dictum of Judge Huber in the Island of 
Palmas case.63 The draft Articles for the International Law Commission on the Law of 
Treaties extended this ambiguous doctrine to the applicability of subsequent legal 
evolution to interpretation of treaties—a treaty would be interpreted in the light of the law 
in force at the time the treaty was drawn up, but its application would be governed by the 
rules of international law in force at the time the treaty was applied. 64 The proposed 
article was not included in the Vienna Convention , which contains no such general rule. 
However, Higgins notes that Article 31(3) contains a ‘hint’ in providing that ‘any 
relevant rules of international law’ may be applicable, while Article 64 allows a later 
emergent rule of jus cogens to void a treaty. 65 Higgins concludes that it is preferable to 
focus on the intention of the parties, reflected by reference to the objects and purpose, 
                                                                                                                                            
embodied in a treaty are ‘by definition, evolutionary’, their ‘interpretation cannot remain unaffected by the 
subsequent development of law….’ 
62 See Rosalyn Higgins, ‘Some Observations on the Inter-Temporal Rule in International Law’, in Jerzy 
Makarczyk (ed), Theory of International Law at the Threshold of the 21st Century (1996), 173.  
63 Island of Palmas II UNRIAA 845: ‘A judicial fact must be appreciated in the light of the law 
contemporary with it, and not the law in force at the time such a dispute in regard to it arises or falls to be 
settled….the existence of the right, in other words, its continued manifestation, shall follow the conditions 
required by the evolution of the law.’ 
64 See Higgins, above n 62,178. 
65 The only peremptory norms that are clearly accepted and recognized in general international law are the 
prohibitions of aggression, genocide, slavery, racial discrimination, crimes against humanity and torture, 
and the right to self-determination. See International Law Commission, Annual Report 2001 , Chapter IV, 
State Responsibility, <http://www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/2001/english/chp4.pdf>, at 21 October 2003, 208. 
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notwithstanding judicial indications that the Huber rule is applicable to the law of 
treaties. 
 
GATT 1994, which consists of GATT 1947 (as amended), ‘is legally distinct from the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, dated 30 October 1947’.66 Thanks to this legal 
fiction, even if the GATT must be interpreted in the light of the law in force at the time 
the treaty was drawn up, the relevant time frame is now arguably 1994, not 1947. This 
view is buttressed by the Vienna Convention interpretation rule that the object and 
purpose of the treaty may be gleaned, in part, from its preamble, which was drawn up 
during the Uruguay Round, not 1947. However, in the context of Article XX, there are 
many arguments that favour an ‘evolutionary’ approach that permits a more flexible 
interpretation that can take into account both existing non-WTO rules of international law 
and future developments. 
 
Nothing in the Vienna Convention prevents the ‘evolutionary’ approach to interpretation. 
Indeed, Article 31(3) clearly allows subsequent agreements and practice to inform treaty 
interpretation and, as Judge Higgins points out, ‘any’ relevant rules of international law. 
Frowein notes that Article 3(2) might be read as an ‘attempt to prevent the development 
of treaty rights through later evolutions’, but rejects that view.67 Pauwelyn also rejects the 
                                                
66 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying 
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —Results of the 
Uruguay Round, vol. I, 33 ILM 1125 (1994), Article II(4). Jackson notes that the Uruguay Round, by 
establishing an entirely new treaty, avoided the need to use the amendment requirements of the GATT. See 
Jackson, Jurisprudence , above n 56, 375. 
67 Jochen Abr. Frowein, ‘Reservations and the International Ordre Public’ in Jerzy Makarczyk (ed), Theory 
of International Law at the Threshold of the 21 st Century (1996), 403, 404-5. Frowein suggests that DSU 
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view that Article 3(2), in explicitly confirming certain existing rules, demonstrates an 
intention to contract out of all other rules of international law.68  
 
Article XX recognizes that GATT obligations might have to give way in order to achieve 
other policy goals. Articles XX(b) and (g) use broad language that does not restrict the 
choice of policy instruments available to achieve environmental goals, but rather allows 
this determination to evolve over time as knowledge and conditions change. Both 
international law and scientific knowledge evolve over time. Both affect the 
interpretation and application of Articles XX(b) and (g). Thus, the interpretation of 
Article XX involves both questions of law and questions of fact whose conclusions 
cannot be predetermined.  
 
Because Articles XX(b) and (g) take aim at moving targets, they need to be interpreted 
flexibly. Environmental conditions, prevailing rules of international law and state practice 
need to be taken into account at the time of interpretation. Since the Article XX chapeau 
                                                                                                                                            
Article 3(2) represents a misplaced attempt to prevent the development of treaty rights through later 
evolutions: 
We have recently witnessed a strange phenomenon where States tried to protect themselves against the development of 
treaty rights through later evolutions. Under Article 3 para. 2…the dispute settlement system is described as a central 
element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The provision then adds: 
‘The Members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, 
and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law. Recommendations and rules of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in 
the covered agreements.’ 
It would seem that particularly powerful States…have insisted on this clause limiting what is sometimes considered to be 
the rather broad discretion of courts or other dispute settlement organs when they make use of rules of dynamic or 
evolutive interpretation. However, even with the rule indicated it is certainly beyond human possibilities to avoid evolutive 
interpretation with new facts and social conditions arising. 
68 Pauwelyn, above n 19, 541. He cites, inter alia, Georges Pinson (France) v United Mexican States 
(1928) 5 RIAA 327, 422 (Permanent Court of Arbitration): ‘Every international convention must be 
deemed tacitly to refer to general principles of international law for all questions which it does not itself 
resolve in express terms and in a different way’ and Korea—Measures Affecting Government Procurement , 
WTO Doc WT/DS163/R (2000) (Report of the Panel), para 7.96, n 753 (rejecting the argument that DSU 
3(2) excludes other international law). 
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fulfils the role of preventing abuse of Articles XX(b) and (g), the latter need not be 
interpreted in an overly restrictive manner. 
 
One problem with this evolutionary approach to interpretation is that it leads to more 
ambiguity and less predictability regarding how a provision might be applied in the 
future. Nevertheless, there are strong arguments in favour of flexibility. Articles XX(b) 
and (g), like the GATT Article XXI security exception, play a central role in the 
allocation of responsibility between national governments, the WTO, and other 
international organizations. The shifting circumstances of both global security and global 
environmental concerns require a flexible approach to policy making. Moreover, the 
evolutionary nature of customary international law favours an evolutionary approach to 
interpreting such key provisions. For example, the practice of States with respect to the 
general international law principles of  sovereign equality and non-intervention continues 
to evolve. Their evolution will affect the methods employed to manage the global 
environment and thus the range of environmental measures that can be justified under 
Articles XX(b) and (g).  
 
The evolution of human knowledge affects the determination of how to address 
environmental problems. For example, fifty years ago, banning the use of CFCs could not 
have been justified scientifically, because we had no knowledge of their effect on the 
ozone layer nor any knowledge of the impact of ozone depletion on human, animal or 
plant life or health. Today, we know that it is necessary to avoid using these chemical 
compounds because scientific knowledge has advanced to the point where we can make 
that determination. Thus, the very subject matter of Articles XX(b) and (g) is not static. It 
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will vary with the particular circumstances of each case and the state of human 
knowledge at the time the case is considered. Circumstances change. 
 
Accepted wisdom on which measures work best to achieve a given policy objective 
changes over time; so do the policy goals. Numerous considerations from a variety of 
academic disciplines go into the determination of whether to permit the consumption of a 
particular product and how to prevent its consumption if that is the chosen policy. Is it 
necessary to restrict trade in cocaine in order to protect human health? What about 
alcohol? What about CFCs? What about tobacco? For each of these products, the answer 
to the question posed depends on the era in which it is asked, scientific knowledge 
regarding the health effects of the product, the social and economic implications of a 
given policy choice, and information regarding the effectiveness of one policy instrument 
(taxation, education) versus another (regulation, criminalization). 
 
The evolutionary approach to WTO interpretation is consistent with the rules of treaty 
interpretation, particularly the rules allowing interpretation in light of the objectives (such 
as trade liberalization, sustainable development, environmental protection and 
recognition of the needs of developing countries) and international law (which includes 
international obligations set out in agreements such as CITES). 
 
B. The Effect of Non-WTO Rules on WTO Law 
Pauwelyn defines the relationship between WTO rules and other rules of international 
law based on five categories: 
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(1) WTO rules that add previously nonexistent rights or obligations to the corpus of international 
law (such as nondiscrimination principles in trade in services);  
(2) WTO rules that contract out of general international law (such as [the DSU with respect to] 
general international law on countermeasures)…or deviate from, or even replace, other preexisting 
rules of international law…; 
(3) WTO rules that confirm preexisting rules of international law, be they of general international 
law (such as DSU 3.2…) or preexisting treaty law (such as GATT 1994 incorporating GATT 1947 
and the TRIPS Agreement incorporating parts of certain WIPO conventions); 
(4) non- WTO rules that already existed when the WTO treaty was concluded (on April 15, 1994) 
and that are (a) relevant to and may have an impact on WTO rules; and (b) have not been 
contracted out of, deviated from, or replaced by the WTO treaty….general international 
law…other treaty rules that regulate…the trade relations between states (such as 
environmental…conventions…); and  
(5) non- WTO rules that are created subsequent to the WTO treaty…and (a) are relevant to and 
may have an impact on WTO ru les; (b) either add to or confirm existing WTO rules or contract 
out of, deviate from, or replace aspects of existing WTO rules; and (c) if the latter is the case, do 
so in a manner consistent with the interplay and conflict rules in the WTO treaty and general 
international law.69 
 
Pauwelyn argues that the reference in Article 3(2) to the ‘customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law’ favours the view that the interpretation of WTO 
rules must take into account other rules of international law.70 He notes that this approach 
was confirmed by the panel in Korea—Measures Affecting Government Procurement: 
Article 3.2 of the DSU requires that we seek within the context of a particular dispute to clarify the 
existing provisions of the WTO agreements in accordance with the customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law. However, the relationship of the WTO Agreements to 
customary international law applies generally to the economic relations between the WTO 
members. Such international law applies to the extent that the WTO treaty agreements do not 
‘contract out’ from it….[T]o the extent that there is not conflict or inconsistency, or an expression 
in a covered WTO agreement that implies differently, we are of the view that the customary ru les 
of international law apply to the WTO treaties…. 71 
 
Thus, the effect of other rules of international law on WTO law will depend in part on 
their consistency with WTO law, and vice versa. Achieving greater coherence between 
WTO law and other branches of international law is facilitated where the two are 
consistent. In Chapters 3 and 4, I will show that the interpretation of Article XX in the 
                                                
69 Pauwelyn, above n 19, 540-541. 
70 Pauwelyn, above n 19, 542-543. 
 28 
Shrimp cases is indeed consistent with the relevant rules of international environmental 
law and general international law, even though the latter was not explicitly taken into 
account in the rulings. I will argue that, in future, these rules should be taken into account 
explicitly in order to maintain consistency and coherence between WTO law and the 
other branches of international law. This will prevent deviations that might create 
divergence, rather than coherence. 
 
C. Context, Object and Purpose: The WTO preamble 
Although it provides no binding right or obligation,72 the WTO preamble sets out the 
object and purpose of the trade agreements and provides an overall context in which to 
interpret trade obligations and exceptions applied in cases involving the environment.73  
It thus directly affects interpretation.  The preamble sets out a concise summary of the 
principal issues and policy objectives that shed light on the context and purpose of the 
WTO agreements. 
 
The WTO preamble incorporates the objectives of sustainable development and 
environmental protection on the following terms: 
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted 
with a view to raising standards of living , ensuring full employment and a large and steadily 
growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade  
in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance 
with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the 
                                                                                                                                            
71 Korea—Measures Affecting Government Procurement, WTO Doc WT/DS163/R (2000) (Report of the 
Panel), para 7.96. 
72 Note, inter alia, the use of the word ‘should’ in the first paragraph, as opposed to the mandatory term 
‘shall’. 
73 This argument was raised with respect to the GATT, in support of amending the GATT preamble to 
promote such environmental policy goals as conservation of exhaustible resources and sustainable 
development. See E Patterson, ‘International Trade and the Environment: Institutional Solutions’ (1991) 21 
Environmental Law Reporter 10599, 10600. 
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environment and to enhance the means for doing so  in a manner consistent with their respective 
needs and concerns at different levels of economic development, 
 
Recognizing further that there is a need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing 
countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth of 
international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development, 
 
Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually 
advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to 
trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade  relations…’  
(emphasis added) 
 
In assessing the appropriate balance to achieve and the mechanisms to employ in the 
(potentially) conflicting policies of global trade liberalization and global environmental 
protection, the issues laid out in the preamble inform the interpretation of the WTO. 74 
 
The fundamental objective of the WTO is to reduce barriers to trade in order to increase 
global welfare through the efficient allocation of resources based on the concept of 
comparative advantage. Differences in the level of technological, economic and 
institutional development affect the ability of developing countries to implement both 
international trade obligations and international environmental obligations. The preamble 
recognizes that levels of economic development affect the priority given to 
environmental protection and that improving environmental protection requires 
enhancing the means for doing so. This is consistent with Principle 11 of the Rio 
Declaration, which states:  
Environmental standards, management objectives and priorities should reflect the environmental 
and developmental context to which they apply. Standards applied by some countries may be 
inappropriate and of unwarranted economic and social cost to other countries, in particular 
developing countries.  
 
                                                
74 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, 
AB-1998-4 (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body), para 129. 
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The Rio Declaration represents a statement of principles reflecting the broad consensus 
achieved among the nations of the world in 1992, as the Uruguay Round was drawing to 
a close. As such, it provides evidence of the circumstances surrounding the drafting of the 
WTO preamble. 
 
While the WTO preamble does not spell out methods for enhancing the ability of 
members to protect the environment, in the context of the WTO mandate this likely 
means raising incomes through gains from trade, enhancing technological capacity 
through technology transfer and technical assistance, and institution building through 
training and studies. All of these methods are features of the WTO system. The 
fundamental premise of the WTO system is that trade liberalization will raise incomes. 
Technology transfer is promoted indirectly through TRIPS. 75 The theme of technical 
assistance from developed countries to developing countries is found elsewhere in the 
WTO agreements. Institutional capacity building is carried out indirectly through studies 
and trade policy reviews and directly through the WTO training institute, funded by 
developed countries.76 The liberalization of trade in environmental technologies and 
services provide further means of enhancing the ability of members to improve 
environmental protection. All of these methods of enhancing environmental protection 
are in conformity with the fundamental WTO themes of trade liberalization and special 
                                                
75 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994, Final Act 
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —
Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 1C, 33 ILM 1197 (1994).  
76 The Doha Development Agenda Global Trust Fund was created following the WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Doha, in November 2001, to fund capacity-building in developing countries, primarily 
through training programs. See <www.wto.org> at 30 March 2002. 
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treatment for developing countries. They also are consistent with Principle 9 of the Rio 
Declaration, which states:  
States should cooperate to strengthen endogenous capacity-building for sustainable 
development…through exchanges of scientific and technological knowledge, and by enhancing 
the development, adaptation, diffusion and transfer of technologies, including new and innovative 
technologies. 
 
The WTO preamble establishes a hierarchy of objectives that is reflected in both the 
language used and the order in which objectives are laid out. The preamble uses distinct 
language for environmental protection and sustainable development. Seeking 
environmental protection only means making an effort in this regard. 77 Moreover, the 
order of appearance of this objective implies that environmental protection is secondary 
to the objective of raising incomes through trade liberalization, in the context of the WTO 
mandate. In contrast, sustainable development is more closely integrated into the 
economic objectives set out in the preamble. The underlying premise is that the 
fundamental objective of trade liberalization is consistent with the concept of sustainable 
development. 78 Allowing sustainable development means interpreting trade obligations to 
permit measures that have this aim, whether through the interpretation given to trade 
obligations or through the interpretation of exceptions to those obligations. The phrase ‘in 
                                                
77 The Oxford English Dictionary definition of ‘seek’ is ‘to make it one’s aim, to try or attempt to (do 
something)’. See OED (1978) vol. IX, at 389. To ‘try’ means ‘to make and effort, endeavour, attempt’. See 
vol. XI, at 438. The Spanish version uses the term ‘…y procurando…’. The French version uses the term 
‘…en vue a la fois de proteger…’. In European Communities—Trade Description of Sardines, WTO Doc 
WT/DS231/R (2002) (Report of the Panel), the panel examined the Spanish and French versions, using the 
Diccionario de la Lengua Espanola  and the Grand Dictionnaire Encyclopedique Larousse, respectively. 
The English, French and Spanish texts are equally authentic. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, para 6. 
78 ‘In accordance with’ means ‘the action or state of agreeing; agreement; harmony; conformity.’ Oxford 
English Dictionary, Vol I, 62. ‘Agreement’ means ‘mutual conformity of things, whether due to likeness or 
to mutual adaptation; concord; harmony; affinity.’ Oxford English Dictionary, Vol I, 191. ‘In conformity 
with’ means ‘in agreement, accordance or harmony with; in compliance with.’ Oxford English Dictionary, 
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accordance with...sustainable development’ implies mutual adaptation and harmony of 
the objectives of trade liberalization and sustainable development. Mutual adaptation 
means that the concept of sustainable development should accommodate trade 
liberalization and that trade obligations should accommodate sustainable development. 
Arguably, this means that the interpretation of trade obligations, not only the exceptions 
to those obligations, should accommodate the concept of sustainable development. 
 
In Shrimp I, the Appellate Body gave weight to the preamble’s reference to 
environmental protection and sustainable development in applying these references to the 
interpretation of the exception in Article XX(g), but did not apply the preamble to the 
interpretation of the obligations violated by the American measure. The Appellate Body 
stated, ‘While Article XX was not modified in the Uruguay Round, the preamble attached 
to the WTO Agreement shows that the signatories to that Agreement were, in 1994, fully 
aware of the importance and legitimacy of environmental protection as a goal of national 
and international policy.’79 The Appellate Body therefore interpreted Article XX(g) in the 
context of contemporary concerns about environmental protection, as reflected in modern 
international conventions and declarations that address environme ntal issues.  
 
In Shrimp II, the panel appeared uncertain as to the meaning of Article 31(3)(b) of the 
Vienna Convention : 
Insofar as [the 1996 Report of the CTE] can be deemed to embody the opinion of the WTO 
Members, it could be argued that it records evidence of ‘subsequent practice in the application of 
                                                                                                                                            
Vol II, 813. The Spanish version uses the term ‘de conformidad con el objetivo…’. The French version 
uses the term ‘conformement a l’objectif…’. 
79 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, 
AB-1998-4 (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body), para 129. 
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the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation’…and as such 
should be taken into account in the interpretation of the provisions concerned. However, even if it 
is not to be considered as evidence of a subsequent practice, it remains the expression of a 
common opinion of Members and is therefore relevant in assessing the scope of the chapeau of 
Article XX.80  
 
In Tuna II, the panel adopted the view that other international agreements could not be 
taken into account in interpreting the provisions of GATT, because they were, 
not concluded among the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement, and …did not apply to the 
interpretation of the General Agreement or the application of its provisions…practice under [the 
other treaties] could not be taken as practice under the General Agreement, and therefore could not 
affect the interpretation of it.81 
 
However, the panel in Shrimp II adopted a different view: 
the Appellate Body, like the Original Panel, referred to a number of international agreements, 
many of which have been ratified or otherwise accepted by the parties to this dispute. Article 
31.3(c) of the Vienna Convention provides that…there shall be taken into account, together with 
the context, ‘any relevant rule of international law applicable to the relations between the parties’. 
We note that, with the exception of the Bonn Convention…Malaysia and the United States have 
accepted or are committed to comply with all of the international instruments referred to by the 
Appellate Body in paragraph 168 of its Report.82 
 
WTO law forms part of the general body of international law. The opinions of the WTO 
judiciary influence the development of international law. Thus, other sources of 
international law need to be taken into account in interpreting WTO provisions. The 
                                                
80 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 by 
Malaysia, WTO Doc WT/DS58/RW (2001) (Report of the Panel), para 5.56. While perhaps not directly 
applicable to the views expressed in the Report of the CTE, Howse argues that the ‘insider view’ (that is, 
the views of trade experts at the WTO) regarding the permissibility of unilateral measures under Article XX 
would not qualify as an ‘agreement’ within the meaning of Vienna Convention art 31. However, his 
argument is based on the consistent view to the contrary taken by the United States in the Tuna  cases, 
coupled with the fact that these rulings were never adopted by the GATT parties. See Robert Howse, ‘The 
Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal Baseline for the Trade and Environment 
Debate’ (2002) 27 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 491, 518-519. In other words, the consistency 
of American legal arguments, together with consistent American opposition to the adoption of GATT 
reports that contradicted them, provides evidence that there was no agreement among GATT parties 
regarding the interpretation of Article XX on this issue. 
81 United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc DS29/R (1994) 33 ILM 839 (Report by the 
Panel not Adopted), para 5.19. 
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WTO judiciary has accepted this state of affairs. However, the WTO judiciary has been 
sporadic in its consideration of other sources of international law. In subsequent chapters, 
I will argue that the WTO judiciary needs to consider the relevant rules of international 
law on a more systematic basis, in order to promote greater coherence between WTO law 
and other branches of international law. Promoting coherence now will prevent future 
conflicts between WTO law and other sources of international law. 
 
D. Conflicts between Treaties 
Neither GATT nor the WTO Agreement contain a conflicts clause that expressly 
determines whether GATT or MEA obligations prevail in the event of a conflict. Indeed, 
there is no general conflicts clause that determines the relationship between WTO law 
and the rest of international law. Thus, conflicts must be resolved either through 
reference to conflicts clauses in MEAs and other treaties or the general rules of 
international law regarding conflicts between treaties. Customary international law is 
binding on all WTO parties, but treaties can only bind their parties.83 
 
In general international law, where there is no conflicts clause that determines which 
treaty prevails in case of a conflict, there is a presumption that the later treaty prevails 
over an earlier treaty on the same subject.84 The presumption flows from the idea that the 
                                                                                                                                            
82 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 by 
Malaysia, WTO Doc WT/DS58/RW (2001) (Report of the Panel), para 5.57. 
83 See Pauwelyn, above n 19, 544, citing the maxim pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt . Also see 
discussion in Chapter 3. 
84 See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (3rd ed, 1979), 603, where the author states, 
‘...it is to be presumed that a later treaty prevails over an earlier treaty concerning the same subject 
matter...’. See McNair, above n 57, 219: ‘Where the parties to the two treaties said to be in conflict are the 
same,...[i]f the provisions of the earlier one are general and those of the later one are special and detailed, 
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countries would be aware of the earlier treaty when they created the later treaty and that 
their intention would therefore be to have the later treaty take precedence in the event of 
any inconsistency. However, another presumption is that the more specific treaty is 
intended to prevail over the more general one.85 Both presumptions are simply methods 
of determining the intention of the parties to a treaty. 
 
The presumption that the later treaty prevails does not work well in the modern 
multilateral context for two reasons. First, the relevant date for each State is the da te it 
consented to be bound by the treaty. 86 This is problematic where new States accede on an 
ongoing basis, since the determination of which treaties prevail will vary from one State 
to the next depending on their date of accession. For example, both the WTO and CITES 
continue to add new members. Second, the content of the rules of many multilateral 
treaties continues to evolve over time.87 For example, the WTO uses waivers, formal 
decisions and amendments to alter obligations, such as TRIPS obligations on patents.88 
                                                                                                                                            
that fact is some indication that the parties intended the special one to prevail.’ See McNair, ibid 218, note 
2, where the author cites Phillimore, vol. ii, xcviii(6): ‘...if a collision happened between two Treaties 
concluded between two different contracting parties, the more ancient one must be executed, because it was 
not within the competence of the party promising, to act in derogation of his antecedent obligations to 
another.’ 
85 See McNair, above n 57, 219: ‘[where] one treaty contains general provisions and the other special 
provisions in pari materia,...the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant comes into play - that is to say, 
‘the specific prevails over the general’.  
86 See Pauwelyn, above n 19, 546. 
87 Ibid. 
88 For example, least-developed countries agreed to implement patent protection for pharmaceuticals in 
2006, but this date was extended to 2016. See Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health , 14 
November 2001, WTO Doc WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 20 November 2001, <http://www.wto.org> at 30 
November 2001 and Least-developed country members — obligations under article 70.9 of the trips 
agreement with respect to pharmaceutical products, Waiver submitted to the WTO General Council for 
approval on 8 July 2002, <http://www.wto.org> at 10 September 2003. The WTO members also decided to 
amend art 31 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures , 15 April 1994, Final Act 
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —
Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 1A, 33 ILM 1197 (1994), in order to permit compulsory licenses to 
be issued on pharmaceuticals for export to countries that lack manufacturing capacity. See Decision of 30 
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Pauwelyn uses the term ‘continuing treaties’ to refer to such treaties where the 
appropriate date of acceptance of treaty obligations is difficult to determine. He argues 
persuasively that when continuing treaty norms are involved, applying the later -in-time 
rule may not make sense and could lead to arbitrary solutions.89 
 
Of course, treaties may be interpreted so as to avoid conflicts. For example, the broad 
language of Article XX provides a way to avoid conflicts between GATT and other 
branches of international law. 90 
 
With respect to the relationship between different WTO agreements, the practice of the 
Appellate Body suggests that where two agreements apply simultaneously, a panel should 
normally consider the more specific agreement before the more general agreement.91  
However, where there is a conflict between the WTO Agreement and a Multilateral Trade 
Agreement, the former prevails.92 The sequence of analysis of provisions within one 
agreement is also important, since an improper sequence may be considered an error of 
                                                                                                                                            
August 2003, Implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health, WTO Doc IP/C/W/405, <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm> at 10 
September 2003. 
89 See Pauwelyn, above n 19, 546. 
90 Pauwelyn also make this point. See ibid, 550. 
91 In European Communities—Trade Description of Sardines, WTO Doc WT/DS231/R (2002) (Report of 
the Panel), para 7.15 the panel followed the practice set out by the Appellate Body in European 
Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, which stated that the panel 
‘should’ have applied the Licensing Agreement first because this agreement deals ‘specifically, and in 
detail’ with the administration of import licensing procedures. The Appellate Body noted that if the panel 
had examined the measure under the Licensing Agreement  first, there would have been no need to address 
the alleged inconsistency with Article X:3 of the GATT 1994. See European Communities—Regime for the 
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WTO Doc WT/DS27/AB/R (1997) (Report of the 
Appellate Body), para 204. 
92 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying 
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —Results of the 
Uruguay Round, 33 ILM 1125 (1994), art XVI:3. 
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law.93 However, the sequence need not follow the order of appearance of provisions in a 
particular agreement. Rather, the correct sequence is based on logic and whether a 
different sequence would produce a different result.94 
 
The content of MEAs and the practice of parties to them should influence the 
interpretation of both the jurisdiction of the WTO over matters covered in the MEA (a 
choice of forum issue) and the interpretation of WTO obligations. The practice of 
signatories to CITES has been to address the issue of trade bans imposed by CITES 
within the CITES framework, not the WTO. For example, CITES imposes a ban on trade 
in elephant ivory. Four African nations with healthy elephant populations have sought to 
have the ban lifted to allow them to sell stockpiles of ivory. 95 Even though these nations 
are members of the WTO, they have not sought recourse before the WTO where they 
                                                
93 In United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, 
AB-1998-4 (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body), for example, the Appellate Body considered the 
sequence of analysis important in examining whether the American measure was justifiable under Article 
XX of the GATT 1994.  It held that the panel erred by looking at the chapeau of Article XX and then 
subsequently examining whether the American measure was covered by the terms of Article XX(b) or (g) 
because ‘[t]he task of interpreting the chapeau so as to prevent the abuse or misuse of the specific 
exemptions provided for in Article XX is rendered very difficult, if indeed it remains possible at all, where 
the interpreter … has not first identified and examined the specific exception threatened with abuse’. At 
para 120. See also European Communities—Trade Description of Sardines, WTO Doc WT/DS231/R 
(2002) (Report of the Panel) , para 7.17 and United States—Tax Treatment for ‘Foreign Sales 
Corporations’, WTO Doc WT/DS108/AB/R (2000) (Report of the Appellate Body), para 89. 
94 See for example European Communities—Trade Description of Sardines, WTO Doc WT/DS231/R 
(2002) (Report of the Panel) , para 7.19, where the panel decided to analyze the Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade , 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations, Legal Instrume nts—Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 1A, 33 ILM 1197 (1994) in 
the following order: art 2.4, 2.2, 2.1 and then art III:4 of the GATT 1994. 
95 Alanna Mitchell, ‘Proposed ivory sale may harm elephants’, <http://www.globeandmail.com> (Toronto), 
at 18 June 2002. Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe applied for a change in the rules at the 
convention secretariat in Geneva. The request to bring back a limited ivory trade was scheduled for 
consideration at a two-week conference of CITES in Chile in November 2002. 
 
 
 
 
 38 
might challenge the ban as a violation of GATT Article XI. Indeed, in the thirty years 
since CITES was opened for signature, none of its trade provisions have been challenged 
as inconsistent with either GATT or WTO obligations. A reasonable interpretation is that 
the States that are parties to both CITES and GATT intended the more specific trade 
obligations of CITES to prevail over the more general GATT obligation in Article XI. 
 
Moreover, the practice of resolving differences regarding the application of CITES trade 
restrictions under CITES, and not seeking such decisions at the WTO or GATT, suggests 
that a proper interpretation of the decision-making authority granted to the WTO is that it 
does not include jurisdiction to resolve conflicts between parties to CITES regarding 
matters addressed in that MEA. 
 
Support for the view that MEA provisions can influence the interpretation of WTO 
obligations under Vienna Convention Article 31(3)(c) can be found in the decision of the 
Appellate Body in Shrimp I. The Appellate Body applied definitions of natural resources 
found in a variety of MEAs to the interpretation of the term ‘exhaustible natural 
resources’ in GATT Article XX(g) to include living resources.96 Moreover, the finding 
that the five species of turtle at issue were ‘exhaustible’ was based on the fact that they 
had been listed in CITES Appendix I, which includes ‘all species threatened with 
extinction which are or may be affected by trade’.97 
 
                                                
96 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, 
AB-1998-4 (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body), 46-51. 
97 Ibid, para 130. 
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Further support for the view that MEA provisions form part of the rules of international 
law that apply to the interpretation of WTO provisions is found in the statement of the 
ICJ that, ‘…an international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the 
framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation.’98 
 
However, the effect of other rules of international law on the interpretation of WTO 
provisions will depend on whether the other rules are binding on all WTO members (for 
example rules that reflect customary international law) or the parties to the dispute (as in 
Shrimp II). Thus, it is not possible to say that all non-WTO sources of international law 
must be taken into account in the interpretation of WTO agreements. 99  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
The foregoing discussion highlights the need for further analysis to define the 
relationship between specific WTO rules and other rules of international law. The 
purpose of this thesis is to conduct this analysis with respect to key GATT obligations 
and exceptions and the general principles of international environmental law and general 
international law. 
 
Chapter 2 will review WTO jurisprudence and analyse the scope of the relevant GATT 
rules: Articles I, III, XI and XX. Chapter 3 will analyse the consistency of MEA and 
unilateral environmental trade measures with GATT rules, principles of international 
                                                
98 Namibia (Legal Consequences)  (Advisory Opinion) [1971] ICJ Rep 31. 
99 See generally, Pauwelyn, above n 19. 
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environmental law and the jurisdictional competence of States. Chapter 4 will analyse the 
consistency of the Shrimp rulings with the international legal principles of sovereign 
equality, non-intervention, and necessity. Chapter 5 will analyse whether and how the 
ambiguity in Article XX should be resolved in light of its role with respect to the 
‘constitutional’ division of authority between national governments and the WTO and the 
ability of Article XX to facilitate evolutionary coherence between different branches of 
international law. 
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Chapter 2 
The Evolution of GATT Obligations and Exceptions 
 
I. Introduction 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the balance between trade and environment in the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (‘GATT’)1 and the Final Act Embodying the 
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (‘WTO Agreements’).2 
It reviews the relationship between key substantive obligations with respect to trade and 
key exceptions for environmental measures in GATT and WTO jurisprudence. It traces 
the evolution of interpretations of the key GATT obligations and exceptions in GATT 
1947 and GATT 19943 and identifies outstanding interpretative issues that have yet to be 
resolved.  
 
                                                
1 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 
Annex 1A, 33 ILM 1197 (1994). In this chapter, the analysis of the applicability of article XX to the 
environment at pp 34-36 and the analysis of Canada—Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring 
and Salmon, GATT BISD, 35th Supp, 98, GATT Doc 35S/98 (1988)  (Report of the Panel Adopted 22 
March 1988) and In the Matter of Canada’s Landing Requirement for Pacific Coast Salmon and Herring, 2 
Canadian Trade and Commodity Tax Cases 7162 (Final Report of the FTA Panel 16 October 1989) at pp 
61-68 closely follow Bradly J Condon, Making Environmental Protection Trade Friendly Under the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (unpublished LL M thesis, University of Calgary, 1993). 
2 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying 
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —Results of the 
Uruguay Round, Annex 1A, 33 ILM 1125 (1994). 
3 GATT 1994 consists of the provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade dated 30 October 
1947, annexed to the Final Act Adopted at the Conclusion of the Second Session of the Preparatory 
Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment (excluding the Protocol of 
Provisional Application), as amended by the legal instruments which have entered into force before the date 
of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. See GATT 1994, art 1. The substantive obligations and 
exceptions discussed in this chapter are essentially the same in both GATT 1947 and GATT 1994. 
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Where a panel report is adopted and results in the disputing parties conforming their 
practice to the conclusions and findings of the report, this provides evidence of practice 
establishing agreement regarding interpretation under the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties (‘Vienna Convention’).4 Where later panels follow prior panel interpretations 
on the same issue, this provides further evidence of practice. It is difficult to resolve the 
issue of what constitutes sufficient practice under the Vienna Convention.5 Nevertheless, 
where a consistent approach to interpretation emerges over several years and several 
cases, it is likely that future panels and the Appellate Body will continue to apply the 
same interpretation. For this reason it is important to identify interpretative trends. 
 
The adequacy of the GATT in general regarding environmental protection is a matter of 
debate, which often depends on one’s perspective on the role that trade measures should 
play in environmental protection. For example, a 1992 GATT study concluded:  
GATT rules do not prevent governments adopting efficient policies to safeguard their own 
domestic environment, nor are the rules likely to block regional or global policies which command 
                                                
4 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered 
into force 27 January 1980), art 59. 
5 See John Jackson, The Jurisprudence of GATT and the WTO: Insights on Treaty Law and Economic 
Relations (2000), 129. He also argued that the Council adoption of a panel report could be viewed as the 
equivalent of a resolution or decision by the Contracting Parties definitively interpreting the GATT, but 
doubted that this was the intention of adoption. Jackson notes in another article that the practice of GATT 
parties was to treat adopted panel reports as binding on the parties, but not unadopted reports. The changes 
to WTO decision-making procedures introduced in the Uruguay Round do not state the legal effect of a 
panel report as clearly as the Statute of the International Court of Justice, art 59, but nevertheless indicates 
that the panel decisions are binding on the parties. See Jackson, Jurisprudence, 165. The introduction of 
formal mechanisms for interpretation and amendment under WTO, combined with automatic adoption of 
panel and Appellate Body reports, will likely affect the legal impact of panel interpretations in terms of 
constituting practice under the Vienna Convention. These mechanisms are discussed in Chapter 5 of this 
thesis and in Jackson, at 168. With respect to unadopted GATT reports, the Appellate Body takes the view 
that they may offer guidance, but there is no legal requirement to take them into account in WTO cases. See 
European Communities – Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment , WTO Doc 
WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R, WT/DS68/AB/R (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body) and Japan – 
Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO Doc WT/DS8/10/11/AB/R (1996) (Report of the Appellate Body). 
Also see Robert Howse, ‘The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal Baseline 
for the Trade and Environment Debate’ (2002) 27 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 491, 516. 
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broad support within the world community. At the same time, trade measures are seldom likely to 
be the best way to secure environmental objectives and, indeed, could be counter-productive.6  
 
In 1999, a WTO study reiterated that trade barriers are a poor policy instrument to use to 
pursue environmental goals. However, the study notes:  
[G]overnments have found trade measures a useful mechanism for encouraging participation in 
and enforcement of multilateral environmental agreements in some instances, and for attempting 
to modify the behaviour of foreign governments in others. The use of trade barriers in this way is 
fraught with risks for the multilateral trading system, unless trade policy is used in this manner on 
the basis of prior commitments and agreements among governments as to their obligations in the 
field of environmental policy.7 
 
In United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products , (‘Shrimp 
I’),8 the United States banned imports of shrimp from several countries on the grounds 
that they did not provide adequate safeguards to ensure that sea turtles were not killed in 
the process of catching shrimp. The Shrimp I panel developed a new test to apply in the 
analysis of GATT Article XX exceptions that reflected the policy concerns expressed in 
the 1999 WTO report, finding that measures which ‘undermine the multilateral trading 
system’ cannot be permitted under Article XX.9 The Appellate Body overturned this 
attempt to formulate a new doctrine, based on interpretative principles: 
[T]he Panel did not look into the object and purpose of the chapeau of Article XX . Rather, the 
Panel looked into the object and purpose of the whole of GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement, 
which…it described in an overly broad manner….Maintaining, rather than undermining, the 
multilateral trading system is necessarily a fundamental and pervasive premise underlying the 
WTO Agreement; but it is not a right or an obligation, nor is it an interpretative rule which can be 
                                                
6 GATT Secretariat, ‘Expanding trade can help solve environmental problems, says report’ Press Release, 
in GATT, Trade and the Environment (1992) [hereinafter GATT Report]. 
7 Hakan Nordstrom and Scott Vaughan, WTO Special Studies, Trade and Environment (1999), 3. For a 
review of the report, see Steve Charnovitz, ‘World Trade and the Environment: A Review of the New 
WTO Report’ (2000) 12 Georgetown International Law Review 523. 
8 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc WT/DS58 (1998) 
(Report of the Panel), WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, AB-1998-4 (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body). 
9 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc WT/DS58 (1998) 
(Report of the Panel), para 7.44-7.62. 
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employed in the appraisal of a given measure under the chapeau of Article XX. (emphasis in 
original)10 
 
Thus, the Appellate Body clearly rejected the philosophical approach to GATT 
interpretation that had found expression in similar cases under GATT 1947. In United 
States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna , GATT panels in 1991 (‘Tuna I’) and 1994 
(‘Tuna II’) rejected American import bans on tuna imports where the tuna was caught in 
a manner harmful to dolphins.11 In both instances, the panels reasoned that allowing the 
American measures would undermine the multilateral trading system. 12 While neither 
panel report was adopted by the GATT, the decisions had a significant impact on the 
trade and environment debate.13 The reasoning of the Appellate Body in Shrimp I was 
                                                
10 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,  WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, 
AB-1998-4 (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body), para 116. 
11 See United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD, 39th Supp, 155, GATT Doc DS21/R 
(1991) (Report by the Panel not Adopted) and United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc 
DS29/R (1994) (Report by the Panel not Adopted). These rulings were never adopted by the GATT due to 
the opposition of the United States. Under the dispute settlement system of the GATT, adoption of panel 
reports required consensus, effectively providing a veto on adoption. 
12 See United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD, 39th Supp, 155, GATT Doc DS21/R 
(1991) (Report by the Panel not Adopted), 46 and United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT 
Doc DS29/R (1994) (Report by the Panel not Adopted), para 5.26. The argument that basing trade 
restrictions on the importing country’s assessment of the exporter’s policies would open a Pandora’s box of 
trade barriers has been described as a ‘slippery slope’ argument by John Jackson. See John Jackson, ‘The 
Limits of International Trade: Workers’ Protection, the Environment and Other Human Rights’ (2000) 94 
American Society of International Law Proceedings 222, 224. Howse argues that reading this into the text 
of art XX in WTO dispute resolution would amount to adding to obligations or diminishing rights of WTO 
members and thus run counter to DSU art 3.2. See Howse, above n 5, 517-518. 
13 See, for example, Ted McDorman, ‘The GATT Consistency o f U.S. Fish Import Embargoes to Stop 
Driftnet Fishing and Save Whales, Dolphins and Turtles’ (1991) 24 George Washington Journal of 
International Law and Economics 477; K Holland, ‘ Exploitation on Porpoise: The Use of Purse Seine Nets 
by Commercial Tuna Fishermen in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean’ (1991) 17 Syracuse Journal of 
International Law and Commerce 267; E Christensen and S Geffin, ‘GATT Sets its Net on Environmental 
Regulation: The GATT Panel Ruling on Mexican Yellowfin Tuna Imports and the Need for Reform of the 
International Trading System’ (1991) 23 Inter-American Law Review 569; Thomas J Schoenbaum, ‘Trade 
and Environment: Free International Trade and Protection of the Environment: Irreconcilable Conflict?’ 
(1992) 86 American Journal of International Law 700; Thomas E Skilton, ‘GATT and the Environment in 
Conflict: The Tuna-Dolphin Dispute and the Quest for an International Conservation Strategy’ (1993) 26 
Cornell International Law Journal  455; Daniel C Esty, Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment, and the 
Future (1994); Bradly J Condon, ‘NAFTA and the Environment: A Trade-Friendly Approach’ (1994) 14 
Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 528; Thomas J Schoenbaum, ‘International Trade 
and Protection of the Environment: The Continuing Search for Reconciliation’ (1997) 91 American Journal 
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more consistent with new provisions setting the parameters of the WTO dispute 
settlement system, which make it clear that panels and the Appellate Body are to clarify 
provisions, using the customary rules of treaty interpretation, rather than create 
obligations not found in the text of the agreements.14 
 
In 2001, Malaysia complained that the United States had failed to comply with the ruling 
in Shrimp I. In United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 by Malaysia (‘Shrimp II’), the Appellate Body pushed 
the envelope further.15 In their consideration of whether the United States had complied 
with the ruling in Shrimp I, both the original panel and the Appellate Body found that a 
unilaterally imposed import ban met the requirements of the Article XX(g) exception. 
Malaysia chose not to apply for American certification of its sea turtle protection 
program and not to participate in a regional agreement to protect sea turtles. The United 
States maintained its import ban on shrimp from Malaysia in order to pressure the 
Malaysian government into doing both. Chapter 3 will consider the implications of this 
decision for the permissibility of unilateral and multilateral trade measures to address 
international environmental problems. This chapter will consider this decision in the 
context of a series of GATT and WTO decisions in which the more general treatment of 
trade and environment has evolved. 
                                                                                                                                            
of International Law 268; Joseph. J Urgese, ‘Dolphin Protection and the Mammal Protection Act have Met 
Their Match: The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’ (1998) 31 Akron Law Review  457; Richard W 
Parker, ‘The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage to Protect the Global Commons: What We Can Learn from 
the Tuna-Dolphin Conflict’ (1999) 12 Georgetown International Law Review  1. 
14 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 15 April 1994, Final 
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments—
Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 2, 33 ILM 1197 (1994), art 3(2).  
 46 
 
The key GATT obligations that are typically contravened in trade and environment 
disputes are national treatment (Article III), most -favoured-nation treatment (Article I) 
and the general prohibition against trade restrictions (Article XI). Non-discrimination is a 
fundamental principle underlying the GATT, and other WTO agreements. GATT rules 
are concerned primarily with limiting the extent to which countries may discriminate 
between domestic products and imports, between imports from different countries, and 
between goods sold in the domestic market and those exported.16 Thus, if environmental 
measures do not discriminate between countries or between domestic and imported 
goods, they are less likely to violate the GATT. 
 
GATT Articles XX(b) and (g) are the key exceptions that encompass environmental 
measures. The Article XX preamble (referred to as the ‘chapeau’) makes these exceptions 
‘subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner that would 
constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’, implying that discrimination may be 
justified in certain circumstances. An environmental measure that violates GATT 
obligations may nevertheless be allowed to stand if it meets the conditions set out in these 
provisions. The WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade uses similar language in 
its non-discrimination obligations and environmental exceptions.17 However, it is beyond 
                                                                                                                                            
15 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,  WTO Doc WT/DS58 
(1998) (Report of the Panel), WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, AB-1998-4 (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body). 
16 GATT Report, above n 6, 7. 
17 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —Results of the Uruguay Round, 
Annex 1A, 33 ILM 1197 (1994). Other than in European Communities—Trade Description of Sardines, 
WTO Doc WT/DS231/R (2002) (Report of the Panel), WTO Doc WT/DS231/AB/R, AB-2002 -3 (2002) 
(Report of the Appellate Body), the substantive provisions of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
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the scope of this thesis to analyse these provisions of the Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade, since they require an analysis independent of the GATT analysis. 18 
 
II. Non-Discrimination 
 
This part considers the application of the principle of non-discrimination to 
environmental measures in the GATT. I first examine the most-favoured-nation and 
national treatment rules. I then discusses how the term ‘like products’ may restrict the 
range of environmental goals that may be pursued using trade measures. 
 
A. Most-Favoured-Nation and National Treatment 
 
Two key subsidiary principles flow from the principle of non-discrimination. The ‘most-
favoured-nation’ rule prohibits discrimination among nations who are party to the trade 
                                                                                                                                            
Trade have not been interpreted by either panels or the Appellate Body. The provisions of the Tokyo 
Round Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (the ‘Tokyo Round Standards Code’) which preceded the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade have also not been addressed by any panel. 
18 The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade is an extension of the GATT to a particular type of trade 
barrier. See European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, 
WTO Doc WT/DS135/AB/R (2001) (Report of the Appellate Body), para 80. While the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade uses similar principles and language, treaty terms must be interpreted in the 
context of the provision and agreement in which they are used, even where the language is identical. See 
European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WTO Doc 
WT/DS135/AB/R (2001) (Report of the Appellate Body), para 88, where the Appellate Body makes this 
point with respect to the term ‘like products’.  Moreover, they cannot be given an identical interpretation as 
the GATT equivalents since that would violate the principle that all treaty terms are to be interpreted so as 
not to be redundant. This principle has been applied by the Appellate Body. In United States—Standards 
for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc WT/DS2/AB/R, AB-1996-1 (1996) (Report of the 
Appellate Body), 23 the Appellate Body stated the principle in the following terms: ‘One of the corollaries 
of the ‘general rule of interpretation’ in the Vienna Convention  is that interpretation must give meaning and 
effect to all the terms of a treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing 
whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility.’ For example, the admonition against 
‘unnecessary’ obstacles to trade in the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade echoes the use of the 
term ‘necessary’ in GATT art XX. Had the drafters intended these terms to have the same effect, they could 
have incorporated GATT art XX into the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade by reference. Since 
they did not do so, and a lso chose different wording, interpretations of the term ‘necessary’ will not 
necessarily apply to the term ‘unnecessary’.  
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agreement.19 The ‘national treatment’ rule prohibits discrimination between domestic and 
imported goods that favours the former to the detriment of the latter.20  
 
Because it applies to domestic regulatory measures, the national treatment rule may call 
into question governmental measures that are not necessarily designed for the purpose of 
restricting imports. 21 The national treatment rule prohibits both explicit and implicit 
discrimination. It may thus be used to challenge regulations or taxes that prima facie 
appear to be non-discriminatory, but have the effect of placing imported products at a 
disadvantage. 22 
 
B. GATT: ‘Like Products’ (The Product-versus -Process Debate) 
 
GATT Articles I and III require MFN treatment and national treatment, respectively, for 
‘like products’. This phrase plays a central role in determining the basis upon which a 
                                                
19 GATT art I:1 states the MFN principle as follows: ‘...any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity 
granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be 
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of 
all other contracting parties.’ However, there are exceptions to this rule. For example, pursuant to GATT art 
XXIV, this rule does not prevent the formation of free-trade areas, which by their very nature, grant 
privileges to their members that are not extended to non-members.  
20 GATT art III:4 states the national treatment principle as follows: ‘The products of the territory of any 
contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no 
less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and 
requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.’ 
For a general discussion of national treatment in the context of GATT 1947, see John H Jackson, ‘National 
Treatment Obligations and Non-tariff Barriers’ (1989) 10 Michigan Journal of International Law 207 and, 
in the context of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, see Lobsters from Canada, 3 TCT 8182 
(Final Report of the FTA Panel 25 May 1990). 
21 Jackson, ibid 209. 
22 Jackson, ibid 212. A good example of such a measure is Ontario’s 10-cent tax on aluminum cans. While 
the tax applied equally to domestic and imported products, it placed American beer at a competitive 
disadvantage vis-à-vis Ontario beer because the forme r is packaged primarily in cans while the latter is sold 
mostly in bottles. Because of the tax, a case of 24 bottles sold for $26.40, while a case of 24 cans sold for 
$31.60. After the tax was introduced, canned beer sales dropped by more than 60%, while bottle sales 
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country may discriminate against imports. If two products are alike, they must be so 
treated. If they are not alike, they may then be treated differently. This raises the issue of 
whether products may be distinguished based solely on the physical characteristics of the 
product or whether they may also be distinguished based on the manner in which they 
were produced. That is, may products be treated differently because the production and 
processing methods (PPMs) used to make them are harmful to the environment? 
 
To what extent does the requirement to accord non-discriminatory treatment to ‘like 
products’ prohibit product differentiation based on environmental standards observed in 
the production or processing of the products? The term ‘like products’ appears to refer to 
the nature and properties of two competing although not identical products. But the 
expression ‘like product’ may have different meanings according to the context in which 
the term is used. Hence, product differentiations based on production processes (for 
example, health standards) may be GATT-inconsistent if they are ‘applied to imported or 
domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production’ (Article III:1,2,5), to 
discriminate in favour of certain supplier countries (Article I), or to unduly interfere in 
foreign regulatory systems by making most-favoured-nation treatment subject to 
conditions (Article I). But they may be consistent with GATT rules (Article III) if they 
are applied as non-discriminatory production or consumption standards with a view to 
protecting health and environmental resources in the importing country. 23 In the trade and 
                                                                                                                                            
increased marginally over the same period. See S Feschuk, ‘Can the tax, Alcan urges’, Globe and Mail 
(Toronto), 12 November 1992, B3. 
23 E-U Petersmann, ‘Trade Policy, Environmental policy and the GATT: Why Trade Rules and 
Environmental Rules Should Be Mutually Consistent’ (1991) 46 Aussenwirtschaft  197, 216. John Jackson 
has argued that the GATT focuses on the product, not the production process. If a production process in an 
exporting nation causes cross-border pollution in an importing nation, he suggested the parties may use a 
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environment debate, the focus has thus been on the correct interpretation of Article III, 
which will be the focus of this section.  
 
The GATT 1947 term in Article III:4 was interpreted in United States - Restrictions on 
Imports of Tuna to prohibit discrimination based on PPMs and to allow discrimination 
based only on the characteristics of the products themselves.24 While this interpretation 
reflected conventional wisdom, some commentators have argued that adequate 
environmental protection requires that countries be able to distinguish between products 
based on the environmental impact of both the product and its production method. 25  
 
However, GATT Article III requires that like products be granted unconditional market 
access, which may imply that non-discriminatory access to the importing nation’s market 
can not be made conditional upon the exporting country's environmental policies.26  
Environmental policies might take differences in the environmental impact of products 
and their production processes into account. A key issue is whether the term ‘like 
                                                                                                                                            
bilateral or multilateral treaty to deal with the problem. See John Jackson, The World Trading System: Law 
and Policy of International Economic Relations (1989), 208-209. However, following the Appellate Body 
ruling in Shrimp I, Jackson modified his view, stating, ‘the product-process distinction will probably not 
survive and perhaps should not survive’. See John Jackson, ‘The Limits of International Trade: Workers’ 
Protection, the Environment and Other Human Rights’ above n 12, 224. 
24 United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD, 39th Supp, 155, GATT Doc DS21/R 
(1991) (Report by the Panel not Adopted).  
25 For example, Patterson argued that environmental impact should be a relevant factor in defining 
‘likeness’ so that countries will be able to impose standards on products based on environmentally harmful 
characteristics of their production process. See E Patterson, ‘International trade and the environment: 
institutional solutions’ (1991) 21 Environmental Law Reporter 10599, 10600. She cited as an example a 
1950s French internal tax that applied only to automobiles of large horsepower, which turned out to be 
almost exclusively American-made. The subsequent dispute was resolved by negotiation between the 
United States and France. At n 14.  
26 F Roessler, The Rules of the GATT and Environmental Policies, mimeo cited in Petersmann, above n 23, 
210, note 1. 
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products’ permits the environmental impact of a product outside the importing nation to 
determine ‘likeness’.27   
 
In Tuna I, the United States banned imports of Mexican tuna products on the grounds that 
Mexican fishing techniques killed more dolphins than United States fishing techniques. 
The GATT panel held that the national treatment obligation in Article III:4 requires the 
importing nation to treat like products the same irrespective of differences in production 
methods. The term ‘like products’ did not apply to production processes, but rather to 
products as such. It therefore did not permit differentiation between products based on 
production processes that had no effect on the quality of the product. The panel stated in 
this regard, that: 
Article III:4 calls for a comparison of the treatment of imported tuna as a product with that of 
domestic tuna as a product. Regulations governing the taking of dolphins incidental to the taking of 
tuna could not possibly affect tuna as a product. Article III:4 therefore obliges the United States to 
accord treatment to Mexican tuna no less favourable than that accorded to United States tuna, whether 
or not the incidental taking of dolphins by Mexican vessels corresponds to that of United States 
vessels.28 
 
Under the Tuna I interpretation, which was never adopted by the GATT parties, 
production processes could only be taken into account if they alter the environmental 
impact or safety of the product itself. Following this line of reasoning, the environmental 
impact of production processes on the environment outside the importing nation is 
irrelevant to the determination of whether products are alike. An importing country may 
protect its own environment, but has no say in how the exporting country protects its own 
environment or the global commons. Consequently, domestic regulations could not 
                                                
27 Petersmann, above n 23, 210. 
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discriminate against imported goods based on processing methods that do not have a 
domestic environmental impact. However, policies that discriminate between goods on 
the basis of their environmental impact without regard to the country of origin, and that 
do not have the effect of placing imports at a competitive disadvantage, would not violate 
the principle of non-discriminatory treatment.  
 
The argument against trade restrictions based on processing methods is rooted in the 
principle of non-discrimination. The principle of non-discrimination permits an importing 
nation to distinguish between similar goods on the basis of their environmental impact in 
the importing nation’s territory. However, because it prohibits discrimination based on 
the product’s country of origin, it may be interpreted to prohibit discrimination based on 
the environmental impact of production processes in the territory of the exporting nation. 
On this view, the domestic environmental standards of the exporting nation are irrelevant 
to the issue of whether two products are alike, and cannot justify discrimination against 
that country’s products. However, this view has now been challenged in WTO 
jurisprudence29 and in the academic literature.30  
                                                                                                                                            
28 United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD, 39th Supp, 155, GATT Doc DS21/R 
(1991) (Report by the Panel not Adopted), 41.  
29 See European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WTO 
Doc WT/DS135/R (2000) (Report of the Panel); WTO Doc WT/DS135/AB/R (2001) (Report of the 
Appellate Body), United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc 
WT/DS58 (1998) (Report of the Panel), WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, AB-1998-4 (1998) (Report of the 
Appellate Body), and United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse 
to Article 21.5 by Malaysia, WTO Doc WT/DS58/RW (2001) (Report of the Panel); WTO Doc 
WT/DS58/AB/RW (2001) (Report of the Appellate Body). For a complete list of GATT and WTO cases 
addressing the term ‘like products’, see European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products, WTO Doc WT/DS135/AB/R (2001) (Report of the Appellate Body), 
footnote 58. 
30 See Howse, above n 5, 514-515; Robert Howse and Donald Regan, ‘The Product/Process Distinction – 
An Illusory Basis for Disciplining ‘Unilateralism’ in Trade Policy’ (2000) 11 European Journal of 
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1. Recent Jurisprudence 
 
In European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing 
Products (‘Asbestos ’), Canada challenged a French ban on imports of asbestos 
products. 31 The Appellate Body held that the interpretation of ‘likeness’ is different in 
Articles III:2 and III:4.32 The general principle in Article III:1, that internal measures 
‘should not be applied to imported and domestic products so as to afford protection to 
domestic production’, informs the interpretation of both provisions.33 Thus, in Article 
III:4, the term applies to products that are in a competitive relationship.34 The Appellate 
Body has adopted a framework of four criteria to assess evidence that indicates whether 
products are in a competitive relationship that would lead to the conclusion that they are 
like products: 
(i) the physical properties, nature and quality of the products; 
(ii) the extent to which they may serve the same or similar end-uses ; 
(iii) the extent to which consumers perceive and treat the products as 
alternative means of satisfying a want or demand; and  
(iv) the international tariff classification of the products.35 
 
                                                                                                                                            
International Law 249; Patterson, above n 25; John Jackson, ‘The Limits of International Trade: Workers’ 
Protection, the Environment and Other Human Rights’, above n 12.  
31 European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WTO Doc 
WT/DS135/AB/R (2001) (Report of the Appellate Body).  
32 Ibid paras 94-100. 
33 Ibid paras 97-98. 
34 Ibid para 99. 
35 Ibid para 101. 
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All four criteria must be examined before reaching a conclusion as to likeness. 36 The 
source of the first three criteria is the Working Party Report on Border Tax 
Adjustments,37 while the fourth was added by subsequent panels.38 Other criteria may be 
added in the future.39 The range of evidence that will be considered in determining 
likeness has thus expanded since the ruling in Tuna I. As a result, processing methods 
such as the impact of fishing methods on dolphin mortality might now be taken into 
account in determining likeness, under the third criteria, if there is evidence of consumer 
perception and behaviour to support this.40 Nevertheless, the conclusion would likely 
remain the same, since dolphin-friendly and dolphin-unfriendly tuna would likely be 
found to be like products under the other three criteria. The physical qualities of the 
product are the same and the end-use is the same regardless of how the tuna is caught. 
The tariff classification of tuna is based on the type of tuna, not how it is caught.41  
 
In Shrimp I, the measure at issue was remarkably similar in nature to the measures at 
issue in the Tuna cases. In the Shrimp cases, the parties to the dispute did not argue that 
turtle-friendly and turtle-unfriendly shrimp were not like products under GATT Article 
                                                
36 Ibid para 109. 
37 Working Party Report on Border Tax Adjustments , Adopted 2 December 1970, BISD 18S/97. 
38 See, for example, EEC – Measures on Animal Feed Proteins, BISD 25S/49, (Report of the Panel adopted 
14 March 1978), para 4.2 and Japan – Customs Duties, Taxes and Labelling Practices on Imported Wines 
and Alcoholic Beverages, BISD 34S/83 (Report of the Panel adopted 10 November 1987), para 5.6, in 
addition to European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, 
WTO Doc WT/DS135/AB/R (2001) (Report of the Appellate Body), para 101. 
39 In European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WTO Doc 
WT/DS135/AB/R (2001) (Report of the Appellate Body), para 102, the Appellate Body noted, ‘These 
criteria are…simply tools to assist in the task of sorting and examining the relevant evidence. They are 
neither treaty mandated nor a closed list of criteria that will determine the legal characterization of a 
product.’ 
40 Howse also makes this point. See Howse, above n 5. 
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III. Rather, the United States conceded that the shrimp embargo violated GATT Article 
XI and focussed its arguments on whether the measure was justifiable under Article XX. 
On the facts of the case, this was the correct approach to take, since the analysis 
employed in the Asbestos case would result in a ruling that they are like products under 
the first, second and fourth criteria. Thus, even if they could be proved not to be like 
products under the third criteria (consumer tastes), the balance of evidence would weigh 
against such a conclusion. Moreover, it would be difficult to prove that consumer tastes 
treat the two as unlike products, since many consumers (perhaps a majority) would make 
their product selection based on price rather than environmental impact. Indeed, were this 
not the case, a consumer labelling requirement (stating which product was turtle-friendly) 
would be sufficient and an import ban would be unnecessary. 
 
In the Asbestos case, the Appellate Body decided that the health risks associated with 
asbestos could be evaluated under the first (physical properties) and third (consumers’ 
tastes) criteria. The physical properties of asbestos fibres that made them carcinogenic 
were likely to influence its competitive relationship with other produc ts in the market 
place. Moreover, the health risks associated with asbestos fibres would influence 
consumers’ behaviour. The Appellate Body held that Canada had not met the burden of 
proving that asbestos fibres and the French product (PCG fibres, a non-carcinogenic, 
artificial substitute for asbestos) were like products, reversing the panel’s conclusion on 
this issue. These facts are very different from the facts in the Tuna and Shrimp cases. The 
                                                                                                                                            
41 For example, in Canada’s implementation of the Harmonized System, yellow fin tunas carry the tariff 
classification number 0303.42.00. See <http://www.ccra-
adrc.gc.ca/customs/general/publications/tariff2003/chap03ne.pdf> at 22 September 2003. 
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method of processing and producing asbestos was not at issue , but rather the physical 
properties of the product itself. Moreover, the physical properties of the product would 
influence consumer behaviour, rather than the consumer’s reaction to the method of 
production. 
 
In a key aspect of the ruling, the Appellate Body overruled the panel’s interpretation of 
the relationship between Article III:4 and Article XX(b): 
We do not agree with the Panel that considering evidence relating to the health risks associated 
with a product, under Article III:4, nullifies the effect of Article XX(b) of the GATT 
1994….Article III:4 and Article XX(b) are distinct and independent provisions…each to be 
interpreted on its own. The scope and meaning of Article III:4 should not be broadened or 
restricted beyond what is required by the normal customary international law rules of treaty 
interpretation, simply because Article XX(b) exists and may be available to justify measures 
inconsistent with Article III:4. The fact that the interpretation of Article III:4, under those rules, 
implies a less frequent recourse to Article XX(b) does not deprive the exception in Article XX(b) 
of effet utile. Article XX(b) would only be deprived of effet utile  if that provision could not  serve 
to allow a Member to ‘adopt and enforce’ measures ‘necessary to protect human…life or 
health’….[D]ifferent inquiries occur under these two very different Articles. Under Article III:4, 
evidence relating to health risk may be relevant in assessing the competitive relationship in the 
marketplace between allegedly ‘like’ products. The same, or similar, evidence serves a different 
purpose under Article XX(b), namely, that of assessing whether a Member has a sufficient basis 
for ‘adopting or enforcing’ a WTO-inconsistent measure on the grounds of human health.42 
(emphasis in original) 
 
This approach to defining the relationship between substantive GATT obligations and 
exceptions makes sense. The particular facts in any given case can be analysed both to 
determine whether a substantive obligation has been breached and, if so, whether the 
breach may be excused under an exception to the obligation. However, two important 
issues remain. Should PPM-based trade measures pass the test under Article III:4 and is 
there only one appropriate analytical procedure to follow with respect to the analysis of 
PPM-based trade measures? 
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2. The Academic Debate 
 
In the academic literature, there are essentially two opposing views on how to address 
trade restrictions that are based on PPMs. Howse and Regan argue that the GATT 
consistency of PPM-based me asures should be based on an analysis of discrimination 
effects under Article III:4, rather than an analysis under GATT Article XI and XX.43 
They argue that PPM-based measures are governed by Article III:4 because they are 
regulations affecting the internal sale of products, even when they take the form of import 
prohibitions. Sanford Gaines argues that measures that prevent goods from entering the 
market are covered by Article XI (which governs measures affecting ‘importation’), not 
                                                                                                                                            
42 European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WTO Doc 
WT/DS135/AB/R (2001) (Report of the Appellate Body), para 115. 
43 Howse and Regan, above n 30. Howse pursued this argument further a few years later in another article. 
Howse interprets paragraph 121 of the Appellate Body report in Shrimp I as suggesting that the product 
versus process distinction is unlikely to hold up in future interpretations of art XX. He argues that the 
Appellate Body’s remarks (that art XX would be largely inutile unless it could be used to justify measures 
conditioned under other countries’ policies) support the view that process-based measures do not violate 
GATT obligations and that art XX is therefore not necessary to justify them (provided they are non-
discriminatory). For examp le, measures that condition market access on the method of production used, 
rather than the policies in the exporting country, would not violate non-discrimination obligations. In 
particular, Howse believes that the Appellate Body ruling in Asbestos supports the view that non-
discriminatory process -based measures are consistent with art III:4, based on their consideration of 
consumer preferences their interpretation of ‘like products’. Thus, while he notes that no single factor is 
dispositive, he finds this  particular factor to be significant with respect to the product/process issue. See 
Howse, above n 5. Howse argues as follows: ‘Perhaps of even greater significance in assessing whether the 
product/process distinction forms any real part of the WTO jurisprudence is the dictum of the AB in 
Asbestos that, even where two products are deemed to be ‘like’ for purposes of art III:4, they may still be 
treated differentially in regulation, provided that the result is treatment ‘no less favorable’ for the ‘group’ of 
imported products compared against the ‘group’ of like domestic products. Thus, arguendo, if a panel were 
to hold that turtle-friendly and turtle-unfriendly shrimp were ‘like’ products, it would still need to consider 
whether treating turtle-unfriendly shrimp differently would lead to less favorable treatment of imported 
shrimp as a group than domestic shrimp as a group. This would require a judgment as to whether, in 
singling out turtle-unfriendly shrimp, the regulatory scheme in its structure, design and operation, is 
systematically biased against imported shrimp as a group. A scheme that was even-handed between imports 
and domestic shrimp, and focused appropriately on conservation goals, might well pass this test.’ Howse, 
above n 5, 515. 
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Article III (which governs measures affecting ‘imported’ products).44 Gaines favours an 
analysis of the trade consistency of PPMs in Article XX, using  an OECD analysis of the 
relationship between trade rules and PPMs that categorizes PPMs based on the proximity 
of interest of the country taking the trade measure and the environmental resource be 
protected and the location of the targeted producers of the product.45 
 
One purpose of advocating an Article III:4 analysis of the kind of PPM-based trade 
measures used in the Tuna and Shrimp cases is to avoid the restrictive interpretation of 
Article XX that was taken in the Tuna cases. However, the interpretation of Article XX in 
the Shrimp cases lessens the need to remove the PPMs analysis from Article XX. 
Moreover, Article XX is the more appropriate place to decide the complex issues at stake 
in the trade and environment debate, not only with respect to trade law, but also with 
respect to public international law. 46 The analysis of the term like products in the 
Asbestos case does not support the view that the products in the Tuna and Shrimp cases 
                                                
44 Sanford E Gaines, ‘Processes and Production Methods: How to Produce Sound Policy for Environmental 
PPM-Based Trade Measures?’ (2002) 27 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 383. Gaines argues 
persuasively that, while one might argue ‘that keeping a product out of the market is an extreme form of a 
measure affecting sale. But that would make art XI superfluous.’ At 416. Moreover, he takes issue with the 
Howse and Regan reliance the Automobile Taxes case (interpreting art III:4 to cover measures that apply to 
manufacturers or importers that might adversely modify the conditions of competition between domestic 
and imported products on the internal market and not just to the products as such), noting that the foreign 
automobiles in question were allowed for sale in the United States, whereas most environmental PPM cases 
involve banning imports altogether. At 415. However, the coup de grace is his argument that the intention 
of the WTO members to not permit PPM-based trade measures under GATT, except under an art XX 
exception, is confirmed by the explicit reference in the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade to 
‘products and related processes and production methods’ and the absence of any corresponding amendment 
to art III in GATT 1994, given the prevailing view that such measures were not allowed under art III of 
GATT 1947. At 417-418. 
45 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Processes and Production Methods(PPMs): 
Conceptual Framework and Considerations on Use of PPM-based Trade Measures, OCDE/GD (97) 137 
(11 August 1997), <www.oecd.org>at 12 October 2003. 
46 I discuss these issues later in the thesis. 
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are not like products.47 At this point, the key question is therefore whether there are other 
types of PPM-based measures that are amenable to an Article III:4 analysis. In this 
regard, the OECD-based analysis used by Gaines is most useful. 
 
Gaines classifies environmental regulations into three general categories: product 
regulations; resource access regulations; and PPM regulations.48  
 
Gaines points out that product regulations are generally accepted under GATT (as long as 
their implementation does not discriminate against foreign producers), whether they set 
standards for products49, tax products50 or prohibit the import of banned products.51 These 
regulations are generally acceptable because their focus is on protecting the environment 
or human health in the importing country and they focus on the product itself. The French 
ban on asbestos falls into this category. Gaines sees the argument of Howse and Regan as 
a proposal to treat PPM-based trade measures the same way as product regulations.  
 
In disputes involving resource access regulations, Gaines argues that a ‘government’s 
sovereign right to exercise control’ over the resource is not at stake. Rather, the issue is 
whether rules regulating access to publicly-owned or commons resources (such as timber, 
                                                
47 For a contrary view, see Howse, above n 5.  
48 Gaines, above n 44, 390-395. 
49 See United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc WT/DS2/AB/R, 
AB-1996-1 (1996) (Report of the Appellate Body), 14. 
50 See United States—Taxes on Automobiles, WTO Doc WT/DS31/R (1994) (Report of the Panel not 
Adopted), paras 5.44-5.55 and United States—Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances , 
GATT BISD, 34 th Supp (1988) (Report of the Panel adopted 17 June 1987), 34. 
51 See European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WTO 
Doc WT/DS135/AB/R (2001) (Report of the Appellate Body), para 192. 
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petroleum and fish ) treat foreign nationals unfairly or distort markets.52 Gaines cites the 
example of the Softwood Lumber dispute between Canada and the United States. This 
dispute involves countervailing duties (and, more recently, antidumping duties) applied 
periodically against Canadian lumber imports by the United States.53 Another example 
would be Canadian regulations that banned exports of unprocessed herring and salmon.54  
 
Gaines’ method of distinguishing the resource access category from the category of PPM 
regulations is not entirely satisfactory. One can argue that the government’s control over 
the resource is at stake in the Softwood Lumber dispute, since the American government 
has pressured Canadian governments to replace their system of setting the fees companies 
pay to harvest timber with the American system of auctioning timber rights. Thus, in this 
particular case, a more accurate distinction might be that this case involves GATT rules 
regulating trade remedy laws, rather than the analysis under Article III that takes place 
with respect to product regulations or the analysis under Articles XI and XX that takes 
place in cases involving PPM regulations. However, this distinction is not entir ely 
satisfactory either, since the Canada-United States dispute regarding herring and salmon 
centred around Articles XI and XX, not trade remedy laws. Moreover, the Tuna and 
                                                
52 Gaines, above n 44, 393. 
53 For a detailed discussion of this case, see Bradly J Condon, NAFTA, WTO and Global Business Strategy: 
How AIDS, Trade and Terrorism Affect Our Economic Future (2002), 45-49. Since 1993, there have been 
several panel decisions regarding different aspects of this dispute under the Canada -United States Free 
Trade Agreement, opened for signature 22 December 1987-2 January 1988, 27 ILM 281 (entered into force 
1 January 1989), the North American Free Trade Agreement between the Government of Canada, the 
Government of the United Mexican States and the Government of the United States of America , opened for 
signature 17 December 1992, 32 ILM 296 (1993) (entered into force 1 January 1994) and the WTO. 
54 Canada—Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, GATT BISD, 35th Supp, 98, 
GATT Doc 35S/98 (1988)  (Report of the Panel Adopted 22 March 1988) and In the Matter of Canada's 
Landing Requirement for Pacific Coast Salmon and Herring, Final Report of the FTA Panel, (16 October 
1989). 
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Shrimp cases, which he classifies as PPM cases, also involve rules regulating access to 
commons resources. Nevertheless, Gaines distinction between product and PPM 
regulations provides a useful conceptual framework for determining the appropriate 
GATT analysis in these two categories.  
 
Gaines describes PPM regulations as laws that ‘seek to mitigate the environmental effects 
of private activities by specifying the conditions under which those activities must be 
carried out’ (that is, the PPMs used to produce the goods).55 He cites the example of 
emissions standards to reduce air, water and soil pollution, noting that the majority of 
regulations in this category do not regulate trade and are primarily aimed at protecting the 
domestic environment. As a result, the majority of PPM regulations fall outside the realm 
of trade law.56 However, a sub-category—PPM-based trade measures—does fall under 
the jurisdiction of trade law. This category is the focus of the OECD conceptual 
framework. 
 
The OECD framework classifies PPM-based trade measures as product-related and non-
product-related. The product-related category regulates production processes to ensure 
the safety of food and pharmaceuticals, for example. In the WTO context, this category is 
governed primarily by the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
                                                
55 Gaines, above n 44, 393. 
56 Gaines argues that ‘trade law has no jurisdiction in this realm of environmental policy’, despite 
allegations by business interests that strict environmental regulation impairs international competitiveness, 
which he categorizes as a ‘debatable point at best’. Gaines, ibid 394. It is worth noting, however, that these 
concerns regarding the effect of this type of environmental law on competitiveness has prompted some 
commentators to propose the use of countervailing duties to compensate for the allegedly lower production 
costs enjoyed by firms operating in so-called ‘pollution havens’ and that it was this type of concern 
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Measures and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade.57 Non-product-related 
PPMs influence the technology and raw materials used by the producer, without altering 
the quality or character of the final product. The American trade embargoes against tuna 
and shrimp fall into this category. The majority of PPM-based trade measures in this 
category involve the methods used by primary producers to harvest or cultivate natural 
goods and are limited in number.58 
 
The OECD framework further classifies non-product-related PPM-based trade measures 
into four categories, based on the nature and location of the environmental problem: 
transboundary pollution; management of transboundary living resources; global 
environmental concerns; and local environmental concerns limited to the territory of the 
country (or territories of the countries) that is/are the target of the trade measure.59 
Neighbouring countries generally resolve cases of transboundary pollution through 
negotiation, treaties or litigation, rather than through the application of trade sanctions.60 
The remaining three categories are thus the most interesting from a trade policy 
perspective and are the focus of this thesis. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
regarding competitiveness that prompted the American government to reject the adoption of the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
57 Gaines, ibid 396-397. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 15 April 
1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal 
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 1A, 33 ILM 1197 (1994). Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade , 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 1A, 33 ILM 1197 (1994). 
58 Gaines cites the following examples: fisherman, farmers, loggers, miners and hunters. Gaines, ibid 399. 
59 Gaines, ibid 399-400. 
60 Perhaps the best example is the Trail Smelter Case (United States v Canada)  (1941) 3 RIAA 1905, 
discussed in Chapter 4. A mining company in the Canadian province of British Columbia polluted a river 
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(a) Transboundary Living Resources  
 
PPM-based trade measures have been used  to protect transboundary living resources in 
two situations: 1) multilaterally, to enforce international resource conservation 
agreements among the interested states 61 and 2) unilaterally, by one of the countries with 
an interest in the resource, to enforce its own conservation regime in the absence of an 
international conservation regime. 62 Gaines states the issue in this context as ‘whether the 
rules of international trade will or should deny a single interested state the use of 
unilateral PPM-based trade measures to achieve its environmental protection objectives 
even though it is widely agreed that the same measures would be permissible if taken in 
conjunction with a multilateral arrangement’.63 The WTO Appellate Body has provided 
one answer to this question in the Shrimp cases.64 
 
(b) Global Environmental Concerns  
 
                                                                                                                                            
valley in the American state of Washington. The United States successfully sued Canada for the damage 
that the pollution caused in American territory.  
61 For example, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) requires 
signatories to ban, control or monitor trade in products derived from endangered species. Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, opened for signature 6 March 1973, 
993 UNTS 243 (entered into force 1 July 1975). For a concise description of CITES, its operation and its 
decision making procedures, see ‘The CITES Fort Lauderdale Criteria: The Use and Limits of Science in 
International Decisionmaking’ (2001) 114 Harvard Law Review 1769 (arguing that politics and economics 
play as great a role in CITES decision making as science).  
62 For example, the shrimp embargoes of the United States in United States—Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products,  WTO Doc WT/DS58 (1998) (Report of the Panel), WTO Doc 
WT/DS/AB/R, AB-1998-4 (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body) (with respect to Asian countries with 
which it had not negotiated a multilateral agreement) and in United States—Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 by Malaysia, WTO Doc WT/DS58/RW (2001) 
(Report of the Panel); WTO Doc WT/DS58/AB/RW (2001) (Report of the Appellate Body) (with respect to 
Malaysia, which refused to participate in a multilateral agreement). 
63 Gaines, above n 44, 400-401. 
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Gaines describes this category as a mirror image of the case of transboundary resources. 
The unilateral actor may be the target, rather than the initiator, of a trade measure taken 
under a multilateral agreement to regulate internationally traded goods. He cites the 
example of the ban on trade in CFCs with non-cooperating countries under the Montreal 
Protocol.65 These trade restrictions are product-related. The authority to impose non-
product-related PPM-based measures on goods made using ozone depleting substances 
has not been implemented in the Montreal Protocol.66   
 
(c) Local Environmental Concerns  
 
The OECD study defines this category as a situation where the ‘environmental and other 
effects [are] limited to the territory of the country using the PPM’.67 A country is free to 
address its own environmental problems through a PPM regulation as long as it does not 
distort trade or otherwise externalise the costs of its own policies. The OECD study does 
not discuss the situation where a country uses a PPM-based trade measure to pressure a 
foreign government (or business) to adopt the desired PPM in its own territory. 68  With 
respect to the latter situation, Gaines cites Austria’s unsuccessful effort to impose PPM-
based import restrictions on tropical timber. 69 
 
                                                                                                                                            
64 This point is discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
65 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, opened for signature 16 September 
1987, UKTS 19 (1990) (entered into force 1 January 1989), art 4(1) and art (2). 
66 Ibid, art 4(4). 
67 Gaines, above n 44, 401. Organization for Economic Co -operation and Development, above n 45, 15. 
68 Gaines, ibid 401. 
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While the foregoing categorization is useful, all three of the above categories raise the 
issue of whether trade measures should be allowed to provide economic incentives to 
countries to participate in multilateral environmental agreements (‘MEAs’) and, if so, 
how to square such a policy with not only WTO law, but public international law as well. 
Thus, these three situations could also be categorized as follows: 1) unilateral measures to 
conserve transboundary living resources in the absence of a MEA; 2) multilateral 
measures to induce acceptance or implementation of a MEA; and 3) unilateral measures 
to address non-transboundary concerns in the absence of a MEA. The Appellate Body 
rulings in Shrimp I and Shrimp II have established a basis for justifying the first two 
categories under Article XX, although the limits of that approach have yet to be clearly 
defined.70 Measures under the third category are less tenable, however, due to the lack of 
‘jurisdictional nexus’71 between the importing country and the environment of the 
exporting country.  
 
If the environmental or health interests of the importing country are not at stake in the 
third category, it is difficult to see how such a trade measure could be justified solely on 
the basis of a discrimination analysis under Article III. All three categories refer to PPMs 
that do not affect the characteristics of the product itself, so the Asbestos analysis of 
whether they are like products would not save a discriminatory measure. Moreover, all 
                                                                                                                                            
69 Gaines, ibid 402. Daniel C Esty, Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment and the Future (1994) 188-
189. 
70 See discussion in Chapter 3. 
71 In United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, 
AB-1998-4 (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body), the Appellate Body cited the ‘jurisdictional nexus’ 
between the United States and the migratory sea turtles as one reason for holding that the American 
embargo qualified as a measure relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources under GATT 
art XX(g).  
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three categories raise issues regarding the limits of WTO jurisdiction. The analysis under 
Article III assumes that the WTO has jurisdiction over the matter at hand. In contrast, 
Article XX sets out the fields of regulation that have been reserved to the jurisdiction of 
WTO members, to be exercised at the national level or in other international agreements 
if they wish. Therefore, all three types of non-product-related PPM trade measures should 
be analysed under Articles XI and XX, not Article III (those measures that ban or restrict 
imports would constitute Article XI violations). Product-related PPM trade measures, like 
product regulations, if they fall outside the scope of the Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade,72 would be susceptible to an Article III analysis because they affect the character 
of the final product.  
 
C. Outstanding Issues Regarding National Treatment 
Whether PPM-based trade measures should be allowed under Ar ticle III is an 
interpretative issue that has yet to be resolved in academic debate. However, despite 
academic arguments to the contrary,73 I conclude that non-product-related PPM trade 
measures are not permitted under Article III and must therefore be justified under Article 
XX. WTO jurisprudence does not contradict this view and, in my view, does not support 
the contrary view presented by Howse and Regan. 74 Moreover, for the reasons cited 
                                                
72 Gaines, above n 44, 396-397. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 15 
April 1994 , Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 
Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 1A, 33 ILM 1197 (1994). Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade, 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 1A, 33 ILM 
1197 (1994). 
73 See Howse and Regan, above n 30. 
74 Ibid. 
 67 
above, it would be inappropriate for the WTO judiciary to substitute an Article III 
analysis for the Article XI/XX analysis (or an analysis under the Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade75 or the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures 76) with respect to this category of measures.  
 
III. Article XI: Quantitative Restrictions  
 
Should PPM-based trade measures be allowed under Article XI? GATT Article XI 
prohibits import and export restrictions 77, subject to narrow exceptions for agricultural 
trade. ‘Environmental’ trade embargoes, such as American bans on tuna and shrimp 
imports and a Canadian ban on herring and salmon exports, have been found to violate 
this obligation. 78 The main analysis of the measures in these cases has taken place under 
the Article XX exceptions. For the reasons given in the preceding section, non-product-
related PPM trade restrictions or bans are best analysed under Article XX. The 
appropriate approach under Article XI should therefore be to find that such measures are 
prohibited by Article XI so that the analysis may then proceed to Article XX. Should a 
different approach be taken in the case of import or export restrictions imposed under a 
MEA? 
                                                
75 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —Results of the Uruguay Round, 
Annex 1A, 33 ILM 1197 (1994). 
76 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 15 April 1994 , Final Act 
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —
Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 1A, 33 ILM 1197 (1994).  
77 GATT art XI:1 states: ‘ No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether 
made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or 
maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of any other contracting party or on 
the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party.’ 
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The relevant part of GATT Article XI:1 states:  
No prohibitions or restrictions…shall  be instituted or maintained…on the importation of any 
product of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product 
destined for the territory of any other contracting party.’ (emphasis added) 
 
This is pretty unequivocal, mandatory language. No import or export restrictions shall be 
used for any product from any WTO member. However, even such clear and absolute 
language must be interpreted in its context, in light of its object and purpose, and taking 
into account other agreements and rules of international law applicable between the 
parties.79 The intention and practice of the parties are also relevant.80 An argument can be 
made that it was not the intention of the WTO members to prohibit import or export 
restrictions imposed under MEAs or other international agreements requiring the use of 
such measures. This intention is confirmed in practice by the resort of MEA parties to 
MEA forums to address the issue of import and export restrictions,  rather than 
challenging such measures under Article XI:1. For example, African countries that wish 
to resume the commercial exploitation of ivory have sought permission to relax trade 
restrictions under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
(‘CITES’), not the WTO.81 Thus, one can argue that Article XI:1 should be interpreted as 
not applying to MEA measures (between parties to the MEA) because they fall outside 
                                                                                                                                            
78 As noted above, this point was conceded in United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, AB-1998-4 (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body). 
79 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered 
into force 27 January 1980), art 31. 
80 See Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties (1961), 424. 
81 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, opened for 
signature 6 March 1973, 993 UNTS 243 (entered into force 1 July 1975). See Alanna Mitchell, ‘Proposed 
ivory sale may harm elephants’, <http://www.globeandmail.com> (Toronto), at 18 June 2002. Botswana, 
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the jurisdiction of the WTO. This approach views MEA trade measures as lex specialis—
the more specific trade provisions in MEAs prevail over the more general language of 
Article XI in the event of inconsistency. 82 However, Article XI:1 should be interpreted in 
a manner that is compatible with other international obligations where possible.83 
Moreover, this approach has been rejected in GATT and WTO jurisprudence.84 
 
An alternative approach is to interpret MEA trade restrictions as violations of Article 
XI:1 and proceed to analyse the measure under Article XX exceptions. In Shrimp II, the 
Appellate Body accepted that the US import ban violated Article XI:1 because that issue 
was not contested by the parties to the dispute. No case has raised the issue of whether an 
import or export ban imposed under a MEA violates Article XI:1. However, this 
analytical approach is the better of the two alternatives. 
                                                                                                                                            
Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe applied for a change in the rules at the convention secretariat in 
Geneva. 
82 See discussion in Chapter 1. 
83 In Indonesia—Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, WTO Doc WT/DS54R, WT/DS55R, 
WT/DS59R, WT/DS64R (1998) (Report of the Panel), para 14.28, in response to Indonesia’s argument that 
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures , 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying the 
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments—Results of the 
Uruguay Round, Annex 1A, 33 ILM 1197 (1994) was lex specialis and therefore was the only applicable 
law (to the exclusion of other WTO provisions), the Panel invoked the presumption against conflict in 
public international law:  
In considering Indonesia’s defence that there is a general conflict between the provisions of the SCM Agreement and those 
of Article III of GATT, and consequently that the SCM Agreement is the only applicable law, we recall first that in public 
international law there is a presumption  against conflict. This presumption is especially relevant in the WTO context since 
all WTO agreements, including GATT 1994 which was modified by Understandings when judged necessary, were 
negotiated at the same time, by the same Members and in the same forum. In this context we recall the principle of 
effective interpretation pursuant to which all provisions of a treaty (and in the WTO system all agreements) must be given 
meaning, using the ordinary meaning of words.  
See also Turkey—Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, WTO Doc WT/DS34/R (1999) 
(Report of the Panel), paras 9.92-9.95. 
84 See Turkey—Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, WTO Doc WT/DS34/R (1999) 
(Report of the Panel), para 9.64:  
Notwithstanding this broad prohibition against quantitative restrictions, GATT contracting parties over many years failed 
to respect completely this obligation. From early in the GATT, in sectors such as agriculture, quantitative restrictions were 
maintained and even increased to the extent that the need to restrict their use became central to the Uruguay Round 
negotiations. In the sector of textiles and clothing, quantitative restrictions were maintained under the Multifibre 
Agreement. Certain contracting parties were even of the view that quantitative restrictions had gradually been tolerated and 
accepted as negotiable and that Article XI could not be and had never been considered to be, a provision prohibiting such 
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Environmental policy choices do not fall under the jurisdiction of the WTO. However, 
trade measures do. Article XI clearly prohibits trade restrictions as a general rule. Thus, 
there is a clear conflict between the general rule of Article XI and the obligation to use 
trade restrictions in certain MEAs. 85 There is no conflicts clause in the WTO that 
determines which obligation is to prevail. However, Article XX provides exceptions to 
the Article XI general rule that reserve jurisdiction over environmental policy to national 
governments, subject to the requirements of the Article XX chapeau. The national 
governments can exercise their jurisdiction regarding the content of environmental policy 
alone or in concert with other national governments in MEAs. As long as the policy fits 
the parameters of Article XX(b) or (g), the trade restrictions in question will qualify for 
provisional justification under one of these two subheadings. However, the WTO retains 
jurisdiction over the use of trade restrictions to implement those policies. That 
supervisory jurisdiction is exercised under the Article XX chapeau, to ensure that MEA 
obligations are not implemented so as to avoid GATT obligations. It is necessary to retain 
this jurisdiction of the WTO over the manner of implementation in order to ensure that 
WTO members do not abuse their jurisdiction under Article XX(b) or (g) to create 
disguised barriers to trade or to unjustifiably discriminate against other WTO members. 
Even if the WTO had a conflicts clause that determined that MEA trade obligations 
prevail over GATT obligations (or if the rules regarding conflicts between treaties led to 
                                                                                                                                            
restrictions irrespective of the circumstances specific to each case. This argument was, however, rejected in an adopted 
panel report EEC – Imports from Hong Kong.  
85 See Chapter 1, n 42, which summarizes the MEAs that contain trade-related provisions. 
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the same conclusion), the implementation of the MEA obligations would still need to be 
subject to the requirements of the chapeau in order to safeguard against abuse.  
 
This analytical procedure accords with the intention of WTO and MEA parties to place 
trade policy under the jurisdiction of the WTO and environmental policy under the 
jurisdiction of the MEA. The view that MEA trade restrictions qualify for provisional 
justification under either Article XX(b) or (g) but nevertheless remain subject to WTO 
supervision under the chapeau provides a way to reconcile potential conflicts between the 
two sets of obligations. This approach thus avoids the conflict and is more consistent with 
the presumption against conflict in public international law. 86 
 
National treatment and MFN must also apply to MEA measures, in order to prevent 
abuse in the manner in which they are implemented and applied in domestic law. The 
obligations set out in the MEA itself are unlikely to discriminate, but could be 
implemented in domestic legislation so as to violate MFN or national treatment 
obligations or applied in a manner that constitutes arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination and thus requires an examination under Article XX. Since the 
discrimination test under Articles I and III are more strict than the discrimination test in 
the Article XX chapeau, discriminatory measures that could be justified under Article XX 
would nevertheless fail to pass muster under Articles I and III. It would be unwise to say 
that the DSB has no jurisdiction at all over trade measures implemented pursuant to 
MEAs, because a WTO member could then purport to take a measure under a MEA and 
                                                
86 See above n 83. 
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thereby preclude DSB scrutiny altogether.87 As long as the MEA requires that trade 
measures be implemented in conformity with the requirements of the Article XX 
chapeau, any apparent conflict between the MEA and GATT obligations will be 
resolved. 88 Even if the MEA contains no explicit requirement in this regard, the MEA 
should be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with GATT obligations where the 
MEA parties are GATT members. 89 
 
If a measure does not discriminate, or violate Article XI, there is no need to determine 
whether it meets the conditions set out in Articles XX(b) or (g). 90 On the other hand, if 
                                                
87 In addition to non-discrimination, in exceptional circumstances GATT art XXIII:1(b) provides a further 
cause of action that should not be ruled out in the case of MEA measures, for the same reasons. For a 
discussion of the scope of  art XXIII:1(b) in the context of measures taken to protect human health, see 
European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WTO Doc 
WT/DS135/AB/R (2001) (Report of the Appellate Body), paras 185-191. 
88 Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration is consistent with this view. It provides that ‘[t]rade policy measures 
should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on 
international trade’. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, adopted 14 June 1992, Report of 
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 3, Rio de Janeiro 3-14 June 1992, UN 
GAOR, 47th Sess, 4 UN Doc A/Conf 151/5/Rev.1 (1992) 31 ILM 874. This language echoes the language 
of the art XX chapeau. Similarly, Agenda 21, para 39.3(d) provides guidelines for the implementation of 
trade measures that reflect key GATT obligations and exceptions: non-discrimination, least-trade-
restrictiveness, transparency and special consideration for developing countries. Agenda 21, Report of the 
United Nations Conference on Environme nt and Development 9, Rio de Janeiro 3-14 June 1992, UN Doc 
A/Conf.151/26/Rev.1. Following these guidelines in the implementation of MEA trade measures promotes 
coherence between international environmental law and international trade law. Also see United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 4 June 1992 (1992) 31 ILM 849 (entered 
into force 21 March 1994) and Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global 
Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forest, Report 
of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992. For a 
different view of the purpose of these provisions, see Jan McDonald, ‘It’s not easy being green: Trade and 
Environment Linkages Beyond Doha’ in Ross Buckley (ed), The WTO and the Doha Round: The Changing 
Face of World Trade (2003), 145 (arguing that deference to the imperatives of world trade and economic 
development in non-trade fora show that real progress on promoting mutually supportive trade and 
environment policies remains elusive).  
89 The GATT would be taken into account under Vienna Convention, art 31(3)(c), which requires that ‘any 
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties’ be taken into account in 
the interpretation of treaties. 
90 In the context of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, opened for signature 22 December 
1987-2 January 1988, 27 ILM 281 (entered into force 1 January 1989), the majority of the FTA panel in the 
Lobsters  case ruled that once a measure that deals with both foreign and domestic products is found to be 
consistent with the national treatment obligation of GATT art III, not only is there no need to consider the 
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the measure is found to violate an obligation, the issue then becomes whether it is 
nevertheless permitted under an Article XX exception. This raises the question of the 
subject matter of Articles XX(b) and (g). 
 
IV. Article XX Exceptions 
 
 
GATT Article XX contains two paragraphs, drafted in 1947,91 that seek to balance trade 
liberalization and environmental protection: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions 
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed 
to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: 
... 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
... 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in 
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption… 
 
While Articles XX(b) and (g) do not explicitly cover environmental measures, their 
language can be and has been interpreted to include environmental concerns. 
Nevertheless, before the WTO Agreement entered into force,92 there was some debate 
over the applicability of these provisions to the environment. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
environmental exceptions, but there is no need to consider any other obligations either, in this case, those 
prohibiting import and export restrictions under art XI. However, two of the five panel members delivered a 
strong dissent, arguing persuasively that arts III and XI are not mutually exclusive. Lobsters from Canada, 
3 TCT 8182 (Final Report of the FTA Panel 25 May 1990). See also T McDorman, ‘Dissecting the Free 
Trade Agreement Lobster Panel Decision’ (1991) 18 Canadian Business Law Journal 445, 453. 
91 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947. 
92 The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, Final Act 
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —
Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 ILM 1197 (1994) entered into force 1 January 1995. 
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A. The Applicability of Article XX to the Environment 
Some GATT critics have argued that environmental issues were mostly overlooked when 
the GATT was drafted, because environmental protection was not an issue at the time.93 
For example, Shrybman pointed to the fact that the word ‘environment’ does not appear 
in the GATT text, but only in a collateral agreement on subsidies.94 He further argued 
that paragraph XX(b) was not intended to protect the environment because ‘it is a 
fundamental tenet of legal interpretation that the meaning and application of an 
agreement be determined at the time that it was concluded or amended’.95 Shrybman 
therefore concluded that the drafting history of XX(b) indicated it was intended to protect 
‘quarantine and other sanitary regulations’.96 He did not, however, address paragraph 
XX(g). 
 
Others have taken the opposite view. For example, Charnovitz concluded, after an 
historical review going back to the 19th century, that the history of Article XX 
demonstrates that it was designed to encompass environmental measures.97 To conclude 
that XX(b) was aimed solely at sanitary restrictions would require a narrow look at the 
                                                
93 See, for example, S Shrybman, ‘International Trade and the Environment: An Environmental 
Assessment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’ (1990) 20 The Ecologist 30. 
94 Ibid 34, note 22. The Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of 
GATT, art 11 recognized the validity of subsidies that may be used to effect the ‘redeployment of industry 
in order to avoid congestion and environmental problems’. The Tokyo Round Standards Code also made 
reference to the environment. 
95 Shrybman, ibid. 
96 GATT, Analytical Index, Notes on the drafting, interpretation and application of the Articles of the 
General Agreement (3rd ed) 116, cited in ibid 34. 
97 S Charnovitz, ‘Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GATT art XX’ (1991) 25 Journal of World 
Trade 37, 55. 
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drafting process that took place between 1946 and 1948. 98 He cited more than a dozen 
examples of treaties that used trade measures to pursue environmental objectives between 
1890 and 1927. 99  
 
The prior existence of trade-restrictive environmental provisions does not prove that 
Article XX was intended to resolve conflicts between the GATT and these other 
international agreements. However, it does demonstrate that trade-restrictive 
environmental laws did exist before the GATT was drafted. Whether the drafters of 
Article XX were aware of the existence of such trade barriers and the need to consider the 
circumstances under which environmentally motivated trade restrictions would prevail 
over the general principles of trade law is now a moot point. The Appellate Body has 
held that term ‘natural resources’ in Article XX(g) is not static in its content but rather 
‘by definition evolutionary’ and therefore has to be interpreted within the framework of 
the entire legal system prevailing at the time of interpretation.100 This temporal issue has 
thus been resolved, at least with respect to Article XX(g). 
 
                                                
98 Ibid 44. Charnovitz points out that the reason why there was little debate on the scope of XX(b) at the 
time was that the point had already been debated twenty years earlier, in the context of the International 
Convention for the Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions of 1927  and several 
bilateral treaties. One example of the latter is the Canada-Mexico trade agreement of 1946, which exempted 
restrictions ‘imposed for the protection of plants or animals, including measures for protection against 
disease, degeneration or extinction...’. At 41-43. 
99 Ibid 39-41. 
100 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, 
AB-1998-4 (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body), para 130, citing Namibia (Legal Consequences) 
(Advisory Opinion)  [1971] ICJ Rep 31. 
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Leaving aside the issue of whether or not the interpretation of Article XX should be 
frozen in time,101 GATT 1947 has now become GATT 1994. The drafters of the Uruguay 
Round agreements were certainly aware of the trade and environment debate, as 
evidenced by the reference to sustainable development and environmental protection in 
the preamble of the WTO Agreement and the Decision on Trade and Environment. Thus, 
if the applicability of Articles XX(b) and (g) to environmental protection measures 
depends on the negotiating context in the year in which they were drafted (or susceptible 
to amendment), both the year and the context have now changed.  
 
Charnovitz considers the language of Article XX, properly interpreted, to be adequate to 
meet the task of balancing free trade and environmental protection: 
There may be a few issues that do not fit the Article XX framework - the preservation of scenic vistas, 
perhaps. But just about everything else relates squarely either to the life or health of living organisms 
or to the conservation of truly exhaustible resources like clean air, fossil fuels, and stratospheric 
ozone.102 
 
Experts advising Canada’s NAFTA Environmental Review Committee took the view that 
the combination of GATT Articles XX(b) and XX(g) provide an exception for a broad 
range of environmental measures. 103 Nevertheless, some environmental organizations 
recommended that this understanding be clarified in the NAFTA.104 As a result, NAFTA 
Article 2101, which incorporates Article XX, states in part: 
The Parties understand that the measures referred to in GATT Article XX(b) include environmental 
measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, and that GATT Article XX(g) 
                                                
101 This issue was discussed in Chapter 1. 
102 Charnovitz, above n 97, 55. 
103 Canada, North American Free Trade Agreement: Canadian Environmental Review (Ottawa: October 
1992), 15. 
104 Ibid. 
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applies to measures relating to the conservation of living and non-living exhaustible natural 
resources.105 
 
This provision may clarify the application of GATT Article XX to environmental 
measures, but it does not alter its meaning or scope. Article XX(b) still applies to the 
protection of ‘human, animal or plant life or health’ and Article XX(g) still applies to the 
conservation of ‘exhaustible natural resources’. The Uruguay Round negotiations 
presented an opportunity to provide a comparable clarification. It is reasonable to assume 
that they found this unnecessary to do so.  
 
B. The Division of Subject Matter Between Articles XX(b) and (g) 
One issue that remains unresolved is the division of subject matter between Articles 
XX(b) and (g). In United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline (‘Reformulated Gasoline’), the Appellate Body stated: 
In enumerating the various categories of governmental acts, laws or regulations which WTO 
Members may carry out or promulgate in pursuit of differing legitimate state policies or interests 
outside the realm of trade liberalization, Article XX uses different terms in respect of different 
categories: 
‘necessary’ - in paragraphs (a), (b) and (d);  
‘essential’ - in paragraph (j);  
‘relating to’ - in paragraphs (c), (e) and (g);  
‘for the protection of’ - in paragraph (f); 
‘in pursuance of’ - in paragraph (h);  
 and ‘involving’ - in paragraph (i). 
It does not seem reasonable to suppose that the WTO Members intended to require, in respect of 
each and every category, the same kind or degree of connection or relationship between the 
measure under appraisal and the state interest or policy sought to be promoted or realized. 
(emphasis added)106 
 
                                                
105 North American Free Trade Agreement between the Government of Canada, the Government of the 
United Mexican States and the Government of the United States of America, opened for signature 17 
December 1992, 32 ILM 296 (1993) (entered into force 1 January 1994), art 2101(1). 
106 United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc WT/DS2/AB/R, 
AB-1996-1 (1996) (Report of the Appellate Body).  
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Article XX plays the key role of dividing jurisdiction over different subjects between the 
WTO ‘legislature’ and national governments. In this respect, the function of Article XX 
is similar to the constitutional division of powers in federal systems between federal 
governments and states or provinces. Indeed, the nature of the analysis can be quite 
similar in both contexts. 107 However, in the case of Article XX, the jurisdictional line 
shifts with the nature of the subject matter in question. 
 
A GATT panel interpreted the words ‘relating to’ in Article XX(g) as exempting a 
broader range of measures from the strict application of the trade rules than does the 
word ‘necessary’ in Article XX(b).108 In practice, however, both provisions were applied 
by GATT panels to require that governments use the least trade-restrictive means 
reasonably available to implement environmental policies. This standard has continued to 
be applied under the WTO, albeit at different points in the Article XX analysis.  
 
The Appellate Body has adopted an analytical procedure under Article XX that first 
examines whether a measure can be provisionally justified under Article XX(b) or (g) 
and then considers whether it satisfies the Article XX introductory proviso, referred to as 
                                                
107 For a comparison of the art XX analysis with the division of powers analysis regarding jurisdiction over 
environmental laws in the Canadian constitution, see Bradly J Condon, ‘Constitutional Law, Trade Policy 
and Environment: Implications for North American Environmental Policy Implementation in the 1990s’ in 
A R Riggs and T Velk (eds), Beyond NAFTA: An Economic, Political and Sociological Perspective (1993), 
222. For a comparison of Canadian and Mexican constitutional treatment of environmental law, see Bradly 
J Condon, ‘Federal Environmental Protection in Mexico and Canada’ in S Randall and H Konrad (eds), 
NAFTA in Transition (1996) 281. Also see John O McGinnis and Mark L Movsesian, ‘The World Trade 
Constitution’ (2000) 114 Harvard Law Review 511 and Peter M Gerhart, ‘The Two Constitutional Visions 
of the World Trade Organization’ (2003) 24 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic 
Law 1. For a general discussion of trade regulation in federal systems, see Donald H Regan, ‘Judicial 
Review of Member-State Regulation of Trade within a Federal or Quasi-Federal System: Protectionism and 
Balancing, Da Capo’ (2001) 99 Michigan Law Review 1853. 
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the ‘chapeau’. 109 While the Appellate Body has stated that the term ‘necessary’ in Article 
XX(b) requires a higher level of scrutiny than the term ‘relating to’ in Article XX(g),110 
the Appellate Body has applied a standard under the chapeau of Article XX that is 
reminiscent of the least-trade restrictive test applied under Article XX(b).111  
 
The threshold for establishing provisional justification for a measure under Article XX(g) 
(relating to) is lower than under Article XX(b) (necessary). In most cases involving 
environmental matters, the enacting country argues both.  However, the different 
standards applied suggest that these articles should address different types of policies and 
measures. In matters addressing protection of human health, XX(b) would seem to apply 
while XX(g) would not. However, even in this realm, a measure addressing air pollution 
(to protect human health) was accepted as fitting XX(g) on the grounds that clean air is 
an exhaustible natural resource.112 Similarly, Article XX(b) specifically applies to animal 
life, but measures aimed at saving the life of sea turtles were justified under XX(g).113 In 
                                                                                                                                            
108 Canada—Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, Report of the GATT Panel 
(22 March 1988) BISD, 35th Supp 98, para 4.6. 
109 See United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc 
WT/DS2/AB/R, AB-1996-1 (1996) (Report of the Appellate Body), 22 and United States—Import 
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, AB-1998-4 (1998) (Report 
of the Appellate Body), paras 118-122. 
110 See United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc 
WT/DS2/AB/R, AB-1996-1 (1996) (Report of the Appellate Body). 
111 With respect to art XX(g), see United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, AB-1998-4 (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body), para 171, ‘…an 
alternative course of action was reasonably open to the United States for securing the legitimate policy goal 
of its measure…’. With respect to the least trade restrictive test in arts XX(b) and (d), see discussion below. 
112 United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc WT/DS2/AB/R, 
AB-1996-1 (1996) (Report of the Appellate Body). 
113 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, 
AB-1998-4 (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body) and United States—Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 by Malaysia, WTO Doc WT/DS58/AB/RW (2001) 
(Report of the Appellate Body). 
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the case of the French ban on asbestos, the aim is clearly to protect human health, not to 
conserve natural resources, but most cases are not so clear. 
 
So what, then, is the difference between XX(b) and XX(g)? Should they be interpreted so 
that a given subject matter can fit either exception? There is nothing in the treaty 
language to suggest XX(b) is limited to sanitary and phytosanitary measures, though they 
can be included there.114 Nor is there any indication that one is intended to apply to 
internal matters and the other to the global environment. Does this issue matter, since all 
categories in Article XX are subject to the chapeau test in the end? It should. Otherwise, 
there would be a redundancy. 115 Moreover, if the threshold is lower for Article XX(g) 
measures than for Article XX(b) measures, the difference to the two categories needs to 
be more clearly delineated. While it is not possible to make a definitive list of measures 
that fit into one category or another, some general guidelines would be useful. 
 
                                                
114 Sanitary and phytosanitary measures would now be addressed under the Agreement on the Application 
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures , 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 1A, 
33 ILM 1197 (1994). See Australia—Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon,  WTO Doc 
WT/DS18/AB/R,  AB-1998-5 (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body).  
115 In United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc WT/DS2/AB/R, 
AB-1996-1 (1996) (Report of the Appellate Body), 23, the Appellate Body stated: ‘One of the corollaries 
of the “general rule of interpretation” in the Vienna Convention is that interpretation must give meaning 
and effect to all the terms of a treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in 
reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility’. In support, the Appellate Body 
cited, inter alia, Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v Albania), [1949] ICJ Rep 22 and Territorial Dispute 
(Libyan Arab Jamahariya v Chad)  [1994] ICJ Rep 21. Also see Argentina—Measures Affecting Imports of 
Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items, WTO Doc WT/DS56/AB/R (1998) (Report of the Appellate 
Body), para 81, in which the Appellate Body held, ‘a treaty interpreter must read all applicable provisions 
of a treaty in a way that gives meaning to  all  of them, harmoniously’. Also see Korea—Definitive 
Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products, WTO Doc WT/DS98/AB/R, AB-1999-8 (1999) 
(Report of the Appellate Body), para 81, affirming this view. 
 81 
Gaines’ categorization of environmental laws (product regulations, resource access 
regulations, and PPM regulations) and the OECD framework for PPM-based trade 
measures are useful in this regard. In Reformulated Gasoline, the Appellate Body 
suggested that the ‘connection…between the measure…and the state interest’ should 
inform the interpretation of Article XX. 116 The categorization of measures based on the 
proximity of interest of the enacting country in the subject matter being addressed is thus 
useful in determining not just whether the measure fits the exception, but also in 
determining which exception applies. 
 
Categories of measures that have been found to fit into one exception should presumably 
not fit into the other. For example, since a unilateral measure aimed at protecting 
transboundary resources (migratory turtles) has been held to fit into Article XX(g), this 
category of measure should not be covered by Article XX(b). However, since this 
measure can be classified as one that was necessary to protect animal life—the subject of 
Article XX(b) —to make the differentiation between XX(b) and XX(g) consistent with 
the Shrimp decisions, one must distinguish this measure on a different basis. The logical 
choices are the territorial reach of the measure (that is, whether the measure regulates or 
affects activities inside the territory of the enacting country, outside its territory or both) 
or the location of the subject matter being protected (that is, whether the interest being 
protected is in the territorial jurisdiction of the enacting country, outside its territory or 
transboundary/global). 
                                                
116 United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc WT/DS2/AB/R, 
AB-1996-1 (1996) (Report of the Appellate Body). While one may argue that this statement was made with 
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The focus of product regulations is on protecting plants, animals or human health in the 
importing country and they focus on the product itself. The French ban on asbestos falls 
into this category. Thus, some measures in this category may not be prohibited by Article 
III and therefore not require justification under Article XX. Those that are prohibited by 
Article III should be addressed under Article XX(b), since they focus on the effect the 
product has in the importing country, rather the effect of the PPMs in the exporting 
country. While they may affect the activities of foreign producers, that is not their 
primary aim. 
 
Gaines definition of resource access regulations is more problematic. It requires further 
definition in order to be useful in the Article XX context. Where the concern is with their 
effect on market distortions, so that the issue is subsidies rather than trade restrictions, 
Article XX does not come into play, as in the Softwood Lumber case. However, where 
they involve export restrictions aimed at conserving natural resources, as in the Herring 
and Salmon case,117 the logical choice is Article XX(g). In this case, control over the 
resource being protected is in the country enacting the measure, but the location of the 
resource is transnational (the fish migrate between international, Canadian and American 
waters) and the measure has effects on transnational access to the resource. Thus, as in 
the Shrimp case, the territorial reach of the measure is extraterritorial and the location of 
the subject matter being protected is transnational. 
                                                                                                                                            
respect to the strictness of the different standards rather than with respect to the division of subject matter, 
the two are closely related. 
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PPM regulations include emissions standards to reduce air, water and soil pollution that 
do not regulate trade and are primarily aimed at protecting the domestic environment. 
This category of PPM regulations fall outside the realm of trade law and need not be 
categorized as falling under XX(b) or (g). Thus, only PPM measures that affect trade 
need to be considered—the focus of the OECD conceptual framework. 
 
PPM-based trade measures in the product-related category focus on the protection of 
human health in the importing country and are governed primarily by the Agreement on 
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and the Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade.118  In cases where Article XX comes into play, these measures fit 
Article XX(b) for the same reason as product regulations do. While they may have 
extraterritorial reach with respect to the PPMs used in the exporting country, measures 
affecting human health clearly fall under XX(b) because of the location and nature of the 
interest being protected.   
 
Non-product-related PPM-based trade measures do not alter the quality or character of 
the final product. Of the four OECD subcategories, three are relevant here: 1) 
management of transboundary living resources (where unilateral measures are used to 
                                                                                                                                            
117 Canada—Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, GATT BISD, 35th Supp, 
98, GATT Doc 35S/98 (1988)  (Report of the Panel Adopted 22 March 1988). 
118 Gaines, above n 44, 396-397. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 
15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 
Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 1A, 33 ILM 1197 (1994). Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade, 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 1A, 33 ILM 
1197 (1994). 
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conserve transboundary living resources in the absence of a MEA); 2) global 
environmental concerns (whe re multilateral measures are used to induce acceptance or 
implementation of a MEA); and 3) local environmental concerns limited to the territory 
of the country (or territories of the countries) that is/are the target of the trade measure 
(where unilateral measures are used to address non-transboundary concerns in the 
absence of a MEA). The American trade embargoes against tuna and shrimp fall into the 
first subcategory and, pursuant to the Shrimp decision, fit Article XX(g) based on both 
the territorial reach of the measure and the location of the subject matter being protected. 
The second category fits Article XX(g) for the same reasons. Moreover, MEAs in this 
category protect global interests in subject matters that may be classified as exhaustible 
natural resources, such as the ozone layer,119 global biodiversity,120 and the global 
climate.121  
 
The third category of measure could fit into either XX(b) or (g) depending on the subject 
matter. However, if one is to interpret Article XX in accordance with prevailing 
principles of international law, such measures would not be justifiable under either. There 
is a lack of ‘jurisdictional nexus’ between the country enacting the measure and the 
location of the interest being protected. The proximity of interest is too remote. They do 
not fit Article XX(b) because they are not aimed at protecting humans, animals or plants 
                                                
119 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, opened for signature 16 September 
1987, UKTS 19 (1990) (entered into force 1 January 1989). 
120 Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5 June 1992, UNEP/bio.Div./CONF/L.2, 31 
ILM 818 (1992) (entered into force 29 December 1993), Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 29 January 
2000, UNEP/CBD/ExCop/1/3, <http://www.biodiv.org/biosafe> at 4 November 2003. 
121 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 4 June 1992 (1992) 
31 ILM 849 (entered into force 21 March 1994). Kyoto Protocol , opened for signature 16 March 1998, 
available at <http://unfccc.int/resource/convkp.html> at 4 November 2003. 
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inside the territory of the enacting country. Nor do they fit Article XX(g), since there is 
no territorial nexus between the enacting country and the subject matter of the measure. 
Thus, while it may be possible to accompany such trade measures with domestic 
restrictions (for example, ban the import of tropical timber and ban its sale domestically), 
the domestic restrictions do not conserve a natural resource  that occurs within the 
territory of the enacting country. 
 
Non-product-related PPM-based trade measures taken pursuant to a MEA would be 
considered under Article XX(b) or (g) based on the location and nature of the interest 
being protected. For example, those aimed at the management of transboundary living 
resources or global environmental concerns would fit into Article XX(g). 
 
One problem with the foregoing proposal is that there is nothing in the wording of Article 
XX that explicitly assigns subject matter based on geographic proximity of interest. 
However, there is nothing that excludes this possibility either. Moreover, this approach is 
consistent with the nature of the subject matter addressed under other Article XX 
headings that use the term ‘necessary’.  
 
In addition to Article XX(b), two other headings employ the term ‘necessary’. Article 
XX(a) permits measures that are ‘necessary to protect public morals’. Since public 
morals are an aspect of cultural differences, the morals being protected would have to be 
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those of the citizens in the enacting country.  122 Any other interpretation would have to 
assume the existence of a global moral norm or permit a measure aimed at effecting a 
policy of cultural imperialism. Article XX(d) permits measures that are ‘necessary to 
secure compliance with laws or regulations’. While Article XX(d) does not specify that 
the laws in question are those of the enacting country, this is a logical assumption. The 
illustrative list of laws includes, for example, customs enforcement. Since customs 
officers are generally not permitted to enforce laws outside their country’s territory, this 
must refer to the enforcement of customs regulations in the enacting country. 123 Thus, the 
use of the term ‘necessary’ in Article XX suggests that the location of the state interest is 
within the territory of the enacting country. 
 
In addition to Article XX(g), two other headings employ the term ‘relating to’. Article 
XX(c) permits measures ‘relating to the importations and exportations of gold or silver’. 
When this article was drafted, the international monetary system was based on the gold 
standard. It is reasonable to infer that this heading is related to the management of this 
system. Thus, measures in this category would be primarily aimed at a transnational or 
global issue, namely the stability of international exchange rates. Article XX(e) permits 
measures ‘relating to the products of prison labour’. These measures would be classified 
as non-product-related PPM-based trade measures do not alter the quality or character of 
                                                
122 See Bradly J Condon, ‘NAFTA at Three-and-One-Half Years: Where Do We Stand and Where Should 
We Be Headed? A Cross-Cultural Analysis of North American Legal Integration’ (1997) 23 Canada-
United States Law Journal 347, 360-361. 
123 Generally speaking, the jurisdiction of law enforcement officers ends at the border of their country. 
Thus, it is necessary for countries to enter into international agreements to permit cross-border law 
enforcement, such as the Schengen Agreement, whose signatories have agreed to allow police from 
member countries to pursue criminals across jurisdictions. See 
<http://Europa.Eu.int/en/agenda/schengen.html>at 14 October 2002. 
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the final product. As noted above, this category of measure falls under Article XX(g) 
using the proposed conceptual framework. While the activities being regulated occur 
entirely within the territory of the exporting country, the competitive effect on prices 
would be international in scope (assuming this is the rationale for this heading). Thus, the 
use of the term ‘relating to’ in Article XX suggests that the state interest in question is 
transnational or global, rather than contained within the territory of the enacting country.  
 
The following sections examine GATT and WTO jurisprudence regarding Articles XX(b) 
and (g) and the Article XX chapeau. This examination will identify inconsistencies in the 
jurisprudence with the conceptual framework that I have proposed, if any exist. However, 
the primary focus of the following sections is on the other tests that measures must pass 
in order to be justified under Article XX. 
 
C. Article XX(b): Necessary Restrictions on Trade 
 
The party relying on this exception must make a prima facie case that the policy goal at 
issue falls within the range of policies designed to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health. 124 The analysis then proceeds to whether the measure at issue is ‘necessary’ to 
                                                
124 For example, in European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing 
Products, WTO Doc WT/DS135/R (2000) (Report of the Panel), para 8.194, the panel found that the EC 
had made a prima facie case for the existence of a health risk in connection with the use of asbestos that 
was confirmed by the opinions of experts and not rebutted by Canada. Thus the policy of prohibiting 
asbestos fell within the range of policies designed to protect human health. The Appellate Body upheld the 
Panel’s ruling as a finding of fact that did not exceed the Panel’s lawful discretion, as the trier of facts, in 
its appreciation of the evidence. The Appellate Body also made special mention that the Panel had noted 
that the carcinogenic nature of asbestos fibres had been acknowledged since 1977 by international bodies, 
such as the International Agency for Research on Cancer and the World Health Organization. See 
European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WTO Doc 
WT/DS135/AB/R (2001) (Report of the Appellate Body), para 162.  
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achieve the policy goal. With respect to human health, the Appellate Body has held that 
there is no requirement under Article XX(b) to quantify the risk a particular product poses 
to human health. Moreover, WTO Members have an ‘undisputed…right to dete rmine the 
level of protection of health they consider appropriate in a given situation’.125 Rather, the 
test of necessity turns upon the issue of whether an alternative measure is reasonably 
available that is consistent or less inconsistent with WTO obligations. 
 
 
1. The Availability of Alternative Measures 
 
The central test of necessity is whether there are any alternative, non-trade -restrictive 
measures reasonably available to achieve the legitimate objective. In the absence of 
reasonably available non-trade-restrictive measures, the least-trade-restrictive measure 
that is reasonably available should be chosen.  In Thailand - Restrictions on Importation 
of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, a GATT panel adopted the following interpretation 
of the term ‘necessary’ in Article XX(d) and applied it to Article XX(b): 
...a contracting party cannot justify a measure inconsistent with other GATT provisions as ‘necessary’ 
in terms of Article XX(d) if an alternative measure which it could reasonably be expected to employ 
and which is not inconsistent with other GATT provisions is available to it. By the same token, in 
cases where a measure consistent with other GATT provisions is not reasonably available, a 
contracting party is bound to use, among the measures reasonably available to it, that which entails the 
least degree of inconsistency with other GATT provisions.126  
 
                                                
125 European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WTO Doc 
WT/DS135/AB/R (2001) (Report of the Appellate Body), paras 167-168. 
126 United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, GATT BISD, 36th Supp 345, 39 2f (Report by the 
Panel adopted on 7 November 1989), cited in Thailand—Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes 
on Cigarettes, GATT BISD, 37th Supp, 200, GATT Doc DS10/R (1990)  (Report by the Panel Adopted 7 
November 1990), (1991) 30 ILM 1122, 1138.  
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This standard has been followed consistently by both panels and the Appellate Body 
under the WTO in interpreting the term ‘necessary’ under both Articles XX(b) and 
XX(d).127 
 
In Korea—Measures Affecting Import of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, the Appellate 
Body set out the general guidelines, which it reiterated and expanded upon in Asbestos: 
We indicated in Korea—Beef that one aspect of the ‘weighing and balancing 
process…comprehended in the determination of whether a WTO-consistent alternative measure’ is 
reasonably available is the extent to which the alternative measure ‘contributes to the realization of 
the end pursued’. In addition, we observed…that ‘[t]he more vital or important [the] common 
interests or values’ pursued, the easier it would be to accept as ‘necessary’ measures designed to 
achieve those ends. In this case, the objective pursued by the measure is the preservation of human 
life and health through the elimination, or reduction, of the well-known, and life -threatening, 
health risks posed by asbestos fibres. The value pursued is both vital and important in the highest 
degree. The remaining question, then, is whether there is an alternative me asure that would 
achieve the same end and that is less restrictive of trade than a prohibition.128 
 
This suggests that the characterization of the objective of a measure by the enacting 
country is of great importance in determining whether the means chosen to achieve the 
goal are ‘necessary’. 
 
The line of cases under GATT 1947 and GATT 1994 provide a series of examples of the 
factors that may be considered in determining whether the standard of necessity has been 
met. 
 
                                                
127 See Korea—Measures Affecting Import of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, WTO Doc 
WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R (2000) (Report of the Appellate Body), para 166 (with respect to 
XX(d)) and European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, 
WTO Doc WT/DS135/AB/R (2001) (Report of the Appellate Body), paras 169-175 (with respect to 
XX(b)). Also see United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline , WTO Doc 
WT/DS2/9 (1996) (Report of the Panel); WTO Doc WT/DS2/AB/R, AB-1996-1 (1996) (Report of the 
Appellate Body). 
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2. Efforts to Negotiate International Cooperative Arrangements 
 
In Tuna I, the GATT panel ruled that Article XX(b) does not cover measures necessary to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health outside the jurisdiction of the party taking 
the measure.129 This interpretation is consistent with my conceptual framework. However, 
the panel went on to say that, if Article XX(b) were interpreted to permit extra-
jurisdictional protection of life and health, the party invoking the exception would have to 
demonstrate that it had exhausted all options reasonably available to it to pursue its 
protection objectives through measures consistent with the GATT, in particular through 
the negotiation of international cooperative arrangements.130 This hypothetical obiter 
dicta would be inconsistent with my proposal. The Tuna I ruling was never adopted by 
the GATT parties.131 
   
3. Extraterritorial Effect 
 
The Tuna II panel, whose ruling was also not adopted by the GATT, employed a different 
analysis than Tuna I, but reached the same result. It applied a three-prong test to both 
Articles XX(b) and XX(g). The first prong considered whether the American regulations 
qualified as measures to conserve ‘exhaustible natural resources’ under Article XX(g) 
and ‘to protect human, animal or plant life or health’ under Article XX(b). Despite 
                                                                                                                                            
128 European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WTO Doc 
WT/DS135/AB/R (2001) (Report of the Appellate Body), para 169. 
129 United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD, 39th Supp, 155, GATT Doc DS21/R 
(1991) (Report by the Panel not Adopted), 44-45. 
130 Ibid 46. 
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arguments from the EEC and the Netherlands that such measures could not be applied 
extraterritorially, the panel held that neither article specifically limited the location of the 
resource or animal in question. The panel reasoned that other provisions in Article XX 
did not exclude measures aimed at actions outside a contracting party’s territorial 
jurisdiction and that international law permitted states to regulate the conduct of their 
nationals outside their territory. 132 This reasoning is consis tent with my framework 
insofar as its application to Article XX(g), but not with respect to Article XX(b). The 
Tuna II ruling was never adopted by the GATT parties.133 
 
4. Market-Based Instruments and Economic Considerations  
 
The Tuna I panel indirectly encouraged the use of one other GATT-consistent method of 
pursuing environmental protection—the use of voluntary, market-based standards to 
effect changes in production methods, in this case the labelling provisions of the 
American Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act (‘DPCIA’). The panel found 
the labelling provisions of the DPCIA consistent with the GATT, and in particular, 
consistent with the most -favoured-nation obligation of GATT Article I:1. The DPCIA did 
not restrict the sale of tuna products, which could be sold freely with or without the 
‘Dolphin Safe’ label. Nor did its provisions establish requirements that have to be met in 
                                                                                                                                            
131 However, the effort to negotiate was an important element in the Shrimp rulings, albeit in the context of 
art XX(g), which is discussed below. 
132 United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc DS29/R (1994) (Report by the Panel not 
Adopted),  891-892. The panel gave the example of art XX(e), allowing measures ‘relating to the products 
of prison labour’, as one that clearly applied to extraterritorial subject matter. It also noted that a ‘state may 
in particular regulate the conduct of its fishermen, or of vessels having its nationality or any fisherman on 
these vessels, with respect to fish located in the high seas.’  
133 There was similar reasoning regarding the territorial reach of measures in the Shrimp rulings, but 
limited to the context of art XX(g). This is discussed below. 
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order to obtain an advantage from government. Any advantage resulting from access to 
the label would depend on the free choice of consumers to prefer tuna carrying the 
‘Dolphin Safe’ label. The labelling provisions did not therefore make the right to sell tuna 
conditional upon the use of specific fishing methods. Access to the label was likewise 
consistent with Article I:1, since the regulations applied to all countries whose vessels 
fished in the Eastern Tropical Pacific and thus did not distinguish between products 
originating in Mexico and products originating in other countries. 
 
The DPCIA, like other environmental labelling programmes, did not restrict trade by 
banning or restricting market access. Rather, it relied on access to the market to set the 
stage for ‘green’ consumers to influence the choice of production processes used by 
industry. Since such programmes rely on market demand to achieve their environmental 
objectives, rather than government intervention, it is not surprising that they be found 
GATT-consistent, since the GATT is aimed at government regulations and not private 
transactions.  
 
Petersmann draws the following conclusion from the GATT 1947 cases regarding the 
necessity of trade-restrictive environmental measures as compared with market-based or 
other economic instruments: 
Discriminatory import bans, export prohibitions, discriminatory taxes and unilateral discriminatory 
trade sanctions were found to violate GATT obligations and not to be ‘necessary’ to achieve the 
environmental policy objectives of GATT Article XX. Non-discriminatory internal taxes, border tax 
adjustments, the ‘polluter pays principle’, product standards, production process requirements, 
labeling and ingredient disclosure requirements, prohibitions of unhealthy substances, restrictions on 
cigarette advertising, quantitative internal restrictions and state monopolies were recognized, in 
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conformity with the recommendations of economists, as more effective, alternative instruments of 
environmental policy permitted by GATT law.134 
 
The implication of this view is that where other available policy instruments, such as 
market-based instruments, can be shown to be more cost-effective, less trade-restrictive 
and equally effective in achieving an environmental goal, only those measures will be 
considered ‘necessary’. Necessity is thus determined by evaluating the effectiveness of 
the choice of policy instrument, not the choice of policy goal. Non-economic 
considerations are allowed to affect policy choices, but economic considerations become 
relevant at the implementation stage, particularly when the instruments chosen to 
implement those policies interfere with trade.135 
 
In Asbestos, the Appellate Body diverged on the appropriate weight to give to economic 
considerations in the context of analysing the ‘likeness’ of products under Article III:4. In 
a concurring opinion, one member of the Appellate Body wrote: 
…the other Members of the Division [share a] conception of the ‘fundamental’, perhaps decisive, 
role of economic competitive relationships in the determination of the ‘likeness’ of products under 
Article III:4….[T]he necessity or appropriateness of adopting a ‘fundamentally’ economic 
interpretation of the ‘likeness’ of products under Article III:4 does not appear to me to be free from 
substantial doubt. Moreover, in future contexts, the line between a ‘fundamentally’ and 
‘exclusively’ economic view of the ‘like products’ under Article III:4 may well prove very 
difficult, as a practical matter, to identify. It seems to me the better part of valour to reserve one’s 
opinion on such an important, indeed, philosophical matter, which may have unforeseeable 
implications, and to leave that matter for another appeal and another day, or perhaps other appeals 
and other days.136 
                                                
134 Petersmann, above n 23, 215. 
135 The effectiveness of a particular measure depends on several considerations. With respect to PPMs, a 
uniform measure may prove ineffective in different environmental, economic and political circumstances. 
The effect on trade may make the measure ineffective if it induces a shift to other markets, rather than 
compliance with the measure on the part of producers. Similarly, if the measure induces a shift to other 
environmentally harmful production methods, the measure may lack environmental effectiveness. Finally, 
where the effectiveness of the measure depends on the market power of the country that restricts imports, 
its effectiveness will depend on this factor. See Gaines, above n 44, 407-409.  
136 European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WTO Doc 
WT/DS135/AB/R (2001) (Report of the Appellate Body), paras 153-154. 
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A GATT-inconsistent measure will not be found necessary under Article XX(b) where 
alternative, GATT-consistent or less inconsistent measures are reasonably available. 
However, it is difficult to generalize as to the role that economic considerations may 
place in any given case in making a determination under this standard. Moreover, given 
the analytical role of the Article XX chapeau in assessing the manner in which measures 
are applied (that is, implementation), economic considerations should be reserved for the 
chapeau analysis. Economic considerations are not the only factor governments take into 
account in setting environmental policy. The  issue in Article XX(b) is whether the policy 
falls into the range of subject matters governed by the exception. In order to preserve the 
freedom of WTO members to determine their policy goals independently, the basis for 
choosing the policy should not be second-guessed by WTO panels. Rather, the panels 
should focus on whether the implementation of the policy goal meets the tests laid out in 
the chapeau. 
 
5. The Possibility of Compliance  
 
Another factor that may be considered under the test of the necessity of a given 
regulation is whether compliance is possible. Even assuming that an import prohibition 
were the only measure reasonably available to protect dolphins, the Tuna I panel found 
that the particular measure chosen by the United States could not be considered necessary 
within the meaning of Article XX(b). The United States linked the maximum incidental 
dolphin taking rate which Mexico had to meet during a particular period in order to be 
able to export tuna to the United States to the taking rate actually recorded for United 
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States fishermen during the same period. Consequently, the Mexican authorities could 
not know whether, at a given point in time, their policies conformed to the United States 
dolphin protection standards. The panel considered that a limitation based on such 
unpredictable conditions could not be regarded as necessary to protect the health or life of 
dolphins. 137  
 
6. Difficulty of Administrative Implementation 
 
In Reformulated Gasoline, the panel held that an alternative measure did not cease to be 
reasonably available simply because the alternative measure involved administrative 
difficulties for a member. The panel’s findings on that point were not appealed, and thus 
not address by the Appellate Body. However, in Asbestos, the Appellate Body addressed 
this issue. After noting that a measure which is impossible to implement is not reasonably 
available, the Appellate Body held that the difficulty of implementation is only one of 
several factors that must be taken into account.138  
 
7. Reference to International Standards  
 
Relying on evidence from the World Health Organization, the Thai Cigarettes panel 
found that non-discriminatory health protection measures (such as labelling requirements, 
bans on cigarette advertising, and non-discriminatory taxes) offered effective means to 
                                                
137 United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD, 39th Supp, 155, GATT Doc DS21/R 
(1991) (Report by the Panel not Adopted), 46.  
138 European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WTO Doc 
WT/DS135/AB/R (2001) (Report of the Appellate Body), paras 169-170. The Appellate Body did not 
elaborate on what other specific factors were to be considered. 
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achieve Thailand’s health policy goals regarding cigarettes in a manner consistent with 
GATT rules.139 The implication is that what is ‘necessary’ should be determined in part 
by reference to international standards, rather than unilaterally.140  
 
Canada, in its capacity of amicus curiae , used this argument in a challenge to a United 
States ban on asbestos in Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA141, arguing that the ban would 
‘unnecessarily impede international commerce’.142 Canada argued that since other 
industrial countries, the World Health Organization, and the International Labour 
Organization had all rejected a ban on asbestos in favour of a controlled-use policy, the 
complete ban was inconsistent with the GATT. 143 A ban would not be ‘necessary’ under 
the GATT where there is an international consensus that particular asbestos products may 
be regulated safely. 144 
 
                                                
139 See Thailand—Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, GATT BISD, 37th 
Supp, 200, GATT Doc DS10/R (1990)  (Report by the Panel Adopted 7 November 1990), (1991) 30 ILM 
1122, 1138-39. See also Petersmann, above n 23, 214. 
140 The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade expressly incorporates a general requirement to base 
standards on international standards and to use the least-trade-restrictive alternative. See Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade, 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 1A, 33 ILM 
1197 (1994), art 2. 
141 Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F. 2d 1201, 1209-1211 (5th Circ. 1991). The Court held that the 
Canadian petitioners did not have standing to contest the EPA's actions. The GATT did not give Canada 
standing to protest the EPA's decision in a United States court. The GATT establishes trade dispute 
procedures of its own. However, the Court vacated the regulation prohibiting the manufacturing and 
importation of asbestos because (1) the EPA failed to give the required notice to the public regarding the 
data it intended to use, and (2) the EPA failed to give adequate weight to statutory language requiring it to 
promulgate the least burdensome, reasonable regulation required to protect the environment adequately. For 
a further discussion of the case, see D Wirth, ‘A Matchmaker's Challenge: Marrying International Law and 
American Environmental Law’ (1992) 32 Virginia Journal of International Law 377, 409-410. 
142 Brief of Amicus Curiae Government of Canada, filed M ay 22, 1990 (No 89-4596), 1, cited in K 
McSlarrow, ‘International trade and the environment: building a framework for conflict resolution’ (1991) 
21 Environmental Law Reporter 1058910592, note 44. 
143 McSlarrow, ibid 10592-93. 
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In Asbestos, Canada adopted a similar view, arguing that controlled use was a less 
GATT-inconsistent and equally effective means of achieving France’s health policy with 
respect to asbestos. However, the international consensus on the carcinogenic effects of 
asbestos fibres, reflected in the views of the World Health Organization and other 
international bodies, influenced the Appellate Body’s decision to uphold France’s choice 
of a complete ban as the only means reasonably available to achieve its chosen level of 
health protection—a halt in the spread of asbestos-related risks. 145 Since the panel found, 
based on scientific evidence, that the efficacy of ‘controlled use’ remained to be 
demonstrated and remained doubtful in the case of the building industry and ‘do-it-
yourself’ enthusiasts, the Appellate Body held that ‘controlled use’ was not an alternative 
measure that would achieve the end sought by France. 146 
 
Thus, on the one hand, where there is international consensus that a given product poses a 
serious health threat, that will support a finding of fact that the measures taken to regulate 
the product fall within the range of policies covered in Article XX(b). On the other hand, 
where there is an international consensus that certain non-trade-restrictive methods of 
effectively achieving a particular environmental policy goal are reasonably available, 
trade restrictions will be deemed unnecessary to achieve that goal, and be ruled 
inconsistent with trade obligations.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
144 Brief of Amicus Curiae Govern ment of Canada, filed May 22, 1990 (No. 89-4596), 17, cited in 
McSlarrow, ibid 10594, note 76. 
145 See European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WTO 
Doc WT/DS135/AB/R (2001) (Report of the Appellate Body), para 162. 
146 Ibid para 174. 
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8. Discrimination 
 
Under GATT 1947, arbitrary discrimination between equally harmful products, premised 
solely on their country of origin, did not qualify as necessary. 147 In the Thai Cigarettes 
case, Thailand sought to justify a virtual ban on imported cigarettes under Article XX(b). 
The GATT panel’s report accepted that smoking endangers human health and that 
measures designed to reduce cigarette consumption were therefore permissible under 
Article XX(b). However, the Thai measure was designed to reduce consumption of 
imported cigarettes only. Accordingly, the panel found that, because imported cigarettes 
were banned, while the domestic production and sale of cigarettes remained unrestricted, 
and since effective alternative means of reducing cigarette consumption were available, 
the import ban was not necessary. 148 
 
9. Outstanding Issues Regarding XX(b) 
 
While the meaning of the Article XX term ‘necessary’ has been analysed in the factual 
contexts of several GATT and WTO disputes, in none of these cases was there a 
discussion of the relationship between this term and the general principle of necessity in 
international law. Indeed, there is little academic discussion of the relationship between 
these two concepts. Massimiliano Montini has written an interesting article proposing 
                                                
147 As Petersmann observes, it remains to be seen ‘to what extent inconsistencies of environmental 
measures with the basic GATT obligations can be justified as being ‘necessary’ in terms of art XX. 
Petersmann, above n 23 , 216. 
148 Thailand had alleged that there were differences in the composition of foreign and domestic cigarettes 
that justified the discriminatory measures, but this argument was not accepted by the GATT panel. See 
Thailand—Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, GATT BISD, 37th Supp, 200, 
GATT Doc DS10/R (1990)  (Report by the Panel Adopted 7 November 1990), (1991) 30 ILM 1122, 1127 
and 1130-31. Also see GATT Report, above n 6, 13. 
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that the Article XX(b) necessity test be applied to environmental measures in a manner 
consistent with the principle of necessity in international law.149 This is an excellent 
example of the scholarship that is needed to increase the coherence of WTO law with 
public international law, not only with respect to trade and environment, but more 
generally. I will explore this issue more fully in Chapter 4.  
 
Another area of academic discussion concerns the use of the European concept of 
proportionality in the development of the necessity test in Article XX. 150 I have argued 
elsewhere that the proportionality test used in the European Court of Justice is less 
favourable to environmental measures than is the least-trade -restrictive test traditionally 
used in GATT and WTO jurisprudence.151 It second guesses decisions of national 
governments regarding the level of environmental protection they choose and is thus 
more intrusive on the independence of national governments in the field of environmental 
policy. Since the purpose of Article XX is to remove certain policy areas from the 
                                                
149 Massimiliano Montini, ‘The Necessity Principle as an Instrument to Balance Trade and the Protection 
of the Environment’ in Francesco Francioni (ed), Environment, Human Rights and International Trade 
(2001). 
150 See, for example, A Desmedt, ‘Proportionality in WTO Law’ (2001) 4 Journal of International 
Economic Law 441; M Hilf and S Puth, ‘The Principle of Proportionality on its Way into WTO/GATT 
Law’ in A von Bogdandy, P Mavroidis and Y Mény (eds), European Integration and International 
Coordination, Studies in Transnational Economic Law in Honour of Claus-Dieter Ehlermann (2002) 199; 
and Jan Neumann and Elisabeth Türk, ‘Necessity Revisited: Proportionality in World Trade Organization 
Law After Korea—Beef, EC—Asbestos, and EC—Sardines’ (2003) 37 Journal of World Trade  199. 
Montini, ibid 155 proposes that the proportionality test be used to conduct a cost-benefit analysis to 
determine what is necessary under art XX. I disagree with both the use of the proportionality test and the 
use of cost-benefit analysis in art XX. See discussion below. Howse interprets aspects of United States—
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, AB-1998-4 (1998) 
(Report of the Appellate Body) as incorporating a proportionality concept into art XX(g). See Howse, 
above n 5 and discussion below. 
151 Bradly J Condon, ‘Reconciling Trade and Environment: A Legal Analysis of European and North 
American Approaches’ (2000) 8 Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law  1. 
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jurisdiction of the WTO, it would be inappropriate to introduce such an intrusive test in 
WTO jurisprudence.152 
 
The only jurisprudence that is inconsistent with my proposal to limit measures under 
Article XX(b) to those aimed at the protection of interests within the territory of the 
enacting country consists of obiter dicta in Tuna I (the actual holding is consistent with 
my proposal) and the reasoning regarding territorial reach in Tuna II. Since neither 
decision was adopted, nothing in the adopted jurisprudence is inconsistent with my 
proposal with respect to Article XX(b) (particularly with respect to GATT 1994).  
 
D. Article XX(g): Measures Relating to Conservation  
 
Article XX(g) has played a central role in GATT and WTO cases involving 
environmental issues. GATT panels tended to interpret XX(g) as restrictively as Article 
XX(b), applying a least-trade-restrictive test in both instances. While the Appellate Body 
has rejected this trend in terms of the analysis under each of these headings, making the 
threshold under Article XX(g) easier to meet than under Article XX(b), the chapeau 
applies to both at the end of the analysis. 
 
In Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon,153 a 
GATT panel examined regulations under the Canadian Fisheries Act 154 that prohibited 
                                                
152 Neumann and Türk, above n 150, reach the same conclusion for similar reasons. 
153 Canada—Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, GATT BISD, 35th Supp, 
98, GATT Doc 35S/98 (1988)  (Report of the Panel Adopted 22 March 1988). 
154 RSC 1985, c F-14, as am.  
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the export of unprocessed herring and salmon from Canada. The GATT panel concluded 
that ‘the export prohibitions...were contrary to Article XI:1 and were justified neither by 
Article XI:2(b) nor by Article XX(g)’.155 The panel developed a ‘primarily aimed at’ test 
in its interpretation of the words ‘relating to’ under GATT Article XX(g). 156 This test 
characterized the purpose of a measure by comparing its effect on the environment to its 
effect on trade. If the measure is not an effective means of environmental protection, but 
is an effective trade barrier, then the measure does not ‘relate to’ environmental 
protection and is treated as a simple trade barrier rather than an environmental measure. 
 
Canada advised the United States that it would accept the GATT decision and remove the 
export restrictions, but added ‘that our conservation and management goals cannot be met 
unless we continue to have a landing requirement’.157 The United States considered that 
such a requirement would seem ‘designed to have the same effect as the GATT illegal 
export restrictions’.158  
 
The Canadian government replaced the export prohibitions with new regulations 
requiring the same fish, plus a few additional species of salmon, to be landed at stations 
in the west coast province of British Columbia. Once landed, the regulations required the 
                                                
155 Canada—Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, GATT BISD, 35th Supp, 
98, GATT Doc 35S/98 (1988)  (Report of the Panel Adopted 22 March 1988), para. 5.1. GATT art XI:2(b) 
provides that art XI:1 does not apply to ‘import and export prohibitions necessary to the application of 
standards or regulations for the classification, grading or marketing of commodities in international trade’.  
156 Ibid. 
157 Letter of Canadian Minister for International Trade, Pat Carney, to United States Trade Representative 
Clayton Yuetter, March 21, 1988, cited in Herring (FTA) at 4. 
158 Letter of United States Trade Representative Clayton Yuetter to Canadian Minister for International 
Trade John Crosbie, May 2, 1988, cited In the Matter of Canada's Landing Requirement for Pacific Coast 
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completion of catch reports, reporting of landings, on-site examination, and biological 
sampling.159 The United States challenged Canada’s landing requirement as an export 
restriction that was designed to favour Canadian fish-processing plants, this time under 
the new Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (‘FTA’).160 Canada said the 
measure was necessary to ensure accurate data collection for the purpose of managing the 
resource. The relevant obligations and exceptions in the FTA mirrored those of GATT 
1947. 161 
 
In the Matter of Canada’s Landing Requirement for Pacific Coast Salmon and Herring 
(‘Herring (FTA)’) ,162 the FTA panel found the landing requirement to be an export 
restriction in violation of GATT XI:1 and then considered whether the measure could be 
saved by the GATT XX(g) exception. The FTA panel accepted the interpretation given 
by the GATT panel regarding the meaning of the words ‘relating to’: 
...the purpose of including Article XX(g) in the General Agreement was not to widen the scope for 
measures serving trade policy purposes but merely to ensure that the commitments under the General 
Agreement do not hinder the pursuit of policies aimed at the conservation of [exhaustible] natural 
resources...[W]hile a trade measure did not have to be necessary or essential to the conservation of 
an exhaustible natural resource, it had to be primarily aimed at the conservation of an exhaustible 
natural resource to be considered as ‘relating to’ conservation within the meaning of Article 
XX(g)...[S]imilarly...the terms ‘in conjunction with’ in Article XX(g) had to be interpreted in a way 
that ensures that the scope of possible actions under that provision corresponds to the purpose for 
which it was included in the General Agreement. A trade measure could therefore...only be considered 
                                                                                                                                            
Salmon and Herring, 2 Canadian Trade and Commodity Tax Cases 7162 (Final Report of the FTA Panel 
16 October 1989), 4. 
159 Pacific Herring Fishery Regulations, amendment, SOR/89-217, Canada Gazette Part II, Vol. 123, No. 
10, pp. 2384-2385; Pacific Commercial Salmon Fishery Regulations, amendment, SOR/89-219, Canada 
Gazette Part II, Vol. 123, No. 10, pp. 2390-2391, cited in Herring (FTA) at 4. 
160 Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, opened for signature 22 December 1987-2 January 1988, 
27 ILM 281 (entered into force 1 January 1989). 
161 GATT arts XI:1 and XX(g) are incorporated into the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement in  
arts 407 and 1201, respectively. 
162 In the Matter of Canada's Landing Requirement for Pacific Coast Salmon and Herring, 2 Canadian 
Trade and Commodity Tax Cases 7162 (Final Report of the FTA Panel 16 October 1989). 
 103 
to be made effective ‘in conjunction with’ production restrictions if it was primarily aimed at 
rendering effective these restrictions. (emphasis added) 163 
 
The FTA panel acknowledged the need to allow governments appropriate latitude in 
implementing conservation and environmental policies.164 However, the panel further 
developed the ‘primarily aimed at’ test by interpreting Article XX(g) to permit 
governments the freedom to employ a given conservation measure only ‘if the measure 
would have been adopted for conservation reasons alone’.165 The analysis under this test 
considers such factors as the conservation benefits of the measure and the alternative 
measures available that might achieve the same objective.  
 
The FTA panel adopted a cost-benefit analysis as the appropriate method to determine 
whether the stated conservation purpose of a measure is genuine, apparently assuming 
that such an approach was the only means of making environmental policy decisions: 
...since governments do not adopt conservation measures unless the benefits to conservation are worth 
the costs involved, the Panel must examine the costs of the conservation measure—both resource 
costs and the costs of inconvenience to commercial and other interests affected by the measure -- to 
determine whether the conservation benefits would in fact have led to the adoption of the 
                                                
163 Canada—Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, GATT BISD, 35th Supp, 
98, GATT Doc 35S/98 (1988)  (Report of the Panel Adopted 22 March 1988), para. 4.6, cited in In the 
Matter of Canada's Landing Requirement for Pacific Coast Salmon and Herring, 2 Canadian Trade and 
Commodity Tax Cases 7162 (Final Report of the FTA Panel 16 October 1989), 28-29. 
164In the Matter of Canada's Landing Requirement for Pacific Coast Salmon and Herring, 2 Canadian 
Trade and Commodity Tax Cases 7162 (Final Report of the FTA Panel 16 October 1989), 29. 
165 Ibid 30. Two commentators have misquoted this test. Shrybman writes: ‘...the panel went on to hold 
that it is also incumbent upon the country seeking to justify a conservation program that may have trade-
restricting effects to establish that the program ‘was established for conservation reasons alone and that no 
other means were available to accomplish those objectives.’ S Shrybman, Paying the Price: How Free 
Trade is Hurting the Environment, Regional Development, Canadian and Mexican Workers (1991), 6. 
Similarly, McKeith writes: ‘In dicta, however, the trade panel stated that any regulation restricting free 
trade would be upheld only if its sole purpose was conservation and no lesser [sic] restrictive alternative 
was available.’ M McKeith, ‘The Environment and Free Trade: Meeting Halfway at the Mexican Border’ 
(1991) 10 UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal 183, 207. While converting ‘relating to’ into ‘primarily aimed 
at’ stretches the meaning of those words, their conversion into ‘sole purpose’ by these commentators would 
make the term a narrower one than ‘necessary’, an interpretation that is supported by neither the GATT 
provision nor the panel interpretation thereof. 
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measure...[and] whether the government would have been prepared to adopt that measure if its own 
nationals had to bear the actual costs of the measure.166 
 
Charnovitz criticized this as an ‘idealistic but dubious proposition’ upon which to build a 
definition of ‘primarily aimed at’, concluding that such an inherently subjective analysis 
leaves environmental regulations vulnerable to a broad array of challenges.167 Cost-
benefit analysis is no more subjective than other kinds of analysis, such as ethical, 
philosophical or political analysis. And it may seem consistent with the primary function 
of trade agreements—to act as instruments of economic policy. However, it does not 
answer the question of whether a government would have enacted an environmental 
regulation in the absence of trade effects. In some instances, ethical and political 
considerations may cause governments to select the less cost-effective of two policy 
instruments.168 While cost-benefit analysis may have a role to play in balancing economic 
and environmental goals, it should not be used to determine whether a given regulation 
‘relates to’ environmental protection, since it is not capable of answering that question. 169  
                                                
166 In the Matter of Canada's Landing Requirement for Pacific Coast Salmon and Herring, 2 Canadian 
Trade and Commodity Tax Cases 7162 (Final Report of the FTA Panel 16 October 1989), 31. The panel 
took this economic analysis approach in spite of an earlier recognition that ‘the conservation of natural 
resources encompasses broader environmental concerns reflecting both economic and non-economic 
interests’. At 29. This test second-guesses what are in essence political policy decisions. However, the 
panel took the view that the prohibition against ‘disguised’ trade restrictions in art XX Preamble both 
required and empowered the panel to look behind a government's representations as to its purpose in 
enacting a measure to make its own evaluation of the conservation justification in question. At 32-33.  
167 S Charnovitz, ‘Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GATT Article 20’ (1991) Journal of World 
Trade 37, 50-51. 
168 See, for example, M Sagoff, The Economy of the Earth: Philosophy, Law, and the Environment (1988). 
Sagoff questions the role economic analysis should play in political decisions regarding the environment. 
He sees economic analysis as antithetical to democracy because it takes political decisions out of the hands 
of elected representatives and places them in the care of unelected economists. Sagoff argues that 
substantive environmental policy should be based on ethical, aesthetic, cultural, and historical 
considerations and, therefore, should be the subject of political deliberation, not economic analysis. If the 
latter has a role to play, it is limited to determining the most cost-effective of the procedures that may be 
used to implement the substantive policy goals that have already been determined by the politicians.  
169 Whether environmental regulation is a proper subject of cost-benefit analysis is a contentious issue. 
See, for example, Sagoff, ibid; S Rhoads, The Economist's View of the World: Governments, Markets, and 
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The panel was unable to determine with certainty how necessary the landing requirement 
was for the collection of data, and hence the conservation of the fishery, given the 
difficulty of measuring the risk that, without such a requirement, there could be 
substantial volumes of unlanded exports. Given a choice between erring on the side of 
conservation and removing a barrier to trade, they chose the latter, despite having earlier 
expressed the view that Article XX(g) was not intended to allow the trade interests of one 
country to override the ‘legitimate’ environmental concerns of another. 
 
One could infer from the panel’s application of the ‘primarily aimed at’ test that their 
interpretation required them to err on the side of trade liberalization when in doubt. The 
implication is that, where a measure is aimed equally170 at conservation and restricting 
                                                                                                                                            
Public Policy (1985); J Knetsch, ‘Economics, Losses, Fairness and Resource-use Conflicts’ in Ross and 
Saunders (eds), Growing Demands on a Shrinking Heritage: Managing Resource Use Conflicts (1991) 20; 
H Daly and J Cobb, For the Common Good (1989); and A Gore, Earth in the Balance: Ecology and the 
Human Spirit (1992), 182-196. In many cases, it is as impossible to accurately measure the monetary value 
of environmental benefits as it is to place a dollar value on non-pecuniary losses such as the death of a child 
in a tort action. Sagoff argues that some things should never be assigned a monetary value. He writes, ‘The 
things we cherish, admire, or respect are not always the things we are willing to pay for. Indeed, they may 
be cheapened by being associated with money. It is fair to say that the worth of things we love is better 
measured by our unwillingness to pay fo r them. Consider, for example, love itself.’ At 68. In sum, if the 
non-pecuniary value of an environmental benefit cannot be accurately measured, or should not be 
measured, then the issue of whether the economic cost of achieving that benefit is disproport ionate cannot 
be satisfactorily resolved using cost-benefit analysis. The Appellate Body has rejected cost-benefit analysis 
as a requirement for justifying a measure under Article XX(g) in United States—Standards for 
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc WT/DS2/AB/R, AB-1996-1 (1996) (Report of the 
Appellate Body), 21: 
We do not believe … that the clause ‘if made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption’ was intended to establish an empirical ‘effects test’ for the availability of the Article XX(g) exception. In the 
first place, the problem of determining causation, well-known in both domestic and international law, is always a difficult 
one. In the second place, in the field of conservation of exhaustible natural resources, a substantial period of time, perhaps 
years, may have to elapse before the effects attributable to implementation of a given measure may be observable. The 
legal characterization of such a measure is not reasonably made contingent upon occurrence of subsequent events. We are 
not, however, suggesting that consideration of the predictable effects of a measure is never relevant. In a particular case, 
should it become clear that realistically, a specific measure cannot in any possible situation have any positive effect on 
conservation goals, it would very probably be because that measure was not designed as a conservation regulation to begin 
with. In other words, it would not have been ‘primarily aimed at’ conservation of natural resources at all. 
170 Shrybman reads the decision differently, concluding that the case ‘illustrates that in a contest between 
environmental and trade objectives, the former is not likely to come out the winner even when the effects 
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trade, it will fail the FTA panel’s ‘primarily aimed at’ test and will not be considered a 
measure ‘relating to the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource’.171  
 
The ‘primarily aimed at’ test is meant to determine the purpose of the measure in 
question, rather than its effect. The FTA panel implicitly concluded that the primary 
purpose of the landing requirement was to restrict trade. However, the FTA panel also 
found that its primary effect was to facilitate the collection of information172 and that 
‘catch information is vital to Canada's management of its salmon and herring 
fisheries’.173 Nevertheless, the FTA panel concluded that access to 100 per cent of the 
catch was not necessary to the validity of the data.174  
 
The panel derived the ‘primarily aimed at’ test from the words ‘relating to’.175  ‘Relate to’ 
means to ‘have some connection or relation to’.176 The words ‘relating to’ cover a wider 
                                                                                                                                            
on trade are tangential or secondary’. See Shrybman, above n 165, 6. While this statement may be an 
accurate reading of the case, it is somewhat misleading, since the holding in the case errs on the side of 
trade where the purpose of the measure is equally divided between trade and environmental objectives, 
seemingly disregarding the effect of the measure. 
171 In the Matter of Canada's Landing Requirement for Pacific Coast Salmon and Herring, 2 Canadian 
Trade and Commodity Tax Cases 7162 (Final Report of the FTA Panel 16 October 1989), 52. One panel 
member disagreed with this conclusion and considered that the landing requirement did meet the criterion 
of being ‘primarily aimed at’ conservation. At 52, note 29. 
172 The panel stated, ‘an important reason for the specific rule requiring all salmon and herring to be landed 
in Canada was to make exports more amenable to data collection and this, in fact, is its principal effect’. 
Ibid 22. 
173 Ibid 52.   
174 Ibid 41. This was the key rationale for invalidating the regulations. The panel stated (at 54): ‘Because it 
is applicable to 100% of the salmon and herring catch, the present landing requirement cannot be said to be 
“primarily aimed at” conservation and thus cannot be considered a measure ‘relating to the conservation of 
an exhaustible natural resource’ within the meaning of GATT art XX(g) and hence not a measure subject to 
an exception applicable under art 1201 of the Free Trade Agreement’. 
175 In the panel’s view, ‘the “primarily aimed at” test is meant to determine whether [the measures are part 
of a genuine conservation programme]’: Ibid 30. The criterion in art XX(g) that the measures be taken ‘in 
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption’ was not at issue in the FTA case. 
Ibid 27. 
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range of measures than the words ‘necessary’ or ‘essential’.177 Even though the FTA 
panel adopted the GATT panel’s distinction between measures ‘necessary’ to the 
achievement of a stated policy purpose and measures ‘primarily aimed at’ conservation, 
in the end the FTA panel’s application of the latter test in the Herring (FTA) case 
transformed the words ‘relating to’ into a requirement that the measure be necessary. The 
‘primarily aimed at’ test, as set out in Herring (FTA), narrows the scope of the words 
‘relating to’ so that they are read as ‘necessary’. In both the GATT and the FTA cases, 
the elaboration of the ‘primarily aimed at’ test led to an interpretation that the ordinary 
meaning of the words ‘relating to’ does not bear. 
 
In effect, the FTA dispute panel interpreted the words ‘relating to’ in GATT Article 
XX(g) to mean that a measure cannot qualify as relating to conservation unless it is the 
least trade-restrictive means of achieving the conservation goal. 178 The FTA panel ruled 
that, while it was necessary to land 80 to 90 per cent of the catch in Canada to ensure 
proper data collection, it was not necessary to land 100 per cent in Canada. This FTA 
                                                                                                                                            
176 Webster's Dictionary, (2nd ed, 1959) vol 2, 1525. Similarly, Black's Law Dictionary , 1158, defines 
‘relate’ as ‘to stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association 
with or connection with’. 
177 Canada—Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, GATT BISD, 35th Supp, 
98, GATT Doc 35S/98 (1988)  (Report of the Panel Adopted 22 March 1988), para 4.6, cited in In the 
Matter of Canada's Landing Requirement for Pacific Coast Salmon and Herring, 2 Canadian Trade and 
Commodity Tax Cases 7162 (Final Report of the FTA Panel 16 October 1989), 28. 
178 See J Anderson and J Fried, ‘The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement in Operation’ (1991) 17 Canada-
United States Law Journal 397, 403, ‘...the principle promulgated by this panel states that, if one is 
pursuing environmental regulation, the GATT provides that one do so in the least trade-restrictive way 
possible without compromising the environmental standard one has set for oneself.’ Canada and the United 
States subsequently agreed to allow 20 to 25% of the catch to be landed outside Canada, subject to a further 
review regarding the effect on data collection. The implementation of the decision by Canada and the 
United States provides evidence of their intention that the least-trade-restrictive test form part of the 
analysis under art XX(g).  
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panel interpretation of Article XX(g) required the parties to use the least-trade restrictive 
means of conserving natural resources in order to rely on the exception.  
 
In Tuna I, the GATT panel interpreted Article XX(g) as only permitting measures aimed 
at resource conservation within the jurisdiction of the enacting country. The panel 
reasoned that a country can effectively control the production or consumption of a 
resource only to the extent that it falls under its jurisdiction.179 Moreover, the panel 
expressed the view that its interpretation restricting environmental measures to internal 
matters under Article XX ‘would affect neither the rights of individual countries to 
pursue their internal environmental policies and to cooperate with one another in 
harmonizing such policies’.180 This interpretation of Article XX(g) is inconsistent with 
the conceptual framework I proposed above. 
 
The Tuna II panel rejected the view that Article XX(g) limited the location of the 
resource in question. The panel noted that two previous panels had considered Article 
XX(g) to be applicable to policies relating to migratory species of fish, without 
distinguishing between fish caught inside or outside the jurisdiction of the country 
enacting the measure. The panel reasoned that other provisions in Article XX did not 
exclude measures aimed at actions outside a contracting party’s territorial jurisdiction and 
that international law permitted states to regulate the conduct of their nationals outside 
                                                
179 United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD, 39th Supp, 155, GATT Doc DS21/R 
(1991) (Report by the Panel not Adopted), 47. 
180 Ibid 51. 
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their territory. 181 However, the panel found that the American trade measures could only 
accomplish their objective by forcing other countries to adopt American-style laws and 
that this disqualified the measures under Article XX(g). This proved fatal: 
…measures taken so as to force other countries to change their policies, and that were effective 
only if such changes occurred, could not be primarily aimed at either the conservation of an 
exhaustible natural resource, or at rendering effective restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption…182 
 
Unlike the Herring and Salmon decision, the Tuna I and Tuna II rulings were never 
adopted by the GATT and have not been cited with approval by the Appellate Body. 
Indeed, recent interpretations and rulings of the Appellate Body have diverged 
significantly from the course charted by the Tuna rulings. Nevertheless, the Tuna rulings 
remain relevant to future interpretations in that they highlight the divergence 
interpretations that exist under GATT 1947 and GATT 1994.  Divergence and 
convergence of interpretations are relevant in determining the degree to which continuity 
of practice exists between the GATT 1947 and the GATT 1994, which in turn will inform 
future interpretations and negotiations in the trade and environment field.183 
 
The Appellate Body has examined Article XX(g) on three occasions under GATT 1994. 
In Reformulated Gasoline, at issue were American regulations under the Clean Air Act 
                                                
181 United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc DS29/R (1994) (Report by the Panel not 
Adopted), 33 ILM 839, 891-892. The panel gave the example of art XX(e), allowing measures ‘relating to 
the products of prison labour’, as one that clearly applied to extraterritorial subject matter. It also noted that 
a ‘state may in particular regulate the conduct of its fishermen, or of vessels having its nationality or any 
fisherman on these vessels, with respect to fish located in the high seas.’ 
182 Ibid paras 5.26-5.27. 
183 See Lord McNair,  The Law of Treaties (1961), 424, where the author states: 
‘...when there is doubt as to the meaning of a provision or an expression contained in a treaty, the relevant 
conduct of the contracting parties after the conclusion of the treaty has a high probative value as to the 
intention of the parties at the time of its conclusion.’ 
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that set different standards for foreign and domestic refiners.184 The measures were found 
to violate national treatment under GATT Article III:4. Having found that ‘clean air’ 
qualified as an exhaustible natural resource and that clean air standards were imposed 
upon both foreign and domestic producers, the Appellate Body found that the regulations 
qualified for provisional justification under Article XX(g). However, they failed to meet 
the test set out in the chapeau because the discrimination was arbitrary and unjustifiable. 
The United States had failed to make an effort to cooperate with foreign governments and 
refineries to facilitate the application of the same standard to foreign producers and the 
difference in standards imposed higher costs on foreign than on domestic producers. 
 
In Shrimp I and Shrimp II, at issue were US regulations under the Endangered Species 
Act that imposed an import ban on imports of shrimp from countries that did not meet 
unilaterally imposed US standards for the protection of migratory sea turtles. In the 
appeals, the issue of whether the US measures violated Article XI:1 was not contested. In 
Shrimp I, the policy of protecting turtles was found to meet the requirements of Article 
XX(g), since they were an exhaustible natural resource and the same requirements were 
imposed on domestic fishermen. The Appellate Body held that there was a sufficient 
jurisdictional nexus between the turtles and the United States because they spent part of 
their migratory life cycle in American waters, without ruling on whether there was an 
implied jurisdictional limit implied in the language of Article XX(g). However, the 
American regulations failed the chapeau test because the United States treated Latin 
                                                
184 United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc WT/DS2/9, 35 ILM 
274 (1996) (Report by the Panel) and 35 ILM 603 (1996) (Report by the Appellate Body adopted 20 May 
1996). 
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American and Southeast Asian countries differently. In particular, the United States had 
failed to make the same effort to negotiate an international agreement for turtle protection 
with Southeast Asian countries as it had for Latin America. 
 
In Shrimp II, the issue was whether the American regulations had been amended so as to 
comply with the ruling in Shrimp I. In the interim, the United States had made significant 
efforts to negotiate an international agreement for turtle protection with Southeast Asian 
countries and amended the regulations to comply with each of the requirements set out in 
Shrimp I. However, Malaysia did not fully participate in the new international agreement 
and refused to seek certification for its turtle program under the new American 
regulations. Malaysia argued that it should not be required to submit to unilaterally 
designed American requirements because that would violate its sovereignty. Both the 
panel and the Appellate Body found that the United States had met the requirements of 
the chapeau. In short, they interpreted Article XX(g) as allowing the United States to use 
unilateral trade measures to persuade Malaysia to implement internal measures to protect 
sea turtles. 
 
1. Exhaustible Natural Resources 
 
In Reformulated Gasoline, the Appellate Body ruled that clean air was an exhaustible 
natural resource. This decision is not consistent with my proposal. The environmental 
aim of the measure was to protect human, animal or plant life or health from the effects 
of air pollution inside the territory of the United States. As such, the measure should have 
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been dealt with under Article XX(b), not XX(g). This would have avoided the necessity 
of interpreting ‘exhaustible natural resource’ to include clean air. 
 
In Shrimp I, the Appellate Body held that sea turtles were an exhaustible natural resource, 
rejecting arguments that this term refers to non-living natural resources. The 
complainants argued that the term should be interpreted according to the understanding of 
this term in 1947, when the original GATT was drafted. However, as one author notes, 
the Appellate Body was bound to reject this view, due to the creation of a new 
interpretive context with the incorporation of GATT 1947 into the WTO framework in 
1994. 185 The Appellate Body noted that the generic term ‘natural resources’ was not static 
in its content but rather ‘by definition evolutionary’ and therefore had to be interpreted 
within the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of interpretation.186 
It then cited examples from several multilateral environmental agreements in which the 
term was used to include living and non-living natural resource. To support its conclusion 
that the turtles were ‘exhaustible’, the Appellate Body noted that they were listed under 
                                                
185 See Howse, above n 5, 502. Howse supports this evolutionary approach to the interpretation of the term, 
arguing that the issue is ‘whether a Member has a legitimate reason today for taking trade-restricting 
measures, not whether they would have had a legitimate reason in 1947’. At 503. Moreover, he argues that 
the Appellate Body’s interpretation of exhaustible natural resources is compatible with the original intent of 
the drafters of this provision, even if they thought living resources were not exhaustible, since they ‘might 
have intended XX(g) to be interpreted in light of the evidence at the time of the dispute concerning whether 
a given resource was exhaustible’. At 502. 
186 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, 
AB-1998-4 (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body), para 130, citing Namibia (Legal Consequences) 
Advisory Opinion  [1971] ICJ Rep 31. 
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CITES as being in danger of extinction. 187 Moreover, GATT 1947 panels had found fish 
to be included in this term.188 
 
2. ‘Relating to’ Means ‘Primarily Aimed at’ 
 
In Reformulated Gasoline, the Appellate Body adopted the same approach to the term 
‘relating to’ as used in GATT 1947: 
All the participants and the third participants in this appeal accept the propriety and applicability 
of the view of the Herring and Salmon report and the Panel Report that a measure must be 
‘primarily aimed at’ the conservation of exhaustible natural resources in order to fall within the 
scope of Article XX(g). Accordingly, we see no need to examine this point further, save, perhaps, 
to note that the phrase ‘primarily aimed at’ is not itself treaty language and was not designed as a 
simple litmus test for inclusion or exclusion from Article XX(g). 
…The relationship between the baseline establishment rules and the ‘non-degradation’ 
requirements of the Gasoline Rule is not negated by the inconsistency, found by the Panel, of the 
baseline establishment rules with the terms of Article III:4. We consider that, given that 
substantial relationship , the baseline establishment rules cannot be regarded as merely incidentally 
or inadvertently aimed at the conservation of clean air in the United States for the purposes of 
Article XX(g).189  
 
In Shrimp I, the Appellate Body applied the same test as in Reformulated Gasoline, 
noting that the term ‘relating to’ required an examination of ‘the relationship between the 
measure at stake and the legitimate policy of conserving exhaustible natural resources’.190 
In what appeared to be a reference to the legitimacy of the policy goal at issue, the 
Appellate Body stated, ‘the policy of protecting and conserving the endangered sea 
turtles here involved is shared by all participants and third participants in this appeal, 
                                                
187 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, 
AB-1998-4 (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body), para 132. 
188 Ibid para 131. 
189 United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc WT/DS2/AB/R, 
AB-1996-1 (1996) (Report of the Appellate Body), 19. 
190 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, 
AB-1998-4 (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body), para 135. 
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indeed, by the vast majority of nations of the world’  191, noting that at the time 144 States 
were party to CITES. 
 
In Shrimp I, the Appellate Body pursued the concept of substantial relationship further, 
noting that it required ‘a closed and genuine relationship of ends and means’.192 In the 
context of the Shrimp measure, that required examining ‘the relationship between the 
general structure and design of the measure…and the policy goal it purports to serve’.193 
The import ban was designed to influence countries to require the use of ‘turtle exclusion 
devices (‘TEDs’) in shrimp fishing to prevent harm to sea turtles and exempted shrimp 
harvested under conditions that did not adversely affect sea turtles, such as aquaculture. 
The requirement to use TEDs was directly connected with the policy of conserving sea 
turtles and was ‘not disproportionately wide in scope and reach in relation to the policy 
objective’.194 Therefore, the relationship between ends and means was ‘a close and real 
one’.195 
 
Howse describes the test applied by the Appellate Body in Shrimp I as ‘a ‘rational 
connection’ or reasonableness standard’ that uses an implicit proportionality concept. 196 
He interprets the reference to proportionality in scope and reach as a test of whether all of 
the trade-restrictive aspects of the American measure have some reasonable connection to 
the conservation programme. However, he argues that this test does not entail a cost -
                                                
191 Ibid para 135. 
192 Ibid para 136. 
193 Ibid para 137. 
194 Ibid para 141. 
195 Ibid para 141. 
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benefit analysis, but focuses instead on how well the design of the measure fits with its 
goal. While this is an accurate assessment of the ruling, referring to it as a proportionality 
test is apt to cause confusion, given the use of a proportionality test in European 
jurisprudence that involves a comparison of environmental benefits and trade-restrictive 
effects, an analysis that is absent in the Shrimp I decision (as Howse acknowledges). 
 
3. Restrictions on Domestic Production or Consumption 
 
Article XX(g) requires that conservation measures be ‘made effective in conjunction with 
restrictions on domestic production or consumption’. In Reformulated Gasoline , the 
Appellate Body interpreted ‘made effective’ as referring to a governmental measure 
being ‘operative’, as ‘in force’, or as having ‘come into effect’. The phrase ‘in 
conjunction with’ meant ‘together with’ or ‘jointly with’. In this regard, the Appellate 
Body stated: 
The clause is a requirement of even-handedness in the imposition of restrictions, in the name of 
conservation, upon the production or consumption of exhaustible natural resources. 
 
There is, of course, no textual basis for requiring identical treatment of domestic and imported 
products. Indeed, where there is identity of treatment - constituting real, not merely formal, 
equality of treatment - it is difficult to see how inconsistency with Article III:4 would have arisen 
in the first place.197  
 
In Shrimp I the Appellate Body applied the same test as in Reformulated Gasoline, 
finding that the requirement was met because the same standards were imposed on 
American shrimp fishermen and enforced with civil and criminal sanctions.  Later, in 
determining whether the American measures constituted arbitrary or unjustifiable 
                                                                                                                                            
196 Howse, above n 5, 503. 
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discrimination under the Article XX chapeau, the Appellate Body found that identical 
requirements did not pass the test because they failed to take into account differences in 
conditions in other countries rather than the effectiveness of other countries’ programs in 
conserving sea turtles. This point is discussed below, but it is important to note that 
equality of treatment imposes different requirements at different points of analysis. (In 
Shrimp I, the measure was found to violate Article XI:I, so the issue of discrimination 
under Article III did not arise in the report of the Appellate Body). 
 
In Reformulated Gasoline, the Appellate Body distinguished between the analysis of 
discrimination in Article III:4 and the analysis in Article XX(g): 
In the present appeal, …restrictions on the consumption or depletion of clean air by regulating the 
domestic production of ‘dirty’ gasoline are established jointly with corresponding restrictions with 
respect to imported gasoline. That imported gasoline has been determined to have been accorded 
‘less favourable treatment’ than the domestic gasoline in terms of Article III:4, is not material for 
purposes of analysis under Article XX(g).  
 
We do not believe, finally, that the clause…was intended to establish an empirical ‘effects test’ for 
the availability of the Article XX(g) exception. …in the field of conservation of exhaustible 
natural resources, a substantial period of time, perhaps years, may have to elapse before the effects 
attributable to implementation of a given measure may be observable. The legal characterization of 
such a measure is not reasonably made contingent upon occurrence of subsequent events. We are 
not, however, suggesting that consideration of the predictable effects of a measure is never 
relevant. In a particular case, should it become clear that realistically, a specific measure cannot in  
any possible situation have any positive effect on conservation goals, it would very probably be 
because that measure was not designed as a conservation regulation to begin with. In other words, 
it would not have been ‘primarily aimed at’ conservation of natural resources at all. 198 
 
Interpretations of Article XX(g) under GATT 1947 and GATT 1994, have been 
consistent in applying the ‘primarily aimed at’ test, albeit with some refinement over 
time. The term exhaustible natural resources has been consistently interpreted as applying 
to both living and non-living resources. In terms of the jurisdictional question, with the 
                                                                                                                                            
197 United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc WT/DS2/AB/R, 
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exception of Tuna I, interpretations have not limited the scope of Article XX(g) to 
internal environmental issues. However, while it is now clear that Article XX(g) covers 
resources that occur outside a nation’s territory, the degree of connection that is required 
between the country enacting the measure and the resource in question remains unclear. 
 
Howse argues that the requirement of restrictions on domestic production or consumption 
makes the issue of whether there is an implicit territorial or jurisdictional limitation in 
Article XX(g) a moot point. 
The AB’s failure to resolve the question of whether Article XX(g) has jurisdictional or territorial 
limits must be understood in light of the section’s condition that unilateral trade measures be taken 
in conjunction with restrictions on domestic resource production or consumption. By virtue of this 
condition, Article XX(g) already requires a link between environmental trade measures and 
domestic regulation dealing with the same conservation problem. Were a WTO Member to target 
its conservation concerns solely at the policies of other countries, without putting its own house in 
order, then it would not be able to meet this condition of XX(g). The question, then, of whether 
there is an implicit  territorial or jurisdictional limitation in XX(g) may therefore be largely moot, 
since Article XX(g) by its explicit language only applies to environmental trade measures that are 
coupled with domestic environmental regulation.199  
 
On this reading of Article XX(g), measures aimed at the conservation of transnational or 
global resources would fall into the range of subjects that fit the exception. However, 
measures aimed at the conservation of resources that only occur outside the territory of 
the country enacting the measure might also fit, since the importing country could impose 
restrictions on consumption of a resource that is not produced in its territory. 200 
 
4. Outstanding Issues Regarding XX(g) 
 
                                                                                                                                            
AB-1996-1 (1996) (Report of the Appellate Body), 20-21. 
198 Ibid. 
199 Howse, above n 5, 504. 
200 For example, signatories to CITES effectively impose domestic consumption restrictions with respect to 
endangered species that do not occur inside their territories. 
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The issue of the jurisdictional nexus that is required in Article XX(g) was left unresolved 
by the Appellate Body in the Shrimp cases. There are two important aspects to this issue. 
One aspect is whether the jurisdictional nexus in Article XX(g), in terms of the 
geographical location of the resource or environmental issue, should be the same as in 
Article XX(b). I have proposed a conceptual framework to be used to resolve this issue. 
My proposal is consistent with all of the adopted decisions regarding Article XX(b) and 
(g) except Reformulated Gasoline. The second aspect requires an analysis of 
jurisdictional nexus in light of the general principles of international law relating to the 
sovereign equality of States, extraterritoriality, and the doctrine of necessity. These issues 
will be analysed in Chapter 4.  
 
E. The Chapeau 
In the chapeau, the words ‘discrimination between countries where the same conditions 
prevail’ and ‘disguised restriction[s] on international trade’, provide little guidance on 
what conditions are relevant or what constitutes a disguise. The approach adopted in both 
Reformulated Gasoline and the Shrimp cases in the chapeau analysis is to focus on the 
manner in which a measure is applied, rather than its content (which has already been 
assessed under the specific exception). In Reformulated Gasoline , the Appellate Body 
discussed the purpose of the chapeau as follows: 
The chapeau by its express terms addresses, not so much the questioned measure or its specific 
contents as such, but rather the manner in which that measure is applied. It is, accordingly, 
important to underscore that the purpose and object of the introductory clauses of Article XX is 
generally the prevention of ‘abuse of the exceptions of [what was later to become] Article [XX].’ 
This insight drawn from the drafting history of Article XX is a valuable one. The chapeau is 
animated by the principle that while the exceptions of Article XX may be invoked as a matter of 
legal right, they should not be so applied as to frustrate or defeat the legal obligations of the holder 
of the right under the substantive rules of the General Agreement. If those exceptions are not to be 
abused or misused, in other words, the measures falling within the particular exceptions must be 
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applied reasonably, with due regard both to the legal duties of the party claiming the exception and 
the legal rights of the other parties concerned. 
 
The burden of demonstrating that a measure provisionally justified as being with in one of the 
exceptions set out in the individual paragraphs of Article XX does not, in its application, constitute 
abuse of such exception under the chapeau, rests on the party invoking the exception. That is, of 
necessity, a heavier task than that involved in showing that an exception, such as Article XX(g), 
encompasses the measure at issue.201  
 
In Reformulated Gasoline, Shrimp I and Shrimp II, the Appellate Body has fleshed out 
the analysis required under the chapeau for measures that have passed muster under 
Article XX(g). However, the same is not true with respect to Article XX(b).202 As a 
result, there remains an important analytical hurdle to jump—how the analysis of whether 
a measure is ‘necessary’ is different from the chapeau analysis. The analysis that has 
been set out thus far looks pretty similar, though not identical. For example, in finding 
that the American measure did not pass the chapeau test in Reformulated Gasoline, the 
Appellate Body stated: 
There was more than one alternative course of action available to the United States in 
promulgating regulations without differentiation as between domestic and imported gasoline.203  
 
This language resembles the requirement under Article XX(b) that WTO members must 
use the least ‘inconsistent’ measure reasonably available for it to qualify as necessary. 
 
                                                
201 United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc WT/DS2/AB/R, 
AB-1996-1 (1996) (Report of the Appellate Body), 22. 
202 In European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WTO 
Doc WT/DS135/AB/R (2001) (Report of the Appellate Body), the Appellate Body ruled that Canada had 
not met its burden of proof under art III:4 with respect to the issue of like products. While it ruled that the 
panel was correct in the manner in which it analyzed the measure under art XX(b) in terms of DSU art 11, 
the Appellate Body did not discuss the chapeau. (It did not have to because it found no violation of 
substantive obligations and therefore did not need to make a ruling under art XX.) 
203 United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc WT/DS2/AB/R, 
AB-1996-1 (1996) (Report of the Appellate Body). 
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In Shrimp I, the Appellate Body focused further on the theme of reasonableness in 
defining the role of the chapeau: 
The chapeau…is, in fact, but one expression of the principle of good faith….One application of 
this general principle, the application widely known as the doctrine of abus de droit, prohibits the 
abusive exercise of a state’s rights and enjoins that whenever the assertion of a right ‘impinges 
upon the field covered by [a] treaty obligation, it must be exercised bona fide, that is to say, 
reasonably.204 
 
The Appellate Body has broken down the chapeau analysis to first ask whether a measure 
is applied in a manner that constitutes ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the  same conditions prevail’, which in turn contains three elements: (1) 
the application of the measure results in discrimination; (2) the discrimination is arbitrary 
or unjustifiable; and (3) the discrimination occurs between countries where the same 
conditions prevail (between different exporting countries or between the exporting 
countries and the importing country).205 In both Reformulated Gasoline and the Shrimp 
cases, the chapeau was read so as to require an effort at international cooperation, an 
important point that is discussed below. 
 
1. Unjustifiable Discrimination 
 
In Reformulated Gasoline, the Appellate Body found two elements of the US measures to 
constitute unjustifiable discrimination: 
                                                
204 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, 
AB-1998-4 (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body), para 158. The characterization of the role of the 
chapeau as preventing the abuse of the rights listed in the specific exceptions means that the only logical 
sequence of analysis is to consider the specific right before analyzing in the chapeau whether the right has 
been abused. As Howse notes, ‘[i]t is conceptually impossible to know whether a Member is abusing their 
rights until those rights have been determined’. See Howse, above n 5, 499. 
205 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, 
AB-1998-4 (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body), para 150. 
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We have above located two omissions on the part of the United States: to explore adequately 
means, including in particular cooperation with the governments of Venezuela and Brazil, of 
mitigating the administrative problems relied on as justification by the United States for rejecting 
individual baselines for foreign refiners; and to count the costs for foreign refiners that would 
result from the imposition of statutory baselines. In our view, these two omissions go well beyond 
what was necessary for the Panel to determine that a violation of Article III:4 had occurred in the 
first place. The resulting discrimination must have been foreseen, and was not merely inadvertent 
or unavoidable. In the light of the foregoing, our conclusion is that the baseline establishment rules 
in the Gasoline Rule, in their application, constitute ‘unjustifiable discrimination’ and a ‘disguised 
restriction on international trade.’ We hold, in sum, that the baseline establishment rules, although 
within the terms of Article XX(g), are not entitled to the justifying protection afforded by Article 
XX as a whole.206  
 
In Shrimp I, the Appellate Body found that the American regulations (but not the statute 
upon which they were based) failed this test for four reasons. First, the regulations 
required WTO members to adopt ‘essentially the same policy’ as that applied in the 
United States without taking into account other policies and measures a country may 
have adopted that would have a comparable effect on sea turtle conservation. 207 Second, 
the United States applied the same standard without taking into consideration whether it 
was appropriate for the conditions prevailing in other countries. 208 Third, the United 
States failed to engage in ‘serious, across-the -board negotiations with the objective of 
concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements for the protection and conservation of sea 
turtles, before enforcing the import prohibition’.209 Fourth, the United States pursued 
negotiations with countries in the Americas but not in South and South-east Asia and 
gave the former three years to adopt TED requirements while the latter had only four 
months. Having successfully negotiated the Inter-American Convention, the United 
                                                
206 United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc WT/DS2/AB/R, 
AB-1996-1 (1996) (Report of the Appellate Body). 
207 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, 
AB-1998-4 (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body), para 163. 
208 Ibid para 165. 
209 Ibid para 166. 
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States had demonstrated that there was an alternative course of action reasonably 
available to achieve its goal of turtle conservation. 
 
2. International Cooperation and Justifiable Discrimination 
 
If non-discriminatory administration of a measure requires international cooperation, an 
effort must be made to secure that cooperation. In Reformulated Gasoline, the Appellate 
Body rejected the argument of the United States that it was justified in applying different 
standards to domestic and foreign refiners because verification procedures with foreign 
refiners would require international cooperation whereas verification of domestic refiners 
would not.  
 
In essence, the American argument that it was easier to discriminate than to cooperate 
was not accepted, just as the same (implicit) argument was not accepted in Shrimp I. 
The United States must have been aware that for these established techniques and procedures to 
work, cooperative arrangements with both foreign refiners and the foreign governments concerned 
would have been necessary and appropriate. …[It appeared that] the United States had not pursued 
the possibility of entering into cooperative arrangements with the governments of Venezuela and 
Brazil or, if it had, not to the point where it encountered governments that were unwilling to 
cooperate. The record of this case sets out the detailed justifications put forward by the United 
States. But it does not reveal what, if any, efforts had been taken by the United States to enter into 
appropriate procedures in cooperation with the governments of Venezuela and Brazil so as to 
mitigate the administrative problems pleaded by the United States.210  
 
Thus, while the American measures were provisionally justified under Article XX(g), 
they failed the test of ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’ of the chapeau.  
 
                                                
210 United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc WT/DS2/AB/R, 
AB-1996-1 (1996) (Report of the Appellate Body). 
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This view that efforts to secure international cooperation must be made before GATT-
incons istent action can be justified under the chapeau is consistent with the Appellate 
Body’s interpretation of the chapeau in Shrimp I and Shrimp II, a chapeau analysis that 
was also made in the context of Article XX(g).211 In order to make the analysis of 
Articles XX(b) and (g) coherent, this factor should not be considered in determining what 
is necessary under Article XX(b) (as in Tuna I), but rather reserved to the chapeau 
analysis. In this regard, the analytical procedure used in Tuna I has been implicitly 
overturned by Reformulated Gasoline and the Shrimp cases, since the chapeau analysis 
will have to be consistent regardless of whether the measure fits Article XX(b) or (g).  
 
3. Arbitrary Discrimination 
 
In Shrimp I, the Appellate Body found the lack of flexibility embodied in the American 
requirement to adopt essentially the same policy without consideration for differences in 
prevailing conditions constituted not only unjustifiable, but also arbitrary, 
discrimination. 212 In addition, the lack of transparency in the certification process through 
which US officials determined whether a country could be exempted from the import ban 
constituted arbitrary discrimination. There was no opportunity for the applicant country 
to be heard, no opportunity to respond to arguments made against it, no notice given of a 
negative decision, no reasons provided for the decision, and no procedure for review or 
                                                
211 What remains unclear, however, is whether art XX must be interpreted as containing a general duty to 
negotiate. This issue is discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. 
212 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, 
AB-1998-4 (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body), para 177. 
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appeal.213 In other words, the lack of due process in the denial of certification constituted 
arbitrary discrimination compared to those who were granted certification. 214 
 
In Shrimp II, the panel and Appellate Body both found that the amended US regulations, 
together with the efforts made to conclude a comparable multilateral agreement for turtle 
conservation in the Indian Ocean region, had addressed all of the flaws identified in 
Shrimp I. Even though the United States did not succeed in concluding an agreement with 
Malaysia, the United States no longer applied the measures in a manner that constituted 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination under the chapeau.  
 
4. Countries Where the Same Conditions Prevail 
 
The analysis of conditions in different countries should depend on the location of the 
environmental concern. Where the issue is the effect of the product itself on the health or 
environment of the importing countries, there should be no reason to discriminate against 
products produced in countries that have harmonized product or process standards or that 
use different standards that achieve the same level of safety (so that mutual recognition is 
feasible). In this category of measures, different conditions can justify differential 
treatment. However, the analysis need not take place in Article XX(b), since the effect of  
the product on human health or the environment would be a distinguishing feature in the 
analysis of whether they are like goods. 
 
                                                
213 Ibid para 180. 
214 Ibid para 181. 
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Where the issue is the effect of PPMs on the transnational or global environment, 
differences must be taken into account in order to ensure that the measure is effective. 
This aspect of the chapeau thus recognizes that applying the same requirements without 
regard for differences between countries may be both ineffective (with respect to 
achieving the stated goal of the requirements) and inequitable (in that it results in 
inequality of treatment). 
 
5. Disguised Restriction 
 
In Shrimp I and Shrimp II, the Appellate Body did not address the issue of ‘disguised 
restriction’.215 In Reformulated Gasoline, the Appellate body stated the following: 
We consider that ‘disguised restriction’, whatever else it covers, may properly be read as embracing 
restrictions amounting to arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination in international trade taken under the 
guise of a measure formally within the terms of an exception listed in Article XX. Put in a  somewhat 
different manner, the kinds of considerations pertinent in deciding whether the application of a 
particular measure amounts to ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’, may also be taken into 
account in determining the presence of a ‘disguised restriction’ on international trade. The 
fundamental theme is to be found in the purpose and object of avoiding abuse or illegitimate use of the 
exceptions to substantive rules available in Article XX.216  
 
This aspect of the chapeau test thus remains large ly undefined. While the definition of 
‘disguised restriction’ was left floating in the Shrimp cases, the Appellate Body appears 
to have accepted that the American measures truly were motivated by the desire to 
prevent the extinction of sea turtles, rather than protectionist aims. The facts of the case 
did not lend themselves to a finding of ‘disguised restriction’. It will likely take a case 
                                                
215 In United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 
by Malaysia, WTO Doc WT/DS58/AB/RW (2001) (Report of the Appellate Body), para 142, the panel 
found the revised US measures to be consistent with the requirements of the chapeau and the Appellate 
Body agreed, but without specifically discussing the issue of disguised restriction. 
216 United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc WT/DS2/AB/R, 
AB-1996-1 (1996) (Report of the Appellate Body). 
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that involves a cleverly disguised protectionist measure to flesh out the analysis under 
this test, such as the landing requirement that Canada used to replace its export restriction 
in the Herring and Salmon case. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
The use of trade measures to address environmental concerns can be addressed at several 
different points in GATT. Where such measures do not violate national treatment or 
MFN obligations, either because they do not discriminate or because they apply different 
measures to distinguishable products, there may be no need to justify them under Article 
XX. However, where such measures take the form of import or export restrictions, they 
will generally fail to meet the obligations set out in Article XI and will have to be 
justified under Article XX. 
 
While it is clear that Articles XX(b) and (g) cover environmental trade measures, what 
remains unclear is the division of subject matter between these two headings. I have 
proposed that, where a measure does not clearly fit into one or the other, then the subject 
matter should be assigned based on the location of the environmental concern, with 
domestic concerns dealt with under XX(b) and transnational or global concerns dealt with 
under XX(g). Using this proximity-of-interest framework, the measures at stake in 
Reformulated Gasoline should have been addressed under Article XX(b). Measures such 
as those used in the Shrimp cases belong in Article XX(g). These subparagraphs leave 
WTO members free to choose their environmental policies. However, once it is 
determined that the policy qualifies as one covered by one of these subparagraphs, the 
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tests of the chapeau will determine whether the implementation of the policy goal is 
consistent with GATT. 
 
Under the Article XX exceptions, the burden of proving that a measure is necessary is on 
the country enacting the measure and seeking the exception. 217 As the cases have 
demonstrated, this can be a difficult burden of proof to meet.218 To demonstrate that a 
trade restriction is necessary to achieve its stated environmental goal, an importing nation 
must prove that it is the least-trade -restrictive measure reasonably available to achieve the 
policy goal. While this test has not been applied by WTO panels in Article XX(g) to 
determine whether a measure ‘relates to’ conservation, in practice it has been applied 
                                                
217 United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, GATT BISD, 36th Supp 345 (Report by the Panel 
adopted on 7 November 1989). See also McDorman, above n 13, 522, note 292. In contrast, under the 
North American Free Trade Agreement between the Government of Canada, the Government of the United 
Mexican States and the Government of the United States of America, opened for signature 17 December 
1992, 32 ILM 296 (1993) (entered into force 1 January 1994), the importing nation must prove the purpose 
is to achieve a ‘legitimate objective’: art 904(4)(a); unless the measure ‘conforms to an international 
standard’: art 905(2).  
218 The issue of burden of proof has been repeatedly examined in WTO jurisprudence.  The Appellate 
Body stated in United States—Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, 
WTO Doc WT/DS33/AB/R (1997) (Report of the Appellate Body), 335 that: 
‘… the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative 
of a particular claim or defence.  If that party adduces evidence sufficient to raise a presumption that what 
is claimed is true, the burden then shifts to the other party, who will fail unless it adduces sufficient 
evidence to rebut the presumption.’  
In European Communities—Trade Description of Sardines , the panel stated: 
‘Once the Panel determines that the party asserting the affirmative of a particular claim or defence has 
succeeded in raising a presumption that its claim is true, it is incumbent upon the Panel to assess the merits 
of all the arguments advanced by the parties and the admissibility, relevance and weight of all the factual 
evidence submitted with a view to establishing whether the party contesting a particular claim has 
successfully refuted the presumption raised.  In the event that the arguments and the factual evidence 
adduced by the parties remain in equipoise, the Panel must, as a matter of law, find against the party who 
bears the burden of proof.   
Under the well-established principle concerning burden of proof, it is for the complaining party to establish 
the violation it alleges; it is for the party invoking an exception or an affirmative defense to prove that the 
conditions contained there are met; and it is for the party asserting a fact to prove it.’ European 
Communities—Trade Description of Sardines, WTO Doc WT/DS231/R (2002) (Report of the Panel), citing 
Turkey—Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, WTO Doc WT/DS34/R (Report of the 
Panel), as modified by the, WT/DS34/AB/R, adopted 19 November (1999) (Report of the Appellate Body), 
para 9.57. 
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under the chapeau. Current jurisprudence suggests that it is easier to get provisional 
justification under Article XX(g) than under (b), but the analysis of what is necessary 
under (b) does not look very different than the analysis that has been applied under the 
chapeau. Indeed, no analysis of XX(b) has ever made it to the chapeau under GATT 
1994. 219 Thus far, the Appellate Body has avoided having to explain how this test differs 
from the chapeau test. Since many aspects of the least-trade -restrictive test ultimately 
turn on the range of choices available to implement a particular policy goal, 
considerations related to this test would be more appropriately placed in the chapeau 
analysis. 
 
While Article XX has to be applied on a case-by-case basis, the body of cases to date 
provide a basis for summarizing the types of factors that are relevant to the analysis of the 
manner in which a policy goal is implemented. First, compliance with the measure must 
be possible.220 The measure must therefore be clear as to what constitutes compliance. 
This may be viewed as an aspect of transparency. Second, there should be international 
consensus that trade restrictions are the most effective means available to achieve the 
measure’s environmental goal.221 At the very least, there should be no international 
                                                
219 In European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WTO 
Doc WT/DS135/AB/R (2001) (Report of the Appellate Body), the Appellate Body found the measure to 
qualify under XX(b), but did not proceed to analyze its application under the chapeau.  
220 See United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD, 39th Supp, 155, GATT Doc DS21/R 
(1991) (Report by the Panel not Adopted), where the United States required foreign fishermen to kill no 
more than 1.25 times as many dolphins as American fishermen in the course of catching tuna. If they did 
not meet this condition, their tuna was banned from the American market. However, the foreign fishermen 
had no way of knowing in advance how many dolphins their American counterparts would kill in each year 
and thus could not know whether they had complied with the condition until after the fact. 
221 For example, in European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing 
Products, WTO Doc WT/DS135/AB/R (2001) (Report of the Appellate Body), the fact of international 
consensus on the health risks posed by asbestos was a key factor in finding that it was necessary to protect 
human health. 
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consensus 222 that the trade restrictions are unnecessary. 223 Third, where international 
cooperation is possible, genuine efforts to resolve the problem through international 
cooperation should have failed. 224  Fourth, one should consider whether market-based 
incentives, such as environmental labelling and non-discriminatory green taxes, would be 
as effective as trade restrictions to achieve the environmental goal.225 Fifth, the measure 
must address a problem connected with the environment of the territory of the country 
enacting the measure. A measure is unlikely to qualify as necessary if it addresses a 
                                                
222 There are two approaches to defining when a sufficient degree of international consensus has been 
reached. It may require agreement among a majority of countries or unanimity. Unanimity is impractical at 
the global level due to the number of nations involved, but is obviously necessary at the bilateral level, and 
advisable at the trilateral level. The GATT adopts a ma jority approach. The GATT Report argues that 
GATT rules are unlikely to block ‘regional or global policies which command broad support within the 
world community.’ GATT Report, above n 6, 1. The Report implies that what is meant by ‘broad support’ 
is at least a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, comprising more than half of the contracting parties - the 
majority required under the waiver provision of art XXV. The Report states, ‘If most of GATT's 
contracting parties agree to participate in a particular multilateral environmental agreement, the consistency 
of its trade provisions with GATT is not likely to be a problem since there would be enough votes to secure 
a waiver, if necessary.’ At 12. 
North American Free Trade Agreement between the Government of Canada, the Government of the United 
Mexican States and the Government of the United States of America, opened for signature 17 December 
1992, 32 ILM 296 (1993) (entered into force 1 January 1994), art 104, on the other hand, implies that, 
within North America, ‘international consensus’ means unanimity. Art 104 expressly sets out which 
multilateral or bilateral environmental agreements may override NAFTA's trade obligations, and provides 
for the addition of further environmental agreements to the existing list by supplementary agreements in 
writing between the parties. 
223 See Thailand—Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, GATT BISD, 37th 
Supp, 200, GATT Doc DS10/R (1990)  (Report by the Panel Adopted 7 November 1990). Thailand tried to 
reduce consumption of imported cigarettes with trade barriers and discriminatory taxes, without trying to 
reduce consumption of domestic cigarettes. The GATT panel accepted evidence from the World Health 
Organization that non-discriminatory measures, such as labeling, advertising bans, and non-discriminatory 
taxes, provided effective means with which to achieve Thailand's health goals without restricting trade. 
224 United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD, 39th Supp, 155, GATT Doc DS21/R 
(1991) (Report by the Panel not Adopted), United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc 
DS29/R (1994) (Report by the Panel not Adopted), United States—Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline , WTO Doc WT/DS2/AB/R, AB-1996-1 (1996) (Report of the Appellate Body), 
United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, AB-
1998-4 (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body), United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 by Malaysia, WTO Doc WT/DS58/AB/RW (2001) (Report of 
the Appellate Body). 
225 United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD, 39th Supp, 155, GATT Doc DS21/R 
(1991) (Report by the Panel not Adopted), Thailand—Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on 
Cigarettes , GATT BISD, 37th Supp, 200, GATT Doc DS10/R (1990)  (Report by the Panel Adopted 7 
November 1990). 
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problem that does not affect the importing nation. Nor will it be necessary if it purports to 
address a domestic problem, but does nothing to restrict domestic activities that are a 
cause of the problem.226 
 
Rather than limit political discretion with respect to the formulation of environmental 
policy, GATT Article XX seeks to limit political discretion regarding its implementation. 
Under Article XX, a nation can only justify trade -restrictive environmental measures if 
there are no less trade-restrictive and equally effective means available to implement its 
environmental policies. GATT Articles XX(b) and (g) are not concerned with what 
environmental policies should be, but whether the subject of the measure falls within the 
range of policies covered by the relevant heading. The chapeau focuses on  how they are 
achieved. Trade restrictions used to achieve environmental goals must be implemented so 
as to be the most effective means of achieving the stated goal.  
 
A primary aim of trade rules concerning environmental laws has traditionally been to 
prohibit their use as disguised trade barriers. 227 This prohibition assumes that, as other 
trade barriers are eliminated, protectionists may seek to have environmental policies 
implemented using the most trade-restrictive means available, effectively replacing tariffs 
with non-tariff barriers to trade. The prohibition against the use of disguised trade barriers 
is designed to prevent such circumvention of trade obligations. 
 
                                                
226 Thailand—Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, GATT BISD, 37th Supp, 
200, GATT Doc DS10/R (19 90)  (Report by the Panel Adopted 7 November 1990). 
227 See GATT art XX.  
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Another central purpose of the trade-environment rules is to seek a balance between trade 
and environmental policy goals, by permitting environmental policy to be implemented in 
a manner that restricts trade where necessary. In order to achieve that balance, the rules 
must also restrict the use of trade-restrictive environmental policy instruments. GATT 
Article XX therefore require policy makers to choose the least trade-restrictive means 
available to achieve their environmental goals. 
 
These considerations do not require a nation to justify its substantive choice of 
environmental policy, but rather the methods it chooses to implement that policy. This 
distinction is important for two principal reasons. First, it clarifies which aspect of a 
challenged environmental measure is to be scrutinized by trade panels. Secondly, it 
determines the kind of analysis that is appropriate to resolve the issue of whether the 
measure is the most effective means available of achieving the environmental goal, an 
issue that is crucial to determining whether a party has chosen the least trade-restrictive 
means of implementing its stated environmental policy goal.  
 
GATT and WTO jurisprudence has clarified the factors that apply to the analysis of 
implementation. The analytical procedure has evolved to assign different roles to the 
chapeau and the subparagraphs, although this evolution is not complete with respect to 
Article XX(b). However, the jurisprudence has failed to clarify the range of policies that 
are susceptible to provisional justification under Articles XX(b) and (g). This is in part 
due to the need to assess the parameters of national jurisdiction in the context of public 
international law in a manner that is consistent with WTO law. For example, the 
relationship between the term ‘necessary’ in Article XX(b) and the general principle of 
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necessity in customary international law could serve to define the parameters of this 
heading. However, as I will discuss in Chapter 4, it would be preferable to place the 
analysis of the necessity principle in the chapeau, where it can be applied in a uniform 
manner to measures under both Articles XX(b) and (g). In the context of Article XX(g), 
principles of international law regarding the sovereign equality of States and 
extraterritoriality may place limits on the range of permissible policies. These issues are 
explored in the next two chapters. 
 
In principle, the analysis under the chapeau should be the same whether the measure has 
been provisionally justified under Article XX(b) or (g). In practice, however, the facts of 
each case must dictate the appropriate factors to consider in a given situation. In 
particular, the factors that come into play when an importing country uses trade sanctions 
to motivate a change in the laws and policies of another country may have to take into 
consideration differences between countries that would not come into play where the aim 
is only to protect the domestic environment of the importer. The factors considered in this 
context by the Appellate Body in the Shrimp decisions represent an initial attempt to flesh 
out the analysis in this regard and are discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
Crossing the Line: MEAs, Unilateral Measures and Jurisdiction 
 
I. Introduction 
 
This chapter will consider to what extent GATT permits the use of trade measures to 
address international environmental problems in multilateral environmental agreements 
(‘MEAs’) and unilateral measures by nations.1 This chapter analyses the consistency of 
unilateral and multilateral trade restrictions with customary international law regarding 
the jurisdictional competence of States, international environmental law, a nd WTO law. 
This chapter then considers whether the least-trade-restrictive rule should apply to MEA 
trade measures. Finally, I show how the authorization of unilateral trade measures under 
GATT Article XX creates a problem of unequal access to the rights provided by that 
provision, raising concerns regarding the consistency of unilateral measures with the 
sovereign equality of States. 
                                                
1 In sections II, IV, V and VI of this chapter, the discussion of United States—Restrictions on Imports of 
Tuna, GATT BISD, 39th Supp, 155, GATT Doc DS21/R (1991) (Report by the Panel not Adopted), 30 ILM 
1594 (1991) and United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,  WTO Doc 
WT/DS/AB/R, AB-1998-4, 12 October 1998 (Report of the Appellate Body adopted 6 No vember 1998) 
closely follows the discussion of these two cases in Bradly J Condon, ‘Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements and the WTO: Is the Sky Really Falling?’ (2002) 9 Tulsa Journal of International and 
Comparative Law  533. However, the analysis of these cases has changed significantly in light of United 
States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Art 21.5 by Malaysia, 
WTO Doc WT/DS58/RW, 15 June 2001 (Report of the Panel); WTO Doc WT/DS58/AB/RW, 22 October 
2001, (Report of the Appellate Body Adopted 21 November 2001), a case that was not analysed in this 
article. The summary of the submissions of the parties in United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 
ibid, closely follows Bradly J Condon, Making Environmental Protection Trade Friendly Under the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (unpublished LL M thesis, University of Calgary, 1993). 
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II. The Tuna and Shrimp Rulings on Jurisdiction 
 
The issue of whether there is an implied jurisdictional limitation in GATT Article XX 
was raised in the Tuna cases2 and the Shrimp cases.3  This part reviews the evolution of 
Article XX interpretations with respect to this issue. 
 
In United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (1991) (‘Tuna I’), the United States 
had banned tuna imports from several countries, including Mexico, pursuant to its Marine 
Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (‘MMPA’).4 The stated purpose of the United States 
                                                
2 United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD, 39th Supp, 155, GATT Doc DS21/R 
(1991) (Report by the Panel not Adopted), 30 ILM 1594 (1991) and United States – Restrictions on Imports 
of Tuna, GATT Doc DS29/R (1994) (Report by the Panel not Adopted), 33 ILM 839 (1994). 
3 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,  WTO Doc WT/DS58, 15 
May 1998 (Report of the Panel), WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, AB-1998-4, 12 October 1998 (Report of the 
Appellate Body adopted 6 November 1998) and United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, Recourse to Art 21.5 by Malaysia, WTO Doc WT/DS58/RW, 15 June 2001 (Report of 
the Panel); WTO Doc WT/DS58/AB/RW, 22 October 2001, (Report of the Appellate Body Adopted 21 
November 2001). It is important to note that GATT 1947, under which the Tuna cases were decided, is 
legally distinct from GATT 1994, under which the Shrimp cases were decided. See WTO Agreement, Art 
II(4). However, the wording of GATT 1947, Art XX was not changed in GATT 1994. What did change 
was the incorporation of environmental concerns in the WTO Agreement Preamble, which affects the 
interpretation of GATT Art XX.  In addition, the DSU expressly incorporates the customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law, while the GATT 1947 did not. See Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (‘DSU’), 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying the 
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments—Results of the 
Uruguay Round, Annex 2, 33 ILM 1197 (1994), Art 3(2). While this should be viewed as a codification 
rather than a substantive change, it has led to more references to international law in WTO rulings. The 
Uruguay Round integrated GATT 1994 into a new framework of several agreements under the 
administration of the World Trade Organization. While the relevant exceptions in Art XX of GATT 1947 
and GATT 1994 are the same, the interpretation of the has changed due to the introduction of new 
references to environmental protection and sustainable development in the WTO Agreement Preamble, and 
the explicit reference to the customary rules of interpretation of customary international law in art 3(2) of 
the DSU. It was more difficult to have panel decisions adopted under the old GATT because the 
requirement for unanimous agreement essentially gave each contracting party a veto. The DSU created an 
Appellate Body to hear appeals of panel decisions on issues of law and legal interpretations. See DSU, art 
17(1) and (7).  The DSU eliminated the veto by requiring the adoption of the AB decision unless there is 
unanimous agreement against adoption. See DSU, art 17(14).  
4 The Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA) (P.L. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (1972), as amended, 
notably by P.L. 100-711, 102 Stat. 4755 (1988), and P.L. 101-627, 104 Stat. 4467 (1990); codified in part 
at 16 U.S.C. 1361ff, cited in United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD, 39th Supp, 155, 
GATT Doc DS21/R (1991) 30 ILM 1594 (Report by the Panel not Adopted), 3, generally prohibits hunting, 
capturing, killing or importing marine mammals into the United States without authorization. Section 
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tuna embargo was to discourage fishing methods that kill dolphins in international 
waters.5 However, the MMPA provisions gave no regard to whether the foreign fishing 
activity that resulted in the incidental taking of marine mammals was conducted wholly 
within the waters of another state and was consistent with that State’s domestic and 
international law obligations. 6 In all of the cases in which import bans were imposed, the 
fishing activity of the foreign fishermen was consistent with that State’s international 
legal rights pursuant to international treaty and customary international law.7 While the 
                                                                                                                                            
101(a)(2) authorizes limited incidental taking of marine mammals by American commercial fishermen 
under permits issued by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). Under section 101(a)(2)(B) of the 
MMPA, the importatio n of yellow-fin tuna harvested with purse-seine nets in the ETP is prohibited unless 
the country in question proves through documentary evidence that its regulatory regime is comparable to 
that of the United States and its dolphin-kill rates are comparable. The regulatory regime must include the 
same prohibitions the United States applies to its own vessels and the average incidental dolphin kill must 
not exceed 1.25 times the average kill of United States vessels in the same period. Section 101(a)(2)(C) of 
the MMPA requires intermediary nations exporting yellow-fin tuna products to the United States to certify 
and prove that it prohibits imports of tuna from any nations directly embargoed by the United States. If they 
do not, they, too, are subject to the embargo. On October 10, 1990, the United States, pursuant to court 
order, imposed an embargo on imports of tuna from Mexico. The embargo went into effect on February 22, 
1991. See United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD, 39th Supp, 155, GATT Doc 
DS21/R (1991) 30 ILM 1594 (Report by the Panel not Adopted), 3-5. See also  Earth Island Institute  v. 
Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964, 976 (N.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd 929 F. 2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991) holding that the 
Secretaries of Commerce and the Treasury may not allow imports of yellow-fin tuna into the United States 
from any nation that does not conform with the 1988 MMPA amendments . See also T McDorman, ‘The 
GATT Consistency of U.S. Fish Import Embargoes to Stop Driftnet Fishing and Save Whales, Dolphins 
and Turtles’ (1991) 24 George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics  477, 495, note 
130.  
5 For the historical background of international conflicts over tuna fishing and the relationship between 
dolphins and tuna in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean, see R Rosendahl, ‘The Development of Mexican 
fisheries and its effect on United States-Mexican relations’ (1984) 3 UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal 1; K 
Holland, ‘Exploitation on porpoise: the use of purse seine nets be commercial tuna fishermen in the Eastern 
Tropical Pacific Ocean’ (1991) 17 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce  267; T Steiner, 
‘The Senseless Slaughter of Marine Mammals’ (1987) 61 Business and Society Review 18; E Christensen 
and S Geffin, ‘GATT sets its net on environmental regulation: the GATT panel ruling on Mexican 
yellowfin tuna imports and the need for reform of the international trading system’  (1991) 23 Inter-
American Law Review 569, 572, note 9. Intentional encirclement of dolphins with purse-seine nets is used 
as a tuna fishing technique only in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP). See United States—
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD, 39th Supp, 155, GATT Doc DS21/R (1991) 30 ILM 1594 
(Report by the Panel not Adopted), 2. The MMPA prevents American fleets from using this method of tuna 
fishing. See ‘Divine Porpoise’, The Economist , 5 October 1991, 31; McDorman, ibid; and United States—
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD, 39th Supp, 155, GATT Doc DS21/R (1991) 30 ILM 1594 
(Report by the Panel not Adopted). 
6 McDorman, above n 4, 492. 
7 Ibid 495. 
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dolphins being protected were listed as at risk of becoming endangered under the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (‘CITES’),8 CITES neither 
required nor authorised the ban on trade in tuna. Mexico challenged the embargo as a 
disguised trade barrier that was inconsistent with the United States’ obligations under the 
GATT. In United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (1994) (‘Tuna II’),9 the 
European Economic Community (‘EEC’) and the Netherlands challenged provisions of 
the MMPA, since amended by the International Dolphin Conservation Act of 1992,10 that 
imposed trade restrictions on imports of tuna from ‘intermediary’ nations. 
  
In United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (‘Shrimp 
I’), the United States banned shrimp imports from WTO members that did not comply 
with American legal requirements regarding the protection of sea turtles from incidental 
death in the shrimp harvesting process. 11 The United States negotiated and concluded a 
regional international agreement on sea turtle protection and conservation with some 
countries in the Americas, but not other countries that were affected by the trade ban. 
Article XV of the Inter-American Convention included a conflicts clause that stated: 
1. In implementing this Convention, the Parties shall act in accordance with the provisions of the 
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation (WTO), as adopted at Marrakesh in 1994, 
including its annexes. 
                                                
8 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora , opened for signature 
6 March 1973, 993 UNTS 243 (entered into force 1 July 1975). 
9 United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc DS29/R (1994) 33 ILM 839 (Report by the 
Panel not Adopted). For a more detailed discussion of this ruling see, inter alia, Joseph J Urgese, ‘Dolphin 
Protection and the Mammal Protection Act have Met Their Match: The General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade’ (1998) 31 Akron Law Review 457. 
10 See 138 Cong Rec H9064-02 (1992) and Subchapter IV of the MMPA, 16 USC s 1411 -1418 (1992). For 
a detailed discussion of the Tuna cases from a political economy perspective, see Richard W Parker, ‘The 
Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage to Protect the Global Commons: What We Can Learn from the Tuna-
Dolphin Conflict’ (1999) 12 Georgetown International Law Review 1. 
11 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, 
AB-1998-4 (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body). 
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2. In particular, and with respect to the subject matter of this Convention, the Parties shall act in 
accordance with the provisions of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade contained in Annex 1 
of the WTO Agreement, as well as Article XI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 
1994. 12 
 
The United States gave countries that were parties to the Inter-American Convention 
three years to introduce ‘turtle exclusion devices’ (‘TEDs’), while others were given only 
four months.13  
 
All species of turtles involved were listed as being under threat of extinction under 
CITES Appendix I, and occurred in American territorial waters as part of their migratory 
route.14 However, the American measures were not taken under CITES or any other 
                                                
12 Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles, opened for signature 1 
December 1996, 37 ILM 1246, Art XV. 
13 This was not part of the original design of the measures, but resulted from a United States court order 
requiring the United States administration to apply the import ban to the entire world when it was only 
being applied in the Americas. See Earth Island Institute v. Christopher, 20 CIT 1389, 948 F Supp 1062 
(Court of International Trade 1996). However, the Appellate Body held that the United States government 
was responsible for meeting its WTO obligations and it was no excuse under international law that the 
action was required by the courts. 
14 For a detailed review of the American legislation, litigation to enforce the legislation, and the 
amendments and negotiations that occurred after the WTO case, see Eric L Richards and Martin A 
McCrory, ‘The Sea Turtle Dispute: Implications for Sovereignty, the Environment, and International Trade 
Law’ (2000) 71 University of Colorado Law Review 295. For a variety of interpretations of the Shrimp 
decision, see: Joseph R Berger, ‘Unilateral Trade Measures to Conserve the World’s Living Resources: An 
Environmental Breakthrough for the GATT in the WTO Sea Turtle Case’ (1999) 24 Columbia Journal of 
Environmental Law 355 (taking the view that the Shrimp case represents a positive evolution in the 
treatment of conservation measures); Benjamin Simmons, ‘In Search of Balance: An Analysis of the WTO 
Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report’ (1999) 24 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 413 (arguing in 
favour of unilateral measures); Shannon Hudnall, ‘Towards a Greener International Trade System: 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the World Trade Organization’ (1996) 29 Columbia Journal of 
Law and Social Problems 175 (arguing that the GATT needs to be changed to respond to environmental 
concerns); Jennifer A Bernazani, ‘The Eagle, the Turtle, the Shrimp and the WTO: Implications for the 
Future of Environmental Trade Measures’ (2000) 15 Connecticut Journal of International Law  207 
(proposing the addition of an exception to Art XX specifically for MEAs); Axel Bree, ‘Art XX GATT – 
Quo Vadis? The Environmental Exception After the Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report’ (1998) 17 
Dick. Journal of International Law  99 (interpreting the decision of the Appellate Body as finding that the 
American measure did not have extrajurisdictional effect); Terence P Stewart and Mara M Burr, ‘Trade and 
Domestic Protection of Endangered Species: Peaceful Co-existence or Continued Conflict? The Shrimp -
Turtle Dispute and the World Trade Organization’ (1998) 23 William and Mary Environmental Law and 
Policy Review 109; Matthew Brotmann, ‘The Clash between the WTO and the ESA: Drowning a Turtle to 
Eat a Shrimp’ 16 Pace Environmental Law Review 321 (1999); Ryan L Winter, ‘Reconciling the GATT 
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MEA but rather under American regulations unilaterally designed to comply with the 
court order regarding implementation of a section of the American Endangered Species 
Act. The Appellate Body rejected arguments that unilateral measures could not be 
included under Article XX(g), stating: 
It appears to us…that conditioning access to a Member’s domestic market on whether exporting 
Members comply with, or adopt, a policy or policies unilaterally prescribed by the importing 
Member may, so some degree, be a common aspect of measures falling within the scope of one or 
another of the exceptions (a) to (j) of Article XX.15 
 
The Appellate Body held that the measure met the requirements of Article XX(g), but not 
the chapeau. 
 
In United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse 
to Article 21.5 by Malaysia (‘Shrimp II ’), the Appellate Body repeated this statement 
regarding unilateral measures (twice in two successive paragraphs), referring to it as ‘a 
principle that was central to our ruling’ in Shrimp I.16 In Shrimp I, the Appellate Body 
had emphasized a preference for multilateral solutions to international environmental 
problems, citing both WTO and other international instruments to that effect. It noted that 
the protection and conservation of migratory species demands concerted and co-operative 
efforts on the part of many countries. It cited the references in the Decision on Trade and 
Environment to Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
and Agenda 21 as proof that the WTO has recognized both the need for such co-operative 
                                                                                                                                            
and WTO with Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Can we have our cake and eat it too?’ (2000) 11 
Colorado Journal of International  Environmental Law 223 (arguing that a conflict between the WTO and 
MEAs is inevitable). 
15 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, 
AB-1998-4 (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body), para 121. 
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efforts and the inappropriateness of unilateral action in dealing with extraterritorial 
aspects of international environmental problems. 17 
 
However, in Shrimp II, the Appellate Body said: 
Requiring that a multilateral agreement be concluded by the United States in order to avoid 
‘arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination’ in applying its measure would mean that any country 
party to the negotiations with the United States, whether a WTO Member or not, would have, in 
effect, a veto over whether the United States could fulfil its WTO obligations. Such a requirement 
would not be reasonable. 
… 
Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration…states, in part, that ‘[e]nvironmental measures addressing 
transboundary or global environmental problems should, as far as possible, be based on 
international consensus’. Clearly, and ‘as far as possible’, a multilateral approach is strongly 
preferred. Yet it is one thing to prefer a multilateral approach in the application of a measure that 
is provisionally justified under one of the subparagraphs of Article XX…; it is another to require 
the conclusion  of a multilateral agreement as a condition of avoiding ‘arbitrary and unjustifiable 
discrimination’ under the chapeau….We see, in this case, no such requirement.18  
(emphasis in original) 
 
Thus, while the chapeau required the United States to make good faith efforts to reach 
international agreements before imposing a unilateral import ban to further international 
environmental objectives, it could not be required to succeed. Certainly, if trade 
                                                                                                                                            
16 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Art 21.5 by 
Malaysia, WTO Doc WT/DS58/AB/RW (2001) (Report of the Appellate Body), para 138. 
17 Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, adopted 14 June 1992, Report of 
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 3, Rio de Janeiro 3-14 June 1992, UN 
GAOR, 47th Sess., 4 UN Doc A/Conf 151/5/Rev.1 (1992) 31 ILM 874 states: ‘Unilateral actions to deal 
with environmental challenges outside the juris diction of the importing country should be avoided. 
Environmental measures addressing transboundary or global environmental problems should, as far as 
possible, be based on international consensus.’  
Agenda 21 , Report of the United Nations Conference on En vironment and Development 9, Rio de Janeiro 
3-14 June 1992, UN Doc A/Conf.151/26/Rev.1, para 2.22(i) reads: ‘Avoid unilateral action to deal with 
environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of the importing country. Environmental measures 
addressing transborder problems should, as far as possible, be based on an international consensus.’ 
The Appellate Body also cited Art 5 of the Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5 June 
1992, UNEP/bio.Div./CONF/L.2, 31 ILM 818 (1992) (entered in to force 29 December 1993) (requiring 
parties to co-operate in respect of areas beyond national jurisdiction for the conservation and sustainable 
use of biological diversity) and the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, 
which reads: ‘The contracting parties [are] convinced that conservation and effective management of 
migratory species of wild animals requires the concerted action of all States within the national boundaries 
of which such species spend any part of their life cycle.’ 
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restrictions are to be permitted for the purpose of persuading other countries to participate 
in multilateral environmental protection efforts, this is a logical result. Moreover, the 
wording of the Rio Declaration (‘as far as possible’) clearly leaves open the possibility 
that unilateral measures may be needed in some circumstances.19 However, the issue of 
whether there is an implied jurisdictional limit in Article XX was left unresolved, despite 
the numerous arguments made with respect to this issue in both the Tuna and Shrimp  
hearings. 
 
In Tuna I, the United States took the position that a government could unilaterally decide 
to prohibit imports of a product in order to protect the life of humans, plants or animals 
outside its jurisdiction.20 The United States argued that the MMPA did not subordinate 
the legislation of other parties to its own, but simply specified the requirements for tuna 
imported into the United States. Moreover, nothing in Article XX supported the assertion 
that the United States legislation could not be justified because it was applied 
extraterritorially, since trade measures by nature had effects outside a contracting party's 
territory. 21 It argued further that the GATT should not be interpreted to require a country 
to allow access to its market that served as an incentive to deplete the populations of 
species that are vital components of the ecosystem. Finally, the United States implied 
that, because CITES obliged parties to prohibit imports in order to protect endangered 
                                                                                                                                            
18 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Art 21.5 by 
Malaysia, WTO Doc WT/DS58/AB/RW (2001) (Report of the Appellate Body), paras 123-124. 
19 This point has also been made by Robert Howse. See Robert Howse, ‘The Appellate Body Rulings in the 
Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal Baseline for the Trade and Environment Debate’ (2002) 27 Columbia 
Journal of Environmental Law 491, 510. 
20 Submissions of the United States, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD, 39th 
Supp, 155, GATT Doc DS21/R (1991) 30 ILM 1594 (Report by the Panel not Adopted), 16-22. 
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species found only outside its own jurisdiction, international law permitted a state to use 
trade restrictions to pursue extraterritorial environmental policy objectives.22  
 
Mexico argued that Article XX was confined to measures a party could adopt or apply 
within its own territory. 23 Nothing in Article XX entitled any contracting party to impose 
measures whose implementation would subordinate the legislation of one party to the 
legislation of another.  To accept that one party could impose trade restrictions to 
conserve resources in international areas or within the territories of other parties would 
introduce the concept of extraterritoriality into the GATT and be contrary to international 
law.24  
 
In the Tuna I case, Canada stated the issue as being when and to what extent measures 
taken relating to unilaterally-set conservation objectives can be extended to areas outside 
national jurisdictions. The United States would have to demonstrate that Mexico's 
incidental dolphin mortality in waters outside United States jurisdiction impinged on its 
conservation program to an extent that would allow justification of the embargo under 
                                                                                                                                            
21 Ibid 16-22. 
22 Ibid. In this case, CITES did not include in its Appendix I list of species in danger of extinction any of 
the species of dolphins which the United States was claiming to protect. The dolphins actually threatened 
with extinction were found only outside the ETP and were not protected by the United States legislation. 
United States and international data indicated that no dolphin populations in the ETP were threatened with 
extinction. Submissions of Mexico, ibid, 20. However, the three ETP species are listed in Appendix II of 
CITES, which includes species that may be threatened if trade is not restricted. See Christensen and Geffin, 
above n 4, 595, note 118. 
23 Submissions of Mexico, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD, 39th Supp, 155, 
GATT Doc DS21/R (1991) 30 ILM 1594 (Report by the Panel not Adopted), 16-17. 
24 Ibid. 
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Article XX(g).25 Canada thus implied that a state should be permitted to exercise 
jurisdiction over extraterritorial environmental matters in so far as it was necessary to 
effectively manage a related internal environmental matter, even if it involved taking 
measures in the absence of any international agreement on the issue. However, the 
Canadian submission did not clarify the set of circumstances that might justify such 
actions in the context of Article XX(g). 
 
The Tuna I panel noted that the GATT text in Article XX(b) did not clearly say whether 
it covers measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health outside the 
jurisdiction of the contracting party taking the measure.26 However, the drafting history 
of Article XX(b) indicated it did not.27 The panel reasoned that: 
...this paragraph of Article XX was intended to allow contracting parties to impose trade restrictive 
measures inconsistent with the General Agreement to pursue overriding public policy goals to the 
extent that such inconsistencies were unavoidable...[I]f the broad interpretation suggested by the 
United States were accepted, each contracting party could unilaterally determine the life or health 
protection policies from which other contracting parties could not deviate without jeopardizing 
their rights under the General Agreement. The General Agreement would then no longer constitute 
a multilateral framework for trade among all contracting parties but would provide legal security 
only in respect of trade between a limited number of contracting parties with identical internal 
regulations.28 
 
For the same reason, Article XX(g) only permitted measures aimed at resource 
conservation within the jurisdiction of the enacting country. Moreover, those measures 
had to be taken ‘in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption’. 
The panel reasoned that a country can effectively control the production or consumption 
                                                
25 Submissions of Canada, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD, 39th Supp, 155, 
GATT Doc DS21/R (1991) 30 ILM 1594 (Report by the Panel not Adopted), 29. 
26 United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD, 39th Supp, 155, GATT Doc DS21/R 
(1991) 30 ILM 1594 (Report by the Panel not Adopted), 45. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid 46. 
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of a resource only to the extent that it falls under its jurisdiction. 29 Finally, the panel 
expressed the view that its interpretation restricting environmental measures to internal 
matters under Article XX ‘would affect neither the rights of individual countries to 
pursue their internal environmental policies and to cooperate with one another in 
harmonizing such policies’.30 
 
While not mentioned by the Tuna I panel in its decision, academics had argued that the 
Article XX exceptions are designed to allow a state to protect vital internal resources and 
to pursue vital internal policies, not to project its internal policies and goals onto other 
states.31 The Tuna I interpretation of the GATT did not permit a state to use trade 
restrictions to unilaterally assert jurisdiction over environmental matters outside its 
national territory. The Tuna I panel’s ruling on this issue was thus consistent with 
prevailing opinion regarding the scope of the Article XX exceptions in GATT 1947 and 
the applicable principles of international law.  
                                                
29 Ibid 47. One author takes the opposite view of the effect of this phrase on the issue of whether 
jurisdictional limitations are implied in Art XX. See Howse, above n 19, 504. 
30 United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD, 39th Supp, 155, GATT Doc DS21/R 
(1991) 30 ILM 1594 (Report by the Panel not Adopted), 51. 
31 See, for example, McDorman, above n 4, 520. He cites in support Jackson's comments regarding art 
XX(b), ‘[a]lthough the language is not explicitly restricted to health and safety of the importing  country, it 
can be argued that that is what Art XX means’. See John Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and 
Policy of International Economic Relations (1989), 209. Jackson characterizes this as an issue of equalizing 
competition where foreign manufacturers are subject to less stringent environmental process standards. His 
opinion on this issue appears to have been accepted by the panel in this case. He states (209): ‘Whether an 
importing nation could use border restrictions or taxes to equalize the price of imported goods with 
domestic costs of health and safety regulation is as yet an unresolved issue for the world trading system. It 
is an issue fraught with dangerous potential. If this principle were extended to many types of government 
regulation - for example minimum wage or other labor regulations - it could be the basis of a rash of import 
restrictions, often defeating the basic goals of comparative advantage.’ Also see Owen Saunders, who 
argues: ‘While it is true that Art XX does not refer specifically to the health of citizens of the acting state, 
this is certainly what must be inferred; otherwise the GATT could be read as implicitly justifying far-
reaching intrusions on the territorial sovereignty of other states, an interpretation that is unsupported on a 
reading of the Agreement and on the basis of state practice.’ See J Owen Saunders, ‘Legal Aspects of Trade 
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The reasoning of the Tuna I panel regarding the jurisdictional scope of Article XX was 
rejected in Tuna II. The Tuna II panel applied a three-prong test to both Articles XX(b) 
and XX(g). The first prong considered whether the MMPA regulations qualified as 
measures to conserve ‘exhaustible natural resources’ under Article XX(g) and ‘to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health’ under Article XX(b). Despite arguments from the 
EEC and the Netherlands that such measures could not be applied extraterritorially, the 
panel held that neither article specifically limited the location of the resource or animal in 
question. 32 The panel noted that two previous panels had considered Article XX(g) to be 
applicable to policies relating to migratory species of fish, without distinguishing 
between fish caught inside or outside the jurisdiction of the country enacting the measure. 
The panel reasoned that other provisions in Article XX did not exclude measures aimed 
at actions outside a contracting party’s territorial jurisdic tion and that international law 
permitted states to regulate the conduct of their nationals outside their territory. 33  
 
However, the American measures failed to pass the second prong of the test under either 
Article XX(b) or XX(g). The intermediary embargo covered tuna imports from third 
countries whether or not the tuna was harvested in a manner that was harmful to dolphins. 
The primary embargo permitted the applicable countries to harvest tuna in a manner that 
                                                                                                                                            
and Sustainable Development’ in J Owen Saunders (ed), The Legal Challenges of Sustainable Development 
(1990) 370, 375. For a contrary view, see Christensen and Geffin, above n 5, 582 and 590. 
32 See discussion in Chapter 2 regarding the scope of Arts XX(b) and (g). 
33 United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc DS29/R (1994) 33 ILM 839 (Report by the 
Panel not Adopted), 891-892. The panel gave the example of Art XX(e), which allows measures ‘relating 
to the products of prison labour’, as one that clearly applied to extraterritorial subject matter. It also noted 
that a ‘state may in particular regulate the conduct of its fishermen, or of vessels having its nationality or 
any fisherman on these vessels, with respect to fish located on the high seas’. 
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was harmful to dolphins as long as their prac tices and policies were comparable to 
American standards. Thus, the American trade measures could only accomplish their 
objective by forcing other countries to adopt American-style laws. As a result, they could 
not be considered ‘necessary’ under Article XX(b), nor related to conservation (that is, 
‘primarily aimed at’ conservation) under XX(g), nor be considered to have been made 
effective in conjunction with domestic measures under XX(g). Nor could the measures be 
saved under the Preamble to Article XX, the third prong of the test. The reasoning of the 
panel echoed the reasoning in Tuna I: 
If…Article XX were interpreted to permit Contracting Parties to take trade measures so as to force 
other Contracting Parties to change their policies within their jurisdiction, including their 
conservation policies…the General Agreement could no longer serve as a multilateral framework 
for trade among Contracting Parties. 
 
…measures taken so as to force other countries to change their policies, and that were effective 
only if such changes occurred, could not be primarily aimed at either the conservation of an 
exhaustible natural resource, or at rendering effective restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption…34 
 
In Shrimp I the Appellate Body held that there was a sufficient jurisdictional nexus 
between the United States  and the turtles for the purposes of Article XX(g). All of the 
species occur in waters over which the United States has jurisdiction, even though they 
migrate across national borders and international waters. In this regard, the Appellate 
Body’s reasoning resembles that of Canada’s submission in the Tuna I case. At the same 
time, however, the Appellate Body expressly declined to decide whether there is an 
implied jurisdictional limitation in Article XX(g) and, if so, the nature or extent of that 
limitation. The Appellate Body recognized that a State has a legitimate interest in the 
protection of migratory species that occur within its territory. However, the more difficult 
                                                
34 Ibid paras 3.26-3.27. 
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issue of what limitations to impose on a State’s trade measures in these circumstances 
remained unresolved. 
 
In Shrimp I, the Appellate Body ruled: 
The parties to the Inter-American Convention together marked out the equilibrium line…and 
provides convincing demonstration that an alternative course of action was reasonably open to the 
United States for securing the legitimate policy goal of its measure, a course of action other than 
the unilateral and non-consensual procedures of the import prohibition.35 
 
The Appellate Body thus implied that the lack of consent on the part of the exporting 
countries was a relevant factor in its decision. International rules in treaties and 
customary international law derive from State consent.36 
 
In Shrimp II the Appellate Body assessed whether the negotiation effort subsequently 
made by the United States in Asia was comparable to that made in the Americas. While 
the Appellate Body emphasized that the Inter-American Convention was the relevant 
‘example’ to use in this case, it rejected the notion that it could serve as a legal standard 
against which to measure the adequacy of negotiation efforts.37 Nevertheless, the ruling 
with respect to the kind of efforts that are required to fulfill the duty to negotiate38 will 
undoubtedly be seen by many as an important precedent to follow in this field. In this 
particular case, the American efforts were assessed as follows: 
                                                
35 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, 
AB-1998-4 (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body), paras 170-171. 
36 ‘The lack of consent by a given state generally means that it cannot be held to the rule in question (pacta 
tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt).’ Joost Pauwelyn, ‘The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How 
Far Can We Go?’ (2001) 95 American Journal of International Law 535, 536. 
37 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Art 21.5 by 
Malaysia, WTO Doc WT/DS58/AB/RW (2001 ) (Report of the Appellate Body), para 130. 
38 Howse argues that the AB did not establish a duty to negotiate. See Howse, above n 19.  
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The negotiations need not be identical. Indeed, no two negotiations can ever be identical, or lead to 
identical results. Yet the negotiations must be comparable in the sense that comparable efforts are 
made, comparable resources are invested, and comparable energies are devoted to securing an 
international agreement. So long as such comparable efforts are made, it is more likely that 
‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’ will be avoided between countries where an importing 
member concludes an agreement with one group of countries, but fails to do so with another group 
of countries.39  
 
With the exception of Tuna I , both GATT 1947 panels and the Appellate Body rulings on 
GATT 1994 have consistently adopted the view that Article XX(g) applies to measures 
involving migratory species – tuna, salmon, herring, dolphins, and turtles. However, none 
of these decisions have answered this question: what jurisdic tional nexus is required 
under Article XX(g)?40 
 
Howse argues that the issue of whether there is an implicit territorial or jurisdictional 
limitation in Article XX(g) a moot point:  
Once it has been established that the state taking the environmental trade measures is equivalent to 
restrictions on its own producers and/or consumers, why should it be necessary to identify whether 
the species being protected is itself sometimes to be found within the state’s territory? The purpose 
of a territorial nexus is to prevent a state that lacks legitimate concern from using a global 
environmental problem as a pretext for protectionist interventionism. Therefore, it should be 
sufficient, as required by the text of Article XX(g), that the U.S. measure was even-handed, 
imposing a conservation burden on its own producers and consumers, and not merely attempting 
to externalize the costs of environmental protection to the producers of other countries. (sic) 41 
 
This argument sounds reasonable, at first glance. However, it misses the point. The 
reason why the issue of territorial nexus is important is not simply due to concerns over 
protectionism disguised as environmental measures.42 Jurisdiction is an important issue 
                                                
39 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Art 21.5 by 
Malaysia, WTO Doc WT/DS58/AB/RW (2001) (Report of the Appellate Body), para 122. 
40 Having argued in Chapter 2 that Art XX(b) should be limited to measures aimed at the protection of 
purely domestic environmental interests, I will limit my discussion of jurisdictional nexus to Art XX(g). 
41 Howse, above n 19, 504. 
42 Indeed, the issue of whether a measure constitutes a disguised protectionist measure is addressed in the 
Art XX chapeau, not Art XX(g). 
 148 
because the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes (‘DSU’), Article 3(2) requires that WTO rules be interpreted in accordance with 
public international law. 43 At a broader level, the concern is over how to avoid conflicts 
between WTO law and public international law and to ensure the integrity of 
international law. It is generally accepted that WTO rules are part of the wider body of 
public international law. 44 Even if one sets aside the issue of consistency between WTO 
law and public international law, the wording of Article XX(g) regarding domestic 
restrictions does not appear in Article XX(b), where the jurisdictional issue could also 
arise.45 Moreover, an importing nation could comply with the Article XX(g) requirement 
by restricting consumption of a natural resource that does not occur in its own territory, 
without having any jurisdictional nexus at all.46 For example, what if the United States 
imposed similar restrictions to address the conservation of elephants in Africa, a species 
that does not occur in American territory?  
 
                                                
43 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 15 April 1994, Final Act 
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —
Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 2, 33 ILM 1197 (1994). 
44 See Pauwelyn, above n 36; John Jackson, The World Trading System (1997) 25; Donald McCrae, ‘The 
WTO in International Law: Tradition Continued or New Frontier?’ (2000) 3 Journal of International 
Economic Law 27; Donald McCrae, ‘The Contribution of International Trade Law to the Development of 
International Law’ (1996) 260 Recueil des Cours 111; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘Dispute Settlement in 
International Economic Law – Lessons for Strengthening International Dispute Settlement in Non-
Economic Areas’ (1999) 2 Journal of International Economic Law 189. 
45 I have argued in the previous chapter that Art XX(b) should only cover measures that are aimed at the 
protection of the environment within the enacting country’s territory. Indeed, the absence of a domestic 
restrictions requirement in Art XX(b) provides further support to my argument. (Since the measures that 
fall under XX(b) are aimed at purely domestic concerns, there is no need to insert this requirement). 
However, for the sake of argument, I recognize here that the jurisdictional issue might arise under Art 
XX(b), as it did in United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc DS29/R (1994) 33 ILM 839 
(Report by the Panel not Adopted). 
46 Since elephants do not occur naturally in American territory, the United States would not have the 
jurisdictional nexus that it does with respect to sea turtles. 
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There is an important distinction to be made between environmental concerns based on 
their geographic connection with the importing country.  In international environmental 
law, both Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration call upon countries to avoid ‘unilateral 
action to deal with environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of the importing 
country’ (emphasis added).47 It is only with respect to ‘environmental measures 
addressing transboundary or global environmental problems’ that countries are urged, ‘as 
far as possible’, to base their actions on international consensus. 48 The phrase, ‘as far as 
possible’, leaves an opening for a country to take unilateral action where efforts at 
international negotiation fail, but only with respect to transboundary or global 
environmental problems.49  
 
Under customary international law, a State acts in excess of its own jurisdiction when its 
measures purport to regulate acts which are done outside its territorial jurisdiction by 
persons who are not its own nationals and which have no, or no substantial, effect within 
its territorial jurisdiction. 50 In Shrimp I , the holding that the United States had a sufficient 
‘jurisdictional nexus’ for its measure to qualify for provisional justification under GATT 
                                                
47 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, adopted 14 June 1992, Report of the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development 3, Rio de Janeiro 3-14 June 1992, UN GAOR, 47th Sess., 4 
UN Doc A/Conf 151/5/Rev.1 (1992) 31 ILM  874. Agenda 21, Report of the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development 9, Rio de Janeiro 3-14 June 1992, UN Doc A/Conf.151/26/Rev.1. 
48 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, ibid. Agenda 21 , ibid. 
49 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, ibid refers to transboundary and global 
environmental problems. However, Agenda 21 , ibid only refers to ‘transborder problems’. See note 17, 
above. 
50 See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (2nd ed,1973), 299-301. Jurisdiction flows from 
the general legal competence of states, often referred to as ‘sovereignty’. See ibid, 291. This prohibition of 
extraterritoriality, which may also be described as an aspect of the principle of non-intervention, would 
qualify as a ‘customary  rule of international law’, within the meaning of art 38 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 
1980). See also Brownlie, ibid 302.  
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Article XX(g) is consistent with customary international law insofar as harm to the turtles 
would have an effect within its territorial jurisdiction. This holding is also consistent with 
international environmental law in that the conservation of sea turtles is a transboundary 
environmental problem. However, the ruling is inconsistent with public international law 
to the extent that the American measure purports to regulate acts which are done outside 
its territorial jurisdiction by persons who are not its own nationals. The following section 
analyses the factors that are relevant to determining whether a unilateral measure meets 
the requirements of Article XX in the context of general international law and 
international environmental law. 
 
III. Article XX and Unilateral Environmental Trade Restrictions   
 
It is now clear that some unilateral measures will survive scrutiny under Article XX(g), 
where they address transboundary or global concerns that affect the environment of the 
importing country. Given that international environmental law is implicitly open to the 
use of unilateral measures in such circumstances, this does not by itself create a rift 
between international trade law and international environmental law. Indeed, the ruling in 
the Shrimp cases helps to define the duty to negotiate that is expressed in international 
environmental instruments.  
 
The facts in Shrimp I and Shrimp II provide guidance regarding the factors that may be 
considered in determining whether a unilateral trade measure meets the requirements of 
Article XX. Here, it is important to distinguish between factors that merely tip the 
balance in favour of the unilateral measure in question and factors that may be interpreted 
as decisive. 
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A. Transboundary or Global Environmental Policy 
In the Shrimp case, the environmental policy goal was to save a migratory species 
threatened with extinction. 51 The geographic location of the environmental interest was 
transboundary and included a connection with importing country, since all species of 
turtle involved occurred in American waters. The legitimacy of the policy goal was 
accepted by the parties to CITES and by all parties to WTO dispute and third-party 
participants. The measures required to achieve the goal (that is, the regulation of shrimp 
fishing, among others) were accepted regionally (as indicated by regional agreements 
among the affected countries in the Americas and around the Indian Ocean), with the 
exception of one country (Malaysia). Thus, the effectiveness of the measures was 
implicitly accepted. Finally, there was an urgent need to resolve the environmental issue. 
In essence, saving the turtles constituted an ‘emergency’ because they were threatened 
with extinction. 
 
The geographic location of the resource and the legitimacy of the policy goal (which, in 
the Shrimp case, is reflected in the consensus that it is necessary to prevent the extinction 
of species) are factors that must be taken into account in determining whether the subject 
                                                
51 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Art 21.5 by 
Malaysia, WTO Doc WT/DS58/RW (2001) (Report of the Panel), para 5.76: ‘[I]in the present case, a 
number of guideposts are available…that sea turtles are migratory species and that they are on the verge of 
extinction is unanimously acknowledged. Objectives in terms of protection and conservation of sea turtles 
are quite clear and largely uncontested. The means of reaching them have been identified by scientists, 
discussed in seminars and included in negotiation documents. The nature of sea turtles as a migratory 
species is also important, in light of the preference expressed in a number of international conventions for a 
multilateral approach to the conservation of migratory species.’ 
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matter qualifies for provisional justification under Article XX(g).52 The question is 
whether a geographic connection between the resource and the enacting country is 
necessary or whether a less proximate connection should suffice. The governing principle 
of customary international law is that a State acts in excess of its own jurisdiction when 
its measures purport to regulate acts which are done outside its territorial jurisdiction by 
persons who are not its own nationals and which have no, or no substantial, effect within 
its territorial jurisdiction.53  GATT must be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with 
this principle, which means that some degree of territorial connection to the resource is 
necessary for a State to unilaterally regulate activities concerning that resource. 
 
The American measures in the Shrimp cases were aimed at a transboundary 
environmental issue in which the United States had a territorial connection. Such cases 
should be relatively easy to identify. However, distinguishing between ‘global’ and 
‘extraterritorial’ environmental problems is more difficult. Where the problem occurs 
entirely outside the territory of the importing country, it would appear to be 
extraterritorial. However, if one views the global ecosystem as interconnected, then 
problems that appear to be extraterritorial at first glance could be characterized as global. 
                                                
52 The geographic location of the environmental interest is also relevant to determining whether the subject 
matter belongs in XX(b) or (g). See Chapter 2.  
53 See Brownlie, above n 50, 299-301. This rule, regarding extraterritorial enforcement of measures, is an 
aspect of jurisdictional competence. Jurisdiction flows from the general legal competence of states, often 
referred to as ‘sovereignty’. See ibid, 291. This prohibition of extraterritoriality, which may also be 
described as an aspect of the principle of non-intervention, would qualify as a ‘customary rule of 
international law’, within the meaning of art 38 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened 
for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980). See also Brownlie, ibid, 
302. GATT would therefore have to be interpreted in a manner consistent with the prohibition of 
extraterritoriality. A contrary interpretation would render either treaty void under the jus cogens rule. See 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered 
into force 27 January 1980), art 53. 
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For example, does the United States or Europe have a jurisdictional nexus with respect to 
the Amazon because it contains a large percentage of global biodiversity and absorbs a 
significant percentage of global carbon dioxide emissions? Thus, this is not simply a legal 
question, but also a question of fact that requires scientific analysis. Where there exists a 
MEA that indicates wide-spread international consensus regarding the global importance 
of a particular environmental problem, that may provide evidence that the issue is global 
rather than local and thus raise a rebuttable presumption regarding the categorization of 
the issue. 
 
The existence of widespread consensus regarding the measures that are required to 
achieve the policy goal (as opposed to consensus regarding the legitimacy of the goal 
itself) is a factor to be considered in the chapeau analysis, since this is an implementation 
issue. The question is how effective must the chosen measures be in order to pass the 
test? Where there is consensus, the measures are, in essence, deemed to be effective. 
However, the issue of the effectiveness of measures in achieving the stated policy goal 
would have to be considered independently where such consensus is absent.54 
 
The urgency factor suggests that unilateral measures should only be used as a last resort. 
It is thus relevant to determining whether efforts to reach a negotiated resolution have 
                                                
54 For example, in United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD, 39th Supp, 155, GATT 
Doc DS21/R (1991) 30 ILM 1594 (Report by the Panel not Adopted), the design of the American measure 
made it impossible for foreign tuna fishermen to comply with the requirement, making it ineffective as a 
conservation measure. See Chapter 2. For a discussion of the types of concerns that are relevant to the 
analysis of effectiveness, see Sanford E Gaines, ‘Processes and Production Methods: How to Produce 
Sound Policy for Environmental PPM -Based Trade Measures?’ (2002) 27 Columbia Journal of 
Environmental Law 383 and Organization for Economic Co -operation and Development, Processes and 
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been adequate. For example, where a resource is plentiful, it may not be possible to 
justify unilateral actions without devoting several years to negotiations, if ever. The role 
that urgency plays is thus central. Urgency is also a factor that determines whether the 
defence of necessity may be invoked in customary international law. 55 
 
B. Ongoing, Serious, Good Faith Efforts to Negotiate  
There is some debate as to whether the effort to negotiate cooperative solutions is an 
essential requirement that must be met before a unilateral measure can be justified under 
Article XX(g). Moreover, it is not clear how extensive the efforts must be nor what kinds 
of efforts are required. 56  
 
Howse argues that negotiation efforts in the Shrimp case were only relevant to 
determining under the chapeau whether the United States had discriminated between the 
countries around the Indian Ocean and the countries in the Americas and that negotiation 
efforts were only one of several factors that determined the outcome of this analysis, 
                                                                                                                                            
Production Methods (PPMs): Conceptual Framework and Considerations on Use of PPM -based Trade 
Measures, OCDE/GD (97) 137 (11 August 1997), <www.oecd.org>. 
55 See discussion in Chapter 4. 
56 In this particular case, the efforts of the United States we re as follows: 
October 1998: United States initiated the negotiations with a proposal containing possible elements of a 
regional convention. 
July 1999: United States helps to organize and finance an international symposium in Sabah, where 
participants adop t a Declaration calling for a regional agreement. 
October 1999: United States participates in Perth Conference, where governments commit to developing an 
international agreement. 
July 2000: United States helps to organize and finance Kuantan round of negotiations, which produces 
MOU for South-east Asia/Indian Ocean and plan to draft Conservation and Management Plan (CMP). 
September 2001: MOU comes into affect following adoption of CMP at multilateral conference in Manila. 
See United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Art 21.5 by 
Malaysia, WTO Doc WT/DS58/AB/RW (2001) (Report of the Appellate Body), paras 131-134. 
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rather than a decisive factor.57 While I agree with his assessment of this factor’s place in 
the Appellate Body’s analysis, his arguments do not persuade me that efforts to negotiate 
are not essential to justify a unilateral measure under Article XX(g). 
 
Howse argues that ‘there is nothing in the wording of the chapeau (or any other part of 
Article XX) to suggest that a nation must first secure agreement by WTO Members or 
any other nation before exercising its rights under Article XX(g)’.58 While this is true, the 
other headings of XX, unlike XX(g), do not raise the issue of whether unilateral measures 
can be used to protect transnational or global resources.59 Whether there is a duty to 
negotiate prior to imposing unilateral measures under the other headings is a red 
herring.60 Moreover, there is nothing explicit regarding the geographic location of the 
                                                
57 See Howse, above n 19, 507: ‘Perhaps the most pervasive interpretation of the AB decision in 
Shrimp/Turtle is that the AB, under the chapeau,  imposed a duty to negotiate seriously as a pre-condition 
to the application of unilateral trade measures to protect the  global environment. Clearly, the failure of the 
U.S. to negotiate seriously with the complainants figures prominently in the AB’s finding that, 
cumulatively, a number of features of the application of the American scheme amounted to ‘unjustified 
discrimination.’ However, the AB never held that the requirements of the chapeau, in and of themselves, 
impose a sui generis duty to negotiate. Rather, the AB’s Shrimp/Turtle ruling stands for the more limited 
propositions that (1) undertaking serious negotiations with some countries and not with others is, in 
circumstances such as these, ‘unjustifiable discrimination,’ and (2) that a failure to undertake serious 
negotiations may be closely connected with, and indeed part and parcel of, various discriminatory effects of 
a scheme, and may reinforce or perhaps even tip the balance towards a finding that those discriminatory 
effects amount to ‘unjustifiable discrimination’ within the meaning of the chapeau.…by offering negotiated 
market access to some Members and not others, the U.S. was engaging in ‘discrimination.’ One does not 
need to infer any self-standing duty to negotiate in order to arrive at this conclusion….’   
58 Howse, above n 19, 510. 
59 See my argument in Chapter 2 regarding the subject matter of Art XX(g). 
60 Some kinds of unilateralism appear to be permitted by Art XX. For example, Art XX(e) permits trade 
restrictions relating to the products of prison labour and Art XX(f) permits trade restrictions imposed for 
the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or archeological value. The former is likely to take 
the form of import restrictions while the latter is likely to take the form of export restrictions. Neither 
category appears to require the prior negotiation of a multilateral agreement. However, the Art XX 
preamble would prohibit the use of these exceptions to justify arbitrary discrimination or disguised 
restrictions on trade. Thus, the United States could not ban the import of any product on the grounds that 
the exporting country employed prison labour. Only the actual production of prison labourers could be 
banned. Similarly, Mexico could not ban imports from the United States on the grounds that the United 
States failed to ban the import of Mexican archeological artifacts. Mexico, however, would be free to ban 
the export of such items, as indeed it has. However, measures taken under Arts XX(e) and (f) are specific 
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resources being protected in Article XX(g), but that does not mean there is no geographic 
connection requirement. Interpreting Article XX(g) to require negotiations does not 
require an explicit reference in the text of the article because GATT must be interpreted 
in a manner that is consistent with general international law. Howse recognizes the 
existence of that duty and makes a good argument that the duty cuts both ways. 61 
However, his arguments do not support the absence of such a duty in the context of 
Article XX. A widely acknowledged general principle of international environmental law 
is that States are required to co-operate with each other in mitigating transboundary 
environmental risks.62 If such a duty exists in the context of international environmental 
law, it should also exist at the interstices of international environmental law and 
international trade law. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
and narrowly bounded, compared the more general (and ambiguous) language contained in Arts XX(b) and 
(g). Thus, Arts XX(e) and (f) themselves may be considered an agreement to permit such restrictions. As 
such, measures taken pursuant to these exceptions would not be unilateral at all. 
61 See Howse, above n 19, 508: ‘Had the AB intended to read into the chapeau a self-standing duty to 
negotiate seriously, it would have given some guidance as to the extent of the duty and its relationship to a 
corresponding duty of good faith on those countries who are invited into negotiation. After all, the duty of 
cooperation to solve international environmental problems that is found in the international environmental 
instruments that the AB cited is a duty on the part of all states who are affecting the commons problem at 
issue. Thus, the duty to cooperate to solve international environmental problems can be understood not only 
as a discipline on the country contemplating unilateralism; it also can be regarded as a possible justification 
for unilateral measures. That is, unilateral measures can be imposed if a country refuses to negotiate in 
good faith towards a cooperative solution to a commons problem.’ 
62 In the Lac Lanoux arbitration, the tribunal held that France had complied with its treaty and customary 
international law obligations to consult and negotiate in good faith before diverting a watercourse shared 
with Spain. However, the duty to negotiate did not require France to obtain Spain’s consent. See Lac 
Lanoux (Spain v France) 24 ILR (1957), 101. Also see Nuclear Tests Cases (New Zealand v. France), 1974 
ICJ 457. Similarly, the Stockholm Declaration , Principle 24 provides that ‘co-operation through 
multilateral or bilateral arrangements or other appropriate means is essential to effectively control, prevent, 
reduce and eliminate adverse environmental effects resulting from activities conducted in all spheres, in 
such a way that due account is taken of the sovereignty ad interests of all states’. Declaration of the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment  5-16 June 1972, UN Doc A/Conf/48/14/Rev.1 and Corr.1 
(1973), (1972) 11 ILM 1416 (Stockholm Declaration). The United Nations General Assembly endorsed this 
principle but noted that it should not be construed to enable other States to delay or impede the exploitation 
and development of natural resources within the territory of States. See UNGA Res 2995 XXVII (1972). 
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Moreover, the American effort to apply national laws unilaterally in the international 
arena ignored the fundamental difference between the nature of national law and the 
nature of international law. Authority to take actions in the international arena under 
international law is based on coordination,63 whereas national law is based on 
subordination—the actions of a government agency are authorized by legislation, which 
in turn is authorized by a constitution.64 While the existence of a positive duty to 
cooperate in general international law may remain open to question,65 unilateral trade 
measures in the GATT context must be preceded by negotiation efforts in order to be 
justifiable under the necessity doctrine of customary international law.66 
 
Howse further supports his argument that there is no duty to negotiate in Article XX by 
comparing GATT Articles XX and XXI: 
By contrast, where the drafters wanted to make the exercise of some kind of exception to GATT 
disciplines contingent on agreement or collective action among Members or states generally, they 
did so explicitly. For example, Article XXI(c) provides an exception where Members are taking 
action ‘in pursuance of ...obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of 
international peace and security.’67  
 
                                                                                                                                            
See generally, Patricia W Birnie and Alan E Boyle, International Law and the Environment (1992), 102-
109.  
63 The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation 
Amongst States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res 2131, UN GAOR, 20th 
Session, Supp No 14, UN Doc A/6220 (1965), for example, imposes on States ‘the duty to co-operate with 
one another.’  
64 See Jerzy Kranz, ‘Réflexions sur la souveraineté’ in Jerzy Makarczyk (ed), Theory of International Law 
at the Threshold of the 21st Century (1996), 189. 
65 See International Law Commission, Annual Report 2001, Chapter IV, State Responsibility, 
<http://www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/2001/english/chp4.pdf>, 21 October 2003, 287. Art 41 of the draft arts 
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts imposes a positive duty to cooperate to bring 
an end to any serious breach by a State of a peremptory norm of general international law. See ibid, 286. 
The draft articles are discussed in Chapter 4. 
66 See Chapter 4 regarding the relevance of the necessity doctrine to the interpretation of GATT Art XX 
with respect to unilateral measures. 
67 Howse, above n 19, 510. 
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This argument is not convincing. The purpose of Article XXI is to set out a division of 
jurisdiction between the United Nations and the WTO, two international organizations.68 
In contrast, Article XX divides jurisdiction over specific subjects between national 
governments (whether acting unilaterally or in cooperation with others) and the WTO. 
Since Article XX sets out the areas where national governments have reserved their right 
to legislate without being subject to their GATT obligations, there is no need to identify 
any other international body, as is done in Article XXI. 
 
One further aspect of the Shrimp decision suggests that efforts to negotiate are essential. 
The panel in Shrimp II noted that the good faith negotiations had to be ongoing. They 
would be ready to revisit the case if these efforts ceased, which suggests that the decision 
might go the other way were this factor no longer present. The panel emphasized that the 
right to take unilateral measures was provisional, not permanent, and subject to ongoing 
WTO supervision: 
[I]n a context such as this one where a multilateral agreement is clearly to be preferred and where 
measures such as that taken by the United States in this case may only be accepted under Article 
XX if they were allowed under an international agreement, or if they were taken further to the 
completion of serious good faith efforts to reach a multilateral agreement, the possibility to impose 
a unilateral measure to protect sea turtles under Section 609 is more to be seen, for the purposes of 
Article XX, as the possibility to adopt a provisional measures allowed for emergency reasons than 
as a definitive ‘right’ to take a permanent measure. The extent to which serious good faith efforts 
continue to be made may be reassessed at any time. For instance, steps which constituted good 
faith efforts at the beginning of a negotiation may fail to meet that test at a later stage.69 (emphasis 
in original)  
                                                
68 The preparatory work relating to the GATT Art XXI security exception is the only source of guidance in 
this regard because the provision has not been interpreted by any panels. One of the drafters of the original 
Draft Charter describes the security exception as designed to ensure the proper allocation of responsibility 
between the United Nations and the WTO, to ensure the WTO does not attempt to take action which would 
involve passing judgment in any way on essentially political matters. Any measure taken by a member in 
connection with a political matter brought before the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of 
Chapters IV or VI of the United Nations Charter should be deemed to fall within the scope of the United 
Nations, not the WTO. WTO, Guide to GATT Law and Practice, 6th ed, vol I (1995), 600. 
69 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Art 21.5 by 
Malaysia, WTO Doc WT/DS58/RW (2001) (Report of the Panel), para 5.88. 
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The factual context70 and legal framework71 provided the basis for finding an implicit 
duty to negotiate in Article XX chapeau. 72 This duty imposed the following obligations:73 
1. the United States had to take the initiative of negotiations; 
2. the negotiations had to be with all interested parties and aimed at establishing 
consensual means of sea turtle conservation; 
3. the United States had to make serious efforts in good faith to negotiate, taking 
into account conditions in different countries;74  
4. serious efforts in good faith had to take place before the enforcement of a 
unilaterally designed import prohibition;  
5. there must be a continuous process, including once a unilateral measure has been 
adopted and pending the conclusion of an agreement; and 
                                                
70 In this case, the factual context was characterized as one in which the survival of highly migratory 
species depends on concerted and cooperative efforts on part of many countries whose waters are traversed 
in the course of migration. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations 
and Cooperation Amongst States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res 2131, UN 
GAOR, 20th Session, Supp No 14, UN Doc A/6220 (1965). Ibid paras 5.51-5.52. 
71 The panel characterized the legal framework as follows: (1) the need to protect migratory species has 
been recognized by the WTO and numerous international instruments; (2) sustainable development is a 
WTO objective; (3) there was the common opinion of WTO membership expressed in the 1996 Report of 
the CTE endorsing ‘multilateral solutions based on international cooperation and consensus as the best and 
most effective way…to tackle environmental problems of a transboundary or global nature’; and (4) the 
parties to the dispute have accepted almost all of the relevant MEAs. Ibid paras 5.53-5.57 
72 Ibid paras 5.59-5.60. 
73 Ibid paras 5.66-5.67, 5.73. 
74 The panel determined that this was the ‘standard of review’ that should be applied in assessing the effort 
to negotiate. See ibid para 5.73. However, the panel also recognized that ‘no single standard may be 
appropriate’. Ibid para 5.77. The Appellate Body rejected the view expressed by the panel that the Un ited 
States should be held to a higher standard given its scientific, diplomatic and financial means, noting that 
the principle of good faith applies to all WTO members equally. See Ibid para 5.76 and United States—
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Art 21.5 by Malaysia, WTO Doc 
WT/DS58/AB/RW (2001) (Report of the Appellate Body), para 134, footnote 97. 
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6. a multilateral, ideally non-trade restrictive, solution is generally to be preferred, in 
particular if it is established that it constitutes an ‘alternative course of action 
reasonably open’.75 
The Shrimp rulings flesh out the application of the duty to negotiate in the context of this 
particular case. This view of the duty to negotiate is not inconsistent with international 
environmental law or general international law. 
 
C. Flexible Application of Measures 
One aspect of the American measures that changed between Shrimp I and Shrimp II was 
the flexibility of its application in practice. The implementing measure provided for 
‘comparable effectiveness’ of foreign programs, taking into account the specific 
conditions prevailing in the exporting country, rather than require ‘essentially the same’ 
program as the importing country. 76 The regulations do not need to address the conditions 
in each specific country, as long as, in practice, they are taken into account.77 In this 
regard, the Appellate Body stated: 
Authorizing an importing Member to condition market access on exporting Members putting in 
place regulatory programmes comparable in effectiveness to that of the importing Member gives 
sufficient latitude to the exporting Member with respect to the programme it may adopt to achieve 
the level of effectiveness required. It allows the exporting Member to adopt a regulatory 
programme that is suitable to the specific conditions prevailing in its territory.78 
 
                                                
75 Regarding this expression of the least-trade-restrictive test, also see United States—Import Prohibition of 
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Art 21.5 by Malaysia, WTO Doc WT/DS58/RW (2001) 
(Report of the Panel), para 5.51, where the panel states: [I]it seems that the Appellate Body meant to imply 
that other, less trade restrictive measures existed and also that import prohibitions, because of their impact, 
had to be subject to stricter disciplines’. 
76 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Art 21.5 by 
Malaysia, WTO Doc WT/DS58/AB/RW (2001) (Report of the Appellate Body), paras 141-144. 
77 Ibid para 149. 
78 Ibid para 144. 
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This may thus be viewed as a factor that assesses the effectiveness of the measure in 
achieving the policy goal. Assessing the conditions prevailing in a given country is 
necessary to determine what methods of environmental protection will be effective in 
different contexts. The enforcement of environmental laws requires the dedication of 
human and financial resources that some countries may not have, or that a country may 
prefer to dedicate to other matters that it deems more important to the welfare of its 
people. Differences in environmental conditions, technological capacity, financial means, 
economic priorities, and legal systems among the nations of the world make a one -size-
fits-all approach inappropriate.79  
 
D. Transparency and Due Process 
The revised American law permitted the American authorities to take into account the 
specific conditions of Malaysia’s shrimp production and turtle conservation program, 
were Malaysia to decide to apply for certification. 80 A country that did not appear to 
qualify for certification would receive notification explaining reasons for the preliminary 
assessment, suggesting steps that the government could take to get certification, and 
inviting the government to provide further information. 81 Transparency and procedural 
fairness could be considered general requirements under the chapeau because they 
                                                
79 Some of these factors are recognized explicitly in other WTO Agreements as justifying variations in the 
implementation of WTO obligations (for example, TRIPS Art 41 with respect to variations in legal systems 
and distribution of law enforcement resources) or with respect to divergence with international standards 
(for example, TBT Art 2.4 with respect to differences in climate, geography and technology). 
80 Ibid para 146. 
81 Ibid para 147. For additional procedures the United States adopted to comply with the Appellate Body 
ruling, see United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Art 
21.5 by Malaysia, WTO Doc WT/DS58/RW (2001) (Report of the Panel), paras 3.127-3.136. They include 
visits by American officials to foreign countries, face-to-face meetings on site, and access to judicial review 
in the American courts. 
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facilitate compliance and thus affect the ultimate effectiveness of a measure in achieving 
its stated policy goal. 
 
While there is no consensus that transparency constitutes a customary rule of 
international law,82 requiring transparency in the Article XX chapeau is not inconsistent 
with general international law. 
 
E. Technology Transfer 
The panel in Shrimp II interpreted the Appellate Body’s comments in Shrimp I as 
requiring a technology transfer program that would enable the exporting countries to 
comply with the requirements for certification.83 The panel held that the United States 
had complied with this requirement through a standing offer to provide technical 
assistance and training to any government that makes a formal request, proved by actions 
with respect to several countries.84 It is difficult to see how this could be a general 
requirement under Article XX(g), since its implementation depends on the economic and 
technological circumstances of the countries involved in a given dispute. While technical 
assistance for developing and least-developed countries generally is encouraged at the 
WTO, it is not an obligation that must be fulfilled in order to avail oneself of WTO 
rights.85 Principle 20 of the Stockholm Declaration also encourages the transfer of 
                                                
82 See The United Mexican States v Metalclad Corporation  (2001) BCSC 664. 
83 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Art 21.5 by 
Malaysia, WTO Doc WT/DS58/RW (2001) (Report of the Panel), paras 3.117-3.120.  
84 Ibid paras 3.158-3.160, 3.117-3.120. 
85 See, for example, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994, 
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal 
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 1C, 33 ILM 1197 (1994), Art 67 and Decision of 30 
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environmental technologies to developing countries.86 Taking this factor into account is 
not inconsistent with this international environmental principle. 
 
The key factors that need to be taken into account in assessing whether to permit 
unilateral trade measures to conserve transboundary or global resources can be 
summarized as follows. They must be preceded by good faith efforts to reach a 
negotiated solution, be applied flexibly to take into account different conditions among 
countries, and comply with transparency and procedural fairness. In some circumstances, 
they may require technical assistance. However, the degree of urgency may be a factor 
that requires much greater effort to reach a negotiated solution, particularly with respect 
to the time frame involved.  
 
The Appellate Body in Shrimp I made it clear that when a WTO member chooses to 
protect migratory species by way of unilateral trade action rather than multilateral co-
operation, it will accept jurisdiction and scrutinize such trade measures under Article 
XX(g). This approach is consistent with the views I have expressed in Chapter 2 
regarding the subject matter covered by Article XX(g). The factors in the Shrimp case 
that justified the American measure under Article XX(g) are not inconsistent with general 
principles of international environmental law and general international law regarding the 
                                                                                                                                            
August 2003, Implementation of para 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health, WTO Doc IP/C/W/405, available at <www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm> 
at 10 September 2003, para 6.  
86 See Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 5-16 June 1972, UN Doc 
A/Conf/48/14/Rev.1 and Corr.1 (1973), (1972) 11 ILM 1416 (Stockholm Declaration). Also see See 
Francesco Munari, ‘Technology Transfer and the Protection of the Environment’ in Francesco Francioni 
(ed), Environment, Human Rights and International Trade  (2001), 157. 
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circumstances in which a State may exceed its jurisdiction to address an urgent 
transboundary environmental problem. 
 
IV. Conflicts between GATT and MEAs 
An important issue is whether any distinction should be made between trade measures 
taken pursuant to multilateral environmental and conservation agreements and those that 
are not. There is nothing in Article XX(g) that explicitly distinguishes between measures 
applied as part of an international agreement and other measures.87  
 
In Tuna I, Australia argued that where a contracting party takes a measure with 
extraterritorial application outside of any international framework of co-operation, it is 
appropriate for the GATT to scrutinise the measure against the party’s obligations under 
the GATT. In particular, any measure involving conditional most-favoured-nation 
treatment by way of country-specific import prohibitions should be examined strictly, 
especially in view of the history of disputes over tuna. 88 Australia thus implied that the 
existence of an international agreement dealing with the extraterritorial application of 
such measures would be relevant to the jurisdiction of a GATT panel to consider their 
validity under international law and relevant to their consistency with the GATT. 89 
 
                                                
87 Submissions of the United States, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD, 39th 
Supp, 155, GATT Doc DS21/R (1991) 30 ILM 1594 (Report by the Panel not Adopted), 16-22.  
88 Submissions of Aus tralia, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD, 39 th Supp, 155, 
GATT Doc DS21/R (1991) 30 ILM 1594 (Report by the Panel not Adopted), 26. 
89 This issue never arose in the Shrimp case, which only dealt with the American measures as it was 
applied unilaterally outside the context of any international agreement with the affected countries. 
 165 
The Tuna I panel ruled that the MMPA prohibition of imports of tuna from Mexico was 
contrary to GATT Article XI:1 and not justified by Articles XX(b) or XX(g). It 
concluded that: 
a contracting party may not restrict imports of a product merely because it originates in a country 
with environmental policies different from its own...if the Contracting Parties were to permit 
import restrict ions in response to differences in environmental policies under the General 
Agreement, they would need to impose limits on the range of policy differences justifying such 
responses and to develop criteria so as to prevent abuse.90  
 
The Tuna I panel’s ruling was criticized for requiring nations to negotiate international 
agreements and GATT waivers or amendments if they want to use trade restrictions to 
implement international environmental policies. But this was a reasonable position to 
take given the controversy surrounding the proper interpretation of Article XX. 91 The 
ruling indicated that, if the rights and obligations of the GATT contracting parties were to 
be modified, they should be modified by the contracting parties themselves, not dispute 
panels.92 The panel in Tuna II adopted the same view. 
 
The relevance of the distinction between measures taken under MEAs versus measures 
taken unilaterally was also raised in the Shrimp case. The Appellate Body stated a clear 
preference for measures taken under international agreements over measures taken 
                                                
90 United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD, 39th Supp, 155, GATT Doc DS21/R 
(1991) 30 ILM 1594 (Report by the Panel not Adopted), 50-51. 
91 The controversy over the proper scope of Art XX remained evident in the CTE Report to the Singapore 
Ministerial Conference. See Trade and Environment in the GATT/WTO, Background Note by the 
Secretariat, Annex I, Hakan Nordstrom and Scott Vaughan, Trade and Environment, WTO Special Studies, 
(1999), 74-75. 
92 The 1982 Ministerial Declaration on Dispute Settlement, BISD 29S/13, provided that panel decisions 
‘cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided for under the General Agreement’. This was 
adopted by the WTO in Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 15 
April 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 
Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 2, 33 ILM 1197 (1994) , art 3(2), which states: 
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unilaterally, but upheld a unilateral measure because serious efforts to conclude an 
international agreement had failed.  
 
With respect to their parties, MEAs fulfil the key requirements that were imposed on the 
United States with respect to its unilateral measure in the Shrimp  case. Most MEA trade 
measures can be characterized as addressing the protection of transboundary or global 
resources.93 Where a country does not have a territorial nexus with the environmental 
problem, the MEA provides a legal nexus and may provide evidence that the subject 
matter is global, if not transnational. MEAs thus provide the jurisdictional nexus and 
cover subject matter that qualifies MEA trade measures for provisional justification under 
Article XX(g). The conclusion of the MEA fulfils the duty to negotiate. However, the 
fulfilment of the requirement for flexible and transparent application of the measure can 
not be assumed with respect to the implementation of MEA obligations in national law. 
MEA trade measures must therefore remain subject to WTO scrutiny under the chapeau 
analysis. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
‘Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in 
the covered agreements.’ 
93 Most MEAs can be categorized as relating to environmental problems that affect two categories of 
natural resources: (1) non-living resources: clean air, water and soil or climate; and (2) living resources: 
plants and animals. The characterization of clean air as an exhaustible natural resource in United States—
Standards for Reformu lated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc WT/DS2/AB/R, AB-1996-1 (1996) 
(Report of the Appellate Body) supports the first category and the same characterization of turtles in United 
States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, AB-1998-4 
(1998) (Report of the Appellate Body) supports the second category. All of the MEAs listed in the Matrix 
on trade measures pursuant to selected MEAs, WTO Doc WT/CTE/W/160 (2000) can be placed in one of 
these categories. See Chapter 1, n 42. Those measures that are strictly limited to protecting humans should 
generally be aimed at protecting the citizens of the enacting countries and people inside their territories and 
thus would fall within their jurisdictional competence. 
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The general conclusion that can be drawn from WTO jurisprudence is that trade measures 
taken pursuant to MEAs would be consistent with GATT if implemented in a non-
discriminatory and transparent manner between parties to the MEA. However, WTO 
jurisprudence regarding unilateral measures does not apply to resources that are located 
entirely outside the jurisdiction of the importing country and some MEAs, notably 
CITES, require such ‘extraterritorial’ measures. However, the existence of a MEA that 
has been accepted by at least all of the WTO members that are parties to a dispute may be 
sufficient to categorize an environmental issue as global, rather than extraterritorial, thus 
providing a sufficient jurisdictional nexus in customary international law. With respect to 
international environmental law, both the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 indicate that 
multilateral agreement can justify the use of trade measures with respect to otherwise 
extraterritorial environmental problems. Thus, the MEA categorizes a problem as global 
and provides the necessary jurisdictional nexus. On this view, the jurisdictional nexus 
would be legal rather than territorial. 
 
The Tuna I panel failed to directly address the issue of what would happen should there 
arise a conflict between the GATT trade obligations and inconsistent trade obligations 
imposed under multilateral environmental agreements such as CITES. 94 
 
                                                
94 Such a case has not arisen to date, and is unlikely to be brought be a signatory to a MEA. If such an issue 
does come before a WTO panel, it would likely be in relation to non-parties to an MEA. See Richard G 
Tarasofsky, ‘International Biodiversity Law and the International Trade Regime’, presented at Panel 
Session on Multilateral Environmental Agreements and Trade, IUCN/GETS Meeting, Geneva, 26 April 
1995 (on file with author).  
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The United States indirectly raised this issue in support of its argument that it should be 
permitted to use trade restrictions to conserve resources that occur outside its territory, 
noting that a CITES party was obliged to prohibit imports in order to protect endangered 
species found outside its own jurisdiction. 95 Australia also raised this issue by taking the 
position that a GATT panel could not resolve conflicts between a contracting party’s 
international trade obligations under the GATT and its obligations under other 
multilateral agreements, although it acknowledged that no such conflict had arisen in the 
Tuna I case.96 
 
The Tuna I panel suggested that the incidence of conflicting international trade 
obligations could be prevented. However, the Tuna I panel implied that, in the absence of 
a GATT amendment or waiver, such conflicts might be resolved against such competing 
obligations in the absence of any clear intention on the part of the parties to the 
environmental agreement to have the latter prevail in the event of any inconsistency with 
their GATT obligations. 97  
 
However, in this conflict between trade and environment, there existed international trade 
obligations, but no competing international environmental or conservation obligations.98 
                                                
95 Submissions of the United States, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BI SD, 39th 
Supp, 155, GATT Doc DS21/R (1991) 30 ILM 1594 (Report by the Panel not Adopted), 16-22. 
96 Submissions of Australia, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD, 39 th Supp, 155, 
GATT Doc DS21/R (1991) 30 ILM 1594 (Report by the Panel not Adopted), 26.  
97 United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD, 39th Supp, 155, GATT Doc DS21/R 
(1991) 30 ILM 1594 (Report by the Panel not Adopted), 50-51. 
98 See Ted McDorman, ‘The 1991 U.S.-Mexico GATT Panel Report on Tuna and Dolphin: Implications 
for Trade and Environment Conflicts’ (1992) 17 North Carolina  Journal of International Law and 
Commercial Regulation 461, 478.  
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The issue regarding the relationship between GATT Articles XX(b) and (g) and MEAs 
remained an open question after Tuna I.  
 
Where WTO parties agree in a MEA that trade restrictions may be employed to pursue 
specific environmental objectives, it is reasonable to assume that they intend the MEA 
obligations to prevail over the general prohibition of GATT Article XI. With respect to 
the implementation of MEA obligations, it is reasonable to assume that WTO parties 
intend MEA trade measures to remain subject to the Article XX chapeau requirements in 
order to prevent abuse.99 A conflict between MEA trade restrictions and Article XI can be 
avoided by interpreting Article XX to permit such measures as an exception to Article 
XI.100 
 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (‘NAFTA’) uses a conflicts clause to resolve 
the issue more clearly than the GATT.101 While a conflicts clause may be appropriate for 
                                                
99 Regarding the role of the chapeau in preventing abuse, the Appellate Body stated in United States—
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, AB-1998-4 (1998) 
(Report of the Appellate Body), para 158: 
The chapeau of Article XX is, in fact, but one expression of the principle of good faith. This principle, at once a general 
principle of law and a general principle of international law, controls the exercise of rights by states. One application of this 
general principle, the application widely known as the doctrine of abus de droit, prohibits the abusive exercise of a state’s 
rights and enjoins that whenever the assertion of a right ‘impinges on the field covered by [a] treaty obligation, it must be 
exercised bona fide, that is to say, reasonably.’ 
The Appellate Body cited in support B Cheng, General Principles of Law as applied by International 
Courts and Tribunals (1953), 125; Border and Transborder Armed Actions [1988] ICJ Rep 105; Rights of 
Nationals of the United States in Morocco  [1952] ICJ Rep 176; Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries [1951] ICJ Rep 
142. 
100 See discussion of Article XI in Chapter 2. Support for the view that the MEA could be taken into 
account in interpreting Article XX is found in European Communities—Measures Affecting the Importation 
of Certain Poultry Products, WTO Doc WT/DS69/AB/R, AB-1998-3 (1998) (Report of the Appellate 
Body), para 83, in which the Appellate Body found that a bilateral agreement between two WTO Members 
could serve as ‘supplementary means’ of interpretation for a provision of a covered agreement. 
101 North American Free Trade Agreement between the Government of Canada, the Government of the 
United Mexican States and the Government of the United States of America, opened for signature 17 
December 1992, 32 ILM 296 (1993) (entered into force 1 January 1994), Art 104. For comparison of 
approaches to trade and environment in the WTO, NAFTA and the European Union, see Richard H 
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a regional trade agreement among countries that share a regional environment and have 
environmental co-operation systems in place,102 such a clause may be impractical in a 
global trade agreement that contains far greater diversity of members with respect to 
environmental conditions, technological capacity, financial means, economic priorities, 
and legal systems. The use of a NAFTA-style conflicts clause in the WTO is not as 
simple a solution as it appears to be, since it involves amending the agreement and 
choosing which MEAs to list now and which to add in the future. Moreover, such a 
proposal has already been rejected by both developed and developing country members 
of the WTO.103 Resolving ambiguities regarding the relationship between trade and 
                                                                                                                                            
Steinberg, ‘Trade-Environment Negotiations in the EU, NAFTA and WTO: Regional Trajectories of Rule 
Development’ (1997) 91 American Journal of International Law 231. Also see Bradly J Condon, 
‘Reconciling Trade and Environment: A Legal Analysis of European and North American Approaches’ 
(2000) 8 Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law  1. 
102 See North American Agreement on Environmental Co-operation between the Government of Canada, 
the Government of the United Mexican States and the Government of the United States of America, opened 
for signature 13 September 1993, 32 ILM 1480 (entered into force 1 January 1994). See also, Sarah 
Richardson, ‘Sovereignty Revisited: Sovereignty, Trade and the Environment - The North American 
Agreement on Environmental Co-operation’ (1998) 24 Canada-United States Law Journal 183 and Bradly 
J Condon, ‘NAFTA and the Environment: A Trade-Friendly Approach’ (1994) 14 Northwestern Journal of 
International Law and Business 528. 
103 Several alternatives have been discussed in the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment, but no 
agreement has been reached on how to address WTO-MEA conflicts. These alternatives include:  
(1) retention of the status quo (that is, an interpretive linkage approach);  
(2) granting MEA -specific waivers;  
(3) various models for amendment of Art XX;  
(4) introduction of a "Coherence Clause" providing that in WTO disputes involving an MEA -mandated 
trade measure, only the application of the measure will be assessed, it being presumed to be provisionally 
justified under Art XX(b) or (g); 
(5) developing principles and criteria by which to assess the validity of trade measures taken pursuant to 
MEAs; 
(6) reversing the burden of proof under GATT Art XX in cases involving specifically mandated trade 
measures;  
(7) developing non-binding intepretive guidelines to be used as a reference in the negotiation of future 
MEAs, and to assess the WTO-compatability of MEA trade measures; 
(8) developing an Understanding to apply across the entire WTO Agreement, regarding differentiated 
treatment for trade measures applied pursuant to MEAs; and 
(9) developing and implementing a voluntary consultative mechanism.  
See Committee on Trade and Environment Special Session, Note by the Secretariat , ‘Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements (MEAs) and WTO rules: Proposals made in the Committee on Trade and 
Environment (CTE) from 1995-2002’, WTO Doc TN/TE/S/1, 23 May 2002, 2. Also see Jan McDonald, 
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environmental agreements is a complex task that is likely to require a more complex 
solution than that found in NAFTA Article 104. It seems neither necessary nor feasible to 
introduce a MEA conflicts clause in the WTO at the moment. 
 
An alternative to using this type of conflicts clause in GATT, which avoids the need to 
change existing WTO provisions, is to use conflicts clauses in MEAs that contain specific 
obligations to use trade restrictions or give their signatories discretion to employ trade 
measures. Most signatories to MEAs are likely to be members of the WTO, and it is not 
unreasonable to ask them to turn their minds to the issue of a conflicts clause for trade 
measures when negotiating MEAs. However, incorporating a conflicts clause in future 
MEAs fails to resolve the question of conflicts with existing MEAs.  
 
The application of MEA trade measures between parties is not controversial. Indeed, 
there have been no disputes in this area. Both GATT and WTO jurisprudence make 
favourable statements regarding such measures. They are consistent with general 
principles of international law and international environmental law. The only real issues 
involve questions of jurisdiction and analytical procedure. These issues are likely to be 
addressed in the current set of negotiations that were placed on the WTO negotiating 
agenda for the Doha Round.104 The application of MEA trade measures to third parties 
and the use of unilateral trade measures in the international environmental context are 
more controversial and are not currently on the negotiating agenda. 
                                                                                                                                            
‘It’s Not Easy Being Green: Trade and Environment Linkages beyond Doha’ in Ross P Buckley (ed), The 
WTO and the Doha Round: The Changing Face of World Trade (2003), 145. 
104 See Chapter 1. 
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V. Measures Applied to Third Parties 
Two issues arise with respect to third parties: the application of trade sanctions to 
intermediary nations that act as trans-shipment points and the application of MEA trade 
provisions to nations that are not parties to the MEA in question. 105 The former issue was 
addressed in Tuna I. The latter issue, while not directly addressed in Shrimp, is analogous 
to the situation in Shrimp II. 
 
In Tuna I, the American law provided for an embargo against ‘intermediary nations’ that 
continued to buy products which the United States had unilaterally decided should not be 
imported by itself or by any other country. Mexico argued that such interference in trade 
between other parties was not permitted by GATT and was contrary to international 
law.106 The EEC argued that the very concept of ‘intermediary nation’ needed to be 
rejected because it would affect the right of each contracting party to determine 
autonomously its own trade policy. The EEC refused to introduce trade measures against 
a State because of a third country’s requirements or on the basis of that country's 
unilaterally defined standards.107 Similarly, Japan argued that its trade relations with 
Mexico should not be subject to American domestic law. The American embargo was not 
‘primarily aimed at the conservation of’ dolphins within the meaning of Article XX(g) 
                                                
105 The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, opened for signature 16 
September 1987, UKTS 19 (1990) (entered into force 1 January 1989) reprinted in 26 ILM 1550 
(1987), for example, requires parties to ban trade in certain substances with non-parties that do not 
comply with the Protocol.  
106 Submissions of Mexico, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD, 39th Supp, 155, 
GATT Doc DS21/R (1991) 30 ILM 1594 (Report by the Panel not Adopted), 16-17. 
107 Submissions of the EC, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD, 39th Supp, 155, 
GATT Doc DS21/R (1991) 30 ILM 1594 (Report by the Panel not Adopted), 31. 
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because an embargo on all yellowfin tuna and tuna products was not a dolphin 
conservation measure but a sanctions mechanism to force other countries to adopt 
policies established unilaterally by the United States.108 
 
If one views the function of Article XX as preserving the rights of WTO members to 
legislate domestically in the listed subjects, it follows that they retain their autonomy to 
legislate domestically or multilaterally in those areas. An international treaty which 
modifies GATT obligations would do so for those countries party to the newer treaty. 109 
An intermediary embargo that is used to support a direct embargo based on the national 
origin of a product might be justifiable on the same basis as the direct embargo. 
However, no single State has the authority to dictate the terms of trade between other 
nations under international law or WTO law. 
 
How do the subject matter and degree of global acceptance of the MEA at issue affect the 
permissibility of trade sanctions against non-parties?110  It has been argued that in some 
                                                
108 Submissions of Japan, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD, 39th Supp, 155, 
GATT Doc DS21/R (1991) 30 ILM 1594 (Report by the Panel not Adopted), 33. 
109 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 
(entered into force 27 January 1980), art 41(1) and Pauwelyn’s analysis of inter se  agreements, Pauwelyn, 
above n 36, 547-550. Also see McDorman, above n 98, 483. 
110 See art 38 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 
UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980): ‘Nothing in articles 34 to 37 precludes a rule set forth in a 
treaty from becoming binding upon a third State as a customary rule of international law, recognized as 
such.’ For a description of the process by which a rule becomes a customary rule of international law, see 
Virginia Dailey, ‘Sustainable Development: Reevaluating the Trade vs. Turtles Conflict at the WTO’ 
(2000) 9 Transnational Law and Policy 331. Commentators have suggested several criteria to determine 
whether MEAs should be exempted from GATT scrutiny under a GATT waiver or binding interpretation, 
including the number of parties to the agreement, the range of parties and interests represented (such as 
developed, developing, importing and exporting), the number of nations affected by the agreement who are 
parties, the distribution of benefits and harms, and the provision of technical, financial or other assistance. 
See Chris Wold, ‘Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the GATT: Conflict and Resolution?’ (1996) 
26 Environmental Law  841. 
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situations conserva tion and environmental agreements can modify the GATT without an 
explicit modification statement, even with respect to non-parties to such agreements.111 
Thus, an expression of broad international support for the modification of the GATT by 
environmental or conservation considerations could suffice to suspend the operation of 
the GATT rules.112 However, it is difficult to accept that such fundamental principles as 
privity of contract and State sovereignty could be so easily overturned. 113 Moreover, the 
                                                
111 McDorman, above n 98, 484-5. McDorman argues that, with respect to CITES, GATT obligations must 
be modified even for countries not a party to CITES, given the completeness of the CITES regime, its 
obvious inconsistency with GATT, the narrowness of the exceptions to GATT thereby created, and the 
overwhelming international support for CITES, which then had more signatories than GATT.  
112 McDorman, ibid 486. See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 
1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980), arts 30, 34, 38, 59, and 64. Art 64 provides 
that ‘If a new peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any existing treaty which is in 
conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates.’  
art 53 (jus cogens) provides: 
‘A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general 
international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international 
law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from 
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general 
international law having the same character.’ If the relevant CITES provisions regarding trade in 
endangered species were accorded the special status of jus cogens, like the prohibition of trade in slaves 
enjoys, those CITES provisions would undoubtedly prevail over the GATT in the event of an 
inconsistency. See Brownlie, above n 50, note 48, 499-500. However, the proponent of a rule of jus cogens 
in relation to Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 
331 (entered into force 27 January 1980), art 53 will have a considerable burden of proof to meet. See 
Brownlie, ibid, 501. Also see T O Elias, The Modern Law of Treaties (1974), 179-184. 
113 ‘The lack of consent by a given state generally means that it cannot be held to the rule in question 
(pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt).’ See Pauwelyn, above n 36, 536. This principle is the international 
law counterpart to the Latin maxim, privatis pactionibus non dubium est non laedi jus caeterorum (there is 
no doubt that the rights of others [third parties] cannot be prejudiced by private agreements), (see H Black, 
Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th ed (1979), 1076) This principle is reflected in the GATT amending formula. 
Art XXX:1 provides: 
‘Except where provision for modification is made elsewhere in this Agreement, amendments to the 
provisions of Part I of this agreement or to the provisions of Art XXIX or of this Art shall become effective 
upon acceptance by all the contracting parties, and other amendments to this Agreement shall become 
effective, in respect of those contracting parties which accept them, upon acceptance by two-thirds of the 
contracting parties and thereafter for each other contracting party upon acceptance by it.’ The applicable 
rule of international law, which flows from the principle of state sovereignty, has been clearly and 
authoritatively stated as follows: ‘The rule that a treaty cannot impose obligations upon a 'third State' is 
well established.’ Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties  (1961), 310; ‘A treaty may not impose obligations 
upon a State which is not a party thereto.’ Art 18 of the Harvard Research Draft Convention on Treaties, 
cited in McNair, ibid, 310; ‘A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its 
consent.’ Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 
(entered into force 27 January 1980), art 48. There are few exceptions to this rule. The major exception is 
set out in art 38 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties , opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 
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rights of the contracting parties can only be modified by agreement among the 
contracting parties themselves.114 However, MEA trade measures applied against non-
parties are analogous to the type of unilateral measure the United States applied against 
Malaysia in Shrimp II. Thus, they could be justified under Article XX(g) in the same 
fashion where they address transboundary or global environmental concerns. However, if 
they are aimed at extraterritorial environmental concerns, it is difficult to see how they 
would comply with customary international law or international environmental law. As a 
result, they would not be justifiable under any GATT interpretation that is consistent with 
these other branches of international law. However, if the subject matter and degree of 
global acceptance of the MEA permits the problem to be characterized as global, rather 
than extraterritorial, the measure could be justified under Article XX(g) as addressing a 
global issue. 
 
VI. The Least-Trade-Restrictive Principle and MEAs 
 
GATT and WTO jurisprudence have generally indicated that the preferred, less-trade -
restrictive alternative to unilateral measures is to negotiate MEAs. MEA trade measures 
are consistent with GATT if implemented in a non-discriminatory and transparent 
manner between parties the MEA. However, where the MEA is implemented so as to 
avoid WTO obligations, the implementing measures must be subject to WTO scrutiny. 
                                                                                                                                            
UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980): ‘Nothing in articles 34 to 37 precludes a rule set forth in a 
treaty from becoming binding upon a third State as a customary rule of international law, recognized as 
such.’  
114 Pauwelyn, ibid. McNair, ibid. 
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The least-trade-restrictive test also can be employed as a general conceptual approach to 
addressing such implementation cases.  
 
Anderson and Fried state the least -trade-restrictive principle as follows:  
...if one is pursuing environmental regulation, ... one [must] do so in the least trade-restrictive way 
possible without compromising the environmental standard one has set for oneself.115 
 
In Tuna I, Australia argued that, under Article XX(b), as previously interpreted,116 the 
United States was required to demonstrate that country-specific import prohibitions on 
tuna were the only means reasonably available to it to ensure the protection of dolphins, 
and that such measures were the least GATT-inconsistent measures available.117 Mexico 
argued that the best way to protect dolphins was by international co-operation among all 
concerned, not by way of unilateral trade measures.118 
 
It was not necessary for the panel to decide whether the trade embargo was the least 
trade-restrictive means available to conserve dolphins. However, it implied that there 
were less trade-restrictive methods available to achieve that goal. 119 Moreover, it 
implicitly accepted Mexico’s argument that multilateral negotiation would be the 
                                                
115 Jean Anderson and Jonathan Fried, ‘The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement at in Operation’ (1991) 17 
Canada-United States Law Journal  397, 403.  
116 See Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, Report of the GATT 
Panel (7 November 1990) BISD, 37th Supp. 200, DS10/R, 30 I.L.M. 1122 (1991), interpreting the meaning 
of the word ‘necessary’ in the context of Art XX(b).  
117 Submissions of Australia, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD, 39th Supp, 155, 
GATT Doc DS21/R (1991) 30 ILM 1594 (Report by the Panel not Adopted), 26.  
118 Submissions of Mexico, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD, 39th Supp, 155, 
GATT Doc DS21/R (1991) 30 ILM  1594 (Report by the Panel not Adopted), 16-17.  
119 United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD, 39th Supp, 155, GATT Doc DS21/R 
(1991) 30 ILM 1594 (Report by the Panel not Adopted), 50. 
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preferable and less trade-restrictive means of accomplishing international environmental 
goals. 
 
The Tuna II panel also found that a measure cannot qualify as necessary under Article 
XX(b) where there are other GATT-consistent alternatives available, which includes the 
negotiation of multilateral agreements. Moreover, measures designed to force other 
nations to change their environmental policies could neither be considered necessary 
under Article XX(b) nor primarily aimed at the conservation of natural resources under 
Article XX(g). The decision thus appeared to require the negotiation of multilateral 
agreements before a measure could be considered to be the least-trade-restrictive 
alternative available.120 
 
The Shrimp I decision concluded that where an alternative course of action is reasonably 
available, in this case making an effort at multilateral negotiations, a measure cannot 
qualify under the Article XX chapeau. In Shrimp II, the panel indicated that one of the 
factors to consider in determining whether to permit a unilateral measure is whether a 
multilateral solution constitutes an ‘alternative course of action reasonably open’.121 This 
appears to incorporate the less trade-restrictive test into the chapeau and apply the test to 
                                                
120 See United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc DS29/R (1994) 33 ILM 839 (Report 
by the Panel not Adopted). Also see Wold, above n 109. For another environmentally related WTO 
decision that applied the least-trade-restrictive requirement, see United States—Standards for Reformulated 
and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc WT/DS2/AB/R, AB-1996-1 (1996) (Report of the Appellate Body). 
121 Regarding this expression of the least-trade-restrictive test, also see United States—Import Prohibition 
of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Art 21.5 by Malaysia, WTO Doc WT/DS58/RW 
(2001) (Report of the Panel), para 5.51, where the panel states: [I]it seems that the Appellate Body meant to 
imply that other, less trade restrictive measures existed and also that import prohibitions, because of their 
impact, had to be subject to stricter disciplines’. 
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the area of international environmental protection. The Appellate Body did not disagree 
with the panel on this issue in Shrimp II. 
 
In its interpretation of Article XX(g) and the chapeau, the Appellate Body in the Shrimp 
case adopted the interpretation of the Appellate Body in the Reformulated Gasoline 
case.122 One commentator has suggested that this interpretation makes the requirements 
of the chapeau synonymous with the ‘necessary’ test under Article XX(b).123 
 
The question that arises is whether a trade measure taken under a multilateral 
environmental agreement would have to pass the least -trade-restrictive test under Article 
XX. It is reasonable to assume that this principle would apply to the manner in which a 
state implements trade measures under a MEA. Otherwise, the implementation process 
could be subject to abuse. The implementation would have to be non-discriminatory and 
transparent, and comply with the requirements for procedural fairness. However, it is 
unlikely that the least-trade-restrictive test would be applied to second guess the 
substance of measures chosen by the parties to the MEA. The WTO would have to show 
deference in this regard to the parties to the MEA. Otherwise, the MEA would have to be 
renegotiated to comply with the opinion of a WTO panel, a result that would be 
impractical and exceed the jurisdiction of the panel. 
 
                                                
122 United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc WT/DS2/AB/R, 
AB-1996-1 (1996) (Report of the Appellate Body). 
123 See Wold, above n 109. 
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NAFTA Article 104 applies the least-trade-restrictive principle to MEAs. NAFTA Article 
104 provides that the specific trade obligations set out in listed MEAs prevail over 
NAFTA, subject to the proviso that ‘where a Party has a choice among equally effective 
and reasonably available means of complying with such obligations, the Party chooses 
the alternative that is the least inconsistent with the other provisions of this 
Agreement’.124 In order for a measure to be the least inconsistent with the other 
provisions of the NAFTA, it would have to be the least inconsistent with the free 
movement of goods and services between the Parties; that is, the least trade-restrictive. It 
would be reasonable to apply a comparable least-trade-restrictive test to MEAs in the 
context of the Article XX chapeau. 
 
VII. A Conflict between NAFTA and GATT 
Neither the GATT nor any GATT panel dec ision has clearly set out whether Articles 
XX(b) or (g) prevail over international environmental agreements as between parties to 
                                                
124 NAFTA Art 104 provides: 
1. In the event of any inconsistency between this Agreement and the specific trade obligations set out in: 
(a) Convention on the International Trade in Endangered    Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, done at 
Washington, March 3, 1973;  
(b) the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer , done at Montreal, September 16, 
1987, as amended June 29, 1990; 
(c) Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal , 
done at Basel, March 22, 1989, upon its entry into force for Canada, Mexico and the United States; or 
(d) the agreements set out in Annex 104.1,  
such obligations shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency, provided that where a Party has a choice 
among equally effective and reasonably available means of complying with such obligations, the Party 
chooses the alternative that is the least inconsistent with this Agreement. (emphasis added). 
2. The Parties may agree in writing to modify Annex 104.1 to include any amendment to the agreements 
listed in para 1, and any other environmental or conservation agreement. 
Annex 104.1 currently lists only two agreements:  
(1) The Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of 
America Concerning the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste, signed at Ottawa, October 28, 
1986, and  
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both. The prevailing view of public international law is that the later law supercedes the 
earlier125 and that the specific supe rcedes the general. 126 Applying the latter principle, the 
more specific trade obligations in the agreements listed in Article 104 would supercede 
the GATT provisions under international law as between parties to both. 127 Article 104 
thus represents a codification of what the likely outcome would be were any of the listed 
agreements challenged before a WTO panel.  
 
The NAFTA provides no express permission or prohibition regarding the unilateral 
assertion of jurisdiction over extraterritorial environmental matters via the imposition of 
trade restrictions. However, Article 104 expressly permits the use of trade measures to 
pursue extraterritorial environmental goals where such measures have been authorised by 
an international environmental agreement (CITES). Since the NAFTA provides no 
express permission to use trade restrictions to unilaterally assert jurisdiction over 
extraterritorial environmental matters, but expressly permits such measures to be taken 
                                                                                                                                            
(2) The Agreement between the United States of America and the United Mexican States on Cooperation 
for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area, signed at La Paz, Baja 
California Sur, August 14, 1983.  
125 See Brownlie, above n 50, note 48, 603, where the author states, ‘...it is to be presumed that a later 
treaty prevails over an earlier treaty concerning the same subject matter...’. 
See McNair, above n 111, 219: ‘Where the parties to the two treaties said to be in conflict are the 
same,...[i]f the provisions of the earlier one are general and those of the later one are special and detailed, 
that fact is some indication that the parties intended the special one to prevail.’ 
See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 
(entered into force 27 January 1980), arts 30 and 59. 
126 See McNair, ibid, 219: ‘[where] one treaty contains general provisions and the other special provisions 
in pari materia,...the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant  comes into play - that is to say, “the 
specific prevails over the general”’. 
127 For example, it is unlikely that the GATT would be interpreted to ‘liberalize’ trade in endangered 
species. Art VIII of CITES requires the parties to penalize trade in specimens in violation of the 
Convention. Such a specific provision would prevail over the GATT's more general trade obligations under 
international law. The fact that CITES is given priority under NAFTA art 104(1)(a) thus represents a 
codification rather than an innovation. 
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pursuant to universally accepted128 multilateral agreements, the implication is that the 
NAFTA prohibits the unilateral use of trade restrictions to pursue extraterritorial 
environmental goals.  
 
Unlike the GATT, the NAFTA expressly permits a state to use trade restrictions to 
address environmental matters that occur outside its national territory, by international 
agreement. In this regard, the distinction between measures taken under international 
agreements and measures taken unilaterally is key to determining whether trade 
restrictions may be employed. Article 104 thus codifies the requirement implicit in the 
Tuna decisions that such measures must expressly or implicitly be intended to prevail 
over trade obligations, by agreement among the affected trading parties. 
 
Article 104 implies that, where there is a conflict between trade obligations under 
NAFTA and environmental obligations under other agreements, the NAFTA obligations 
prevail unless the competing agreement is listed in Article 104 or Annex 104.1. The 
anticipated inclusion of further bilateral and multilateral environmental agreements in 
Article 104, via Annex 104.1, implies further that such agreements between the NAFTA 
Parties are to precede, and indeed replace, any resort to unilateral trade action.  
 
Article 104 resolves the question of how to address MEA trade measures more explicitly 
and clearly than GATT. Extraterritorial environmental concerns must be addressed in the 
context of this provision. However, States that have a territorial connection with the 
                                                
128 This term refers to universal acceptance by the NAFTA parties, evidenced by inclusion in art 104 or 
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resources in the latter category have the right to employ trade measures under Article 
XX(g) to preserve the resources. Article 104 implies that it is not permissible to employ 
unilateral trade measures to address transboundary or global environmental concerns in 
the absence of a listed agreement. However, NAFTA incorporates Article XX(g) and 
customary international law. As a result, in the wake of the Shrimp II decision, there now 
exists a conflict between NAFTA Article 104 and Article XX(g). 
 
The NAFTA conflicts clause provides one method of clarifying the relationship between 
MEAs and trade obligations. However, it is not the best way to resolve this question in 
the WTO context. The conflicts clause is a less flexible approach than leaving panels to 
apply the broad language of Article XX on a case-by-case basis. The conflicts clause 
requires negotiation each time a new MEA or international environmental issue arises, 
whereas the language of Article XX is sufficiently broad to obviate the need for ongoing 
negotiation. Moreover, the conflicts clause closes off options to take unilateral actions in 
situations of urgency that are consistent with customary international law and 
international environmental law.  
 
The conflicts clause may function in the NAFTA context because there are only three 
parties involved and those parties have several bilateral and trilateral mechanisms in 
place to address transboundary environmental concerns in the region. 129 This makes the 
                                                                                                                                            
Annex 104.1. 
129 The NAFTA parties established a Commission for Environmental Cooperation and other trilateral 
mechanisms in the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation between the Government of 
Canada, the Government of the United Mexican States, and the Government of the United States, 13 
September 1993. See <www.cec.org> at 16 October 2003. There are approximately 200 transboundary 
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identification and negotiation of issues that require resolution far more feasible and quick 
than it is among the WTO membership. The size and diversity of the WTO membership, 
together with the increasing difficulty of achieving consensus among the members, would 
make it difficult to make a conflicts clause work in practice. A conflicts clause such as 
NAFTA Article 104 leaves insufficient flexibility to maintain consistency among the 
different branches of international law as they evolve. As the current situation with 
respect to NAFTA demonstrates, a conflicts clause may even create problems with 
respect to the internal consistency of the trade regime itself. 
 
VIII. The Free Rider Problem 
 
The authorization of unilateral trade measures to address transboundary environmental 
concerns creates a political problem for the WTO and potential inconsistencies with 
fundamental principles of WTO law. The effectiveness of such measures depends on the 
relative market power of the importing and exporting countries. 130 Thus, in practice, this 
                                                                                                                                            
environmental agreements in the NAFTA region. See Commission for Environmental Cooperation, 
Transboundary Agreements Infobase, 
<http://www.cec.org/pubs_info_resources/law_treat_agree/transbound_agree/abouttrans.cfm?varlan=Englis
h> at 16 October 2003. 
130 In a different context, the panel recognized that the effectiveness of countermeasures could be affected 
by an imbalance in market power in European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas—Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities Under Article 22.6 of the 
DSU, WTO Doc WT/DS27/ARB/ECU24 (2000) (Decision by the Arbitrators), paras 73 and 76: 
[I]n situations where the complaining party is highly dependent on imports from the other party, it may happen that the 
suspension of certain concessions or certain other obligations entails more harmful effects for the party seeking suspension 
than for the other party. In these circumstances, a consideration by the complaining party in which sector or under which 
agreement suspension may be expected to be least harmful to itself would seem sufficient for us to find a consideration by 
the complaining party of the effectiveness criterion to be consistent with the requirement to follow the principles and 
procedures set forth in Article 22.3. 
… 
Our interpretation of the ‘practicability’ and ‘effectiveness’ criteria is consistent with the object and purpose of Article 22 
which is to induce compliance. If a complaining party seeking the DSB’s authorization to suspend certain concessions or 
certain other obligations were required to select the concessions or other obligations to be suspended in sectors or under 
agreements where such suspension would be either not available in practice or would not be powerful in effect, the 
objective of inducing compliance could not be accomplished and the enforcement mechanism of the WTO dispute 
settlement system could not function properly. 
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mechanism is only available to WTO members with substantial markets—large 
deve loped and developing countries. While, in theory, this mechanism is available to all 
WTO members, the least-developed countries and small developing countries will not be 
able to use it to great effect. This makes it unacceptable politically, particularly in the 
current climate where WTO negotiations have bogged down due to the perception that 
the WTO benefits its more powerful members at the expense of its weaker members.131 
Indeed, this mechanism is yet another example of the inequality that is perpetuated when 
rules and negotiations disadvantage the already disadvantaged members.132 
 
In addition, this development is inconsistent with other principles of international law and 
WTO law. Interpreting a legal right so that it disadvantages least-developed countrie s 
runs counter to the general principle of sovereign equality of States in international 
law.133 Creating rights that are unavailable to developing and least-developed countries is 
also inconsistent with WTO provisions and decisions that require differential treatment of 
developing and least-developed countries that favours these categories of member.134 
                                                
131 Divisions between developed countries and the developed and least-developed countries prevented the 
WTO from reaching consensus at the Ministerial Conference in Seattle, in 1999, and at the Ministerial 
Conference in Cancun, in 2003. 
132 The right to issue compulsory licenses on patents in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 1C, 33 ILM 
1197 (1994), art 31 is another example of a legal right that was in practice not available to the most 
disadvantaged WTO members, due to their lack of manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector. 
See Bradly J Condon and Tapen Sinha, ‘Bargaining for Lives at the World Trade Organization: The Law 
and Economics of Patents and Affordable AIDS Treatment’ (forthcoming). 
133 See Chapter 4. 
134 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization  (‘WTO Agreement’), 15 April 1994, 
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal 
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 ILM 1125 (1994), art XI, provides that, ‘The least-
developed countries recognized as such by the United Nations will only be required to undertake 
commitments and concessions to the ext ent consistent with their individual development, financial and 
trade needs or their administrative and institutional capabilities’. The Decision on Measures in Favour of 
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In essence, the ruling in Shrimp II represents an attempt to resolve a ‘free rider’ 135 
problem. In the context of international environmental negotiations, each country has an 
incentive to ‘free ride’ on the other countries’ efforts to protect the environmental 
resource at stake. In the Shrimp II case, Malaysia’s refusal to participate in the sea turtle 
                                                                                                                                            
Least-Developed Countries, in GATT Secretariat, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations (1994), 440, art 1 provides: ‘if not already provided for in the instruments negotiated in the 
course of the Uruguay Round, notwithstanding their acceptance of these instruments, the least-developed 
countries… will only be required to undertake commitments and concessions to the extent consistent with 
their individual development, financial and trade needs or their administrative and institutional 
capabilities’. The WTO Agreement preamble also makes special reference to the needs of developing 
countries, ‘especially the least developed among them’. The Dispute Settlement Understanding requires 
that ‘Members shall exercise due restraint’ in filing complaints against least developed countries and in 
asking for compensation or seeking authorization to suspend the application of concessions or other 
obligations. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes(‘DSU’), 15 
April 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 
Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 2, 33 ILM 1197 (1994) Art 24(1). Other 
provisions relating to differential treatment are DSU, art 3(12), which gives developing countries the right 
to invoke the Decision of 5 April 1966 (BISD 14S/18) when they bring a complaint against a developed 
country, and DSU, art 8(10), which permits a developing country to request that at least one member of the 
panel be from a developing country in disputes between a developing country and a developed country. 
Other WTO agreements also contain provisions regarding preferential treatment. GATT Part IV (Arts 
XXXVI, XXXVII, XXXVIII, Ad Art XXXVI, and Ad Art XXXVII), ‘Trade and Development’, gives 
preferential treatment to ‘less-developed contracting parties’. Preferential treatment is also a feature of 
trade remedy law. See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 1994 , 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 1A, 33 ILM 1197 (1994), Art 15 
and Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures , 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying the 
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments—Results of the 
Uruguay Round, Annex 1A, 33 ILM 1197 (1994), Art 27(2)(a) and Annex 7.  
The legal definition of developing countries in international law generally has received relatively little 
attention in the legal literature. Guglielmo Verdirame has written an excellent article on this issue. See 
Guglielmo Verdirame, ‘The Definition of Developing Countries under GATT and Other International 
Law’(1996) 39 German Yearbook of International Law 164. Also see Guy de Lacharrière, ‘Aspects récents 
du classement d’un pays comme moins developpé’(1967) Annuaire français de droit international 703; 
Guy de Lacharrière, Identification et statut des pays moins developpé (1971) Annuaire français de droit 
international 461; Guy Feuer, ‘Les différentes categories de pays en développement’ (1982) Journal du 
droit international 1; Maurice Flory, Droit international du développement (1977); Jacques Bouveresse, 
Droit et politiques du développement (1990); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘Die Dritte Welt und das 
Wirtschaftsvolkerrecht’ (1976) Zeitschrift fur Auslandisches Offentliches Recht under Volkerrecht 492; 
Francis Snyder and Peter Slinn (eds), International Law of Development (1987); Milan Bulajic, Principles 
of International Development Law (1993); F V García -Amador, The Emerging International Law of 
Development (1990); Wil D Verwey, ‘The Principal of Preferential Treatment for Developing Countries’ 
(1983) Indian Journal of International Law 343. 
135 The free rider concept may be defined as follows: ‘The notion that those who do not contribute to some 
project may nevertheless benefit from it (free riders), evidenced in games such as the tragedy of the 
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protection program can be viewed as an attempt to avoid the cost of protecting the turtles 
and thus to free ride on the efforts of the other countries. As long as the other countries’ 
participation achieves the goal of saving the turtle, Malaysia has no incentive to 
participate. By not participating, the free rider gets the benefit of the resource without 
paying the cost of maintaining the resource. 
 
The Kyoto Protocol provides another example.136 Assuming that greenhouse gas 
emissions provoke climate change that harms all countries, the reduction of emissions 
produces a benefit for all. However, there is an economic cost to reducing emissions. If 
one country (the free rider) refuses to pay the cost of participating while the other 
countries agree to pay the cost of reducing emissions, the free rider gains the benefit of 
reduced emissions without paying for the benefit. However, if the free rider is penalized 
for refusing to participate and the cost of the penalty exceeds the cost of participation, the 
free rider now has an incentive to participate in conserving the common resource. 
 
The Shrimp II ruling resolves the free rider problem by allowing the use of trade barriers 
to penalize the free rider and thus to create an incentive for the free rider to participate in 
a multilateral environmental agreement. In this case, the penalty is the denial of access to 
the American market for Malaysian shrimp products. In theory, permitting WTO 
members to impose such trade barriers unilaterally should solve the free rider problem, 
                                                                                                                                            
commons and public goods contribution games.’ Game Theory: Dictionary: Terms: Free Rider 
http://www.gametheory.net/Dictionary/FreeRider.html 
136 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 4 June 1992, (1992) 
31 ILM 849 (entered into force 21 March 1994). Kyoto Protocol , opened for signature 16 March 1998, 
available at <http://unfccc.int/resource/convkp.html>, at 4 November 2003. 
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providing an incentive to free riders to participate in multilateral environmental 
protection efforts. Once the free rider is induced to participate, the penalty is no longer 
required. In theory, the threat of the penalty should be sufficient to induce participation, 
thus maintaining open markets while simultaneously facilitating multilateral cooperation 
on environmental issues. This looks like an ideal way to ensure that trade liberalization 
and environmental protection efforts are mutually supportive. Indeed, some argue that 
interpreting WTO rules to prevent such use of unilateral trade measures to protect the 
environment could exacerbate free-rider problems and thus inhibit the negotiation of 
cooperative solutions to global environmental problems.137 
 
The problem with this theory is that it fails to take into account the impact of market size 
on the ability to impose adequate penalties.138 The larger the market is the higher the cost 
of denying market access will be. This means that the effectiveness of this particular 
mechanism for resolving the free rider problem depends on the economic power of the 
                                                
137 See, for example, Howse, above n 19, and Howard Chang, ‘Carrots, Sticks, and International 
Externalities’ (1997) 17 International Review of Law and Economics 309. Also see Ronald H Coase, ‘The 
Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics  1. Richard Parker also argues in favour of 
the use of trade leverage. See Richard W Parker, ‘The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage to Protect the 
Global Commons: What We Can Learn from the Tuna-Dolphin Conflict’ (1999) 12 Georgetown 
International Environmental Law Review  1. 
138 The OECD has also made this point, noting that market power influences the effectiveness of trade 
measures that are based on processing and production methods: ‘For the most part, countries with small 
internal markets will not be able to impose trade restrictions successfully on large countries to which they 
export their products’. Organisation for Economic Co -operation and Development, above n 63. Gaines also 
discusses this issue, noting that, ‘The real disparity lies not in which countries might feel adversely affected 
by such measures, but in which countries might reasonably be able to take advantage of permission to 
apply them. This inequity of opportunity to impose such measures…accounts  for the vociferous opposition 
by developing countries to PPM-based measures and analogous ‘product’ requirements such as 
environmental packaging and labeling’.(sic) Gaines, above n 54, 427. Gaines argues that the analysis of 
uniform rules must be ‘sensitive to their potential disparate effects’, which could ‘exacerbate rather than 
ameliorate the fundamental inequalities of trade’. Ibid, note 123. On the topic of equity, see Frank J Garcia, 
‘Trade and Inequality: Economic Justice and the Developing World’ (2000) 21 Michigan Journal of 
International Law  975. 
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member imposing the sanction.139 If the free rider is an economic powerhouse, this 
mechanism becomes less effective. 
 
Take the case of the decision of the United States to not participate in the Kyoto Protocol. 
Here, the United States is the free rider. In theory, the reasoning in Shrimp II could be 
applied to authorize unilateral trade measures against the United States in order to induce 
its participation in the agreement. The United States accounts for 23.5 per cent of world 
imports.140 The European Union is the only WTO member that comes close to the United 
States on this measure, with 18.2 per cent.141 Japan, China and Canada, the other three 
                                                
139 The impact of market size on the effectiveness of trade sanctions has also been discussed in the context 
of WTO dispute settlement. Some have proposed that developing countries engage in ‘collective 
sanctioning’ in order to increase their leverage in this context. See B Hoekman and P C Mavroidis, 
‘Enforcing Multilateral Commitments: Dispute Settlement and Developing Countries’, The WTO/World 
Bank Conference on Developing Countries in a New Millenium (WTO Secretariat, 1999) (arguing that 
collective sanctioning is possible under the current WTO system) and Naboth van den Broek, ‘Power 
Paradoxes in Enforcement and Implementation of World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Reports: 
Interdisciplinary Approaches and New Proposals’ (2003) 37 Journal of World Trade 127 (arguing that 
reforms to the DSU are needed to make collective sanctioning fully effective and available and noting that 
it may be difficult in practice to find countries willing to participate in collective sanctioning). In European 
Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas—Recourse to Arbitration by 
the European Communities Under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WTO Doc WT/DS27/ARB/ECU24 (2000) 
(Decision by the Arbitrators), paras 70-73 and 76, the arbitrators recognized that market power is a factor to 
be considered in evaluating the effectiveness criterion under DSU Article 22(3): 
[T]he term ‘effective’ connotes ‘powerful in effect’, ‘making a strong impression’, ‘having an effect or result’. Therefore, 
the thrust of this criterion empowers the party seeking suspension to ensure that the impact of that suspension is strong and 
has the desired result, namely to induce compliance by the Member which fails to bring WTO-inconsistent measures into 
compliance with DSB rulings within a reasonable period of time. 
One may ask whether this objective may ever be achieved in a situation where a great imbalance in terms of trade volume 
and economic power exists between the complaining party seeking suspension and the other party which has failed to bring 
WTO-inconsistent measures into compliance with WTO law. In such a case, and in situations where the complaining party 
is highly dependent on imports from the other party, it may happen that the suspension of certain concessions or certain 
other obligations entails more harmful effects for the party seeking suspension than for the other party. In these 
circumstances, a consideration by the complaining party in which sector or under which agreement suspension may be 
expected to be least harmful to itself would seem sufficient for us to find a consideration by the complaining party of the 
effectiveness criterion to be consistent with the requirement to follow the principles and procedures set  forth in Article 
22.3. 
… 
Our interpretation of the ‘practicability’ and ‘effectiveness’ criteria is consistent with the object and purpose of Article 22 
which is to induce compliance. If a complaining party seeking the DSB’s authorization to suspend certain concessions or 
certain other obligations were required to select the concessions or other obligations to be suspended in sectors or under 
agreements where such suspension would be either not available in practice or would not be powerful in effect, the 
objective of inducing compliance could not be accomplished and the enforcement mechanism of the WTO dispute 
settlement system could not function properly. 
140 See Table 3.1. 
141 See Table 3.1. 
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members in the top five, together account for only 16.4 per cent of world imports. In 
contrast, even though Malaysia ranks twelfth in terms of its share of imports it still only 
accounts for 1.5 percent. 
 
Table 3.1: Share of World Imports as a Measure of Economic Power (2001) 
 
Importer Share of World Rank 
United States 23.5% 1 
European Union 18.2 2 
Japan 7.0 3 
China 4.9 4 
Canada 
Mexico 
Malaysia 
Australia 
Thailand 
India 
4.5 
3.5 
1.5 
1.3 
1.2 
1.0 
5 
7 
12 
13 
14 
18 
 
Source: WTO, ‘International trade statistics 2002’142 
 
 
It is difficult to estimate the economic cost to the United States of implementing its Kyoto 
Protocol obligations, but one estimate put the cost at between $128 and $283 billion per 
year on average for the years 2008-2012 (in 1992 dollars).143 Assuming this figure is 
accurate, to make the Shrimp II mechanism work, the WTO member imposing unilateral 
trade sanctions against the United States would need to ban American imports worth a 
comparable figure. With respect to the larger estimate, there is no single trading partner 
of the United States that comes close to being able to do so, even banning all 
                                                
142 Table I.6, Leading exporters and importers in world merchandise t rade (excluding intra-EU trade), 
2001,  <http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2002_e/section1_e/i06.xls>, at 30 November 2002. 
143 Energy Information Administration, Impacts of the Kyoto Protocol on U.S. Energy Markets & 
Economic Activity, Report # SR/OIAF/98-03 (1998). <http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/kyoto/execsum.html>, 
at 30 November 2002. Another study suggests that there could be zero or negative net costs to the United 
States of implementing the Kyoto Protocol. See Union of Concerned Scientists and Tellus Insitutute, A 
Small Price to Pay: US Action to Curb Global Warming Is Feasible and Affordable (1998), 
<http://www.ucsusa.org/publication.cfm?publicationID=8>, at 30 November 2002. 
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merchandise imports from the United States (using figures for 2001). Using the lower 
estimate, only Canada and the European Union could reach the amount (by 2008, Mexico 
might reach this sum too). 
 
Table 3.2: Value of U.S. Exports to Top 5 Destinations, Billions of Dollars (2001) 
 
Destination Value 
Canada 163.7 
European Union 159.4 
Mexico 101.5 
Japan 57.6 
South Korea 22.2 
 
Source: WTO, ‘International trade statistics 2002’144 
 
Of course, any country that chose to impose trade restrictions on the United States in 
order to provide incentives for American participation in a multilateral environmental 
agreement runs the risk of American counter measures. Thus, even if a country’s market 
were sufficiently important to provide an adequate incentive, the cost of American 
countermeasures would provide a deterrent. For example, Canada is the largest trade 
partner of the United States, which in theory places Canada in the best position to 
penalize the United States through trade barriers. However, the Canadian market receives 
only 22.4 per cent of American exports,145 while the American market receives 87.2 per 
cent of Canada’s exports.146 It is pretty clear who would be penalized the most from a 
Canada-United States trade war. In comparison, Malaysia receives only 1.3 per cent of 
                                                
144 Table III.17: Merchandise Trade of the United States by region and economy, 2001,  
<http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2002_e/section3_e/iii17.xls>, at 30 November 2002. 
145 Table III.16: Merchandise Trade of Canada by region and economy, 2001, 
<http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2002_e/section3_e/iii16.xls>, at 30 November 2002. 
146 Table III.17, ibid. 
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American exports (and it ranked as the thirteenth largest destination for American exports 
in 2001). 147 However, Malaysia sent 26.3 per cent of its exports to the United States.148 
 
When it comes to using trade measures to penalize free riders in multilateral 
environmental negotiations, economic clout counts because it makes equality of 
bargaining power non-existent. The implication is that, while the obligation to bargain in 
good faith may apply equally to all WTO members under the standard of review 
proposed in Shrimp II, the ability to use unilateral trade measures as a bargaining chip is 
anything but equal. As neutral as the statement of the standard sounds, in practice it 
serves to discriminate between WTO members based on the relative size and importance 
of their markets.149 It benefits the economically powerful but not the economically weak 
members. The capacity of countries to contribute to multilateral environmental protection 
(both in terms of their environmental impact on the particular resource and their 
technological and financial capacity to contribute to its solution) and the capacity of 
WTO members to penalize free riders (with trade barriers) is asymmetrical. The standard 
set out in Shrimp II takes the former into account, but ignores the latter. In doing so, it 
runs the risk of violating the public international law principle of sovereign equality of 
                                                
147 Ibid. 
148 Calculated using figures from Table III.17, ibid and WTO, ‘International trade statistics 2002,’Table 
A4, World Merchandise Exports by Region and Selected Economy, 1991-01, 
<http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2002_e/appendix_e/a04.xls>, at 30 November 2002. 
149 The right to use unilateral trade measures in Art XX is not all that different from another mechanism 
whose effectiveness is also based on economic power. This analysis applies as well to DSU provisions 
regarding the authorization of retaliatory trade measures to induce members to comply with DSB rulings. 
Here, the free rider seeks to benefit from the market access that comes with WTO membership without 
incurring the cost of opening its market to the same degree as other members. However, the DSU 
mechanism is better able to overcome asymmetries in economic power in most cases because the retaliatory 
trade measures are equivalent in value to the trade barriers that are penalized. Moreover, the value of trade 
involved is easier to calculate than the cost of participation in MEAs. 
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states and the WTO principle of non-discrimination.150 These issues will be analysed in 
the next chapter. 
 
IX. Conclusion 
 
It is important to recall that the principle of stare decisis does not apply to decisions of 
WTO panels and that panel opinions on the potential GATT-consistency of measures 
taken under MEAs are only obiter dicta. Nevertheless, decisions rendered in the Shrimp 
cases will have persuasive value in future decisions of WTO panels and the Appellate 
Body. However, the primary focus of analysis must be on the provisions of the 
agreements themselves, which were drafted in a way that allows their interpretation to 
evolve over time to deal with shifting global priorities and the growing diversity of WTO 
membership. 
 
Recent interpretations of existing GATT provisions have opened the door for multilateral 
environmental trade measures dealing with shared species and resources to be justified as 
exceptions under Article XX. While it appears unlikely that trade measures taken 
pursuant to a MEA against parties to the MEA will be challenged before the WTO, 
                                                
150 One can argue that the implications of judicial settlement of international disputes for the equality of 
states may be no greater than negotiated solutions, since this legal principle does not reflect economic and 
political reality. Nevertheless, the judicial resolution of such fundamental legal issues represents an 
important shift, as noted by Philippe Sands: 
In the Shrimp/Turtle case, we have seen how an issue which previously would have been decided by international 
negotiation and diplomatic action – on the basis of an assumed equality of states but where in reality great discrepancies in 
sovereign power tilt the balance in favor of the economically and polit ically powerful – is instead subject to binding 
judicial decision. 
Philippe Sands, ‘Turtles and Torturers: The Transformation of International Law’, Inaugural Public Lecture 
as Professor of Public International Law, University of London, 6 June 2000, 
<http://www.nyu.edu/pubs/jilp/main/issues/33/pdf/33p.pdf>, pp 527-559, 555, at 19 February 2003. 
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should such a case arise the measure would probably meet the standards set out in Article 
XX. Should measures be taken against non-parties, the treatment will be the same as for 
unilateral measures and the outcome of a WTO challenge will be determined in 
accordance with the Shrimp decisions.  
 
There appears to be no need to introduce immediate changes to the WTO regime in order 
to deal with conflicts with MEAs. In particular, it does not appear to be either necessary 
or feasible to introduce a MEA conflicts clause in the WTO. While such provisions may 
be useful in regional trade agreements, they would be problematic in the WTO given the 
diversity of its membership.  
 
Environmental policy choices do not fall under the jurisdiction of the WTO. However, 
trade measures do. There is a clear conflict between the general rule of Article XI and the 
obligation to use trade restrictions in certain MEAs.  There is no conflicts clause in the 
WTO that determines which obligation is to prevail. However, Article XX provides 
exceptions to the Article XI general rule that reserves jurisdiction over environmental 
policy to national governments, subject to the requirements of the Article XX chapeau. 
The national governments can exercise their jurisdiction regarding the content of 
environmental policy alone or in concert with other national governments in MEAs. As 
long as the policy fits the parameters of Article XX (g), the trade restrictions in question 
will qualify for provisional justification under one of these two subheadings. I argued in 
Chapter 2 that the subject matter of Article XX(g) covers measures that address 
transnational and global environmental problems. Article XX(g) also requires a 
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jurisdictional nexus between the environmental problem and the country that implements 
a trade measure. Where there is no territorial nexus, the MEA provides a legal nexus that 
should satisfy this requirement. The implementing country must have a jurisdictional 
nexus in order to apply MEA trade restrictions against third parties or to otherwise apply 
trade measures outside the context of a MEA in order to meet the requirements of the 
Shrimp cases. Moreover a jurisdictional nexus is required in order to establish that the 
environmental problem affects the ‘essential interests’ of the country in question. This 
must be established to invoke the doc trine of necessity in customary international law in 
order to address the apparent inconsistency of such measures with the jurisdictional 
competence enjoyed by States in international law. This topic is the focus of Chapter 4. 
 
The WTO has jurisdiction over the use of trade restrictions. That jurisdiction needs to be 
retained even with respect to MEA trade measures so that the WTO may supervise their 
implementation under the Article XX chapeau. It is necessary to retain this jurisdiction 
over the manner of implementation in order to ensure that WTO members do not abuse 
their rights under Article XX(g). Even if the WTO had a conflicts clause that determined 
that MEA trade obligations prevail over GATT obligations (or if the rules regarding 
conflicts between treaties led to the same conclusion), the implementation of the MEA 
obligations would still need to be subject to the requirements of the chapeau in order to 
safeguard against abuse.  
 
This view accords with the intention of WTO and MEA parties to place trade policy in 
the jurisdiction of the WTO and environmental policy in the jurisdiction of the MEA. The 
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view that MEA trade restrictions qualify for provisional justification under Article XX(g) 
but nevertheless remain subject to WTO supervision under the chapeau provides a way to 
reconcile potential conflicts between the two sets of obligations. 
 
It would be unwise to say that the DSB has no jurisdiction at all over trade measures 
implemented pursuant to MEAs, because a WTO member could then purport to take a 
measure under a MEA and thereby preclude DSB scrutiny altogether.  As long as the 
MEA requires that trade measures be implemented in conformity with the requirements 
of the Article XX chapeau, any apparent conflict between the MEA and GATT 
obligations will be resolved.  Even if the MEA contains no explicit requirement in this 
regard, the MEA should be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with GATT 
obligations where the MEA parties are GATT members. 
 
The factors that the Appellate Body considered in permitting the unilateral measure in 
Shrimp II are not inconsistent with international environmental law or general 
international law. However, interpreting Article XX(g) as providing a right to use 
unilateral trade measures to address transboundary or global environmental problems is 
inconsistent with the customary rule of international law regarding the jurisdictional  
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nexus that is required for a State to regulate, the principle of sovereign equality, and 
differential treatment of least -developed and developing countries in WTO law. The next 
chapter will address these issues and seek to reconcile these apparent inconsistencies. 
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Chapter 4 
The Sovereignty Prism: Equality, Extraterritoriality and Necessity 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Sovereignty is the linchpin of global governance. Sovereignty is the main obstacle to 
achieving global governance. International trade agreements represent the exercise of 
sovereignty. International trade agreements erode sovereignty. Sovereignty permits 
nations to protect the environment. Sovereignty prevents nations from protecting the 
environment. Sovereignty protects despots who violate human rights. Sovereignty 
justifies the removal of despots who violate human rights. Sovereignty is a legal 
principle. Sovereignty is a political principle. Sovereignty is not a principle at all. 
 
‘Sovereignty’ is a multifaceted concept that appears capable of supporting virtually any 
argument in the field of international relations.   
 
So, of course, there is debate over whether the rulings in the Shrimp cases represent an 
instance of deference to or intrusion upon national sovereignty.1 For example, Sands 
                                                
1 The United States banned imports of tuna from nations whose fishermen used tuna-fishing methods that 
killed dolphins and imports of shrimp when fishing methods killed sea turtles. See United States – 
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD, 39th Supp, 155, GATT Doc DS21/R (1991) (Report by the 
Panel not Adopted), 30 ILM 1594 (1991); United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc 
DS29/R (1994) (Report by the Panel not Adopted), 33 ILM 839 (1994); United States – Import Prohibition 
of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,  WTO Doc WT/DS58, 15 May 1998 (Report of the Panel), WTO 
Doc WT/DS/AB/R, AB-1998 -4, 12 October 1998 (Report of the Appellate Body adopted 6 November 
1998); and United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 
21.5 by Malaysia, WTO Doc WT/DS58/RW, 15 June 2001 (Report of the Panel); WTO Doc 
 198 
characterizes the Shrimp ruling as an example of ‘the active role of courts in identifying 
the existence of norms where the international legislature…has refrained from doing so’ 
or to ‘fill in the gaps’ of international law.2 He argues that the ‘new international 
judiciary’ of permanent courts and tribunals that have been established in recent years has 
‘in many instances, shown itself unwilling to defer to traditional conceptions of 
sovereignty and state power’ (the WTO judiciary representing but one example).3 The 
creation of an international judiciary means that states have given up ‘a degree of control 
in the “making” of international law, since the line between interpretation and legislation 
can often be a hard one to draw’.4  Howse, on the other hand, argues that the Shrimp 
ruling does not represent a case of judicial activism, but rather an example of deference to 
the national sovereignty of the United States in the absence of clear WTO rules 
prohibiting the use of trade measures to achieve international conservation objectives.5  
 
Others argue that sovereignty is not a meaningful legal concept6 and that the real issue is 
how to allocate decision-making authority.7 Nevertheless, the concept of State 
                                                                                                                                            
WT/DS58/AB/RW, 22 October 2001, (Report of the Appellate Body Adopted 21 November 2001). In both 
cases, the United States applied national laws regulating fishing methods to its own citizens and sought to 
apply the same standards to the citizens of other States. In Shrimp II, the United States addressed this issue 
by requiring that other countries adopt comparable standards, rather than the same law as the United States.  
In Shrimp II, the panel rejected Malaysia’s argument that the American law violated Malaysia’s 
sovereignty.  
2 Philippe Sands, ‘Turtles and Torturers: The Transformation of International Law’, Inaugural Public 
Lecture as Professor of Public International Law, University of London, 6 June 2000, 
<http://www.nyu.edu/pubs/jilp/main/issues/33/pdf/33p.pdf>, pp. 527-559, at 552, at 19 February 2003. 
3 Sands, ibid 553. 
4 Sands, above n 2, 555. 
5 Robert Howse, ‘The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal Baseline for the 
Trade and Environment Debate’ (2002) 27 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 491. 
6 See Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties  (1961), 757: ‘Unfortunately, sovereignty is not a precise term and 
belongs more to political science than to law.’ Jackson succinctly expresses the difficulty in using this term 
as follows: ‘“sovereignty” (whatever that means)’. See John H Jackson, The Jurisprudence of GATT and 
the WTO: Insights on Treaty Law and Economic Relations (2000), 186. Also see Louis Henkin, 
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sovereignty is the starting point for the analysis of the allocation of decision-making 
power under international law.8 In the absence of customary or conventional rules of 
international law to the contrary9, State sovereignty is the ‘default’ position in terms of 
decision-making authority. 10 However, sovereignty is an ambiguous concept whose 
meaning and content vary with the context.11 Indeed, it may not even qualify as a norm of 
international law because its content is not sufficiently precise.12 Nevertheless, it 
embodies the principle that one State does not have the jurisdiction to intervene in the 
internal affairs of another. 
 
On one view, the Shrimp II ruling permits a violation of the principle of nonintervention. 
The unilateral measure represents an intrusion by the United States upon the sovereign 
right of other countries to regulate the activities of their fishermen in international 
waters13 and in their own territorial waters. The United States thus exceeded the limits of 
                                                                                                                                            
International Law: Politics and Values (1995), 9: ‘For international relations, surely for international law, it 
is a term largely unnecessary and better avoided.’  
7 See Jackson, above n 6, 370. 
8 See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law  (2nd ed,1973), 299-301. Jurisdiction flows from 
the general legal competence of states, often referred to as ‘sovereignty’. See ibid 291. 
9 ‘Every State upon the recognition of its statehood by other States, is deemed to have accepted the body of 
customary international law recognized by the society of States, which includes the rule pacta sunt 
servanda.’ McNair, above n 6, 758. 
10 The sovereignty of states is plenary in the absence of specific legal constraints to the contrary. See The 
S.S. ‘Lotus’, [1927] PCIJ (Ser A) No 10, 19. 
11 See Jerzy Kranz, ‘Réflexions sur la souveraineté’ in Jerzy Makarczyk (ed), Theory of International Law 
at the Threshold of the 21st Century (1996), 183, where the author states, ‘La souveraineté fait partie des 
notions les plus controversies et les plus ambigues en droit international….toute discussion concernant la 
souveraineté doit distinguer entre ses divers aspects (politiques et juridiques, constitutionnel et 
international)….dans son évolution historique, la notion de souveraineté n’exclut pas la soumission au droit 
(naturel ou positif, national ou international).’ 
12 See Kranz, ibid 213. 
13 See Pacific Fur Seal Arbitration (United States v. Great Britain) (Paris, 1893), reprinted in 1 John 
Bassett Moore, International Arbitration History (1898) 755-961 (holding that there was no basis in 
international law for the United States to apply its conservation standards to acts that took place outside its 
territorial limits, since the United States had neither a property interest in migratory seals that were born in 
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its jurisdiction (by seeking to regulate activities of non-citizens outside its territory) 
because of the intrusion into the jurisdiction of other States, even though the United 
States itself has a jurisdictional nexus to the turtles.14 This view judges the compatibility 
of the American measure from the perspective of the exporting State’s sovereignty. 
 
Viewed from a different perspective, the Shrimp II decision represents an affirmation of 
American sovereignty over the products that it allows to be imported into its territory. 
This second view characterizes GATT Article XX as preserving the sovereignty or 
autonomy of WTO members in specific fields of public policy. WTO trade obligations 
limit the sovereign right to restrict imports. Article XX permits WTO members to act as 
though those obligations do not exist. In the absence of a clear agreement to accept those 
obligations, the law in effect reverts to the default position of national sovereignty, where 
the State is permitted to do anything in its jurisdiction that is not expressly prohibited (in 
this instance, to prevent a particular product from entering its territory).15 This view 
judges the compatibility of the American measure from the perspective of the sovereignty 
of the importing State. 
 
Whether one views the issue from the perspective of the importing or exporting country, 
what is at stake is where to draw the line when the jurisdiction of States overlaps. In the 
                                                                                                                                            
its jurisdiction nor the right to protect the resource from extinction at the hands of British vessels in 
international waters). 
14 In the Shrimp case the United States had a jurisdictional nexus that appears to comply with the 
requirements of both customary international law and international environmental law to the extent that it 
has an interest in the turtles, casting doubt on this aspect of the ruling in the Pacific Fur Seal case. 
However, the jurisdictional nexus with the turtles does not provide jurisdiction over the acts of non-citizens 
outside American territory. See Brownlie, above n 8 and below n 61. 
15 See The S.S. ‘Lotus’ , [1927] PCIJ (Ser A) No 10, 19. 
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absence of a clear agreement, this competition for jurisdiction over shared resources can 
be resolved by the rule of law or the relative power of States. In adopting a substantial 
body of rules to govern trade relations, WTO members have opted for the former.  
 
Casting the debate in terms of national sovereignty clouds the issue. Nevertheless, more 
concrete expressions of the sovereignty concept can chart a course that promotes greater 
coherence between WTO law and the general body of international law.  
 
Jurisdictional competence is one manifestation of the concept of sovereignty. Another is 
the principle of the sovereign equality of States. Article I of the UN Declaration requires 
States to conduct trade relations in accordance with the principles of sovereign equality 
and non-intervention.16 In the event of any inconsistency between the UN Charter and 
other treaties, the former prevails. 17 These principles constitute customary international 
law.18 DSU Article 3(2) requires the interpretation of WTO agreements in accordance 
with the customary rules of interpretation of public international law, which incorporate 
these principles by reference. 19 Thus, under international law, the exceptions in GATT 
Article XX must be interpreted and applied to conform to the principles of sovereign 
equality and non-intervention.  
                                                
16 Article I of the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation Amongst States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res 2131, UN 
GAOR, 20th Session, Supp No 14, UN Doc A/6220 (1965) provides, ‘State shall conduct their international 
relations in the economic…and trade fields in accordance with the principles of sovereign equality and non-
intervention.’ 
17 Charter of the United Nations, art 103 provides: ‘In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the 
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other 
international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.’ 
18 See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v United States) , 1986 ICJ 14 and discussion below. 
19 See Chapter 1. 
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This chapter is divided into four parts. The first part examines the sovereignty issue from 
the perspective of territorial jurisdiction. The second part examines the sovereignty issue 
from the perspective of sovereign equality. The third part considers how the necessity 
doctrine of customary international law might be used to reconcile the consistency of 
unilateral measures with both facets of sovereignty. The fourth part proposes that the 
WTO judiciary make a greater contribution to achieving coherence among different 
branches of international law. 
 
II. Sovereignty and Territorial Jurisdiction 
 
The principle of state sovereignty empowers countries to enter into agreements (treaties) 
with other countries in which they agree to cede the power to regulate certain matters 
unilaterally.20  Under both GATT 1947 and GATT 1994, the United States has argued 
                                                
20 However, treaty-making capacity is no longer confined to States. International organizations, such as the 
United Nations, also have the legal capacity to enter treaties. McNair, above n 6, 755. Sub-national 
governments (states, provinces) or colonies do not enjoy this status under international law. However, 
federal governments increasingly assume treaty obligations that affect the rights of sub-federal 
governments, a trend that complicates the ability and willingness of nations to allocate decision-making 
power to international bodies. In countries with federal systems, national constitutions divide regulatory 
powers between federal and sub-federal governments, constraining the legal authority of federal 
governments to use their treaty-making power to intrude on sub-federal jurisdiction. As a result, federal 
governments may refuse to allocate decision-making authority under both trade and environmental 
agreements in order to preserve the decision-making authority of sub-level governments. Alternatively, 
they may make their commitment to international obligations subject to acceptance by sub-federal 
governments or subject to lists of sub-federal reservations. As an example of the former, Canada’s 
participation in the dispute settlement mechanisms of the North American Agreement on Environmental 
Cooperation is expressly made conditional upon the acceptance of the agreement by a majority of Canada’s 
provincial governments, under Annex 41 of that agreement. See Bradly J Condon, ‘NAFTA and the 
Environment: A Trade-Friendly Approach’ (1994) 14 Northwestern Journal of International Law & 
Business 527, 542. As an example of the latter, American. commitments under the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services, 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 1B, 33 ILM 1197 (1994) in 
the field of insurance are subject to an extensive list of state reservations, reflecting the allocation of 
regulatory power in insurance in the United States. See Bradly Condon, ‘Smoke and Mirrors: A 
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that it has not ceded its national authority to the GATT/WTO to adopt international 
environmental policies independently (that is, unilaterally). 
 
In Tuna II, the United States position was stated as follows:  
The United States stated that in becoming Contracting Parties to the General Agreement, countries 
did not agree to surrender their ability to take effective action to protect the environment, including 
the global commons.21 
 
This argument was reiterated in Shrimp II: 
[T]he United States pointed out that the US measure did not affect Malaysia’s sovereignty – the 
United States could not force any nation to adopt any particular environmental policy. In contrast, 
claims the United States, control of a nation’s borders is a fundamental aspect of sovereignty, and 
the US measure is simply an application of its sovereign right to exclude certain products from 
importation. Whether or not the United States, in acceding to the WTO Agreement, agreed to 
refrain from such actions is the subject of this dispute . And…the Appellate Body Report addresses 
and resolves these issues. The Appellate Body found that the United States has a jurisdictional 
nexus with the respect to the sea turtles found in [Malaysia’s] waters, and…found that the general 
design and structure of Section 609 falls within the scope of Article XX(g).22 
 
Jackson characterizes political debates regarding the relinquishing of sovereignty under 
international agreements as being concerned with the allocation of decision-making 
authority. 23 This is a central issue that arises in the context of both trade agreements and 
                                                                                                                                            
Comparative Analysis of WTO and NAFTA Provisions Affecting the International Expansion of Insurance 
Firms in North America’ (2001) 8 Connecticut Insurance Law Journal  97. 
21 United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc DS29/R (1994) 33 ILM 839 (Report by the 
Panel not Adopted), para 3.10. 
22 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 by 
Malaysia, WTO Doc WT/DS58/RW (2001) (Report of the Panel), para 3.145. 
23 See Jackson, Jurisprudence, above n 6, 370. He subdivides this issue into the subcategories of vertical 
and horizontal allocation of decision-making power. The vertical division allocates power between 
international, national (federal), sub-federal (states or provinces) and local decision-making bodies. The 
horizontal division allocates power between entities such as courts, legislatures, the executive and non-
governmental actors, such as corporations. Thus, vertical allocation is relevant to decisions regarding the 
subject matter of international agreements while horizontal allocation has more to do with the design of 
decision-making procedures in institutions like the WTO, as well as the allocation of decision-making 
authority between different international institutions. 
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environmental agreements.24 This is a constitutional aspect25 of international law in the 
sense that it deals with the division of responsibility between different levels of 
government (national and supranational) and different institutions (legislatures, 
international organizations and the judiciary).  
 
A core function of Article XX is to delineate the boundary between national autonomy 
and the international obligations of WTO members.26 On one side of the line, decisions 
are taken by the WTO membership, using the various decision-making mechanisms that 
are available. On the other side, decisions are taken autonomously by the individual 
                                                
24 With respect to the WTO, see Jackson, Jurisprudence , above n 6. With respect to environment, see ‘The 
CITES Fort Lauderdale Criteria: The Uses and Limits of Science in International Conservation Decision 
Making’ (2001) 114 Harvard Law Review  1769, arguing that politics and economics are more likely to 
form the basis for decision making in the context of multilateral environmental treaties. With respect to the 
allocation of environmental decision making between federal and state governments in a federalist system, 
see Richard L Revesz, ‘Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis’ (2001) 115 
Harvard Law Review 553. Rio Declaration  principle 10 provides that, ‘Environmental issues are best 
handled with the participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level.’  Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, adopted 14 June 1992, Report of the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development 3, Rio de Janeiro 3-14 June 1992, UN GAOR, 47th Sess., 4 UN Doc A/Conf 
151/5/Rev.1 (1992) 31 ILM 874. However, the issue is not so simple, as evidenced by the difficulty in 
allocation decision-making authority between supra-national, national and sub-national institutions. For 
example, in the European Union, the concept of subsidiarity echoes the principle laid out in the Rio 
Declaration . Nevertheless, debate continues over the division of authority between EU and national 
institutions on a wide range of subjects. Similarly, the Canadian Constitution of 1867 does not clearly 
divide regulatory authority in environmental matters between the federal government and the provinces. 
Neither constitutional interpretations by courts nor constitutional amendments by governments have made 
much progress in clarify the issue in the intervening years. It is thus unrealistic to think that the subject 
matter of environmental protection could be allocated in short order between a still -nascent system of 
international law and national governments, which still jealously guard their sovereign decision-making 
powers in mo st other fields. 
25 See John O McGinnis and Mark L Movsesian, ‘The World Trade Constitution’ (2000) 114 Harvard Law 
Review 511, comparing the WTO to the U.S. constitution. Also see Deborah Z Cass, ‘The 
“Constitutionalization” of International Trade Law: Judicial Norm-Generation as the Engine of 
Constitutional Development in International Trade’ (2001) 12 European Journal of International Law  39, 
noting some similarities of the judicial processes of the World Trade Organization dispute panels with 
those of a national constitutional court. 
26 Article XX is not the only WTO provision that fulfils this function. Another examples is Article XXI 
regarding security matters (dividing authority between national governments and the WTO and between the 
WTO and the United Nations). 
 205 
WTO member using the decision-making mechanisms in their domestic legal systems.27 
At the international level, there is a further jurisdictional issue regarding the division of 
decision-making between different international bodies, in which Article XX also plays a 
role. By excluding certain areas from the application of WTO rules, Article XX 
exceptions leave them to be regulated nationally or in other international agreements. 
 
Howse argues that international law supports the right of the United States to impose 
unilateral embargoes as an exercise of its sovereignty:  
[T]he sovereignty of states is plenary in the absen ce of specific legal constraints to the contrary. 
One does not presume, or presume lightly, that the sovereignty of states is restricted. Moreover, in 
the Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice held that there was no rule of customary 
public international law that prevented a state from taking economic measures in response to 
policies of another state. In the circumstances, the anti-judicial-activism principle would weigh 
against imposing on the United States any legal constraint on its sovereignty not clearly authorized 
by the GATT treaty. Thus, in the presence of controversy over the limits of Article XX, a 
conservative judicial body would have adopted the interpretation that supposes the least 
interference with the sovereignty of the U.S.28 
 
However, others take a different view of this notion of the ‘plenary’ sovereignty of states. 
Sands, for example, argues that in a context in which there were relatively few rules of 
international law, it was possible for the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) 
in the Lotus case29 to say that states were permitted to do anything that they were not 
expressly prohibited from doing. However, modern international law is characterized by 
an excessive number of treaty rules, many of them ambiguous, that increases the 
likelihood of conflicts between different international obligations. Thus, in Sands view, 
                                                
27 In countries with a federalist system, there is a further division of legislative authority between federal 
and state (or provincial) governments. 
28 Howse, above n 5, 520, citing Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v United States) , [1986] 
ICJ Rep 14, 125-26 and  European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products(Hormones), WTO Doc WT/DS28/AB/R, WT/DS46/AB/R (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body) 
(invoking the principle of in dubio mitius). 
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the proliferation of rules of international law make this deferential approach to national 
sovereignty increasingly untenable.30  
 
The Appellate Body appears to have accepted the American characterization of the 
sovereignty issue. In the Shrimp cases, it was clear that marking out this legal boundary 
between areas where WTO members have ceded sovereignty and where they have 
retained it is a principle function of GATT Article XX. 31 However, it is also clear that the 
boundary shifts with the facts of each case and the legal framework existing at the time of 
interpretation. 32 A more clearly defined boundary might defeat the purpose and role of 
Article XX. Hence the ambiguity of the language used in Article XX. 33 However, that 
boundary cannot be defined without reference to other international agreements (where 
WTO members may have ceded sovereignty or where the signatories may have further 
developed relevant international legal principles) and general public international law 
(the source of many relevant principles). Since international law is constantly evolving, 
the boundary must shift over time. This makes the boundary difficult to delineate in any 
general terms that would apply in all circumstances, making the ambiguities inherent in 
Article XX difficult to resolve other than on a case-by-case basis. 
                                                                                                                                            
29 The S.S. ‘Lotus’, [1927] PCIJ (Ser A) No 10, 18. 
30 Sands, above n 2, 548-549. 
31 See United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products , WTO Doc 
WT/DS/AB/R, AB-1998-4 (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body), para 121 and United States—Import 
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 by Malaysia, WTO Doc 
WT/DS58/AB/RW (2001) (Report of the Appellate Body), para 137-138, characterizing the view that 
unilaterally determined policies are, to some degree, a common aspect of the Article XX e xceptions as a 
principle central to the ruling. 
32 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 by 
Malaysia, WTO Doc WT/DS58/RW (2001) (Report of the Panel), paras 5.51-5.52.  
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The panel in Shrimp II appears to have accepted the argument of the United States, that it 
did not agree to refrain from using trade restrictions to protect the global commons when 
it acceded to the WTO, but avoided getting into a debate over the nature of sovereignty: 
Malaysia contests the requirement of a ‘comparable  programme’ as an interference with its 
sovereig n right to determine its environmental policy. The Panel does not read the Appellate Body 
Report as supporting Malaysia’s view. In our opinion, the Appellate Body did not contest the right 
of the United States to restrict imports of shrimp for environmental reasons…34 
 
At present, Malaysia does not have to comply with the US requirements because it does not export 
to the United States. If Malaysia exported shrimp to the United States, it would be subject to 
requirements that may distort Malaysia’s priorities  in terms of environmental policy. As Article 
XX of the GATT 1994 has been interpreted by the Appellate Body, the WTO Agreement does not 
provide for any recourse in the situation Malaysia would face under those circumstances. While 
we cannot, in light of [this] interpretation…find in favour of Malaysia on this ‘sovereignty’ issue, 
we nonetheless consider that the ‘sovereignty’ question raised by Malaysia is an additional 
argument in favour of the conclusion of an international agreement to protect and conserve sea 
turtles which would take into account the situation of all interested parties.35 
 
The Appellate Body did not disagree with the panel on this point, nor shed much light on 
the ‘sovereignty’ issue. Rather, the focus of both the panel and the Appellate Body seems 
to be on disposing of the case in a way that resolves the immediate dispute and 
encourages the parties to settle issues of general international law in another forum. In 
this case, the panel appears to be saying that the best way for Malaysia to preserve its 
sovereignty is to exercise it by participating in the negotiation of an international 
environmental agreement where its situation can be taken into account. If the United 
States fails to negotiate in good faith, then Malaysia can seek a further review of 
                                                                                                                                            
33 The Appellate Body acknowledged the ambiguity in United States—Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline , WTO Doc WT/DS2/AB/R, AB-1996-1 (1996) (Report of the Appellate Body), 
stating ‘[t]he text of the chapeau is not without ambiguity’. 
34 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 by 
Malaysia, WTO Doc WT/DS58/RW (2001) (Report of the Panel), para 5.123. 
35 Ibid para 5.103. 
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American actions under Article 21.5 of the DSU. 36 In other words, the panel implicitly 
adopted the view that Malaysia’s complaint was premature, because Malaysia should 
have first sought to defend its interests in the multilateral environmental negotiations 
before bringing a complaint before the WTO.37 Moreover, the panel implied that 
Malaysia chose the wrong forum to argue that the American measure was inconsistent 
with sovereign equality and non-intervention. 
 
Sands characterizes the Shrimp ruling as an example of the ability of international law:  
to identify broad community values which trump traditional sovereign interests…not on the basis 
of legal instruments which expressly and unequivocally support a limitation on state freedom or 
immunity, but rather on the basis of an interpretive approach which seeks to ascertain and then 
apply the presumed values of the international community.38  
 
In his view, the WTO Appellate Body recognized a legal interest in migratory species 
‘where previously there had been none, under general international law and within the 
WTO context’.39 However, this view is not entirely accurate, since the United States does 
                                                
36 See ibid  para 5.86, where the panel emphasizes that the United States is ‘provisionally’ entitled to apply 
the measure, ‘subject to further control under Article 21.5 of the DSU’. 
37 In addition, Malaysia was encouraged to seek American certification of its turtle protection program in 
order to export shrimp to the United States. In effect, this requires Malaysia to consent to the intrusion of 
American officials in its internal affairs. Malaysia’s consent could preclude the wrongfulness of the 
American actions under international law. See Article 20 of the draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts and the accompanying commentary, International Law Commission, Annual 
Report 2001 , Chapter IV, State Responsibility, <http://www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/2001/english/chp4.pdf>, 
21 October 2003, 173-177. However, the validity of the consent might be vitiated by presence of coercion. 
See ibid, 174. Also see International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals, 
judgment of 1 October 1946, reprinted in (1947) 41 American Journal of International Law 172, 192-194. 
38 Sands, above n 2, 552. 
39 Ibid 535. He cites the Pacific Fur Seal  case to support the proposition that general international law did 
not previously recognize a legal interest in migratory species. Since the Pacific Fur Seal  case did not 
involve the use of trade restrictions, it is not necessarily inconsistent with the view of sovereignty reflected 
in the Shrimp  case. However, the Appellate Body’s recognition of a ‘jurisdictional nexus’ between the 
United States and the migratory turtles does represent a departure from the Pacific Fur Seal case.  
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have an interest in the species, even if it does not have jurisdiction over non-citizens 
outside its territorial limits.40 
 
According to Sands, globalization means that activities that were previously considered 
matters of domestic concern only have now become internationalized, providing 
conditions ‘for new levels of lawmaking beyond the state’. 41 Ruling that the United States 
has a legitimate interest in the protection of migratory sea turtle implies that international 
law must find a way to recognize and give effect to such interests.42 Thus, in Sands’ 
view, the Appellate Body chose not to follow the path of deference to national 
sovereignty in the face of ambiguous rules.43  
 
Another author makes a distinction between extraterritorial and extrajurisdictional laws, 
arguing that the latter is a more precise term given the ‘extraterritorial’ jurisdiction States 
enjoy over their own citizens while abroad.44 However, this view does not resolve the 
                                                
40 See above regarding the jurisdictional competence of States and the discussion below of the necessity 
doctrine. 
41 Sands, above n 2, 538. 
42 Ibid 537. 
43 Ibid 536. 
44 See Richard H Steinberg, ‘Understanding Trade and the Environment: Conceptual Frameworks’ in 
Richard H Steinberg (ed), The Greening of Trade Law  (2002), 1, 4. The jurisdiction to regulate can overlap. 
For example, country A may regulate the acts of person inside its territory and the acts of its citizens 
wherever they may be. When the citizens of country A are in the territory of country B, they may be subject 
to the laws of both A and B. Generally, the actions of individuals will be governed by the laws of the 
territory in which they find themselves. For example, citizens of the United States are required to file 
income tax returns regardless of where they reside. An American who works and resides in Canada will 
also have to file a tax return in Canada, which taxes people on the basis of residence rather than citizenship. 
Should this individual choose to disobey the law of the United States and not file a tax return there, the 
United States can do nothing to enforce its law as long as the person remains outside the territory of the 
United States, unless Canada agrees to help out. In the absence of an agreement, Canada would have no 
obligation to arrest or extradite the American citizen. However, should the person choose to return to the 
United States, he would be subject to arrest there. In practice, there is no conflict because Canada and the 
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problem of how to address jurisdictional conflicts. This view only considers the problem 
from the perspective of the State asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction. It ignores the 
perspective of the State that suffers the jurisdictional intrusion, which asserts the 
exclusive right to regulate activities inside its territory and the activities of its citizens.  
 
Sovereignty is not absolute. Rather, the sovereignty of one State is limited by the 
sovereignty of others.45 The central issue is to define where the jurisdiction of one State 
ends and another begins. Jurisdictional conflicts must be analysed from the perspective of 
both legal and territorial jurisdiction. The two are not mutually exclusive. 
 
A. Legal Jurisdiction and State Responsibility 
State sovereignty gives countries jurisdiction to regulate the acts of persons inside their 
territory and the acts of their citizens.46 It gives countries the right to exploit their own 
resources as they wish, along with the responsibility to ensure that activities inside their 
borders do not cause damage to the environment outside their borders (in other countries 
or in international areas).47 When the actions inside one country cause harm in the 
                                                                                                                                            
United States have signed agreements to resolve any conflicts, such as treaties regarding extradition and the 
avoidance of double taxation. 
45 As Kranz puts it, ‘la souveraineté d’un Etat trouve ses limites dans celle d’un autre Etat.’ Kranz, above n 
11, 195. Delbruck confirms this view of sovereignty: ‘Correctly understood, sovereignty as a principle of 
international law has never been absolute, but relative in the sense that the sovereignty of one state found 
its legal limits in the sovereignty of the other states. The rather oddly phrased article 2 (1) of the UN 
Charter, speaking of the ‘sovereign equality’ of the Member States, codifies this correct understanding of 
the concept of sovereignty.’ Jost Delbruck, ‘Prospects for a “World (Internal) Law?”: Legal Developments 
in a Changing International System’ (2002) 9 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 401, 427.Also see 
Hannah L Buxbaum, ‘Conflict of Economic Laws: From Sovereignty to Substance’ (2002) 42 Virginia 
Journal of International Law  931 (arguing that extraterritoriality jurisprudence shares with choice-of-law 
jurisprudence a theoretical foundation in notions of territorial sovereignty). 
46 See generally Brownlie, above n 8, 299-302. 
47 This principle is confirmed in the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment 5-16 June 1972, UN Doc A/Conf/48/14/Rev.1 and Corr.1 (1973), (1972) 11 ILM 1416 
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territory of another, recourse may be available at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
for countries that accept its jurisdiction. 48  
 
The classic case in this area is the Trail Smelter Case.49 Cominco Ltd, a Canadian mining 
company, operated a smelter in the Canadian province of British Columbia. Its operations 
polluted a river valley in the American state of Washington. 50 The United States sued 
Canada for the damage that the pollution caused in American territory. Both countries 
agreed to accept the jurisdiction of an arbitration panel to settle the matter. The panel 
ruled in favour of the United States, confirming the responsibility of Canada in 
                                                                                                                                            
(Stockholm Declaration), Principle 21 (Stockholm Declaration) and the Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development, adopted 14 June 1992, Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development 3, Rio de Janeiro 3-14 June 1992, UN GAOR, 47th Sess., 4 UN Doc A/Conf 151/5/Rev.1 
(1992) 31 ILM 874. The Rio Declaration , Principle 2 states: ‘States have, in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources 
pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of 
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction’. Also see General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) on 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, adopted December 14, 1962. Restatement (Third) of 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 601(b) (1986) also codifies this principle, providing that it is 
necessary for States to take measures to ‘ensure that activities within its jurisdiction or control are 
conducted so as not to cause significant injury to the environment.’ For a further discussion of the duty 
owed by States to protect the environment, see Brian Trevor Hodges, ‘Where the Grass is Always Greener: 
Foreign Investor Actions Against Environmental Regulations Under NAFTA's Chapter 11, S.D. Myers, 
Inc. v. Canada’ (2001) 14 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, 367, 397-398 and Phillipe 
Sands, ‘The “Greening” of International Law: Emerging Principles and Rules’ (1994) 1 Indiana Journal of 
Global Legal Studies 293, 299-302. This principle is generally regarded as reflecting customary 
international law. See Patricia W Birnie and Alan E Boyle, International Law and the Environment (1992), 
90. The Corfu Channel Case, holding Albania responsible for damage to British warships caused by 
Albania’s failure to warn them of mines in territorial waters, stands for a similar principle that it is ‘every 
state’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other 
states’. See Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v Albania), ICJ Rep (1949) 22. Also see discussion of case in 
Birnie and Boyle, above n 47, 90. 
48 See Nuclear Tests Cases (New Zealand v. France)  [1974] ICJ 457. Article 94 of the United Nations 
Charter states: ‘Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the 
International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.’ 
49 Trail Smelter Case (United States v Canada) (1941) 3 RIAA 1905. 
50 Neither the pollution nor the dispute has gone away. The American Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) has sought compensation from the company to clean up the pollution along a 210-kilometre stretch 
of the Columbia River that occurred between 1894 and 1994. Associated Press, ‘EPA sets deadline for 
Canadian smelter’ <www.globeandmail.com> at 18 September 2003. 
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international law to ensure that activities in its territory did not cause harm outside its 
territory. 51 However, international litigation of environmental disputes remains relatively 
uncommon and the law regarding the assessment of damages for environmental harm 
remains underdeveloped. 52  
 
In an international legal context in which State responsibility for environmental harm is 
difficult to enforce, trade sanctions on the part of a country with significant market 
power, or a group of countries whose combined markets are significant, provide another 
means to address transboundary and global environmental problems. The draft Articles 
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Article 49(1) permits an 
‘injured State [to] take countermeasures against a State which is responsible for an 
internationally wrongful act in order to induce that State to comply with its obligations’.53 
Thus, in general international law, there is a legal basis for taking such measures. 
 
How would these rules apply in the circumstances of the Shrimp case? In international 
law, Malaysia has the responsibility to ensure that activities inside its territory do not 
cause damage to the environment outside its territory. Malaysia argued that its sea turtle 
conservation program was adequate, implying that it had met this obligation. The United 
                                                
51 However, the decision is only binding on the parties. See, for example, the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice, which states: ‘The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties 
and in respect of that particular case.’ Statute of the International Court of Justice, art 59. 
52 See Michael Bowman and Alan Boyle (eds), Environmental Damage in International and Comparative 
Law (2002). Of course, once a species is extinct, restitution is not possible and monetary damages are an 
inadequate form of compensation in any event. 
53 See International Law Commission, above n 37, 56. The use of countermeasures is subject to several 
conditions. See arts 49-54. 
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States used trade measures to induce Malaysia to meet this obligation in the manner that 
the United States deemed best.  
 
An alternative to the unilateral use of trade measures would have been to seek the 
enforcement of Malaysia’s international legal obligations in another forum, such as the 
ICJ. This would have permitted a legal determination of whether Malaysia’s turtle 
conservation program was adequate to meet its international obligations. This 
determination could not be made in the context of a WTO dispute, since this issue is 
beyond the jurisdiction of the WTO judiciary. 54 
 
Setting aside the issue of whether Malaysia in fact breached its international obligations, 
the draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts do not 
apply to the use of trade measures because the consequences flowing from the use of 
trade measures among WTO members is governed by the WTO Agreement.55 Thus, in 
                                                
54 The DSU only applies to the ‘covered agreements’ listed in DSU Appendix 1. None of these agreements 
contain obligations regarding State responsibility for extraterritorial environmental harm. See DSU Article 
1. Also see Joost Pauwelyn, ‘The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?’ 
(2001) 95 American Journal of International Law 535. While the WTO judiciary does not have jurisdiction 
to determine the State responsibility of Malaysia with respect to environmental protection, State 
responsibility has been addressed in WTO jurisprudence in the context of responsibility for measures 
affecting trade. See Turkey—Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, WTO Doc 
WT/DS34/R (1999) (Report of the Panel), para 9.42 and United States—Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act 
of 1974, WTO Doc WT/DS152/1  (2000) (Report of the Panel), para 7.80. 
55 Article 55 (lex specialis) of the draft Articles provides: ‘These articles do not apply where and to the 
extent that the conditions for the existence of an internationally wrongful act or the content or 
implementation of the international responsibility of a State are governed by special rules of international 
law.’ The commentary to Article 55 provides: ‘It will depend on the special rule to establish the extent to 
which the more general rules on State responsibility…are displaced by that rule. In some cases, it will be 
clear from the language of a treaty…that only the consequences specified are to flow. Where that is so the 
consequence will be “determined” by the special rule and the principle…in article 56 will apply…An 
example…is the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Understanding as it relates to certain 
remedies.’ Article 56 provides: ‘The applicable rules of international law continue to govern questions 
concerning the responsibility of a State for an internationally wrongful act to the extent that they are not 
regulated by these articles.’ See International Law Commission, ibid 356-359. More generally, the lex 
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this instance, the provisions regarding countermeasures in the draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts could not justify the American 
measures. Nevertheless, where the draft articles codify customary international law, they 
will apply to the interpretation of WTO provisions, along with other treaty and customary 
rules of international law that apply between the parties.56 The draft Articles codify 
customary international law with respect to the doctrine of necessity, which may be 
invoked to excuse failure to comply with international obligations.  I will discuss the 
application of the necessity doctrine after first analysing the relevant obligations. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
specialis rule in Article 55 only applies where there is ‘some actual inconsistency’ between two provisions 
that deal with the same subject matter or ‘a discernible intention that one provision is to exclude the other’. 
See International Law Commission, ibid 358. Article 55 embodies the maxim lex specialis derogat legi 
generali , a general rule of customary international law that governs conflicts between  treaties. See 
International Law Commission, ibid 356. Also see McNair, above n 6, 219. 
56 See Article 56, International Law Commission, ibid. Article 31.3(c) of the Vienna Convention provides 
that there shall be taken into account, together with the context, ‘any relevant rule of international law 
applicable to the relations between the parties’. In Shrimp II, the panel held that Article 31.3(c) of the 
Vienna Convention required treaty rules that had been accepted by the parties to the dispute to be taken into 
account. United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 
21.5 by Malaysia, WTO Doc WT/DS58/RW (2001) (Report of the Panel), para 5.57. Also see Pauwelyn, 
above n 54; John Jackson, The World Trading System (1997) 25; Donald McCrae, ‘The WTO in 
International Law: Tradition Continued or New Frontier?’ (2000) 3 Journal of International Economic Law  
27; Donald McCrae, ‘The Contribution of International Trade Law to the Development of International 
Law’ (1996) 260 Recueil des Cours 111; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘Dispute Settlement in International 
Economic Law – Lessons for Strengthening International Dispute Settlement in Non-Economic Areas’ 
(1999) 2 Journal of International Economic Law 189. 
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B. Non-intervention and Unilateralism 
 
Once a State enters a trade agreement, it assumes obligations that it is bound to fulfil with 
respect to all other signatories of the agreement.57 That is, the State consents to limits on 
its freedom to regulate international trade unilaterally. 58 
 
The principle of non-intervention limits the ability of one State to interfere in the internal 
affairs of another.59 This restricts the ability of all States to regulate acts outside their 
                                                
57 The rule, Pacta sunt servanda, is expressed in art 26 of the Vienna Convention, ‘Every treaty in force is 
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith’. One author argues that the 
Vienna Convention has altered its meaning: ‘Until 1939,…doctrine worked on the conditions that lead 
towards the validity of treaties; the idea behind the 1969 Convention is that of invalidity, termination and 
suspension of the operation of treaties….the basic idea behind pacta sunt servanda  has changed: the idea 
behind many of the rules that were codified was that under certain conditions the validity of pre-existing 
treaties could be challenged.’ See Gerardo E do Nascimento e Silva, ‘The Widening Scope of International 
Law’ in 21st Century, above n 11, 239. Also see The Wimbledon, [1923] PCIJ (Ser A) No 1. 
58 Commenting on the statement of the PCIJ in the Wimbledon, that ‘the right of entering into international 
engagements is an attribute of State sovereignty,’ McNair stated, ‘…it was necessary to point out the 
logical absurdity of the argument that an act done by a State in the exercise of its sovereignty, namely, the 
conclusion of a treaty, could be lawfully nullified by that State on the ground that the effect of the act was 
to limit its sovereignty. That was not only the effect but the object of the treaty.’ McNair, above n 6, 754. 
GATT Article XXVII allows parties to withhold or withdraw trade concessions for non-parties. 
59 Article I of the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States In Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Annex to Resolution 2625 
(XXV) of the United Nations General Assembly, adopted without vote October 24, 1970, provides: ‘No 
State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the 
internal or external affairs of any other State….No St ate may use or encourage the use of economic, 
political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination 
of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind….Nothing in the 
foregoing…shall be construed as affecting…provisions… relating to the maintenance of international peace 
and security.’ Article 3 states that the principles of the Declaration ‘constitute basic principles of 
international law.’ Brownlie notes that the ‘legal significance of the Declaration lies in the fact that it 
provides evidence of the consensus among Members States of the United Nations on the meaning and 
elaboration of the principles of the Charter.’ Ian Brownlie, (ed), Basic Documents in International Law (2nd 
ed, 1972), 32.With respect to the United Nations, the principle of non-intervention is reflected in UN 
Charter Article 2(7), ‘Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the 
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not 
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.’ 
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territorial limits or inside the territory of another State.60 Extraterritorial laws are invalid 
under international law. 61 Nevertheless, the United States and, to a lesser extent, the 
European Union, have not resisted the temptation to use their economic power to promote 
changes to the internal political or legal regimes of other States. 62 
                                                
60 See Kranz, above n 11, citing s 402 of the Restatement of the Law (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States (1986): ‘a state has jurisdiction to prescribe with respect to 
(1)(a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its territory; (b) the status of persons, or 
interests in things, present within its territory; (c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have 
substantial effect within its territory; 
(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its national outs ide as well as within its territory; and  
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is directed against the security of 
the state or against a limited class of other state interests.’ 
Section 403 provides: ‘Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under s. 402 is present, a state may not 
exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having connections with another 
state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable.’ Reasonableness is not only ‘a basis for 
requiring states to consider moderating their enforcement of law that they are authorized to prescribe, but as 
an essential element in determining whether, as a matter of international law, the state may exercise 
jurisdiction to prescribe.’ (s. 403, Reporters’ Note 10) 
61 As noted in Chapter 3, under customary international law, a State acts in excess of its own jurisdiction 
when its measures purport to regulate acts which are done outside its territorial jurisdiction by persons who 
are not its own nationals and which have no, or no substantial, effect within its territorial jurisdiction. See 
Brownlie, above n 8, 299-301. This prohibition of extraterritoriality, which may also be described as an 
aspect of the principle of non-intervention, would qualify as a ‘customary rule of international law’, within 
the meaning of art 38 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties , opened for signature 23 May 1969, 
1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980).  See also Brownlie, ibid 302. Both the WTO 
agreements and MEAs would therefore have to be interpreted in a manner consistent with the prohibition of 
extraterritoriality. In general, on the legality of extraterritorial measures under present international 
economic law, see Petros Mavroidis and Damien Neven, ‘Some Reflections on Extraterritoriality in 
International Economic Law: A Law and Economic Analysis’, in Melanges en hommage a M. Waelbroeck  
(1999), 1297-1325 and Harold G Maier, ‘Jurisdictional Rules in Customary International Law,  in Karl M 
Meesen (ed), Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Theory and Practice (1996), 64-73. 
62 With respect to the European Union, see Diego J Linan Nogueras and Luis M Hinojosa Martinez, 
‘Human Rights Conditionality in the External Trade of the European Union: Legal and Legitimacy 
Problems’ (2001) 7 Columbia Journal of European Law 307. With respect to the United States, see 
(regarding the Helms -Burton law): Rene Lefeber, ‘Frontiers of International Law: Counteracting the 
Exercise of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction’ (1997) 10 Leiden Journal of International Law 1; Peter Glossop 
and Kelly Harbridge, ‘International Law and the Private Right of Action in Helms-Burton’, in Canadian 
Council on International Law: Fostering Compliance in International Law (Proceedings of the 25th 
Annual Conference, 1996), 148, 165-68; H Scott Fairley, ‘Exceeding the Limits of Territorial Bounds: The 
Helms -Burton Act’ (1996) 34 Canadian Yearbook of International Law  161, 189-95; Andreas F 
Lowenfeld, ‘Congress and Cuba: The Helms -Burton Act’ (1996) 90 American Journal of International 
Law 419, 430-32; Rupinder Hans, ‘The United States’ Economic Embargo of Cuba: International 
Implications of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1995’ (1996) 5 Journal of 
International Law and Practice 327, 340-44; Jonathan R Ratchik, ‘Cuban Liberty and the Democratic 
Solidarity Act of 1995’ (1996) 11 American University Journal of International Law and Policy 343, 362-
64; Luisette Gierbolini, ‘The Helms -Burton Act: Inconsistency with International Law and Irrationality at 
Their Maximum’ (1997) 6 Journal of Transnational Law and Policy 289, 301-04; and Anthony M. Solis, 
‘The Long Arm of U.S. Law: The Helms -Burton Act’ (1997) 19 Loyola International and Comparative 
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In general, each country’s jurisdiction ends at its territorial limits (which includes the sea 
twelve nautical miles from shore), with the exception of powers to regulate certain 
matters within the 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone in coastal waters.63 Thus, 
no single country has jurisdiction to regulate the common areas of the world. 64 Laws 
regulating the global commons arise through the customary practice of the nations of the 
world or through treaties.65 Even where a treaty exists, a country that refuses to 
participate in the treaty generally will not be bound by its rules66, unless the treaty 
                                                                                                                                            
Law Journal 709, 736-38. Also see Todd Doyle, ‘Cleaning Up Anti-Money Laundering Strategies: Current 
FATF Tactics Needlessly Violate International Law’ (2002) 24 Houston Journal of International Law 279 
(with respect to money-laundering policy in the OECD) and H Lowell Brown, ‘The Extraterritorial Reach 
of the U.S. Government’s Campaign Against International Bribery’ (1999) 22 Hastings International and 
Comparative Law Review 407 (analysing extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction under international law). 
Regarding the constitutionality of extraterritorial laws in the United States, see Andreas F Lowenfeld, ‘U.S. 
Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and International Law’ (1989) 83 American Journal of 
International Law 880; Lea Brilmayer, ‘The Extraterritorial Application of American Law: A 
Methodological and Constitutional Appraisal’ (1987) 50 Law and Contemporary Problems 11. For a 
discussion of the integration of customary international law into American federal common law, see Curtis 
A Bradley and Jack L Goldsmith, ‘Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of 
the Modern Position’ (1997) 110 Harvard Law Review 815. Since 1992, the United Nations General 
Assembly has passed a number of resolutions objecting to the American economic embargo against Cuba. 
The most recent, on 4 November 2003, saw 179 countries vote against the embargo, with two abstentions 
and three votes against the resolution (the United States, Israel and the Marshall Islands). Dolia Estévez, 
‘La ONU condena el embargo a Cuba’, El Financiero  (Mexico City), 5 November 2003, 36. 
63 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, arts 3, 55-57. In its Exclusive Economic Zone, 
inter alia, a State enjoys ‘sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and 
managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living….’ United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, art 56(a). 
64 Resources in international waters have been considered common property. However, the property rights 
of States in these resources are counterbalanced by an obligation of reasonable use that requires them to 
take into account conservation needs. See Icelandic Fisheries, [1974] ICJ Rep 3. However, the obligation 
of reasonable use has generally been too vague and general to be of practical use. See Birnie and Boyle, 
above n 47, 119. 
65 See, for example, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea  and Treaty on Principles Governing 
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial 
Bodies, reproduced in Brownlie, Basic Documents, above n 59. 
66 The Latin maxim, privatis pactionibus non dubium est non laedi jus caeterorum (there is no doubt that 
the rights of others [third parties] cannot be prejudiced by private agreements), (see H Black, Black's Law 
Dictionary  (5th ed,1979), 1076), is reflected in the GATT amending formula. Article XXX:1 provides: 
‘Except where provision for modification is made elsewhere in this Agreement, amendments to the 
provisions of Part I of this agreement or to the provisions of Article XXIX or of this Article shall become 
effective upon acceptance by all the contracting parties, and other amendments to this Agreement shall 
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expresses a customary rule of international law that is recognized as binding on all 
States.67 When no country has exclusive jurisdiction, what can occur is the ‘tragedy of the 
commons’.68 Shared resources tend to be over-exploited. 69 The shared jurisdictional 
competence of States in the global commons thus can have serious environmental 
consequences. 
                                                                                                                                            
become effective, in respect of those contracting parties which accept them, upon acceptance by two -thirds 
of the contracting parties and thereafter for each other contracting party upon acceptance by it.’ 
The applicable rule of international law, which flows from the principle of state sovereignty, has been 
clearly and authoritatively stated as follows: 
‘The rule that a treaty cannot impose obligations upon a “third State” is well established.’: McNair, above n 
6, 310. 
‘A treaty may not impose obligations upon a State which is not a party thereto.’: Article 18 of the Harvard 
Research Draft Convention on Treaties, cited in McNair, ibid 310. 
‘A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent’: Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties , opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force 
27 January 1980), art 34. 
67 See art 38 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 
UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980): 
‘Nothing in articles 34 to 37 precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third State 
as a customary rule of international law, recognized as such.’ For example, the Vienna Convention has been 
treated by the International Court of Justice as expressive of customary international law binding on parties 
and non-parties alike. See Stephen M. Schwebel, ‘May Preparatory Work be Used to Correct Rather than 
Confirm the ‘Clear’ Meaning of a Treaty Provision’ in 21st Century, above, n 11, 541; Territorial Dispute 
(Libyan Arab Jamahariya/Chad), [1994] ICJ Rep 21-22; Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions 
between Qatar and Bahrain: Jurisdiction and Admissibility, [1995] ICJ Rep 21-22.  
68 See Garrett Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968) 162 Science 1243, reprinted in Bruce 
Ackerman et al (eds) Perspectives on Property Law (1995), 132 (arguing that economic ideas, such as 
Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’, where individuals working to benefit themselves benefit the public as a 
whole, have led to the ruin of common areas around the world). 
69 A good example is the conflict that occurred over cod in the North Atlantic. The members of the North 
Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) agreed to limit the quantity of fish that each fishing nation could 
take each year, in order to preserve the resource for all. Each fishing nation agreed to annual quotas that 
limited the catch of its fishermen and agreed to enforce those quotas against its citizens. However, Spain 
would not agree to limit the number of fish its fleet could catch in international waters. With cod stocks 
dropping to precarious levels, Canada’s fishermen (whose territory is closest to the Grand Banks) were 
losing their livelihood. Legally however, nothing could be done to force the Spaniards to comply. 
Nevertheless, Canada chose to seize a Spanish vessel that was fishing in international waters, arrest her 
crew, and seize the catch. Spain accused Canada of violating international law. Canada replied that it acted 
out of necessity given the Spanish refusal to limit its catch. The matter was ultimately settled by 
negotiation, but the incident demonstrates the limits of international law in dealing with the regulation of 
the global commons. Without legal obligations or economic incentives, the nations of the world are 
unlikely to exploit international resources in a sustainable manner. Where there is potential or actual 
economic gain at stake, countries may be unwilling to enter into agreements governing the activities of 
their citizens in international waters. See Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada) , [1998] ICJ Rep 431. 
Also see discussion of this case in the context of the necessity principle in International Law Commission, 
above n 37, 200-201. 
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While no country has jurisdiction to regulate fishing by foreign citizens in international 
waters, each country may regulate the acts of its own citizens. One way to provide 
countries with economic incentives to regulate the activities of their fishermen in 
international waters is to impose trade restrictions in important markets for the products 
that are thereby produced. Until Shrimp II, such trade bans were successfully challenged 
under GATT as violations of trade rules that were not saved by exceptions for 
environmental measures in GATT Article XX. The holding in Shrimp II appears to be at 
odds with customary international law regarding jurisdictional competence because the 
American measure seeks to regulate the acts of non-citizens outside its territory and with 
the principle of non-intervention because it permits one State to intervene in the internal 
affairs of another.70 
 
The ICJ has recognized the principle of non-intervention as customary international 
law.71 The principle of non-intervention flows from the concept that all States are 
sovereign equals and thus enjoy the right to freely decide matters within their domestic 
jurisdiction. The other side of this coin is that States are restricted from intervening, 
directly or indirectly, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.72 In its broadest 
expression, the duty of non-intervention condemns ‘any form of interference’ against the 
                                                
70 The panel in Shrimp II appears to have recognized this problem when it said, ‘If Malaysia exported 
shrimp to the United States, it would be subject to requirements that may distort Malaysia’s priorities in 
terms of environmental policy. As Article XX of the GATT 1994 has been interpreted by the Appellate 
Body, the WTO Agreement does not provide for any recourse in the situation Malaysia would face under 
those circumstances.’ United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse 
to Article 21.5 by Malaysia, WTO Doc WT/DS58/RW (2001) (Report of the Panel), para 5.103. 
71 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v United States) , [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 106. 
72 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v United States) , [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 108. 
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personality of a State or its political, economic, or cultural elements.73 Nevertheless, the 
application of this principle remains unclear in the realm of economic coercion.  
 
C. Economic Coercion and Non-intervention 
As with the issue of sovereignty, there are two sides to the coercion coin. From the 
perspective of exporting countries, particularly developing countries, the use of trade 
barriers to induce changes to their internal regulatory regime is an act of coercion that 
violates the non-intervention norm in international law. 74 From the perspective of the 
                                                
73 See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation 
Amongst States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res 2131, UN GAOR, 20th 
Session, Supp No 14, UN Doc A/6220 (1965), principle 3, para 1 and General Assembly Declaration on the 
Inadmissibility of Intervention into the Domestic Affairs of States , GA Res 290 (IV), UN GAOR, 4th 
Session, 13, UN Doc A/1251, 13 (1949), para 1. Also see Hodges, above n 47, 400 -401 and Wesley A 
Cann, Jr, ‘Creating Standards and Accountability for the Use of the WTO Security Exception: Reducing the 
Role of Power-Based Relations and Establishing a New Balance Between Sovereignty and Multilateralism’ 
(2001) 26 Yale Journal of International Law 413, 439-440. 
74 Gathii notes that international legal opinion in developed and developing countries diverges on the issue 
of whether economic coercion violates non-intervention. Siding with the developing country view, he 
argues persuasively that it does. See James Thuo Gathii, ‘Neoliberalism, Colonialism and International 
Governance: Decentering the International Law of Governmental Legitimacy’ (2000) 98 Michigan Law 
Review 1996, 2028-2033. Public international lawyers base their argument on either of two views: (1) that 
each country has a sovereign right not only to determine with which countries it may have economic 
interactions, but also to impose whatever economic restrictions it wishes on other states or (2) that, if a 
norm prohibiting the exercise of economic coercion between states exists, the exercise of one country’s 
economic sovereignty against another could be considered a legitimate reprisal or countermeasure. See 
Gathii, 2028. He does not argue that coercion violates the non-intervention norm in customary or treaty 
law. Rather, he bases his argument on three United Nations General Assembly resolutions that recognize 
economic coercion as a violation of national economic sovereignty: (1) the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Amongst States in Accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations, GA Res 2131, UN GAOR, 20th Session, Supp No 14, UN Doc A/6220 
(1965), which provides that ‘armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats 
against the personality of the State or against its political, economic, and cultural elements, are in violation 
of international law’. This declaration fortifies the General Assembly Declaration on the Inadmissibility of 
Intervention into the Domestic Affairs of States , GA Res 290 (IV), UN GAOR, 4th Session, 13, UN Doc 
A/1251, 13 (1949), paragraph 2, which provides: ‘No state may use or encourage the use of economic, 
political, or any other type of measures to coerce another state in order to obtain from it the subordination 
of the exercise of its sovereign rights or to secure from it advantages of any kind.’ (2) the Resolution of 
Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources GA Res 2635, UN GAOR, 25th Session, Supp No 30, 126, 
UN Doc. A/8028 (1970); and (3) the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, GA Res 3821, UN 
GAOR, 29th Session, Supp No 31, 50, UN Doc A/9631 (1974). Chapter 1 (b) provides: ‘Economic as well 
as political and other relations among States shall be governed, inter alia, by the following principles... 
sovereign equality of all states.’ See Gathii, ibid 2029-2030. Also see Bhupinder Chimni, ‘Towards A 
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importing country that introduces the trade barrier, or that makes market access 
conditional upon changes to the exporting country’s environmental policy, market access 
merely provides an economic incentive to protect the environment.75 Since the 
effectiveness of this category of unilateral trade measure depends on market power, it is 
not surprising that developed countries tend not to view these measures as a form of 
economic coercion that violates the norm of non-intervention.76 Regardless of the legal 
arguments on one side or the other, the intention of such measures is clearly to intervene 
in the internal affairs of other States. However, under Vienna Convention Article 52, 
unlike the use of force, the use of economic coercion to induce States to enter treaties 
does not void those treaties.77 Efforts to add economic coercion to the use of force as a 
ground for voiding a treaty were unsuccessful. 78 
                                                                                                                                            
Third World Approach to Non-Intervention: Through the Labyrinth of Western Doctrine’ (1980) 20 Indian 
Journal of International Law  243. Cann acknowledges that there is no clear prohibition against the use of 
economic sanctions for political and ideological purposes, noting that the International Court of Justice 
declined to hold that an American embargo constituted a form of indirect intervention. See Military and 
Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v United States) , [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 126 (‘At this point, the Court had 
merely to say that it is unable to regard such action on the economic plane as is here complained of as a 
breach of the customary-law principle of non-intervention.’). However he argues that ‘[c]ommon sense 
suggests that the whole purpose of such coercion…is actually designed to intervene in the internal or 
external affairs of another nation and to influence the “choices” being made by that sovereign’. Cann, 
above n 73, 440.  
75 If one accepts the argument that WTO members have reserved the right to refuse market access for 
certain classes of products under Article XX, then market access is an incentive rather than a sanction. 
There are those who argue that GATT provides no general positive right of market access, but rather 
prohibits specific methods of denying market access. See Robert Howse and Donald Regan, ‘The 
Product/Process Distinction – An Illusory Basis for Disciplining “Unilateralism” in Trade Policy’ (2000) 
11 European Journal of International Law 249, 257 and Sanford E Gaines, ‘Processes and Production 
Methods: How to Produce Sound Policy for Environmental PPM-Based Trade Measures?’ (2002) 27 
Columbia Journal of Environmental Law  383, 412. 
76 See Gathii, above n 74, Cann, above n 73 and Chimni, above n 74. 
77 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered 
into force 27 January 1980), art 52 (‘A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use 
of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Ch arter of the United Nations.’)  
78 Silva discusses the negotiating history of Vienna Convention art 52. Various delegations sought to add 
the words ‘including economic and political pressure’ following the ‘use of force’. These proposals were 
withdrawn after a compromise in which the Conference adopted a resolution solemnly condemning ‘the 
threat or use of pressure in any form, military, political or economic, by any State, in order to coerce 
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Even if one accepts the argument that economic coercion does not violate sovereign 
equality or non-intervention, the fact remains that access to the right to use unilateral 
trade measures under Article XX depends on market power. Access to this right is thus 
conditional upon the size and the level of development of WTO members, making such a 
legal right inconsistent with equality and fairness. 
 
The trade obligations in the GATT should act as a means of preventing economically 
powerful States from using economic pressure to force weaker States to accept 
obligations they would otherwise not enter into. In this way, the WTO system would 
reinforce the principle of sovereign equality of States and the corresponding duties 
expressed in the preamble of the UN Declaration (‘Recalling the duty of States to refrain 
in their international relations from military, political, economic or any other form of 
coercion aimed against the political independence of any State…’).79 Thus, if a State does 
not wish to alter its domestic environmental policy or to enter into a MEA, the use of 
trade sanctions as a method to compel the state to do so could be counteracted by a 
complaint to the WTO.  
 
Where a WTO member accepts MEA obligations, the availability of recourse to the WTO 
to challenge economic coercion strengthens the validity the MEA obligations by reducing 
                                                                                                                                            
another State to perform any act relating to the conclusion of a treaty in violation of the principles of 
sovereign equality of States and freedom of consent.’ See Silva, above n 57, 239-40. 
79 See Kranz, above, n 11, 194, ‘Le principe de l’égalité des Etats interdit normalement d’étendre la 
competence legislative, executive our judiciaire d’un Etat au territoire d’un autre ou aux personnes relevant 
de la competence de celui-ci.’  
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the likelihood that they will be accepted under duress. Even though economic coercion 
would not void a treaty, the acceptance of obligations under duress undermines their 
legitimacy. To view MEA trade obligations as inconsistent with WTO law would run 
counter to the supporting role played by the latter in ensuring that the former have not 
been entered into under duress. However, the same can not be said for unilateral 
measures. In order to fortify the legitimacy and effectiveness of MEAs, unilateral trade 
sanctions imposed for the purpose of coercing a State to accept international 
environmental obligations80 should be viewed as inconsistent with the principles of 
sovereign equality and non-intervention.  
 
                                                
80 While Malaysia has international legal responsibility to not cause harm to the external environment, the 
trade measures in Shrimp II were aimed at inducing Malaysia to enter a specific multilateral agreement that 
required that specific measures be taken to protect sea turtles. Malaysia maintained that it already employed 
measures that were adequate to protect sea turtles. 
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III. Sovereign Equality 
 
General international law is based on the sovereign equality of States.81 The validity of 
this concept has been questioned in the academic literature, based on the reality of 
inequality of power (hegemonic theory) or differences between liberal democracies and 
the rest of the world (liberal theory).82 It has also been rejected as an organizational 
principle that is inconsistent with ecological imperatives.83 Others argue that, while the 
principle of sovereign equality cannot remedy all inequalities in power, it can help ‘to 
level the playing field’ between developed and developing countries in international fora 
where it is embodied in a decision making structure based on ‘one state, one vote’.84 Still 
others reject the notion that equality should apply to States at all and question the fairness 
of the one state, one vote system.85 The principle of sovereign equality also has been 
                                                
81 Charter of the United Nations, art 2(1) states that it is ‘based on the principle of the sovereign equality of 
all its Members’. A 1979 resolution confirmed the application of this principle. See Inadmissibility of the 
Policy of Hegemonism in International Relations, GA Res 34/103 (14 December 1979).   
82 Some adopt a hegemonic view of international relations and argue that the permanent members of the 
Security Council constitute a collective hegemony within the United Nations. See, for example, Detlev F 
Vagts, ‘Hegemonic International Law’ (2001) 95 American Journal of International Law  843, 847: ‘A 
hegemon confronts customary international law differently from other countries. In terms of the formation 
of customary law, such a power can by its abstention prevent the emerging rule from becoming part of 
custom…. If a custom has crystallized, the hegemon can disregard it more safely than a treaty rule and have 
its action hailed as creative.’ Also see Jonathan I. Charney, ‘The Persistent Objector Rule and the 
Development of Customary International Law’ (1985) British Yearbook of International Law 1; Paul B 
Stephan, ‘Creative Destruction—Idiosyncratic Claims of International Law and the Helms -Burton 
Legislation’ (1998) 27 Stetson Law Review 1341; and John R Bolton, ‘Is There Really “La w” in 
International Affairs?’ (2000) 10 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems  1. Others question 
equality asserting that a different law prevails among liberal democracies than in the rest of the world. See 
generally Jose E Alvarez, ‘Do Liberal States Behave Better? A Critique of Slaughter's Liberal Theory’ 
(2001) 12 European Journal of International Law 183.  
83 See for example Michael M’Gonigle, ‘Between Globalism and Territoriality: The Emergence of an 
International Constitution and the Challenge of Ecological Legitimacy’ (2002) 15 Canadian Journal of 
Law and Jurisprudence 159. 
84 See Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, ‘Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A 
Reconciliation’ (2001) 95 American Journal of International Law  757, 768, citing Right of Passage over 
Indian Territory , 1960 ICJ Rep, 37. 
85 For example, Daniel Bodansky  argues as follows: ‘Supporters of the “one state, one vote” rule usually 
cite as justification the principle of sovereign equality—a basic axiom of the traditional system of 
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challenged in the field of international human rights law, in the courts,86 domestic 
legislation87 and in the academic literature.88 More generally, sovereign equality has been 
questioned as a basis for determining the jurisdiction of States in international law.89 
                                                                                                                                            
international law, which, in essence, transposed liberalism to inter-state relations. According to this view, 
states—like individuals —are free and equal in the state of nature. Just as individual equality implies the 
principle of “one person, one vote,” sovereign equality justifies the “one state, one vote” rule. The problem 
with this reasoning is that it fails to provide any justification for the initial equation of states and 
individuals. In liberal theory, the right of individuals to equal respect flows from the fundamental character 
of personhood. But there is nothing fundamental about the state; it is merely a social and historical 
construct, which exists to serve human ends. Even supporters of states rights would generally agree that 
these rights are merely means to some other end, such as stability or order, not ends in themselves. Thus, 
there is no intrinsic reason to treat states as equals. Nor is there any equitable reason, given the actual 
disparities among states in population, power, and wealth. To put it bluntly, why should Nauru, with a 
population of approximately seven thousand, have an equal say in global issues as China or India, with 
populations one hundred thousand times as large? Why should the Alliance of Small Island States have 
forty-two votes in the United Nations, while the United States, comprising fifty semi-sovereign states and a 
population more than ten times as large, has only one?’  Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Legitimacy of International 
Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law?’ (1999) 93 American Journal of 
International Law  596, 614. Charnovitz also criticizes the principle of sovereign equality and the one state, 
one vote rule on the basis of population distribution. He points to the permanent seats in the UN Security 
Council and the weighted voting in the IMF as examples of how the nation-state members of international 
organizations lack equal rights in the governance process. He concludes that in the UN context, ‘[t]his 
principle does not seem to mean that governments have a sovereign right to equal participation in U.N. 
processes. Rather, it means that governments are equally sovereign vis -a-vis each other.’ See Steve 
Charnovitz, ‘Transnational and Supranational Democracy: The Emergence of Democratic Participation in 
Global Governance’ (2003) 10 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 45, 48-49. Also see Matthew S 
Dunne III, ‘Redefining Power Orientation: A Reassessment of Jackson's Paradigm in Light of Asymmetries 
of Power, Negotiation, and Compliance in the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System’ (2002)  34 Law 
and Policy in International Business 277. 
86 United Kingdom House of Lords, (Spanish request for extradition). Regina v. Bow Street Stipendiary 
Magistrate, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (no. 3). [1999] 2 Wlr 827. 
87 The Female Genital Mutilation Act, 22 U.S.C. 262K-2 (West Supp. 1998) targets the practice of female 
circumcision outside of the United States. The Act instructs American representatives to the World Bank 
and other international financial institutions to withhold loan funds from nations which have a ‘known 
history’ of such practice if these nations do not implement educational programs ‘designed to prevent the 
practice of female genital mutilation’. Erika Sussman, ‘Contending with Culture: An Analysis of the 
Female Genital Mutilation Act of 1996’ 1998 31 Cornell International Law Journal 193, 195. 
88 George K Walker, ‘Principles for Collective Humanitarian Intervention to Succor Other Countries' 
Imperiled Indigenous Nationals’ (2002) 18 American University International Law Review 35, 104 
(arguing that necessity doctrine justifies intervention to save human lives even if it violates sovereign 
equality): ‘Even if the non-intervention principle associated with the Charter's Article 2(4) prohibitions on 
threats to, or use of force against, a state’s territorial integrity or political independence is a jus cogens 
norm, there may be countervailing jus cogens norms associated with humanitarian and human rights law.’ 
Paolo G Carozza, ‘Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law’ (2003) 97 
American Journal of International Law 38 (Arguing that moving from sovereignty to subsidiarity provides 
a possible foundation for reconciling the concern of international law for the order of states with the 
concern of human rights law for the welfare of individuals). Also see Antonio Cassese, ‘Ex injuria ius 
oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in 
the World Community?’ (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 23. For an excellent analysis of 
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It is beyond the scope of this thesis to enter into theoretical or philosophical debates over 
whether the principle of sovereign equality is compatible with environmental 
imperatives, human rights, democratic liberalism, or the existing distribution of 
population or wealth. The principle of sovereign equality continues to be reaffirmed in 
general international law as a central principle governing international relations, most 
recently with respect to princ iples and guidelines for international negotiations.  90 
Moreover, it continues to be applied in WTO law, either explicitly or implicitly. I will 
therefore focus on the general application of this principle in WTO law and, in particular, 
                                                                                                                                            
the legality of conditioning market access on human rights performance, see Diego J Linan Nogueras and 
Luis M Hinojosa Martinez, above, n 62. 
89 For a fine example of philosophical efforts to create a new conception of sovereignty, see Paul Schiff 
Berman, ‘The Globalization of Jurisdiction’ (2002) 151 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 311 
(proposing a ‘cosmopolitan pluralist conception of jurisdiction’ that ‘aims to capture a jurisdictional middle 
ground between strict territorialism on the one hand and expansive universalism on the other’ to address the 
complaint that ‘a territorialist approach to jurisdiction fails to account for the wide variety of community 
affiliations and social interactions that defy territorial boundaries’). Berman, 491. Also see Ryan Goodman 
and Derek Jinks,’ Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty’ (2003) 55 Stanford Law Review 1749, 
1779: ‘From a realist perspective, it is difficult to understand why powerful states would accept this 
nonhierarchical structure, especially as it limits their ability to intervene 
 in, and override opposition from, far less powerful states. The contemporary understanding of sovereign 
equality is, of course, linked to the struggle against colonialism. Although subjugation of foreign peoples 
might still serve powerful states’ security interests, such objectives are per se no longer appropriate for 
legitimate actors in the international community. Empire is simply not an acceptable principle for 
organizing a modern state’s interests or identity.’  
90 A draft resolution, subsequently adopted by the Sixth Committee, ‘reaffirmed certain principles of 
international law relevant to international negotiations—namely sovereign equality, non-intervention, non-
use of force, the peaceful settlement of disputes, the duty to fulfil international obligations in good faith, the 
invalidity of an agreement resulting from the threat or use of force and the duty to cooperate. It also set out 
the following guidelines: (1) negotiations should be conducted in good faith; (2) states should take account 
of the importance of engaging in the process the participation of other states whose vital interests are 
directly affected by the matters under discussion; (3) the purpose and object of negotiations must be 
compatible with the principles and norms of international law; (4) states should adhere to the mutually 
agreed framework for conducting negotiations; (5) states should endeavor to maintain a constructive 
atmosphere during negotiations and refrain from conduct which might undermine the process; (6) states 
should focus on the main objectives of negotiations; and (7) states should strive to continue to work toward 
a mutually acceptable and just solution in the event of an impasse in negotiation.’ See Virginia Morris and 
M-Christiane Bourloyannis-Vrailas, ‘The Work of the Sixth Committee at the Fifty-Third Session of the 
UN General Assembly’ (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 722, 731. 
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the issue of whether unilateral trade measures are consistent with international legal 
obligations that flow from the principle. 
 
The principle of sovereign equality finds at least four applications in WTO law: the WTO 
principle of nondiscrimination; the WTO practice of decision making by consensus; 91 
dispute settlement; and preferential treatment. The implicit purpose of all four 
manifestations of sovereign equality is to ensure equal access to WTO rights. 
 
The principle of nondiscrimination is not expressed as a specific obligation in WTO law. 
Rather, it finds expression in the application of national treatment and MFN obligations 
in various WTO agreements. Nevertheless, the principles of sovereign equality and 
nondiscrimination can inform the interpretation of WTO law at a more theoretical level, 
by providing a conceptual framework. Specifically, these principles support the view that 
legal rights that are available to all WTO members on their face must be interpreted to 
provide equal access to WTO rights in practice.92 Casting the debate in terms of equality 
provides an overarching framework in which to consider the consistency of WTO 
                                                
91 The practice of decision making by consensus dates back to the nineteenth century and is based on the 
principle of sovereign equality. See Jose E Alvarez, ‘Globalization and the Erosion of Sovereignty: The 
New Treaty Makers’ (2002) 25 Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 213, 218. 
(noting that, ‘in accordance with the principle of sovereign equality, decisions were usually taken on the 
basis of unanimity’.) 
92 In Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, WTO Doc WT/DS139/142/AB/R, 
AB-2000-2 (2000) (Report of the Appellate Body), para 78, the Appellate Body found the prohibition of 
discrimination under GATT art I:1 to include both de jure and de facto  discrimination. In the context of 
international environmental law, the principle of non-discrimination has been used to support equal access 
to legal rights for transboundary litigants. See OECD Secretariat, ´Report on Equal Access in OECD 
Member Countries, in OECD, Legal Aspects of Transfrontier Pollution , 54 and Birnie and Boyle, above n 
47, 197-201. 
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jurisprudence with both the foundational elements of WTO law and the general principles 
of international law. 
 
In the area of dispute settlement, the principle of sovereign equality has been invoked 
explicitly in the WTO context with respect to the authorization of countermeasures. In 
European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas—Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of 
the DSU, the panel permitted the United States to suspend tariff concessions and related 
obligations in the wake of the European Union’s failure to comply with a ruling of the 
Dispute Settlement Body. Among its reasons for not including losses incurred in trade 
between the United States and non-EU countries in their assessment, the panel stated: 
A right to seek redress for that amount of nullification or impairment does exist under the DSU for the 
WTO Members which are the countries of origin for these bananas, but not for the United States. In 
fact, a number of these WTO Members have been in the recent past, or are currently, in the process of 
exercising their rights under the DSU. Moreover, our concern with the protection of rights of other 
WTO Members is in conformity with public international law principles of sovereign equality of 
states and the non -interference with the rights of other states….93  
 
The panel implicitly accepts that the principle of sovereign equa lity requires the 
interpretation of WTO rules in a manner that promotes equal access to legal rights. 
Ironically, in this instance the application of the principle of sovereign equality works 
against the developing countries, since their development status impairs their ability to 
take advantage of the right to seek redress.94 The panel failed to recognize that equal 
                                                
93 European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas—Recourse to 
Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/ARB 
(1999), paragraph 6.14. 
94 Cann makes this point in the context of GATT Article XXI:  ‘Developing countries, and especially least-
developed countries, generally have no ability to retaliate, no ability to receive compensation for damages 
incurred, and no ability to achieve any sort of effective redress under the nullification or impairment 
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access to rights requires a consideration of the economic circumstances of WTO 
members. 
 
The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
(‘DSU’) provides for compensation or the suspension of concessions where a WTO 
member fails to implement rulings within a reasonable period of time.95  Where a WTO 
member with significant market power (such as the United States or the European Union) 
fails to comply with a ruling, if a small developing country withdraws concessions, the 
withdrawal of concessions may cause more harm to an import-dependent developing 
country than to the WTO member that has failed to comply.96 At the same time, the 
developing country may not have the diversity of exports needed to make effective use of 
compensation, which permits the non-conforming member to make concessions in other 
areas in order to compensate for the violation of market access for another product. Thus, 
to provide equal access to the right to use countermeasures, the DSU must be amended to 
permit developing countries to make effective use countermeasures.97  
                                                                                                                                            
provisions of [GATT] article XXIII. The suspension of concessions or other obligations on the part of the 
target is truly meaningless when a two-way embargo has been imposed. As a result, there is very little 
impetus for developed countries to avoid “wrongful” decisions. If one may assume, for the sake of 
argument, that a developed country “wrongfully” imposes a security-based economic sanction, it need not 
fear the imposition of any penalty. In this sense, the developed country actually has very little to lose. In 
light of political expediencies at home, it thus becomes apparent that political leaders may err on the side of 
imposing the sanction.’ Cann, above n 73, 445.  
95 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 15 April 1994, Final Act 
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —
Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 2, 33 ILM 1197 (1994), art 22. 
96 See European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas—Recourse 
to Arbitration by the European Communities Under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WTO Doc 
WT/DS27/ARB/ECU24 (2000) (Decision by the Arbitrators), paras 73 and 76, in which the arbitrators 
recognized that an imbalance in market power may affect the effectiveness of countermeasures used 
pursuant to the DSU. 
97 There are currently several proposals being considered at the WTO to address this situation. Mexico has 
proposed an amendment that would permit developing countries to transfer the right to take 
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Some interpret a statement by the panel in Tuna I (that ‘[a] contracting party may not 
restrict imports of a product merely because it originates in a country with environmental 
policies different from its own’) as an application of the principle of sovereign equality in 
the trade and environment context.98 In this instance, the panel implied that access to 
WTO rights should not depend on the uniformity of environmental policies. This decision 
can also be viewed as denying the right to use economic coercion to intervene in the 
internal affairs of other States in the context of GATT.  
 
Given the acceptance of the principle of sovereign equality in customary international 
law99 and in WTO law, it is odd that this principle was ignored in the Shrimp cases. 
Given its role in compensating for the inequality that flows from levels of economic 
development, it is even odder that this principle was not considered in the context of a 
dispute involving the intrusion on the internal affairs of a developing country, even if the 
WTO judiciary believed the issue to fall outside of its jurisdiction.100 
 
                                                                                                                                            
countermeasures to another WTO member that can use it effectively. See WTO Doc TN/DS/W40. Another 
proposal is to require those who fail to comply with rulings to pay compensation in cash (rather than in the 
form of concessions) where small developing countries are involved. Seminario Sobre el Sistema de 
Solución de Diferencias en la OMC , Mexico City, 25-28 November 2003. 
98 United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD, 39th Supp, 155, GATT Doc DS21/R 
(1991) (Report by the Panel not Adopted), 30 ILM 1594 (1991), paragraph 6.2. See Kuei-Jung Ni, 
‘Contemporary Prospects for the Application of Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration’ (2001) 14 Georgetown 
International Environmental Law Review  1, 6. Also see Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, ‘Using Trade Sanctions 
and Subsidies to Achieve Environmental Objectives in the Pacific Rim’ (1993) 4 Colorado Journal of 
International Environmental Law and Policy 296, 306: ‘It is doubtful whether, in international law, the 
United States can assert the right to protect the life or health of human and animals in international areas or 
within the territory of other states. Compliance with domestic law of another state in spite of the fact that 
there is no international legal obligation to do so is contrary to the notion of sovereign equality.’ 
99 See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v United States) , [1986] ICJ Rep 14. 
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The preferential treatment accorded to developing and least-developed countries in the 
WTO may be viewed as a means to compensate for inequality of circumstances in order 
to promote legal equality. 101 Preferential treatment implicitly recognizes that the 
development status of WTO members affects access to WTO rights.102 For example, the 
                                                                                                                                            
100 This appears to be the view taken by the panel in paragraph 5.103, cited above. However, the principle  
still could have been considered with respect to its effect on the interpretation of Article XX. 
101 See Chapter 3, n136 for a list of provisions providing preferential treatment and academic literature on 
differential treatment. There is little WTO jurisprudence regarding the interpretation and application of 
WTO provisions relating to preferential treatment. In European Communities—Anti-Dumping Duties on 
Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India, WTO Doc WT/DS141/R (2000) (Report of the Panel), para 
6.232, the panel stated in the context of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 1A, 
33 ILM 1197 (1994): 
‘We do not consider that an interpretation of Article 15 which could, in some cases, have negative effects 
on the very parties it is intended to benefit, producers and exporters in developing countries, is required.’  
In European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WTO Doc 
WT/DS27/R (1997) (Report of the Panel), paras 7.272-7.273, the panel addressed the legal significance of 
the reference in the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, art 1(2) to developing country Members:  
With respect to Article 1.2’s requirement that account should be taken of ‘economic development purposes and financial 
and trade needs of developing country Members’, the Licensing Agreement does not give guidance as to how that 
obligation should be applied in specific cases. We believe that this provision could be interpreted as a recognition of the 
difficulties that might arise for developing country Members, in imposing licensing procedures, to comply fully with the 
provisions of GATT and the Licensing Agreement. In the alternative, Article 1.2 could also be read to authorize, but not to 
require, developed country Members to apply preferential licensing procedures to imports from dev eloping country 
Members. In any event, even if we accept the latter interpretation, we have not been presented with evidence suggesting 
that, in its licensing procedures, there were factors that the EC should have but did not take into account under Article 1.2. 
Therefore, we do not make a finding on whether the EC failed to take into account the needs of developing countries in a 
manner inconsistent with the requirements of Article 1.2 of the Licensing Agreement. 
Two panels have made reference to the Preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization , 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 ILM 1125 (1994), which 
recognises ‘that there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and 
especially the least-developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade 
commensurate with the needs of their economic development.’ See India—Quantitative Restrictions on 
Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, WTO Doc WT/DS90/R6 (1999) (Report of the 
Panel), para 7.2 and Brazil—Export Financing Programme for Aircraft—Recourse by Canada to Article 
21.5 of the DSU, WTO Doc WT/DS46/RW (2000) (Report of the Panel), para 6.47, note 49. 
102 Cann makes an argument with respect to the use of the GATT Article XXI security exception that 
applies with equal force to the use of unilateral measures under Article XX: ‘[T]he WTO is founded upon 
the basic premise of “non-discrimination” among nations. Despite this fact, the agreement specifically 
encourages discrimination in favor of less-developed countries. By doing so, the agreement implicitly 
recognizes that its mandates must always be adjusted to take into consideration the various stages of 
development of its Member States…. The most relevant statement in this regard is found in article 
XXXVII, paragraph 3(c). It provides that the developed contracting parties shall “have special regard to the 
trade interests of less-developed contracting parties when considering the application of other measures 
permitted under this Agreement... .”’  He notes further that, with regard to the American embargo of 
Nicaragua, Egypt argued that when invoking the provisions of article XXI, ‘due regard should be given to 
the essential interests of developing countries in the spirit of Part IV’ and that ‘particular attention should 
be drawn to Article XXXVII:3(c).’ See GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 29 May 1985, GATT 
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developing and least-developed countries generally do not have the market power to use 
unilateral trade measures as effectively as the United States or the European Union. This 
creates a situation of unequal access to the right to use unilateral trade measures under 
GATT Article XX(g).103 Unequal access to this right is inconsistent with preferential 
treatment, since it creates a situation in which the opposite occurs.104 Moreover, as the 
2003 decision of the WTO to amend TRIPS Article 31 indicates, unequal access to rights  
is both politically and legally unacceptable in the contemporary WTO context. 105  
 
International law is not entirely clear regarding the legality of unilateral trade measures 
aimed at changing the internal law of another State or inducing acceptance of MEA 
obligations. International law is ambiguous regarding the consistency of economic 
coercion with the principle of non-intervention. Given the absence of international 
consensus and the decision of the ICJ in the Nicaragua case, the inconsistency of 
economic coercion with the principle of non-intervention can not be established as a 
                                                                                                                                            
Doc C/M/188, 12 (28 June 1985). Several other States also took the position that special caution should be 
used when the target is a developing country and that the American actions against Nicaragua actually 
violated Part IV of the Agree ment. See ibid, 5, 7, 10, 12, 13-14, 16. See Cann, above n 73, 443-444. Also 
see United States—Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, Unpublished Panel Report, 1986 WL 363154, 
L/6053, PP 5.2, 5.15 (Oct. 13, 1986) (unadopted). 
103 See discussion of this point in Chapter 3. 
104 Cann makes the same argument with respect to the use of the GATT Article XXI security exception: 
‘Economic sanctions may only be effectively employed by those with economic strength and the history of 
economic sanctions supports the argument that targets tend to be economically weak and lacking in the 
ability to retaliate.’ See Cann, above n 73, 445, citing Gary Clyde Hufbauer et al, Economic Sanctions 
Reconsidered (2d ed, 1990), 95. 
105 The political context surrounding the Decision of 30 August 2003, Implementation of paragraph 6 of 
the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WTO Doc IP/C/W/405, 
<www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm> at 10 September 2003, is discussed briefly 
in Chapter 1. The right to issue compulsory licenses on patents in TRIPS Article 31 was in practice not 
available to the most disadvantaged WTO members, due to their lack of manufacturing capacity in the 
pharmaceutical sector. For a detailed analysis of this topic, see Bradly J Condon and Tapen Sinha, 
‘Bargaining for Lives at the World Trade Organization: The Law and Economics of Patents and Affordable 
AIDS Treatment’ (forthcoming). 
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customary rule of international law. Nevertheless, the intended purpose of such measures 
is clearly to intervene in the internal affairs of the targeted State. Moreover, such 
measures can not be considered consistent with the principle of non-intervention, given 
the divergence in the views of States on the issue. Thus, such measures violate the spirit, 
but not the letter of the law. Despite the obligation in general international law to conduct 
international trade relations in accordance with the principles of sovereign equality and 
non-intervention, the perverse result of the foregoing analysis is that economic coercion 
does not break the rules even when it takes the form of trade sanctions even though the 
use of unilateral trade measures to intervene indirectly in the internal affairs of other 
States undermines the principle of sovereign equality. 
 
In the WTO context, unilateral measures may be viewed as a legitimate exercise of the 
sovereign right of States to control the entry of products into their territory with respect to 
the policy areas covered in Article XX. However, the impact of such measures on the 
sovereign equality of targeted States and the unequal access to the right to use such 
measures is inconsistent with the application of the principle of sovereign equality to the 
interpretation of WTO agreements. When economic coercion is used to induce 
acceptance of MEA obligations, those obligations do not become void. Nevertheless, 
when MEA obligations are accepted under duress their legitimacy and effectiveness are 
undermined. If trade and environmental obligations are to be mutually supportive, then 
economic coercion can not be considered acceptable in the WTO. 
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Even if the illegality of such measures is uncertain in the context of general international 
law, they may be found inconsistent with WTO law.106 Regardless of whether economic 
coercion violates customary international legal obligations, unilateral import bans violate 
the legal obligations of GATT Article XI. Since the principle of non-discrimination may 
be viewed as a concrete expression of the principle of sovereignty, indirect attacks on 
sovereign equality generally should be considered unjustifiable discrimination in the 
Article XX chapeau. 
 
However, a finding that such measures are generally inconsistent with WTO law does not 
require that they be disallowed in all cases. The principle of necessity may be invoked 
under customary international law ‘to excuse the non observance of international 
obligations’ in exceptional circumstances.107 The jurisdictional nexus that the importing 
country has with the environmental problem is relevant to determining whether necessity 
applies. This provides a link between the ruling in Shrimp II and the general body of 
international law that provides a way to reconcile the divergent views of WTO members 
                                                
106 Support for the view that internal consistency of WTO law is required may be found in Brazil—
Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut , WTO Doc WT/DS22/AB/R (1997) (Report of the Appellate 
Body), 17, in which the Appellate Body invoked the WTO Agreement Preamble in the context of the 
integrated WTO system that replaced the old GATT 1947: ‘The authors of the new WTO regime intended 
to put an end to the fragmentation that had characterized the previous system. This can be seen from the 
preamble to the WTO Agreement....’ Also see Korea—Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain 
Dairy Products, WTO Doc WT/DS98/AB/R, AB-1999-8 (1999) (Report of the Appellate Body), para 81: 
‘Article II:2 of the WTO Agreement expressly manifests the intention of the Uruguay Round negotiators 
that the provisions of the WTO Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements included in its Annexes 
1, 2 and 3 must be read as a whole.’ The duty to interpret a treaty as a whole is supported by the following 
international jurisprudence: Competence of the ILO to Regulate Agricultural Labour [1922] PCIJ, B, 2 and 
3, 23; Ambatielos Case  [1953] ICJ Rep 10; Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide [1951] ICJ Rep 15; and Rights of Nationals of the United States in 
Morocco [1952] ICJ Rep 176, 196-199. 
107 Judge Dionisio Anzilotti, Oscar Chinn [1934] PCIJ, A/B 63, 113. 
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and the international community and promote greater coherence between different 
branches of international law. 
 
IV. Necessity 
 
The type of unilateral measure employed in Shrimp II is inconsistent with GATT Article 
XI. The jurisdictional nexus between the United States and the turtles and the 
transboundary nature of the environmental problem qualify the measure for provisional 
justification under Article XX(g). The obligation to conduct international trade relations 
in accordance with the principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention support the 
view that such measures constitute unjustifiable discrimination under the Article XX 
chapeau.  
 
The necessity doctrine may be invoked to excuse actions that are inconsistent with the 
international obligations of a State. However, necessity may not be invoked unless an 
‘essential interest’ of the acting State is involved. Necessity thus requires a jurisdictional 
nexus. The necessity doctrine provides a coherent framework in which to resolve the 
issue of where to draw the line between the jurisdiction of one State and another State 
when they overlap, in the absence of an international agreement. 
 
The draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Article 
25, codifies customary international law regarding necessity as follows: 
1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act 
not in conformity with an international obligation of that State unless the act: 
(a) Is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent 
peril; and 
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(b) Does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards which the 
obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole. 
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding wrongfulness 
if: 
(a) The international obligation in question excludes the possibility of invoking necessity; or  
(b) The State has contributed to the situation of necessity.108 
 
The draft Articles are not concerned with the content of the international obligation in 
question. 109 The content of WTO trade obligations falls under the jurisdiction of the 
WTO.110 However, in order to ensure that interpretations of Article XX are consistent 
with customary international law, the application of Article XX to unilateral measures 
should be consistent with the doctrine of necessity. In the circumstances of the Shrimp 
case, justifying the American measure in a manner consistent with the doctrine of 
necessity is the only way to ensure that Article XX is thus interpreted. 111 Even if one 
accepts the argument that the United States did not agree to refrain from using unilateral 
measures to protect the transnational or global environment, and that they are thus 
consistent with its WTO obligations, the use of such trade measures nevertheless 
undermines other international obligations regarding sovereign equality and non-
intervention. I will therefore consider whether the interpretation of Article XX(g) in the 
Shrimp cases is consistent with the doctrine of necessity and how this doctrine might 
inform the interpretation of Article XX(g) in future cases. 
                                                
108 The International Court of Justice held that these conditions reflect customary international law in 
Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) , [1997] ICJ Rep 7, 40-41, paras 51-52. 
109 See International Law Commission, above n 37,  61. 
110 See ibid 61. 
111 The draft articles provide other circumstances that preclude wrongfulness, but they are not applicable in 
this instance. See Article 20 (Consent by a State to the commission of the act in question), Article 21 (Self -
defence in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations), Article 22 (Countermeasures), Article 23 
(force majeure making it materially impossible to perform the obligation), Article 24 (distress, to save 
human lives) and Article 26 (Compliance with peremptory norm). With respect to Article 26, the only 
peremptory norms that are clearly accepted and recognized are the prohibitions of aggression, genocide, 
 237 
 
In order to invoke necessity, there must be ‘an irreconcilable conflict between an 
essential interest…and an obligation of the state invoking necessity’. 112 It is subject to 
strict limitations in order to safeguard against possible abuse.113 In this regard, necessity 
plays the same role as the Article XX chapeau, the conditions of which serve to guard 
against abuse of the Article XX exceptions. 
 
The following conditions in Article 25 are relevant here114 and must be cumulatively 
satisfied: (1) there must be an ‘essential interest’ of the State invoking necessity; (2) that 
interest must have been threatened by a ‘grave and imminent peril’; (3) the act in 
question must have been the ‘only way’ of safeguarding that interest; (4) the act must not 
have ‘seriously impair[ed] an essential interest’ of the State towards which the obligation 
existed; and (5) the State invoking necessity must not have ‘contributed to the occurrence 
of the state of necessity’. The State invoking necessity is not the sole judge of whether 
these conditions have been met.115 
 
A. Essential Interest 
Necessity has been invoked in several cases to address environmental threats, including 
threats to transnational migratory species in international waters. In the ‘Russian Fur 
Seals’ controversy of 1893, the Russian government invoked necessity to prohibit sealing 
                                                                                                                                            
slavery, racial discrimination, crimes against humanity and torture, and the right to self-determination. See 
ibid 208. 
112 Ibid 195. 
113 Ibid. 
114 The international obligations in question do not exclude the possibility of invoking necessity. 
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in international waters to address the danger that a fur seal population would be 
exterminated by unrestricted hunting. 116 In the Fisheries Jurisdiction case, Canada 
invoked necessity to protect straddling fish stocks of the Grand Banks that were 
threatened with extinction. The Coastal Fisheries Protection Act of 1994 enabled Canada 
to take urgent action and, pursuant to the Act, Canadian officials seized a Spanish fishing 
ship in international waters.117 In March 1967, the British government decided to bomb 
the Liberian oil tanker Torrey Canyon, which had run aground on submerged rocks 
outside British territorial waters, after all other attempts to prevent oil spill damage to the 
British coastline had failed. 118 None of these cases were resolved judicially.119 
Nevertheless, they suggest that the American interest in migratory sea turtles would 
qualify as an ‘essential interest’. 
 
The concept of ‘essential interest’ is relevant to determining the jurisdictional nexus that 
is required under Article XX(g). It would cover situations where the environmental 
problem is transnational or global and has an environmental impact in the territory of the 
country. However, a geographic connection is not necessarily the only means of 
                                                                                                                                            
115 Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia), [1997] ICJ Rep 7, 40-41, paras 51-52. 
116 86 British and Foreign State Papers  220, cited in International Law Commission, above n 37, 197. 
117 Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v Canada) , [1998] ICJ Rep 431, cited in International Law Commission, 
above n 37, 200-201.  
118 The ‘Torrey Canyon’, Cmnd 3246 (London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1967), cited in 
International Law Commission, above n 37, 199. 
119 In the ‘Russian Fur Seals’, case the measure was temporary and Russia offered to negotiate a long term 
solution with the British. In the ‘Torrey Canyon’ case, no international protest resulted and the International 
Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, 970 UNTS 211, 
was concluded to cover future cases. In the Fisheries Jurisdiction  case, the ICJ held that it had no 
jurisdiction, and two subsequ ent agreements were negotiated: Canada-European Community, Agreed 
Minute on the Conservation and Management of Fish Stocks, Brussels, 20 April 1995, 34 ILM 1260 (1995) 
and Agreement relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks, 8 September 1995, A/CONF 164/37. See International Law Commission, above n 
37, 197-201.  
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establishing the country’s interest in the matter. Where there is a MEA, parties to the 
MEA have a legal interest in the issue. For example, the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (‘CITES’) establishes a legal 
nexus between its parties and the endangered species whether or not the species occurs in 
the territory of the country. 120 In the absence of a geographic or legal connection, it 
would be difficult to establish that the country has an essential interest or jurisdictional 
nexus with the environmental problem unless one accepts the argument that all States 
have an interest in preserving global biodiversity. 121 
 
B. Grave and Imminent Peril 
The peril has to be objectively established and has to be imminent in the sense that it is 
proximate.122 This does not exclude that ‘a “peril” appearing in the long term might be 
held to be “imminent” as soon as it is established’, since ‘the realization of that peril, 
however far off it might be, is not thereby any less certain and inevitable’. 123 A measure 
of uncertainty about the future (in environmental cases, there if often scientific 
uncertainty) is permissible if the peril is clearly established  by reasonably available 
evidence. 124 The case of sea turtles threatened with extinction appears to qualify under 
                                                
120 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, opened for 
signature 6 March 1973, 993 UNTS 243 (entered into force 1 July 1975). 
121 American President Bill Clinton appeared to be advocating this view when he said that ‘international 
trade rules must permit sovereign nations to exercise their right to set protective standards for…the 
environment and biodiversity’. See Bill Clinton, speech at the celebration of the 50th anniversary of GATT, 
17 June 1998, <www.wto.org>, cited in Massimiliano Montini, ‘The Necessity Principle as an Instrument 
of Balance’ in Francesco Francioni (ed), Environment, Human Rights and International Trade  (2001), 135, 
136, n 3. 
122 International Law Commission, above n 37, 202. 
123 Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia), [1997] ICJ Rep 7, 42, para 54. 
124 International Law Commission, above n 37, 203. 
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this condition, since their status was objectively determined under CITES. Moreover, the 
Appellate Body in Shrimp accepted that the situation was urgent. 
 
C. Only Way 
According to the International Law Commissison commentary to Article 25, this term ‘is 
not limited to unilateral action but may also comprise other forms of conduct available 
through cooperative action with other States or through international organizations’. 125 
Thus, both unilateral trade measures and MEA trade measures taken against non-parties 
(or parties that do not implement their MEA obligations) could meet this condition in 
principle. Whether the means proposed to address the problem are the only ones available 
in the circumstances of a particular case is a separate issue.  
 
In environmental cases, there may be scientific uncertainty and diverging expert opinions 
regarding the best means of tackling a problem.126 The effectiveness of the chosen 
measure in resolving the problem is thus relevant to the determination of necessity. In the 
Shrimp case, it is not clear how effective a unilateral trade measure would be in 
preventing the extinction of sea turtles, particularly since the result may simply be 
diversion of the shrimp exports to other markets. Nevertheless, the fact that CITES 
categorized the sea turtles as threatened with extinction and consensus had been reached 
in two regional conservation agreements regarding appropriate conservation methods 
suggests that other ways of preventing their extinction had not been effective. Had this 
                                                
125 Ibid. 
126 Uncertainty regarding how and whether to address global warming is a good example. See Chapter 3. 
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issue been addressed directly in the Shrimp II case, the American measure may have met 
this condition of the necessity test. 
 
Whether or not a negotiated solution is an available alternative to unilateral action (or 
multilateral action against a third party) will depend on the facts of the case. In this 
regard, in the Shrimp I case, unilateral trade action was clearly not the only way to 
address the problem. Negotiations had succeeded in the Americas and subsequent 
negotiations achieved agreement among the countries around the Indian Ocean except for 
Malaysia. With respect to the negotiation alternative in Shrimp II, however, the 
unsuccessful effort to include Malaysia in a negotiated solution provided evidence that 
this route was not available in the circumstances. 
 
The ‘only way’ condition of the necessity doctrine suggests that there is a duty to 
negotiate prior to employing unilateral trade measures in circumstances where time 
permits this course of action. In cases of sudden, unexpected environmental disasters, 
such as oil spills, this option will not be available until after the fact. However, in most 
cases involving the conservation of exhaustible natural resources the exhaustion of the 
resource should be sufficiently foreseeable to permit time for negotiation. Thus, in the 
context of GATT Article  XX, the necessity doctrine implies a duty to negotiate before 
taking unilateral action to conserve transboundary or global resources, due to the subject 
matter. 
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In the ‘Russian Fur Seals’ and Fisheries Jurisdiction cases, unilateral actions preceded 
negotiations to resolve the issues. However, in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case, Canada 
had made an effort to resolve the problem in multilateral negotiations in the North 
Atlantic Fisheries Organization before taking unilateral action. In the ‘Russian Fur Seals’ 
case, this did not occur. However, this case occurred in the nineteenth century, when the 
necessary scientific data took longer to gather and receive. The unilateral action was 
taken on a temporary basis just prior to the beginning of hunting season. These factors 
suggest that there may have been inadequate time to resolve the question through 
negotiation prior to the start of the hunting season and distinguish the case from the 
Shrimp II situation.  
 
D. Serious Impairment of an Essential Interest of the Targeted State 
This condition requires that ‘the interest relied on must outweigh all other considerations, 
not merely from the point of view of the acting State but on a reasonable assessment of 
the competing interests, whether these are individual or collective’.127 Does the 
prevention of the extinction of sea turtles outweigh the interest of Malaysia in the 
American export market? Does it outweigh the collective interest in the global trading 
system? It did in the opinion of the panel and Appellate Body. While the American 
measure raises serious issues regarding the proper construction of Article XX and the 
relationship between developed and developing countries in the WTO, restricting trade in 
one product between two countries constitutes a relatively insignificant disruption of 
global merchandise trade. Does it outweigh Malaysia’s interest in maintaining its 
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sovereign equality? Given the current state of international law, this measure was not 
inconsistent with the principles of sovereign equality or non-intervention. On balance, it 
is reasonable to assume that the American measure would not be found to seriously 
impair an essential interest in these circumstances that would outweigh saving sea turtles 
from extinction. However, there is insufficient evidence to make a definitive 
determination on this point because the necessity doctrine was not argued explicitly in the 
Shrimp case. For example, it is not possible to determine the ecological and economic 
impact that the extinction of sea turtles would have on marine ecosystems and fish stocks, 
nor is there information available on the economic impact of the trade embargo on the 
incomes of shrimp fishermen in Malaysia. 
 
E. Contribution to State of Necessity 
For a plea of necessity to be precluded under this condition, ‘the contribution to the 
situation of necessity must be sufficiently substantial and not merely incidental or 
peripheral’.128 If one views the absence of a multilateral agreement as contributing to the 
state of necessity in the Shrimp I case, the lack of effort on the part of the United States to 
conclude an agreement with the affected countries could constitute a bar to the plea. 
Thus, a duty to negotiate may also be relevant to determining the outcome under this 
condition. However, the duty would have been met in Shrimp II. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
127 International Law Commission, above n 37, 204, citing Gabcíkovo -Nagymaros Project (Hungary v 
Slovakia), [1997] ICJ Rep 7, 46, para 58.  
128 International Law Commission, ibid 205. 
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With respect to the American contribution to the reduction in sea turtle populations, 
killing turtles inadvertently, due to a lack of scientific knowledge rather than a lack of 
effort, would not bar a plea of necessity. 
 
Based on the available information, the circumstances in Shrimp II appear to meet the 
conditions for invoking the necessity doctrine. However, because the necessity doctrine 
was not explicitly addressed, it is difficult to say with certainty whether all of the 
conditions would be met. Nevertheless, the Shrimp case represents a contribution on the 
part of the WTO judiciary to the development of this doctrine in international law, not 
just WTO law. Generally speaking, the necessity doctrine is consistent with the least-
trade-restrictive test that has been applied in WTO jurisprudence.129 However, the 
application of both the necessity doctrine and Article XX to international environmental 
concerns would benefit from further development.  
 
It would be useful for the WTO judiciary to make explicit reference to the necessity 
doctrine, as codified in the draft Artic les, when interpreting Article XX. Indeed, it would 
be useful for the WTO judiciary to systematically address the relevant rules of 
international law when interpreting WTO obligations and exceptions in order to ensure 
coherence, and to do so explicitly. This would facilitate the coherent evolution of WTO 
law and other branches of international law, as well as the internal coherence of WTO 
law.  
 
                                                
129 See Montini, above n 121. See discussion of the least-trade-restrictive test in Chapters 2 and 3. 
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V. The Role of WTO Panels in Achieving Coherence in International Law 
 
This section suggests how the WTO can use the above analysis to play an active role in 
achieving greater coherence between WTO law, international environmental law and 
general international law.130 The jurisdiction of the WTO judiciary is restricted to the 
interpretation of covered agreements. This bars the WTO judiciary from determining the 
content of obligations in treaty or customary international law. However, the WTO 
judiciary is required to take these other obligations into account when interpreting the 
covered agreements. Thus, while the ability of the WTO judiciary to influence other 
branches of international law is restricted, a significant contribution can be made to 
achieving coherence in international law.  
 
In this context, the WTO has been called upon to rule on matters involving public 
international law. In the Hormones case, the Appellate Body stated: 
The status of the precautionary principle in international law continues to be the subject of debate 
among academics, law practitioners, regulators and judges. The precautionary principle is regarded 
by some as having crystallized into a general principle of customary international environmental 
law. Whether it has been widely accepted by Members as a principle of general or customary 
international law appears less than clear. We consider, however, that it is unnecessary, and 
probably imprudent, for the Appellate Body in this appeal to take a position on this important, but 
abstract, question. We note that the Panel itself did not make any definitive finding with regard to 
the status of the precautionary principle in international law and that the precautionary principle, at 
least outside the field of international environmental law, still awaits authoritative formulation.131 
 
This decision is consistent with the jurisdictional limits of the WTO judiciary regarding 
the definition of the content of customary international law. Moreover, it demonstrates an 
                                                
130 On the dangers raised by unilateralism for contemporary international law, see the different 
contributions to the conference held at the University of Michigan Law School, Unilateralism in 
International Law: A United States -European Symposium (2000) 11 European Journal of International 
Law 1. 
 246 
appropriate level of deference to national governments by not imposing an obligation 
when it is not clear that they have accepted it. In this case, Canada and the United States 
were clearly of the view that the precautionary principle is not (yet) crystallized as a 
principle of customary international law. However, all parties to the dispute, as WTO 
members, had accepted the more concrete formulation of aspects of the principle found in 
the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures ,132 providing a 
more solid basis for the Appellate Body to make its ruling.  
 
The situation regarding the content of sovereign equality is analogous. While the WTO 
judiciary does not have the jurisdiction to define the content of this principle in general 
international law, they do have the jurisdiction to ensure that their interpretations of the 
covered agreements are consistent with more concrete manifestations of this principle in 
WTO agreements.  
 
It is also appropriate that the Appellate Body defer to the jurisdiction of the ICJ to 
determine whether a principle of customary international law has or has not emerged. 133 
                                                                                                                                            
131 European Communities—Measures Affecting Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WTO Doc 
WT/DS26-DS48/AB/R, (1998) (Re port of the Appellate Body), para 123. 
132 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 15 April 1994, Final Act 
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —
Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 1A, 33 ILM 1197 (1994). 
133 The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, Final Act 
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —
Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 ILM 1125 (1994)does not clearly set out what the relationship is 
between the WTO Dispute Settlement Body and the International Court of Justice. However, the draft 
International Trade Organisation Charter contemplated appeals to the World Court in some  circumstances, 
providing a basis for the development of a body of international law that applies to trade relationships. See 
Jackson, Jurisprudence , above n 6, 170. Also see Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization , 
Articles 92-97 in UN Conference on Trade and Employment – Final Act and Related Documents, UN Doc. 
E/Conf. 2/78 (1948) and Clair Wilcox, A Charter for World Trade (1949), 159 at 305-308. 
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This is a wise course to follow. The ICJ is better placed to perform this task. Moreover, 
since the WTO agreements came into force, international trade law has been more fully 
integrated into the system of international law than the GATT was.134 Panels and the 
Appellate Body both follow the customary rules of treaty interpretation, and make 
reference to other principles of international law, when interpreting the WTO agreements. 
If the WTO begins to rule on the status of principles in international law, it increases the 
risk of diverge nt opinions arising in different international ‘courts’, a development that is 
best avoided. For this reason alone, it is ‘imprudent’ for the DSB to take on this task. 
Jurisdictional boundaries thus contribute to coherence in various fields, including 
international trade law and international environmental law. 
 
However, WTO tribunals need to ensure that their application of accepted principles of 
customary international law are consistent with the general body of international law, in 
order to avoid the ‘fragmentation of international law’.135 The necessity doctrine is a case 
in point. Unlike the precautionary principle, the necessity doctrine has been accepted as 
forming part of customary international law. The Shrimp rulings contribute to the 
                                                
134 See Jackson, Jurisprudence, above n 6, 181, where the author states, ‘…the Appellate Body has made it 
reasonably clear that general international law is relevant and applies in the case of the WTO and its treaty 
annexes, including the GATT. In the past there has been some question about this, with certain parties 
arguing that the GATT was a ‘separate regime’ in some way insulated from the general body of 
international law. The Appellate Body has made it quite clear that this is not the case….’ 
135 See Ian Brownlie, ‘Some Questions Concerning the Applicable Law in International Tribunals’ in 21st 
Century, above n 11, 763. He states, at 763-764, ‘It is beyond question that public international law 
constitutes an applicable law, and may be indicated as such…by the determination of a tribunal….The 
question is…to what extent specialised areas of international law…may constitute discrete forms of 
applicable law, forming bodies of law independent of the parent body….‘International Environmental Law’ 
has tended to develop as a wholly academic personality, developed in ignorance of the practice of States 
and organizations….It is the principles of State responsibility which are applicable and which need 
developing. To encourage the fragmentation of international law will have retrograde effects.’ Also see, 
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development of this doctrine even though they do not do so explicitly. In future cases of 
this kind, the WTO judiciary needs to incorporate a consideration of the doctrine of 
necessity and ensure that its decisions are consistent with its content. It is within their 
jurisdiction to do so. 
 
In Shrimp II, the panel formulated a standard of review to apply in determining whether a 
WTO member was entitled to use unilateral trade measures with respect to international 
environmental issues. 
[T]he Panel feels it is important to take the reality of international relations into account and 
considers that the standard of review of the efforts of the United States on the international plane 
should be expressed as follows: whether the United States made serious good faith efforts to 
negotiate an international agreement, taking into account the situations of the other negotiating 
countries.136 
 
However, the panel also recognized that ‘no single standard may be appropriate’.137 The 
Appellate Body rejected the panel’s view that the United States should be held to a higher 
standard given its scientific, diplomatic and financial means. In this regard, the Appellate 
Body noted that the principle of good faith applies to all WTO members equally, but 
otherwise did not object to the standard of review formulated by the panel.138 
 
This aspect of the Shrimp case is relevant to determining whether the American measure 
met the requirements of the doctrine of necessity. In failing to consider the doctrine of 
                                                                                                                                            
Louis B. Sohn, ‘Enhancing the Role of the General Assemb ly of the United Nations in Crystallizing 
International Law’, in 21st Century, above n 11, 549.  
136 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 by 
Malaysia, WTO Doc WT/DS58/RW (2001) (Report of the Panel), para 5.73.  
137 Ibid para 5.77. 
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necessity, both the panel and the Appellate Body missed an important opportunity to 
contribute to the development of greater coherence between WTO law and customary 
international law. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Generally speaking, powerful developed countries take a different view of sovereign 
equality than do de veloping countries.139 The view of the former sees economic coercion 
as a permissible form of intervention in the affairs of the latter, while the latter do not. I 
will use the term de jure inequality to refer to the former view and the term de jure 
equality to refer to the latter.  
 
Both views are self-serving. It is in the interest of powerful developed countries to 
promote a view of international law that favours the economically powerful. It is in the 
                                                                                                                                            
138 See ibid para 5.76 and United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
Recourse to Article 21.5 by Malaysia, WTO Doc WT/DS58/AB/RW (2001) (Report of the Appellate 
Body), para 134, footnote 97. 
139 I base this generalization on the practice of the United States and the European Union and the views 
expressed by many American academics. I recognize that there is no single view of international law even 
within the American academic community. Indeed, I have shown in this chapter that there is vigorous 
debate in that community regarding international legal theory. However, that community is the primary 
source of theoretical challenges to the concept of sovereign equality. Here, I use the term ‘powerful 
developed countries’ to refer to the United States and the European Union, even though the latter is not a 
‘country’, technically speaking. In the use of the term developing countries, I include least-developed 
countries. According to Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, divergent views of international law also exist in the 
context of the United Nations Security Council, between the permanent members and those who hold seats 
on a rotating basis. Adolfo Aguilar Zinser Representante Permanente de México ante la ONU (Permanent 
Representative of Mexico at the United Nations), Address at the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de 
México, 28 October 2003. Thus, divergent views flow not only from disparities in economic power, but 
also political and military power. The permanent members of the Security Council are the United States, 
France, Great Britain, China and Russia. 
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interest of developing countries (and small developed countries140) to oppose that view 
and to promote de jure equality to counterbalance the reality of de facto inequality. 
However, while powerful developed countries can settle for the leverage that de facto 
inequality gives them in international economic rela tions, the other nations of the world 
cannot accept de jure inequality. Thus, in a contest between these two views of 
international law, de jure equality should win the day.  
 
Divergent views of sovereign equality should be easier to reconcile in the WTO context 
than in the United Nations context, because the stakes are higher for the State in the 
realm of peace and security, where its very existence may be at stake. International legal 
theorists who challenge equality generally are concerned with its implications for military 
security and human rights, which fails to take the WTO context into account. In the 
international trade context, the existence of the State is not at stake. Moreover, the needs 
of the State are different in the trade context, even if it is a hegemon. 141 Even the 
hegemon needs a degree of predictability in the realm of trade law in order to provide a 
more favourable global business environment for its business interests. Thus, it is more 
likely that compliance with the international rule of law will win out over the desire to 
avoid constraints on the unilateral exercise of State power in the international trade 
                                                
140 I do not place any of the members of the European Union in this category because trade policy falls 
within the jurisdiction of the European Union rather than its memb er States. 
141 Vagts makes this point with respect to hegemonic international law: ‘But the historical record shows 
that it can be convenient for the hegemon to have a body of law to work with, provided that it is suitably 
adapted. Moreover, those subject to its domination may need clear indications of what is expected of them. 
The hegemon is also a trading party and the world of trade needs rules. While Bolton’s national security 
world may be rather free of rules, his colleague, Special Trade Representative Robert Zoellick, has to 
operate in the highly legalized universe of the World Trade Organization.’ Vagts, above n 82, 845. 
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context than in the security context. Moreover, in the WTO context, all members benefit 
from a functioning dispute resolution system. 
 
The promotion of de jure equality is not only more feasible in the trade context than in 
the security context. It is also necessary for the WTO to embrace de jure equality, for 
both political and legal reasons.  
 
Politically, the WTO has to embrace a view of international law that is capable of 
bridging the divide and serving the interests of all members. Only de jure equality can do 
this. Moreover, the majority of WTO members are developing countries. Collectively, 
they represent the majority of the world’s population, if not its wealth. 142 The developing 
country members of the WTO have begun to assert themselves in WTO negotiations, 
notably in the Seattle, Doha, and Cancún Ministerial Conferences. In particular, they 
have rejected the practice of the ‘Quad’ (European Union, United States, Japan and 
Canada) of setting the agenda for WTO negotiations. In this political context, the WTO 
must resist attempts to erode the principle of sovereign equality. 
 
There are also strong legal arguments in favour of de jure equality in the context of WTO 
law. De jure inequality is inconsistent with several of the WTO’s fundamental procedural 
and substantive rules: non-discrimination; preferential treatment for developing countries; 
decision making by consensus; and the use of trade sanctions only through recourse to the 
                                                
142 Arguments that reject the notion of sovereign equality and one State, one vote based on representation-
by-population arguments seem to ignore this fact. 
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DSB.143 Moreover, the fundamental premise of the WTO is to govern trade relations 
based on the rule of law, not power. Unilateralism is the antithesis of multilateralism. 
Therefore, in a multilateral institution such as the WTO, unilateralism can only be 
permitted as a last resort, in accordance with the doctrine of necessity. 
 
Where strict adherence to de jure inequality would produce perverse results, necessity 
may be invoked in order to address the specific circumstances on a case-by-case basis. 
The necessity doctrine provides a way to address such situations without eroding de jure 
equality. The integrity of the body of law that flows from the concept of sovereign 
equality will be compromised if another path is chosen, be it in the context of WTO law, 
international environmental law, or general international law.  
 
Hard cases do not have to make bad law. The WTO judiciary cannot afford to let 
ambiguous legal analysis leave the impression that it will acquiesce in the erosion of 
fundamental principles of international law and WTO law or, worse still, give into 
pressure to create some form of ‘hegemonic international law’. Those who advocate the 
replacement of de jure equality with other forms of international governance that suit 
their present circumstances are short-sighted. While the WTO judiciary needs to take a 
flexible approach to interpretation that permits the body of international law to evolve 
                                                
143 With respect to the latter, see United States—Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WTO Doc 
WT/DS152/1  (2000) ( Report of the Panel adopted on 27 January 2000), holding that sections of the Trade 
Act that authorized trade remedies against American trade partners were not inconsistent with the 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (‘DSU’), 15 April 1994, 
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal 
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 2, 33 ILM 1197 (1994), art 23.2(a) or (c)  or GATT 
1994 due to American undertakings to pursue remedies for violations of its WTO rights through the DSU 
rather than unilaterally. 
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over time, the fundamental principles that govern relations between WTO members must 
remain capable of application over centuries, not decades. This requires a clear and 
coherent analysis of the relationship between WTO law and the general body of 
international law of which it forms a part. 
 
Unilateral measures are inconsistent with preferential treatment for developing countries, 
the promotion of equal access to WTO rights, and, more generally, the goal of governing 
trade relations pursuant to multilateral rules. In exceptional cases, necessity may be 
invoked to address urgent environmental issues where the acting State has a jurisdictional 
nexus to the environmental problem. The requirement of an ‘essential interest’ makes 
such a jurisdictional nexus mandatory. This means that unilateral measures can only be 
justified for transnational or global environmental issues where the acting State has a 
territorial connection. Otherwise an applicable MEA obligation must provide the 
jurisdictional nexus through the legal interest that the MEA gives the acting State. Where 
there is no geographic or legal jurisdictional nexus, unilateral measures will not meet this 
requirement of the necessity doctrine and will be incapable of justification under Article 
XX. 
 
Clarity of analysis is not incompatible with a flexible, evolutionary interpretation of 
international law. In this regard, the ambiguous language of Article XX serves a useful 
purpose. The broad language of Article XX leaves interpretative room available to 
achieve the coherence that is necessary for both WTO law and general international law 
to stand the test of time. Ambiguous language leaves room for the WTO to take into 
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account the evolution of de jure equality and the necessity doctrine in both WTO law and 
general international law. It also leaves room for the WTO to take into account shifts in 
the allocation of decision making authority as international environmental laws and 
institutions evolve. Finally, broad language in Article XX lessens the need to employ 
legislative mechanisms to resolve conflicts among WTO members and gives the WTO 
judiciary greater latitude to resolve conflicts on a case-by-case basis. These decision 
making mechanisms are the subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
From Revolution to Evolution: The Role of Ambiguity 
 
I. Introduction 
 
This chapter will analyse whether and how the ambiguity in Article XX should be 
resolved in light of its role with respect to the ‘constitutional’ division of authority 
between national governments and the WTO, the division of authority between different 
international organizations and the ability of Article XX to facilitate evolutionary 
coherence between different branches of international law. How should the ambiguity be 
resolved in the short term, medium term and long term? 
 
In the case of conflicts between WTO rules and MEAs, the best short-term solution may 
be to do nothing. After all, the problem is theoretical. There have been no disputes 
involving MEA-WTO conflicts. Moreover, the existing rules and dispute settlement 
mechanisms may prove to be adequate should any real conflict arise. The current rules 
appear to be adequate to address the issue of unilateral measures employed to induce 
participation in MEAs, provided such measures are allowed only as a last resort in 
accordance with the doctrine of necessity. To choose to do nothing is to recognize that 
‘more law is not necessarily better’.1 
                                                
1 I do not know whether to attribute this phrase to Robert Hudec or to Joel Trachtman. The insight belongs 
to the former while the words were written by the latter. See Joel P Trachtman, ‘Robert E. Hudec (1934-
2003)’ (2003) 97 American Journal of International Law 311, 313. 
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In the medium term, the WTO dispute resolution system is available to resolve 
ambiguities on a case-by-case basis.2 The value of this approach is that it would generate 
new ideas, produce a larger body of jurisprudence and allow flexible practices to develop 
over time. This ‘litigation’ option facilitates an evolutionary approach to developing 
coherence between WTO law and other branches of international law, akin to the course 
of evolution followed by GATT dispute resolution over its first four decades.3 The 
strength of this approach is its flexibility. The principle weakness lies in the lack of 
predictability. The ambiguity remains. Moreover, panel decisions cannot alter the 
obligations of WTO members;4 nor do they bind future panels.5 Thus, beyond the case at 
hand, panel decisions have persuasive value only. Moreover, panels may choose to 
exercise ‘judicial restraint’ and explicitly or implicitly leave the matter for the members 
                                                
2 For a discussion of the difference between litigation between governments and litigation in the domestic 
realm, see Robert E Hudec, ‘Transcending the Ostensible: Some Reflections on the Nature of Litigation 
Between Governments’ (1987) 72 Minnesota Law Review 211. 
3 See John H Jackson, The Jurisprudence of GATT and the WTO: Insights on treaty law and economic 
relations (2000), 439-440. He notes that the GATT clauses setting up the dispute resolution procedures 
were ‘sketchy’, but developed into a full and largely effective procedure over four decades of trial and error 
and general practice. 
4 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 15 April 1994, Final 
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments—
Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 2, 33 ILM 1197 (1994), art 3(2): ‘Recommendations and rulings of 
the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.’ 
5 See Jackson, Jurisprudence , above n 3, 388-389: ‘Clearly, the general international law rule suggests that 
there is no strict precedential effect such as stare decisis….The WTO text…seems to suggest that the WTO 
system does not give power to the panels to create any formal interpretations, i.e. any formal precedents. 
Thus, the panel reports are binding only on the parties to the particular proceeding….’ See also Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of 
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 
33 ILM 1197 (1994) (‘WTO Agreement’), art IX(2): The Ministerial Conference and the General Council 
shall have the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of this Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade 
Agreements…The decision to adopt an interpretation shall be taken by a three-fourths majority of the 
members.’ 
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themselves to resolve.6 Judicial restraint is not an excuse to fail to take all the relevant 
non-WTO rules into account in judicial opinions so that greater coherence may be 
achieved between different branches of international law. Nevertheless, given the 
limitations of panel interpretations and the prospect of judicial restraint, the litigation 
option provides a limited means to resolve ambiguities in the relationship between trade 
and environmental law. 
 
Over the long term, it may become necessary to negotiate a resolution of the ambiguities. 
This ‘negotiation’ option requires a choice not only of substance, but of form and 
procedure. The basic procedural options include adopting a formal interpretation of 
existing obligations, granting a waiver of existing obligations, and negotiating the 
adoption of amendments, new provisions or agreements. New provisions could range 
from a simple addition to the general exceptions contained in GATT Article XX to the 
negotiation of a new agreement. For example, a new Article XX exception might permit 
measures ‘necessary to implement obligations contained in a multilateral environmental 
agreement’. A more ambitious goal would be to negotiate an agreement on minimum 
standards of international environmental protection following the precedents set by the 
                                                
6 See Jackson, Jurisprudence , above n 3, 443. He cites the example of the Tuna case, in which the panel 
stated: ‘…if the Contracting Parties were to permit import restrictions in response to differences in 
environmental policies under the General Agreement, they would need to impose l imits on the range of 
policy differences justifying such responses and to develop criteria so as to prevent abuse. If the 
Contracting Parties were to decide to permit trade measures of this type in particular circumstances it 
would therefore be preferable for them to do so not by interpreting Article XX, but by amending or 
supplementing the provisions of the General Agreement or waiving obligations thereunder. Such an 
approach would enable the Contracting Parties to impose such limits and develop such criteria.’ United 
States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT BISD, 39th Supp, 155, GATT Doc DS21/R (1991) 30 ILM 
1594, 1623 (Report by the Panel not Adopted). 
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Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (‘TRIPS’)7 or the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (‘TRIMS’)8—perhaps an Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Environmental Protection (TREPS) or an Agreement on 
Trade-Related Environmental Measures (TREMS). But such ventures would raise 
difficult and controversial issues regarding the proper scope of the WTO mandate and the 
allocation of decision-making responsibility between international bodies and between 
international bodies and national governments. 
 
The principal benefit of the negotiation option is that it would enhance predictability by 
resolving current ambiguities and provide a long-term solution. However, this implies a 
trade off in terms of flexibility and would entail making difficult choices. For example, 
negotiating a TREPS or TREMS agreement would be challenging and likely require 
concessions in other areas to entice members to sign on. Given the difficulties WTO 
members already have reaching consensus on the Doha agenda, it would not be feasible 
to commence negotiation of new agreements for several years. 
 
Shrimp II appears to have resolved the issue of what would happen if trade measures 
were applied to nations who have chosen not to agree to the MEA after a concerted effort 
to negotiate their inclusion. If a ‘rogue’ WTO member chose to threaten the global 
environment, trade sanctions could be imposed, unilaterally or multilaterally. The Shrimp 
                                                
7 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994, Final Act 
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —
Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 1C, 33 ILM 1197 (1994).  
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cases indicate that trade measures taken pursuant to MEAs between parties to the MEA, 
if ever challenged before a WTO panel, will likely pass the test under Article XX, 
provided that they are non-discriminatory and adhere to principles of transparency and 
procedural fairness. However, the Shrimp decisions do not completely resolve the legal 
ambiguities in the trade and environment area.  
 
Before Shrimp II, it seemed clear that unilateral trade measures aimed at coercing other 
nations to adopt specific environmental policies in the absence of any multilateral 
agreement would not be GATT-consistent. In much of the academic debate over trade 
and environment before Shrimp II, particularly among advocates of unilateralism, there 
was the concern that trade rules may impede efforts to address serious global 
environmental problems, such as climate change and ozone depletion. 9 The starting point 
for the arguments of many American commentators was the assumption that the 
WTO/GATT decisions have produced unsatisfactory results because they failed to allow 
the United States to unilaterally determine how to deal with multilateral environmental 
                                                                                                                                            
8 Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures , 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of 
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 
Annex 1A, 33 ILM 1197 (1994). 
9 See for example, Sean Fox, ‘Responding to Climate Change: The Case for Unilateral Trade Measures to 
Protect the Global Atmosphere’ (1996) 84 Georgetown Law Journal 2499, arguing that economic and legal 
arguments support allowing States to use trade measures when necessary to promote their legitimate 
interests in protecting the global atmosphere. See also Jennifer A Bernazani, ‘The Eagle, the Turtle, the 
Shrimp and the WTO: Implications for the Future of Environmental Trade Measures’ (2000) 15 
Connecticut Journal of International Law  207, who proposes the addition of an exception to Article XX 
that would allow unilateral trade action where there is no MEA in place, there is a critical environmental 
situation, and negotiation efforts have failed to find a multilateral solution. Also see Shannon Hudnall, 
‘Towards a Greener International Trade System: Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the World 
Trade Organization’ (1996) 29 Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems 175, who notes that some 
kinds of unilateral measures are permitted in Article XX, subject to jurisdictional limitations.  
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issues.10 Many therefore argued that it was necessary to make changes to the WTO 
regime, using WTO decision-making procedures to provide further guidance to the WTO 
panels and Appellate Body. If WTO members are unable to agree to resolve their 
differences using legislative mechanisms, they will, in effect, be leaving the decisions to 
the judiciary to resolve. The question of how to clarify the relationship between WTO 
law, international environmental law and public international law is therefore an 
important one. 
 
The issue of how to reach decisions on controversial issues goes far beyond the trade and 
environment debate. What is at stake is the division of decision-making authority 
between the legislative and judicial branches of the WTO. WTO decision-making 
mechanisms provide a system of checks and balances to constrain decision-making by the 
WTO as an institution that ‘would be too intrusive on sovereignty’.11 However, where the 
WTO membership is unable to agree on how to resolve ambiguities in WTO law through 
legislative mechanisms, the task of ‘filling in the gaps’ may fall to the WTO judiciary. 
 
The judicial resolution of some legal ambiguities might not reflect the views of many 
WTO members. The ruling in Shrimp II on the use of unilateral measures is just one 
                                                
10 For an discussion of this issue that takes into account the developing country perspective, see Rita M 
Wisthoff-Ito, ‘The United States and Shrimp Import Prohibitions: Refusing to Surrender the American 
Goliath Role in Conservation’ (1999) 23 Maryland Journal of International Law and Trade 247. It is worth 
noting that the United States has agreed to avoid the unilateral resolution of trade disputes under section 
301 of the Trade Act of 1974  in order to comply with its WTO obligations. See United States—Sections 
301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WTO Doc WT/DS152/1  (2000) (Report of the Panel). 
11 Jackson, Jurisprudence, above n 3, 185. 
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example. 12 The work of the GATT and WTO on trade and environment has consistently 
expressed a preference for multilateral solutions over unilateral actions. The Group on 
Environmental Measures and International Trade 13 concluded that multilateral solutions 
to transboundary or global environmental problems would prove more effective and 
durable than unilateral measures.14 More recently, the WTO Committee on Trade and 
Environment reported that most member delegations considered that GATT Article XX 
did not permit a member to impose unilateral trade restrictions to protect the environment 
outside its jurisdiction.15 The analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 shows that these views are 
consistent with the relevant principles of international environmental law and de jure 
equality among the members States of the WTO. However, unilateral measures may be 
necessary in exceptional circumstances. Provided they are taken in accordance with the 
doctrine of necessity, they should be allowed in rare cases.  
 
                                                
12 Another example is the negative reaction of the WTO membership to the decision of the Appellate Body 
to adopt a procedure for leave to submit written arguments from NGOs in European Communities—
Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products , WTO Doc WT/DS135/AB/R (2001) 
(Report of the Appellate Body). See Minutes of WTO General Council Meeting of 22 November 2001 , 
WTO Doc. WT/GC/M/60 (23 January 2001), available at <http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_home -asp> at 25 
July 2002. Also see David A Wirth, ‘Case Report on European Communities – Measures Affecting 
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products’, 96 American Journal of International Law 435 (2002).    
13 This group was the first institutional framework created by the GATT to address trade and environment 
issues. It was created in 1971, but did little work in this area until some twenty years later. See Trade and 
Environment in the GATT/WTO (Background Note by the Secretariat), prepared for the High Level 
Symposium on Trade and Environment, held at WTO Headquarters in Geneva, March 1999, paragraph 1, 
reproduced in Hakan Nordstrom and Scott Vaughan, WTO Special Studies, Trade and Environment , 
Annex I [hereinafter Background Note].  
14 Report by Ambassador H Ukawa (Japan), Chairman of the Group on Environmental Measures and 
International Trade, 49th Session of the Contracting Parties, GATT Doc L/7402, 2 February 1994, 
reproduced in Nordstrom and Vaughan, ibid, A nnex II [hereinafter Ukawa Report]. 
15 See Background Note, above n 13, paragraph 55. Another delegation expressed the opinion that nothing 
in Article XX indicated that it only applied to environmental protection within the territory of the country 
invoking the exception. See ibid. 
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This chapter questions whether changes are needed to achieve greater coherence between 
WTO law and other branches of international law. This chapter analyses the WTO 
mechanisms that may be used to implement changes to WTO law, assesses the likelihood 
that sufficient agreement can be reached among WTO members to use these mechanisms, 
and analyses the legal effect of different decision-making procedures. This chapter then 
concludes with a synthesis of the issues that have been analysed in this thesis. 
 
II. The Need for Change: The Pros and Cons of Ambiguity 
Many are uncomfortable with the level of ambiguity found in the WTO rules regarding 
the compatibility of environmentally motivated trade barriers with the WTO agreements. 
There has been extensive criticism of the existing trade law regime by environmental 
NGOs and academic commentators and numerous proposals have been made for reforms. 
In general, the aim of these proposed reforms is to clarify the application of WTO 
exceptions to environmental trade barriers through authoritative interpretations, waivers, 
or amendments. Such proposals reflect a lack of faith in the ability of the WTO judiciary 
to interpret WTO provisions in a manner that is compatible with international 
environmental protection. 
 
Striking the right balance between flexibility and predictability in legal rules is a 
fundamental issue that confronts legislators and the judiciary in many areas of law. In 
some areas, such as property and contract law, the balance favours predictability. In other 
areas, such as constitutional law, the expanse of time covered by norms favours 
flexibility. For example, in the environmental field constitutional jurisdiction to pass 
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environmental laws in Canada remains murky but neither the federal nor provincial 
governments have taken concrete steps to clarify the situation.16 Ambiguity regarding 
substantive norms and the allocation of decision-making power in the environmental field 
flow from the nature of the beast. The environment is everywhere and environmental 
laws can affect every other field of law, making the division of legislative authority by 
subject matter an extraordinarily complex task. Thus, the appropriate level of ambiguity 
varies with the subject and purpose of the legal rule in question, even in domestic law. 
 
In international agreements, ambiguity is also a consequence of the compromises needed 
to reach agreement between a large number of States in international treaty 
negotiations.17 At the same time, the specificity of international legal obligations is 
important because specific obligations may prevail over general obligations in the event 
of a conflict between treaties (in the absence of a conflicts clause that states otherwise).18 
However, ambiguity in the rules governing international relations is not necessarily bad.19 
                                                
16 See Bradly Condon, ‘Federal Environmental Protection in Mexico and Canada’ in Stephen Randall and 
Herman Konrad (eds), NAFTA in Transition (1996), 281-294; Bradly Condon, ‘Constitutional Law, Trade 
Policy and Environment: Implications for North American Environmental Policy Implementation in the 
1990s’ in Alan R Riggs and Tom Velk (eds), Beyond  NAFTA: An Economic, Political and Sociological 
Perspective  (1993), 222-230; R Northey ‘Federalism and Comprehensive Environmental Reform: Seeing 
Beyond the Murky Medium’ (1989) 29 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 127. 
17 Philippe Sands, ‘Turtles and Torturers: The Transformation of International Law’, Inaugural Public 
Lecture as Professor of Public International Law, University of London, 6 June 2000, 
<http://www.nyu.edu/pubs/jilp/main/issues/33/pdf/33p.pdf>, 527-559, 549, at 19 February 2003. 
18 See Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties (1961), 219: ‘Where the parties to the two treaties said to be in 
conflict are the same,...[i]f the provisions of the earlier one are general and those of the later one are special 
and detailed, that fact is some indication that the parties intended the special one to prevail.’ 
See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 
(entered into force 27 January 1980), art 30 and 59. 
19 For a contrary view, see Moragodage C W Pinto, ‘”Common Heritage of Mankind”: From Metaphor to 
Myth, and the Consequences of Constructive Ambiguity’, in Jerzy Makarczyk (ed), Theory of International  
Law at the Threshold of the 21st Century (1996), 249, who criticizes the use of ‘constructive ambiguity’ in 
international agreements to paper over a lack of agreement between the parties. In particular, he criticizes 
the use of ‘emotive metaphors’ whose lack of precision lead to lengthy and costly efforts to determine the 
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Indeed, many international environmental instruments, such as the Rio Declara tion,20 are 
even more ambiguous than the WTO rules.21 Ambiguity may be intentional.22 The more 
diverse are the interests at stake and the longer the time frame involved, the higher the 
level of ambiguity may have to be to secure agreement in the negotiation of new norms.23 
 
Where provisions are general (and thus more ambiguous), as is the case with the GATT 
Article XX exceptions, they can be clarified incrementally through their application to 
specific cases. 24 In the environmental context, one author has argued that incremental 
                                                                                                                                            
legal obligations that are to be derived from the term. While his critique focuses on the term ‘common 
heritage of mankind’, it also applies to the concept of sustainable development. Whether ambiguity in 
international obligations is good or bad depends on the context. For example, in the context of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994 , Final Act Embodying 
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments—Results of the 
Uruguay Round, Annex 1C, 33 ILM 1197 (1994), ambiguity regarding the right of WTO members to issue 
compulsory licenses for export required that the agreement be amended. The WTO document that resolved 
this issue introduced further ambiguities that may encourage litigation that would frustrate the purpose of 
the decisions. See Decision of 30 August 2003, Implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on 
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health , WTO Doc IP/C/W/405, available at 
<www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm> at 10 September 2003,  and Bradly J 
Condon and Tapen Sinha, ‘Bargaining for Lives at the World Trade Organization: The Law and Economics 
of Patents and Affordable AIDS Treatment’ (forthcoming). 
20 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, adopted 14 June 1992, Report of the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development 3, Rio de Janeiro 3-14 June 1992, UN GAOR, 47th Sess., 4 
UN Doc A/Conf 151/5/ Rev.1 (1992) 31 ILM 874. 
21 The Rio Declaration consists primarily of principles elaborating the concept of sustainable development. 
Ibid. One author expresses the view that, ‘only as specific normative implications are defined for an ever 
larger number of contexts and actors, will the ambiguity inherent in the basic Rio formulations diminish 
over time.’ See Gunther Handl, ‘Sustainable Development: General Rules versus Specific Obligations’ in 
Winfried Lang (ed), Sustainable Development and International Law (1995) 35, 36. 
22 See for example Anthony D’Amato, ‘Purposeful Ambiguity as International Legal Strategy: The Two 
China Problem’ in Jerzy Makarczyk (ed), 21st Century, above n 19, 109. See also Aust, noting, ‘For 
multilateral treaties, the greater the numb er of negotiating states, the greater is the need for imaginative and 
subtle drafting to satisfy competing interests. The process inevitably produces much wording which is 
unclear or ambiguous.’ Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2000), 184. 
23 For example, Handl advocates ‘an incremental approach to clarifying the specific legal implications of 
‘sustainable development’’ to gradually ‘expand the limits of general consensus’. Handl, above n 21, 43. 
24 Jackson argues that the aim of Vienna Convention Articles 31 and 32 is to resolve ‘any facial 
ambiguities in treaty text.’ Jackson, Jurisprudence, above n 3, 151.Thus, panels are in theory capable of 
resolving the ambiguities regarding MEAs through the application of these rules of interpretation. 
However, if the line is crossed where panels would be altering the obligations by unduly stretching the 
meaning of provisions, they may choose to defer to the WTO members, who may use WTO decision-
making mechanisms to resolve the ambiguity.  
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clarification of existing obligations may be preferable to creating new norms with respect 
to the concept of sustainable development in international environmental agreements.25 In 
the case of Article XX, the same case can be made. Article XX has never been tested in a 
case involving trade measures implemented under MEA obligations, and might never be. 
Moreover, as I argued in Chapter 2, Article XX would benefit from judicial 
interpretations that (1) clarify the subject matter of Article XX(b) and (g) based on 
proximity of interest and (2) clarify the proper place of the least -trade-restrictive test and 
its relation to the necessity doctrine. Negotiating more specific provisions before the 
existing provisions have been tested fully may prove counterproductive and unnecessarily 
restrict future options.26 
 
                                                
25 Handl argues that creating new obligations before existing obligations are clarified may be self-
defeating, because it reflects a lack of concern for the effectiveness of the norms already enacted. 
‘Environmental legislation without concern for the effectiveness of the norms enacted, or the commitments 
states enter into, amounts to legal window-dressing and as such is self-defeating.’ Handl, above n 21, 43. 
Ambiguous language permits the WTO judiciary to have recourse to supplementary means of 
interpretation, including non-WTO agreements reached between the parties to the dispute. It thus facilitates 
the consideration of MEA obligations and other international legal obligations in the interpretations of 
Article XX. In Canada—Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy 
Products, WTO Doc WT/DS103/AB/RWT/DS113/AB/R, AB-1999-4 (1999) (Report of the Appellate 
Body), para 138, regarding Canada’s Schedule the Appellate Body stated:  
Indeed, the language is general and ambiguous, and, therefore, requires special care on the part of the treaty interpreter. For 
this reason, it is appropriate, indeed necessary, in this case, to turn to ‘supplementary means of interpretation’ pursuant to 
Article 32 of the  Vienna Convention. In so doing, we are unable to share the apparent view of the Panel that the meaning 
of the notation at issue is so clear and self-evident that there was ‘no need  to also examine the historical background 
against which these terms were negotiated. 
Also see European Communities—Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment, WTO Doc 
WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R, WT/DS68/AB/R, AB-1998-2 (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body), 
para 92: 
The application of these rules in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention will usually allow a treaty interpret er to establish the 
meaning of the term. However, if after applying Article 31 the meaning of the term remains ambiguous or obscure, or leads 
to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable, Article 32 allows a treaty interpreter to have recourse to: 
‘... supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of 
its conclusion.’ 
With regard to ‘the circumstances of [the] conclusion’ of a treaty, this permits, in appropriate cases, the examination of the 
historical background against which the treaty was negotiated. 
Also see European Communities—Measures Affecting the Importation of Certain Poultry Products, WTO 
Doc WT/DS69/AB/R, AB-1998-3 (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body), para 83, in which the Appellate 
Body found that a bilateral agreement between two WTO Members could serve as ‘supplementary means’ 
of interpretation for a provision of a covered agreement.  
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At the same time, it is important to recognize ‘the need of the international commercial 
system for predictability in the resolution of disputes.’27 The WTO Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (‘DSU’) recognizes this 
need, and assigns the role of clarification of existing obligations to the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body (‘DSB’):  
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and 
predictability  to the multilateral trading system. The Members recognize that it serves to preserve 
the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing 
provisions of those agreements….28  
 
However, this role is limited by the doctrine of judicial restraint, under which panels limit 
their decisions to the interpretation and application of the least number of provisions 
necessary to resolve the dispute before them. 29 Thus, in the absence of a dispute 
involving MEA trade obligations, WTO panels are unlikely to fulfil this task with respect 
to the application of existing GATT provisions to MEAs.30 Nevertheless, the 
interpretations of Article XX(g) in the WTO jurisprudence provide sufficient guidance to 
                                                
27 Blackmun J in Mitsubishi Motors Corp v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc, 473 US 614 (1985). 
28 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 15 April 1994, Final Act 
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —
Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 2, 33 ILM 1197 (1994), art 3(2). In Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic 
Beverages , WTO Doc WT/DS8/10/11/AB/R (1996) (Report of the Appellate Body), 31, the Appellate 
Body made the following general statement about WTO rules and the concept of ‘security and 
predictability’:  
WTO rules are reliable, comprehensible and enforceable. WTO rules are not so rigid or so inflexible as not to leave room 
for reasoned judgements in confronting the endless and ever-changing ebb and flow of real facts in real cases in the real 
world. They will serve the multilateral trading system best if they are interpreted with that in mind. In that way, we will 
achieve the ‘security and predictability’ sought for the multilateral trading system by the Members of the WTO through the 
establishment of the dispute settlement system. 
29 In United States—Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, WTO Doc 
WT/DS33/AB/R (1997) (Report of the Appellate Body), 19, the Appellate Body stated: 
Given the explicit aim of dispute settlement that permeates the DSU, we do not consider that Article 3.2 of the DSU is 
meant to encourage either panels or the Appellate Body to ‘make law’ by clarifying existing provisions of the WTO 
Agreement outside the context of resolving a particular dispute. A panel need only address those claims which must be 
addressed in order to resolve the matter in issue in the dispute. 
Also see European Communities - Trade Description of Sardines , WTO Doc WT/DS231/R (2002) (Report 
of the Panel), WTO Doc WT/DS231/AB/R, AB-2002-3 (2002) (Report of the Appellate Body).  
30 It is perhaps for this reason that the issue was placed on the Doha negotiating agenda. See Chapter 1. 
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be able to predict with some confidence the circumstances in which MEA trade measures 
and unilateral trade measures would pass scrutiny. 
 
III. WTO Decision-Making Procedures 
 
The WTO sets up various legislative mechanisms that could be used to avoid or address 
conflicts between trade liberalization and international environmental protection. If 
reforms are deemed necessary, choices must be made regarding the best mechanism to 
use. Options in this regard include Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, an 
authoritative interpretation, a waiver of obligations, and amendments to the relevant 
agreements.  
 
The appropriateness of each mechanism to resolve ambiguities or disputes depends in 
part on its legal effect and the feasibility of rallying the necessary number of votes. 
Where the issue is politically sensitive, the members may prefer to take a decision by 
consensus rather than take a decision by vote even if there are sufficient votes to make a 
decision using one of these mechanisms.31 Indeed, the practice of decision making by 
                                                
31 For example, at the Doha Ministerial Meeting, the WTO members chose to adopt a Ministerial 
Declaration on TRIPS by consensus despite the difficulty in achieving consensus on the wording of the 
document. The purpose of the Declaration was to clarify the effect of TRIPS on access to patented 
medicine in developing countries to treat diseases such as AIDS. A large number of developing country 
members insisted this issue be resolved to their satisfaction before they would agree to a negotiating agenda 
for a new round of trade negotiations. For a more detailed discussion of the political and legal context 
surrounding the adoption of this Declaration, see Bradly Condon, ‘The Twin Security Challenges of AIDS 
and Terrorism: Implications for flows of trade, capital, people and knowledge’, in Ross P Buckley (ed), The 
WTO and the Doha Round: The Changing Face of World Trade (2003), 251. The TRIPS Declaration left 
one particularly difficult issue to be resolved later (how to ensure that countries lacking manufacturing 
capacity could avail themselves of the right to issue compulsory licenses on patents). Of the 144 WTO 
members, 143 reached agreement on how to resolve this issue (with the United States opposed). 
Nevertheless, the WTO membership chose to continue efforts to reach an agreement by consensus, and 
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consensus reinforces the de jure equality of WTO members and the consistency of WTO 
decision making procedures with the principle of sovereign equality. 
 
A. Ministerial Declarations and Decisions 
As a general rule, the WTO is required to continue the GATT practice of ‘decision-
making by consensus’,32 which is defined as ‘no Member, present at the meeting when 
the decision is taken, formally object[ing] to the proposed decision’.33 Thus, consensus 
does not require unanimity. As a general rule, where a decision cannot be reached by 
consensus, the matter is decided by voting.34 Decisions of the Ministerial Conference and 
General Council are taken by a majority of the votes cast, unless otherwise provided. 35 In 
contrast, decisions of the General Council sitting as the Dispute Settlement Body must be 
taken by consensus.36 Authoritative interpretations, decisions, and waivers come under 
the heading of ‘Decision-Making’ procedures in the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization (‘WTO Agreement’), but the rules differ regarding the 
                                                                                                                                            
agreed to amend TRIPS Article 31. See Decision of 30 August 2003, Implementation of paragraph 6 of the 
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health , WTO Doc IP/C/W/405, available at 
<www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm> at 10 September 2003. For a detailed 
analysis, see Bradly Condon and Tapen Sinha, ‘Bargaining for Lives at the World Trade Organization: The 
Law and Economics of Patents and Affordable AIDS Treatment’ (forthcoming). 
32 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying 
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —Results of the 
Uruguay Round, 33 ILM 1125 (1994), art IX: 1. 
33 Ibid art IX: 1, footnote 1. 
34 Ibid art IX: 1. 
35 Ibid art IX: 1. While the Ministerial Conference and the General Council both consist of all WTO 
members, generally the former is composed of members’ trade ministers, while the latter consists of 
members’ ambassadors to the WTO. Similarly, members may assign different individuals to work in 
different WTO bodies, such as WTO Councils and Committees charged with overseeing different 
agreements and issues, depending on their seniority and specific areas of expertise. See generally World 
Trade Organization, ‘Whose WTO is it anyway?’, 
<www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org1_e.htm#min isterial> at 31 March 2003. 
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number of votes and procedures followed for each. 37 Waivers and authoritative 
interpretations of GATT obligations must be approved by a three-fourths majority. 38 A 
simple majority of WTO members may issue Decisions under GATT39 and the WTO 
Agreement.40 There is no provision that states how many votes are required to issue a 
Ministerial Declaration. The practice is to reach consensus on Ministerial Declarations, 
which accords with the general rule.41   
 
In disputes over the  interpretation of WTO obligations, WTO panels only have 
jurisdiction to hear complaints brought under ‘covered agreements’ (Multilateral 
Agreements on Goods, GATS and TRIPS), the WTO Agreement and the DSU.42 
                                                                                                                                            
36 Ibid art IX: 1, footnote 3; Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 
Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 2, 33 ILM 1197 (1994), art 2(4). 
37 See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, Final Act 
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —
Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 ILM 1125 (1994), art IX. This article applies to decisions in general. 
However, it does not apply to certain types of decisions that are governed by distinct procedures. For 
example, decisions under a Plurilateral Trade Agreement, including decisions on interpretations and 
waivers, are governed by the provisions of those agreements (art IX:5). Decisions relating to amendments 
and accessions are governed by art X and XII, respectively. 
38 See ibid art IX(3), (4). See also, GATT Article XXV and Chris Wold, ‘Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements and the GATT: Conflict and Resolution?’ (1996) 26 Environmental Law 841 . 
39 See GATT Article XXV and Wold, ibid. 
40 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying 
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —Results of the 
Uruguay Round, 33 ILM 1125 (1994), art IX:1. 
41 Ibid art IX: 1. This practice has been evident at recent WTO Ministerial Conferences. The lack of 
consensus at the 1999 Seattle meeting and the 2003 Cancun meeting stalled progress in WTO negotiations. 
At the 2001 Doha meeting, compromises were reached in order to achieve consensus on the content of the 
negotiating agenda, particula rly with respect to pharmaceutical patents, agricultural subsidies and trade 
remedy laws. See Ministerial Declaration, Fourth Ministerial Conference, Doha, Qatar, adopted 14 
November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November 2001, available at 
<www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm> at 30 June 2002. Also see Elizabeth 
Olson, ‘Drug Issue Casts a Shadow on Trade Talks’, <www.nytimes.com>2 November 2001 and Steven 
Chase, ‘Drug patent skirmish threatens WTO talks’, Globe and Mail (Toronto), 9 November 2001, B6. 
42 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (‘DSU’), 15 April 1994, 
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal 
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 2, 33 ILM 1197 (1994), art 1. The application of the 
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Ministerial Decisions and Declarations are not ‘covered agreements’.43 Thus, Ministerial 
Decisions and Declarations may not form the basis of a complaint. However, they may 
influence the interpretation of the covered agreements and thereby provide a defence 
against complaints. 44 WTO panels and the Appellate Body have considered Ministerial 
Decisions and Declarations in their interpretation of the WTO covered agreements, 
including the Declaration on the Relationship of the WTO and the IMF,45 the Decision on 
Trade and Environment.46 Nevertheless, the legal effect of Ministerial Decisions and 
Declarations remains unclear.47 
 
The WTO Agreement makes no mention of ‘Declarations’ at all. Nor do the DSU, GATT 
1947 or GATT 1994. However, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations includes a long list of Ministerial Decisions 
                                                                                                                                            
DSU to Plurilateral Trade Agreements is subject to the adoption of a decision by the parties to each 
agreement. See DSU Appendix 1. 
43 Ibid art 1 defines covered agreements as those listed in Annex 1 of the Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 
ILM 1125 (1994) and Decisions and Declarations are not listed there. 
44 See Joost Pauwelyn, ‘The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?’ (2001) 
95 American Journal of International Law 535. Generally, sources of  international law other than the 
covered agreements apply in WTO disputes provided ‘that both disputing parties are legally bound by them 
and it is done in the examination of WTO claims.’ See Pauwelyn, 563. Thus, ‘a defending party can invoke 
only those rules by which both itself and the complaining party are bound’. See Pauwelyn, 566. 
45 Argentina – Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS56/AB/R (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body) paras 65 and 69. 
46 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, 
AB-1998-4 (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body). 
47 See James Thuo Gathii, ‘The Legal Status of the Doha Declaration on Trips and Public Health Under the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’ (2002) 15 Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 291 
(arguing that given the divergent interpretations of the TRIPS Agreement, the Doha Declaration should 
now be regarded as an interpretive element in the interpretation of the TRIPS agreement under customary 
international law). Gathii notes that the Appellate Body in United States—Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, AB-1998-4 (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body) 
referred to Paragraph 16 of the Singapore Ministerial Declaration, which summa rized the 1996 Report of 
the Committee on the Trade and the Environment, to support its findings, referring in  particular to the 
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and Declarations.48 Where not otherwise provided in the WTO Agreement or Multilateral 
Trade Agreements, the WTO is guided by GATT decisions, procedures and customary 
practices.49 The Vienna Convention also recognizes state practice as a source of law. 50 
Thus, clues as to the legal effect of Ministerial Declarations may be found in GATT and 
WTO practice. 
 
One example of WTO practice regarding Declarations is the Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health , adopted at the Doha Ministerial Conference in 2001. 51 
This Declaration was adopted by consensus. The WTO implemented certain provisions of 
the TRIPS Declaration in the form of a Decision and a Waiver.52 The TRIPS Declaration 
provides, ‘We also agree that the least-developed country members will not be obliged, 
with respect to pharmaceutical products, to implement or apply Sections 5 and 7 of Part II 
of the TRIPS Agreement or to enforce rights provided for under these Sections until 1 
January 2016…’.53 Section 5 applies to patents and Section 7 applies to the protection of 
                                                                                                                                            
Report's emphasis on ‘multilateral solutions’. However, he also notes that the United States has maintained 
that Doha was a political declaration with no legal authority. See Gathii, 315. 
48 GATT Secretariat, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1994), 439-
475. 
49 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying 
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —Results of the 
Uruguay Round, 33 ILM 1125 (1994), art XVI:1. 
50 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered 
into force 27 January 1980), art 31(3)(b). 
51 Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 14 November 2001, WTO Doc 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 20 November 2001, <www.wto.org> at 30 November 2001. 
52 Decision of the Council for TRIPS of 27 June 2002, Extension of the transition period under Article 66.1 
of the TRIPS Agreement for least-developed country members for certain obligations with respect to 
pharmaceutical products, WTO Doc IP/C/25, <www.wto.org> at 14 July 2002. Least-developed country 
members —  obligations under article 70.9 of the trips agreement with respect to pharmaceutical products, 
waiver submitted to the WTO General Council for approval on 8 July 2002, <www.wto.org> at 30 July 
2002. 
53 Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 14 November 2001, WTO Doc 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 20 November 2001, <www.wto.org> at 30 November 2001, para 7. 
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undisclosed information. The TRIPS Decision formalizes paragraph 7 of the TRIPS 
Declaration, using the same language. While this suspension of obligations takes the form 
of a Decision, the effect is to waive these obligations for least-developed countries for the 
stated period of time.54 The TRIPS Waiver waives the obligations of least -developed 
countries to provide exclusive marketing rights to patent owners until 2016. 55 
 
Does the fact that certain aspects of the TRIPS Declaration were implemented using other 
WTO decision-making procedures provide evidence of the intended legal effect of the 
remainder of the TRIPS Declaration? There are two good reasons to believe that it does 
not. First, this choice of procedures reflects the procedural requirements of the WTO 
Agreement with respect to the suspension of obligations, which differ from the procedure 
for merely interpreting obligations. Second, WTO practice with respect to Decisions and 
                                                
54 The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994, Final Act 
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —
Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 1C, 33 ILM 1197 (1994) (‘TRIPS’) already allowed least-developed 
countries and developing countries to delay providing patent protection for pharmaceuticals. Least 
developed countries could delay intellectual property protection generally until 2006 (TRIPS art 66.1). 
Developing countries could do so until 2000 (TRIPS art 65.2). With respect to patents however, developing 
countries could delay protection until 2005 if they did not provide patent protection for a particular area of 
technology when TRIPS obligations came into effect in 1995. Less than twenty developing countries fit 
this description. See WHO/WTO, WTO Agreements and Public Health , 22 August 2002, 47, note 13, 
<www.wto.org> at 22 March 2003. The effect of the Decision, for least-developed countries, is to waive 
their obligations to provide patents for pharmaceuticals until 2016, at which point the exemptions may be 
extended further. Decisions to waive obligations that  are subject to a transition period must be taken by 
consensus only, not by three fourths of the members as with waivers in general. Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 
ILM 1125 (1994), art IX: 3(a), footnote 4. 
55 WTO members have to permit patent applications to be submitted during the transition period for 
pharmaceutical products (TRIPS art 70.8). If the country then approves the sale of the product, and a patent 
has been filed and granted in another WTO member after 1 January 1995, the patent applicant must be 
given ‘exclusive marketing rights’ for five years even though there is no patent (TRIPS art 70.9). These 
obligations have been in force since January 1, 1995 and have been applied in a dispute involving India. 
See India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS50/AB/R (1997) (Report of the Appellate Body). The TRIPS Waiver provides, ‘The obligations of 
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Declarations indicates that the language used is more important than the title used for the 
document in terms of its effect on interpretation. 
 
The Decision on Trade and Environment can be categorized as a non-interpretative 
decision, since it contains no formal interpretations of WTO provisions.56 The Decision 
itself simply requires the establishment of the Committee on Trade and Environment and 
sets out its mandate. However, the preamble of the Decision on Trade and Environment 
nevertheless influenced the interpretation of Article XX(g) in the Shrimp case (by 
prompting the analysis of the multilateral environmental agreements listed in the 
preamble) and so appears to have some effect on interpretation. In contrast, DSU Article 
3(12) gives developing countries the right to invoke the Decision of 5 April 1966 when 
they bring a complaint against a developed country. 57 Moreover, certain provisions in the 
Decision of 5 April 1966 prevail over DSU procedural rules where they differ. Thus, 
there is a category of dec ision whose substantive provisions can prevail over a WTO 
understanding. These two examples demonstrate that not all Decisions are alike. 
Decisions can differ in the degree of influence they have on a WTO panel’s 
interpretation. Where a Decision constitutes a formal interpretation, it is binding on WTO 
panels, whereas a non-interpretative decision  can merely influence a panel’s 
interpretation of the covered agreements. Thus, the language used in the Decision is more 
important than the fact that it is called a Decision. 
                                                                                                                                            
least-developed country Members under paragraph 9 of Article 70 of the TRIPS Agreement shall be waived 
with respect to pharmaceutical products until 1 January 2016’. 
56 Decision on Trade and Environment, adopted 14 April 1994 at the meeting of the Trade Negotiations 
Committee in Marrakesh, in GATT Secretariat, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations (1994), 469. 
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To determine the legal effect of the language used in Ministerial Decisions and 
Declarations on the rights and obligations of WTO members one must turn to the Vienna 
Convention.58 The relevant obligations of the covered agreement must ‘be interpreted in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty 
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’,59 together with ‘any subsequent 
agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application 
of its provisions’,60 ‘any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which 
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation’,61 and ‘any relevant 
rules of international law applicable in the rela tions between the parties’.62  
 
WTO practice indicates that the legal effect of Ministerial Decisions and Declarations 
depends on their content.63 Neither mechanism appears to be suitable for resolving 
ambiguities with respect to trade and environment issues. Indeed, the use of these 
mechanisms could increase the ambiguity since it is difficult to predict how they might 
affect judicial interpretations of the covered agreements.64 
                                                                                                                                            
57 Decision of 5 April 1966, GATT BISD 14th Supp, 18. 
58 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered 
into force 27 January 1980). 
59 Ibid art 31(1). 
60 Ibid art 31(3)(a). 
61 Ibid art 31(3)(b). 
62 Ibid art 31(3)(c). 
63 The United States, however, took the position that the TRIPS Declaration was merely a political 
statement that had no legal effect. 
64 Ministerial Decisions and Declarations are not ‘covered agreement’. As a result, the WTO judiciary does 
not have jurisdiction to consider claims under these documents. See Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —Results of the Uruguay Round, 
Annex 2, 33 ILM 1197 (1994), art 11. Pauwelyn  states the following: ‘A WTO panel may only decide 
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B. Waivers  
In exceptional circumstances, the Ministerial Conference may decide to waive an 
obligation imposed on a member by the WTO Agreement or any of the Multilateral Trade 
Agreements.65 If a waiver decision concerning the WTO Agreement cannot be taken by 
consensus within 90 days, the decision to grant a waiver is taken by three-fourths of the 
Members.66 A request for a waiver concerning the Multilateral Trade Agreements must 
be submitted initially for consideration by the relevant Council, which then submits a 
report to the Ministerial Conference.67 In the interval between Ministerial Conferences, 
the WTO General Council may approve waivers. 68  
 
Waivers have a clear legal effect (though their parameters may be subject to 
interpretation). A waiver does not bind WTO panels to a particular interpretation of the 
obligation in question, nor influence its interpretation. 69 Rather, it suspends the operation 
of the obligation within the parameters set out in the waiver itself. Thus, like 
amendments, waivers form part of the covered agreements, rather than a separate source 
                                                                                                                                            
these other claims if the parties to the dispute in question grant it this jurisdiction ad hoc and by mutual 
consent, for example, by explicitly agreeing on special terms of reference pursuant to DSU Article 7.3 or 
by referring the dispute, including these other claims, to arbitration under DSU Article 25’. Pauwelyn, 
above n 43, 554. 
65 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying 
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —Results of the 
Uruguay Round, 33 ILM 1125 (1994), art IX: 3. There are specific procedures set out for waivers of GATT 
obligations, but the voting procedure is governed by Article IX. See Understanding in Respect of Waivers 
of Obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994. 
66 Ibid art IX: 3. However, decisions regarding obligations that are subject to a transition period can only be 
taken by consensus. See ibid art IX: 3(a), footnote 4.  
67 Ibid art IX:3. 
68 Ibid art IV:2. 
69 See for example, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas, WTO Doc WT/DS27/R (1997) (Report of the Panel), para 164. 
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of interpretation.70 While their language may still be subject to interpretation, like other 
provisions of the covered agreements, the legal effect of using these mechanisms is 
clearer than the legal effect of Ministerial Decisions and Declarations.  
 
Waivers are not an appropriate mechanism to use to deal with the issue of unilateral trade 
measures to protect the extraterritorial environment. Waivers represent a very short-term 
solution because they expire. 71 A longer term solution would be more appropriate to 
address potential conflicts between trade obligations and international environmental 
obligations. The use of a waiver for unilateral measures would indicate that such 
measures are not permitted under Article XX, which would run counter to the Shrimp II 
interpretation of Article XX(g), and thus undermine an interpretation of Article XX that 
is consistent with the doctrine of necessity. In this regard, the use of a waiver could 
present an obstacle to achieving greater coherence between WTO law and customary 
international law. Moreover, unilateral measures are generally not permitted under the 
necessity doctrine unless the situation is urgent and efforts to reach a negotiated solution 
have failed. To require a State to negotiate a waiver in the WTO makes no sense in these 
circumstances. With respect to environmental matters, the appropriate forum for 
negotiations is not the WTO. Rather, environmental negotiations should be conducted on 
                                                
70 Pauwelyn groups these mechanisms as follows: ‘A distinction should be made between treaties or rules 
agreed upon by WTO members (such as amendments pursuant to Article X of the WTO Agreement or 
renegotiations under [GATT and GATS]) and rules set out in acts by WTO organs (such as waivers 
pursuant to Article IX:3…or DSB decisions to suspend concessions. The former…alter WTO covered 
agreements (and hence automatically become part of those agreements). The latter acts…are not strictly 
speaking part of WTO covered agreements. When applying such acts, the WTO judiciary is thus applying 
rules that are not part of WTO covered agreements.’ See Pauwelyn, above n 43, note 194. 
71 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying 
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —Results of the 
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a bilateral, regional or multilateral basis in conformity with the general principles of the 
Rio Declaration and Agenda 21. For these reasons, waivers are not an appropriate 
mechanism for avoiding conflicts between WTO law and international environmental 
law. 
 
C. Authoritative Interpretations 
The WTO Agreement gives the Ministerial Conference and the General Council 
‘exclusive authority to adopt interpretations’ of the WTO Agreement and the Multilateral 
Trade Agreements. 72 With respect to Annex 1 agreements (goods, services and 
intellectual property rights), interpretations must be based on a recommendation of the 
Council overseeing the particular agreement.73 The decision to adopt an interpretation 
must be taken by a three-fourths majority of the Members (though, as noted above, the 
preference is to take decisions by consensus).74 However, this mechanism cannot be used 
in place of the WTO amendment procedures.75 Thus, this procedure may only be used to 
clarify provisions that are otherwise ambiguous, not to create new obligations or 
exceptions. 
 
Dailey advocates an interpretation of Article 3(2) of the DSU to require panels to 
interpret the WTO agreements in accordance with customary rules of public international 
law, rather than simply the customary rules of interpretation of customary international 
                                                                                                                                            
Uruguay Round, 33 ILM 1125 (1994), art IX:4, provides that waivers that do not expire after one year are 
to be reviewed annually to determine whether they should continue in force. 
72 Ibid art IX:2. 
73 Ibid art IX:2. 
74 Ibid art IX:2. 
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law.76 This aspect of Dailey’s proposal is unnecessary. The Vienna Convention already 
permits the customary rules of public international law to be taken into account in treaty 
interpretation. 77 Dailey goes on to argue that sustainable development has become 
accepted as a rule of customary international law. This is a difficult argument to accept 
given the vagueness of the concept.78 Dailey’s version of this ‘principle’ would oblige 
nations to exploit their resources in a manner that is sustainable (a view that is contrary to 
general international law).79  Dailey proposes a WTO interpretation that would require 
panels to take greater account of this formulation of the ‘principle’ of sustainable 
development. However, the Appellate Body has already taken the concept of sustainable 
development into account, though not in the manner proposed by Dailey.80  
                                                                                                                                            
75 Ibid art IX:2. 
76 Virginia Dailey, ‘Sustainable Development: Reevaluating the Trade vs. Turtles Conflict at the WTO’ 
(2000) 9 Transnational Law and Policy 331. 
77 This point is discussed in Chapter 1. Also see Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for 
signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980), art 31(3)(c), Korea—
Measures Affecting Government Procurement , WTO Doc WT/DS163/R (2000) (Report of the Panel), para 
7.96 and Pauwelyn, above n 43, 542-543. 
78 See Philippe Sands, ‘International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development: Emerging Legal 
Principles’ in Lang, above n 21, 54, 58, noting that there is ‘no generally accepted international legal 
definition of sustainable development’.  
79 Dailey, above n 75. State sovereignty gives countries the right to exploit their own resources as they 
wish, a view of international law that is confirmed by the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on 
the Human Environment 5-16 June 1972, UN Doc A/Conf/48/14/Rev.1 and Corr.1 (1973), (1972) 11 ILM 
1416 (Stockholm Declaration), Principle 21 (Stockholm Declaration) and the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, adopted 14 June 1992, Report of the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development 3, Rio de Janeiro 3-14 June 1992, UN GAOR, 47th Sess., 4 UN Doc A/Conf 
151/5/Rev.1 (1992) 31 ILM 874, Principle 2. See Chapter 4. Dailey acknowledges that the scope of the 
principle remains controversial, and adopts the consensus view as to the four core principles of sustainable 
development: intergenerational equity (preserving resources for the benefit of present and future 
generations), sustainable use (exploitation of resources at sustainable levels), equitable use (which takes 
into account the needs of other states), and integration (integrating environmental concerns into economic 
and other decision-making processes). 
80 In United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, 
AB-1998-4 (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body), the Appellate Body referred to the WTO preamble 
reference to sustainable development, contrasting it with the GATT 1947 preamble, in its reasons for 
justifying the American measure as a legitimate natural resource conservation measure under Article 
XX(g). 
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Dailey also advocates an interpretation of the necessity test in Article XX(b) to require 
that less trade restrictive alternatives to trade measures not be accepted as a reason to 
strike down trade measures unless they meet a test of substantially equivalent 
environmental effectiveness. Since several panels have already indicated that multilateral 
efforts are the primary less-trade-restrictive alternative to unilateral trade embargoes, it is 
difficult to see why the least-trade -restrictive principle needs to be re-interpreted to deal 
effectively with MEA trade measures. This proposed interpretation is also unnecessary. 
 
Fletcher advocates the negotiation of an agreement on the interpretation of Article XX 
based on a proposal made by the European Union. 81 The European Union proposal 
included a provision that would explicitly resolve potential conflicts between the WTO 
and MEA trade measures that is similar to NAFTA Article 104 of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement.82 However, the proposal was rejected by both developed and 
developing country members of the WTO. Some nations believed that the existing 
provisions were adequate to resolve any conflicts that might arise, while others feared 
that this would allow developed countr ies to use environmental measures to decrease 
                                                
81 See Charles R Fletcher, ‘Greening World Trade: Reconciling GATT and Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements within the Existing World Trade Regime’ (1996) 5 Journal of Transnational Law and Policy 
341. The EU proposal included the following elements: (1) establishment of measures to ensure the 
effective implementation of measures to protect the environment, including the Basel Convention, the 
Montreal Protocol and CITES; (2) development of an interpretive document for GATT Article XX to set 
out clear criteria on the use of trade measures to enforce multilateral environmental agreements, including 
circumstances under which trade sanctions taken pursuant to a MEA, and applied to a GATT member 
which did not sign the MEA, can go against other GATT obligations; and (3) clarification of the 
circumstances under which the production process methods will qualify as GATT Article XX exceptions. 
82 North American Free Trade Agreement between the Government of Canada, the Government of the 
United Mexican States and the Government of the United States of America, opened for signature 17 
December 1992, 32 ILM 296 (1993) (entered into force 1 January 1994). The European Union proposal 
resembles NAFTA Article 104 insofar as it proposes the inclusion of the same MEAs and implies that 
MEA measures be implemented using the least-trade-restrictive alternative. See EU proposal, ibid. 
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market access.83 Given the differences of opinion among WTO members on whether to 
adopt an authoritative interpretation of this kind, it appears unlikely that consensus could 
be achieved or that sufficient votes could be rallied for such a decision to take place. 
Moreover, seeking to insert a conflicts clause by way of an interpretation, rather than 
incorporating a conflicts clause through the amendment procedure, does not resolve the 
problems that a conflicts clause could cause. 84 
 
The authoritative interpretation mechanism is useful for overruling or confirming judicial 
interpretations where inconsistent judicial decisions create confusion regarding the state 
of the law. This mechanism is also useful to promote coherence between WTO law and 
the general body of international law, by overruling or confirming judicial decisions on 
the WTO application of generally accepted principles of general international law.85 
However, as I showed in Chapters 3 and 4, the decisions of the WTO judiciary in the 
trade and environment area are generally consistent with customary international law. 
The discrepancies that exist between the interpretations in the Tuna cases and the Shrimp 
cases do not need to be resolved through a formal interpretation because the Tuna cases 
were never adopted. Moreover, the task of resolving divergent views of States regarding 
                                                
83 See Wold, above n 37. See also Report of the Committee on Trade and Environment (1996) WT/CTE/1, 
paragraph 176, reproduced in Nordstrom and Vaughan, above n , Annex III.  
84 The problems associated with a conflicts clause were discussed in Chapter 3. 
85 For example, in The United Mexican States v Metalclad Corporation (2001) BCSC 664, the requirement 
to treat foreign investors in accordance with international law was interpreted to exclude the concept of 
transparency, an obligation contained in many treaties, on the grounds that no evidence had been 
introduced to show that the concept of transparency formed part of customary international law. The 
NAFTA Commission subsequently adopted a formal interpretation confirming the court’s interpretation to 
ensure that future arbitration panels would not read a transparency obligation into the min imum standard of 
treatment for foreign investors under NAFTA Chapter 11. See NAFTA – Chapter 11 – Investment, Notes of 
Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions (NAFTA Free Trade Commission, 31 July 2001), 
<www.dfait -maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA -Interpr-e.asp> at 15 October 2001. 
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the content of general principles of international law, such as the principle of non-
intervention, fall outside the jurisdiction of not only the WTO judiciary, but the WTO 
itself.86   
 
At this stage of jurisprudential development, it would be premature to negotiate an 
authoritative interpretation regarding the effect of general international law on the 
interpretation of Article XX in environmental cases. While more research is needed to 
flesh out the relationship between WTO law and other branches of international law, the 
WTO judiciary already takes general international law into account in its interpretations. 
It would be unwise to negotiate an authoritative interpretation that directs the WTO 
judiciary to adopt a particular view of general international law. The WTO is not the 
proper forum in which to seek consensus on the content of general principles of 
international law. Moreover, the divergent views of WTO members on the European 
Union proposal suggest that such negotiations would be futile. 
 
D. Amendments 
There is a precedent for amending GATT Article XX to add new exceptions. GATT 
Article XX(h), allowing measures ‘undertaken in pursuance of obligations under any 
intergovernmental commodity agreement which conforms to criteria submitted…and not 
disapproved…or which itself is so submitted and not so disapproved’, serves as an 
                                                
86 For a customary rule of international law to emerge, there must be universal consent. Since not all States 
are WTO members, it is beyond the capacity of the WTO to establish such consent. As a result, the 
codification of customary international law takes place in the United Nations context (for example, the 
work of the International Law Commission and the International Court of Justice), rather than the WTO. 
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example of the type of amendment that might be inserted in Article XX for MEA trade 
measures. Decisions to amend provisions of the multilateral agreements can be adopted 
through approval either by all members or by a two-thirds majority, depending on the 
nature of the provision concerned. Amendments only take effect for those WTO members 
which accept them. 87 However, in order to maintain the consistency of WTO obligations, 
decisions to amend GATT should be taken by consensus.  
 
Adding a new clause to Article XX that specifically permits trade measures taken 
pursuant to MEAs is problematic. The benefit of adding a clause to Article XX is that the 
clause would clarify that the implementation of MEA trade measures would be subject to 
the tests of the chapeau. 88 However, such a clause would provide evidence that the WTO 
parties intend Article XI and other GATT obligations to apply to MEA trade measures. 
This would forestall an interpretation that Article XI is not intended to apply to MEA 
trade restrictions. Such a clause would invite challenges to MEA trade measures, 
challenges that have not yet occurred.  
 
Moreover, since not all WTO members are parties to every MEA, the legal rights 
provided in a general MEA clause would not be available to all WTO members. This 
                                                                                                                                            
With respect to the emergence of customary rules of international law, see Oscar Schacter, ‘New Custom: 
Power, Opinio Juris and Contrary Practice’ in 21st Century , above n 19, 531. 
87 See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, Final Act 
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —
Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 ILM 1125 (1994), art X and Pauwelyn, above n 43. 
88 This can also be achieved by inserting the language of the chapeau into MEAs. For example, the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change , opened for signature 4 June 1992, (1992) 31 ILM 849 
(entered into force 21 March 1994), art 3.5 provides that ‘measures taken to combat climate change, 
including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a 
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would raise issues regarding the consistency of such a clause with the de jure equality of 
WTO members. As such, it would create divergence, rather than coherence, between 
legal rights under Article XX and the principle of sovereign equality, which underlies 
other GATT and WTO provisions.89 Given existing jurisprudence, no amendment to 
Article XX is necessary to ensure coherence between WTO law, international 
environmental law and general international law in the treatment of MEA and unilateral 
measures. The argument that greater clarity is needed, while appropriate for certain 
classes of legal rights, does not support the amendment of Article XX to address MEA or 
unilateral trade measures.90 Moreover, in the current WTO climate where members have 
difficulty reaching agreement on issues that divide developed and developing country 
members, it would be difficult to achieve an agreement regarding unilateral measures or 
MEA measures that are applied to third parties. Indeed, the fact that the WTO members 
left these issues out of the MEA negotiating mandate in the Doha Round is a sign of their 
lack of agreement. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
disguised restriction on international trade’, which mirrors the language in the chapeau of GATT Article 
XX. 
89 The principle of sovereign equality finds at least four applications in WTO law: the WTO principle of 
nondiscriminatio n; the WTO practice of decision making by consensus;   dispute settlement; and 
preferential treatment. The implicit purpose of all four manifestations of sovereign equality is to ensure 
equal access to WTO rights. See discussion in Chapter 4. 
90 For example, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights , 15 April 1994, 
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal 
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 1C, 33 ILM 1197 (1994) (‘TRIPS’), art 31 required 
amendment because inequality of access to the right to use compulsory licensing could not be resolved with 
the necessary clarity by leaving the matter to judicial interpretation. Certainty regarding the right to issue 
compulsory licenses was necessary to provide equality of bargaining power between national governments 
that lacked pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity and the private sector. Because the language of Article 
31 was too specific to interpret away the problem, it had to be amended. The context of Article XX (general 
exceptions that serve a constitutional function) is very different from TRIPS Article 31 (a specific 
exception to a specific set of obligations in the narrow field of patents). See the discussion of the TRIPS 
amendment, above n 19. 
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In order to fulfil its ‘constitutional’ function, Article XX requires broad language that is 
capable of flexible interpretations in a variety of situations. The addition to Article XX of 
a clause for MEA measures would introduce an element of inflexibility with respect to 
the allocation of decision-making authority over environmental issues between the WTO 
and national governments. The role of Article XX in promoting consistency between 
WTO law and the evolving principles of general international law requires flexible 
language that supports an evolutionary approach to interpretation.  In contrast, the role of 
a conflicts clause is to resolve conflicts where it is not possible to interpret away the 
inconsistencies. Thus, more specific language in Article XX would increase the need for 
a conflicts clause by limiting opportunities to develop consistency. 
 
At present, none of the WTO legislative mechanisms provides an appropriate method for 
resolving the ambiguity of Article XX in a manner that would promote consistency or 
avoid conflicts between GATT, international environmental law and general international 
law. The uncertain legal effect of Ministerial Declarations and Decisions could increase 
the ambiguity. Waivers have a clear legal effect, but would undermine the development 
of judicial interpretations of Article XX that are consistent with non-WTO rules of 
international law. Waivers would provide only short-term solutions that could create 
obstacles to achieving greater coherence between WTO law and other branches of 
international law. Given current jurisprudence on Article XX and the current difficulty 
WTO members have reaching agreements, it would be unnecessary and fruitless to 
engage in negotiations to adopt authoritative interpretations or amendments that would 
reduce the flexibility of the judiciary to use evolutionary interpretations of Article XX to 
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resolve the complex legal issues that are at stake. The WTO dispute resolution process 
provides the best mecha nism for developing further coherence between GATT, 
international environmental law and general international law.91 Like democracy, the 
judicial development of law is imperfect, but it represents the best available alternative to 
develop coherence between different branches of international law. However, 
authoritative interpretations provide a useful mechanism for judicial decisions that 
diverge from this path, should the need arise in the future. 
 
IV. The Standard of Review and Judicial Deference 
Having advocated the path of judicial development of law, it is important to establish the 
parameters within which these developments take place. The judicial branch of the WTO 
cannot legislate. Rather, the task of the judiciary is to clarify the rights and obligations 
that have been created by the legislative branch of the WTO. For this reason, it is 
necessary to maintain a degree of ambiguity in the language of Article XX. The broad 
language of Article XX also facilitates the flexible division of legislative authority 
between the WTO and national governments, a task that must take into account the 
principle of sovereign equality.  
 
The standard of review that WTO panels apply under Article XX has a direct impact on 
the allocation of decision-making authority between the national governments and 
international organizations. Two key issues regarding the standard of review to be 
applied by WTO panels is the degree of deference panels should show to the decisions of 
                                                
91 I recognize that my training in common law may bias my perspective on the benefits of the judicial 
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national governments and to the decisions of other international bodies, including the 
WTO legislative branch itself.  
 
With respect to deference to national governments, the DSU contains no explicit standard 
of review. 92 However, Article 3(2) incorporates the customary rules of public 
international law, which generally extend a high measure of deference to the right of 
domestic authorities to regulate matters within their own borders.93 The point that WTO 
panels and the Appellate Body ‘cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations 
provided in the covered agreements’ is emphasized by repetition in DSU Articles 3(2) 
and 19(2).94 This standard of review shows considerable deference to the decision-
making authority of the members as a group.95  
 
                                                                                                                                            
development of law. 
92 However, art 17(6) of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994 , 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 1A, 33 ILM 
1197 (1994) sets out a standard of review that applies only in antidumping cases. The Decision on review of 
Article 17.6 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 1994  requires a review of this standard after three years to consider whether it is capable of general 
application. For a discussion of these provisions and their negotiating history, see Jackson, Jurisprudence, 
above n 3. In the context of Article 17.6, he raises the question of the type of ambiguity required in a  
provision to permit different interpretations and thus trigger a panel’s deference (at 144), arguing that the 
application of the rules of interpretation in Vienna Convention arts 31 and 32 should eliminate ambiguity. 
93 In The United Mexican States v Metalclad Corporation (2001) BCSC 664, 23, the court stated that the 
standard of review must take into account ‘the high measure of deference that international law generally 
extends to the right of domestic authorities to regulate matters within their own borders’. 
94 In addition, Appellate Body reviews of panel decisions are limited to ‘issues of law covered in the panel 
report and legal interpretations developed by the panel.’ (DSU Article 17(6)). As noted by Jackson, this 
presents the difficulty of distinguishing between questions of law and questions of fact. See Steven P 
Croley and John H Jackson, ‘WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review, and Deference to National 
Governments’ (1996) 90 American Journal of International Law, 193. 
95 Jackson sees the allocation of power between the WTO members and panels as analogous to the 
allocation of power between the United States Congress and the specialized agencies of the United States 
executive set up to interpret and apply the laws passed by Congress, a distribution of power that rests in 
part on the standard of review United States courts apply to the decisions of those agencies. See Jackson, 
Jurisprudence, above n 3, 151. 
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The DSU cautions members that, ‘Before bringing a case, a Member shall exercise its 
judgement as to whether action under these procedures would be fruitful’96  and notes 
DSU provisions ‘are without prejudice to the rights of Members to seek authoritative 
interpretation of provisions of a covered agreement through decision-making under the 
WTO agreement….’97 These provisions imply responsibility on the part of WTO parties 
to recognize the limits to the jurisdiction of WTO panels, both in terms of their inability 
to legislate and in terms of the parameters of their legal jurisdiction. That is, the parties 
must make choices regarding the issues they raise and their choice of judicial forum.  
 
The issue of standard of review and deference to national governments has arisen in 
many cases involving trade remedy laws, but a discuss ion of the standard as it is used in 
those cases is beyond the scope of this thesis.98 Moreover, the argument that reviewing 
courts should show deference to specialized administrative agencies based on the 
relatively greater technical expertise of the latter does not apply to the trade specialists 
sitting as WTO panel members.99 Jackson argues persuasively that the standard of review 
applied in judicial review of administrative action in a domestic context is not necessarily 
appropriate in the WTO context: 
                                                
96 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 15 April 1994, Final Act 
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —
Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 2, 33 ILM 1197 (1994), art 3(7). 
97 Ibid art 3(9). 
98 Jackson lists the following cases where the issue of deference has been raised: United States—Section 
337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, BISD, 36th Supp (1990), 345; Korea—Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of 
Polyacetal Resins from the United States , GATT Doc ADP/92 (1993), paras 208-213; United States—Taxes 
on Automobiles, GATT Doc DS31/R (1994), paras 5.11-5.15; and United States—Imposition of 
Countervailing Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway, GATT Doc ADP/8 
(1992), paras. 43 -67. See Jackson, Jurisprudence, above n 3.  
99 Jackson, Jurisprudence, above n 3, 154. 
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The observation that national authorities, unlike agencies, are not accountable to the [WTO] 
membership at large speaks to the very purpose of the dispute settlement process, indeed the 
GATT/WTO Agreement itself – an agreement that, at bottom, seeks to overcome the significant 
coordination or collective-action problems that its membership otherwise faces. Absent the 
Agreement (or one like it), individual members have an incentive to erect trade barriers that may 
‘benefit’ them individually, to the greater detriment of other members. Furthermore, absent some 
dispute settlement process for keeping members faithful to the Agreement, members have similar 
incentives to apply the Agreement in ways ‘advantageous’ to them. Further still, absent a standard 
of review for legal questions that prohibits self-serving interpretations of the Agreement that are 
arguably but not persuasively faithful to the text, members have an incentive to erode the 
agreement through interpretation.100 
 
Jackson argues that ‘effective international cooperation depends in part on the 
willingness of sovereign states to constrain themselves by relinquishing to international 
tribunals at least minimum power to interpret treaties and articulate international 
obligations’.101 However Jackson also notes ‘the need for some deference to national 
government decisions…[to] lessen the dangers of inappropriate unilateral reactions by 
governments and citizen constituencies of nation-state members of the WTO’.102 Jackson 
argues that the appropriate standard will vary with the subject matter and adds that: 
panels should keep the relevant purposes, strengths and limitations of their institution in 
mind….At times…governments can justifiably argue that an appropriate allocation of power 
should tilt in favor of the national governments that are closest to the constituencies most affected 
by a given decision. 103 
 
This argument in favour of deference to national governments certainly applies to 
environmental problems that are contained within national borders. A similar argument 
can be made that WTO panels should show deference to multilateral environmental 
organizations with respect to transnational or global problems. In chapter 2, I argued that 
the former are the subject matter of Article XX(b), while the latter are the subject matter 
                                                
100 Ibid 156. 
101 Ibid 158. 
102 Ibid 160. 
103 Ibid 160. 
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of Article XX(g). Thus, the degree of deference due to national governments will differ in 
the two subparagraphs, just as they do in these two contexts. 
 
In the environmental context, several panels have made statements that are relevant to the  
standard of review. In Tuna II, the GATT panel discussed this issue in the context of 
Article XX: 
The reasonableness inherent in the interpretation of ‘necessary’ was not a test of what was 
reasonable for a government to do, but of what a reasonable government would or could do. In this 
way, the panel did not substitute its judgement for that of the government. The test of 
reasonableness was very close to the good faith criterion in international law. Such a standard, in 
different forms, was also applied in the administrative law of many contracting parties, including 
the EEC and its member states, and the United States. It was a standard of review of government 
actions which did not lead to a wholesale second guessing of such actions.104   
 
This standard of review is questionable, in that it is based on the standard used in judicial 
review of administrative agencies. It may be appropriate in the context of Article XX(b) 
measures aimed at domestic environmental problems to show this degree of deference to 
national governments. However, panels should be less deferential to national 
governments in the context of Article XX(g), where transnational or global 
environmental problems are at issue. The panel must not only consider the rights of the 
country enacting the measure, but also the rights of the other WTO parties, both under 
WTO agreements and with respect to general international law. The correct balance can 
not be achieved if the panel employs a standard of review that is too deferential to the 
national government enacting the measure. 
 
                                                
104 United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc DS29/R (1994) 33 ILM 839 (Report by the 
Panel not Adopted), para 373. 
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In the Hormones case, the Appellate Body made a more concrete statement of standard of 
review that specifically addressed the division of jurisdiction between the WTO 
legislative and judicial branches, in the context of the Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures : 
The standard of review appropriately applicable in proceedings under the SPS Agreement, of 
course, must reflect the balance established in that Agreement between the jurisdictional 
competences conceded by the Members to the WTO and the jurisdictional competences retained 
by the Members for themselves. To adopt a standard of review not clearly rooted in the text of the 
SPS Agreement itself, may well amount to changing that finely drawn balance; and neither a panel 
nor the Appellate Body is authorized to do that.105 
 ... 
In our view, Article 11 of the DSU bears directly on this matter and, in effect, articulates with 
great succinctness but with sufficient clarity the appropriate standard of review for panels in 
respect of both the ascertainment of facts and the legal characterization of such facts under the 
relevant agreements.106  
 ... 
In so far as legal questions are concerned …Article 11 of the DSU is directly on point, requiring a 
panel to ‘make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment 
of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered 
agreements...’.107  
 
Since the interests protected by national sanitary and phytosanitary measures lie within 
the territorial jurisdiction of the enacting country, it is appropriate to show a higher 
degree of deference in the context of this agreement than for unilateral measures that 
have extraterritorial reach. 
 
In Hormones, the Appellate Body also made a general statement regarding the division of 
decision-making authority between national governments and the WTO: 
We cannot lightly assume that sovereign states intended to impose upon themselves the more 
onerous, rather than the less burdensome obligation by mandating conformity or compliance with 
such standards, guidelines and recommendations. To sustain such an assumption and to warrant 
                                                
105 European Communities—Measures Affecting Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WTO Doc 
WT/DS26-DS48/AB/R, (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body), para 115. 
106 Ibid para 116. 
107 Ibid para 118. 
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such a far-reaching interpretation, treaty language far more specific and compelling than that 
found in Article 3 of the SPS Agreement would be necessary.108  
 
The specificity of WTO obligations is thus relevant to determining the allocation of 
decision-making authority between national governments and the WTO. 
 
Jackson argues that greater deference to national governments in the environmental 
policy area means that ‘the treaty word ‘necessary’ in text like that of GATT Article 
XX…may need to be interpreted to recognize that governments should be authorized to 
have some choice among several government measures (not mandated to choose, e.g., the 
‘least restrictive’ measure), as long as the choice does not unduly detract from the basic 
broader goals of the treaty.’109 I agree that a greater degree of deference is due to national 
governments in the context of XX(b), but because the subject matter of Article XX(b) lies 
within the national territory. Deference is due for national government decisions 
regarding the environment inside their territory. However, the need for deference to 
international environmental agreements and institutions regarding transboundary 
environmental protection requires less deference to national governments that act 
unilaterally.  
 
In Reformulated Gasoline, the Appellate Body made a more general statement regarding 
the degree of deference due to WTO members in the environmental field: 
                                                
108 Ibid para 165. 
109 Jackson, Jurisprudence, above n 3, 159, note 71. 
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WTO Members have a large measure of autonomy to determine their own policies on the 
environment (including its relationship with trade), their environmental objectives and the 
environmental legislation they enact and implement.110 
 
It is difficult to take issue with such a general statement. It could be read as referring not 
only to the unilateral determination of national environmental policies, but also the 
multilateral determination of transnational and global environmental policies in the 
context of MEAs and the multilateral determination of the relationship between WTO 
law and international environmental law by the legislative branch of the WTO.  
 
The standard of review can not be the same in all cases; nor can the degree of deference 
WTO panels accord to national governments, the WTO legislative branch and decisions 
made in other international fora. The deference shown to national governments must vary 
with the proximity of interest between the national government and the environmental 
problem. The degree of deference due to the WTO legislative branch depends on the 
specificity of the provisions under consideration. The deference to decisions made in 
other international fora will vary depending on the subject (for example, the context of 
general international law is beyond the jurisdiction of the WTO judiciary) and the WTO 
members that are parties to any relevant treaties (for example, greater deference is due in 
the case of MEAs that have been entered into force for all of the parties to the dispute). 
There are thus many factors that must be taken into consideration in determining the 
parameters of judicial deference in environmental cases. 
 
                                                
110 United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc WT/DS2/AB/R, 
AB-1996-1 (1996) (Report of the Appellate Body), 30. 
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V. The Legal Effect of Panel Reports  
 
Having advocated the path of judicial development of law, I must also consider the legal 
effect of panel reports.  
 
In the context of GATT 1947, Jackson argued that where a panel report is adopted and 
results in the disputing parties conforming their practice to the conclusions and findings 
of the report, this provides evidence of practice establishing agreement regarding 
interpretation under the Vienna Convention.111 Where later panels follow prior panel 
interpretations on the same issue, this provides further evidence of practice. However, the 
difficult issue to resolve is what constitutes sufficient practice under the Vienna 
Convention.112  
 
Jackson also argued that the Council adoption of a panel report under GATT 1947 could 
be viewed as the equivalent of a resolution or decision by the Contracting Parties 
definitively interpreting the GATT, but doubted that this was the intention of adoption. 
Jackson notes that the practice of GATT parties was to treat adopted panel reports as 
binding on the parties, but not unadopted reports. The changes to WTO decision-making 
procedures introduced in the Uruguay Round do not state the legal effect of a panel 
                                                
111 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 
(entered into force 27 January 1980), art 31(3)(b). In Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO Doc 
WT/DS8/10/11/ /R (1996) (Report of the Panel), the Panel found that panel reports adopted by the 
Contracting Parties constitute subsequent practice in a specific case. 
112 Jackson, Jurisprudence, above n 3, 129.  
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report, but nevertheless indicate that the panel decisions are binding on the parties.113 The 
introduction of formal mechanisms for interpretation and amendment under WTO, 
combined with automatic adoption of panel and Appellate Body reports, will likely affect 
the legal impact of panel interpretations in terms of constituting practice under the Vienna 
Convention.114 
 
The Appellate Body indirectly addressed the issue of the legal effect of its rulings in 
Shrimp I, chastising the panel for not following the analytical sequence established by the 
Appellate Body in the Gasoline case: 
[W]e enunciated the appropriate method for applying Article XX….[T]he analysis of a claim of 
justification under Article XX reflects, not inadvertence or random choice, but rather the 
fundamental structure and logic of Article XX. The Panel appears to suggest, albeit indirectly, that 
following the indicated sequence of steps, or the inverse thereof, does not make any difference. To 
the Panel, reversing the sequence…‘seems equally appropriate’. We do not agree.115 
 
In Shrimp II, the Appellate Body reaffirmed its view of the legal effect of panel and 
Appellate Body reports that it had expressed in Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages: 
The reasoning in our Report in United States – Shrimp on which the Panel relied was not dicta; it 
was essential to our ruling. The Panel was right to use it, and right to rely on it….The Panel had, 
necessarily, to consider our views on this subject, as we…had provided interpretative guidance for 
future panels, such as the Panel in this case. 
… 
[I]n Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages , we stated that: 
Adopted panel reports are an important part of the GATT acquis. They are often considered by 
subsequent panels. They create legitimate expectations among WTO Members, and, therefore, 
should be taken into account where they are relevant to any dispute. 
 
                                                
113 See ibid 165. The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes , 15 
April 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 
Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 2, 33 ILM 1197 (1994) provides further that, 
‘the first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures 
concerned if these are found to be inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered agreements’ (art 
3(7)) and ‘prompt compliance with recommendations or rulings of the DSB is essential….’ (art 21(1)). 
114 See Jackson, Jurisprudence, above n 3, 168. 
115 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc WT/DS/AB/R, 
AB-1998-4 (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body), paras 118-119. 
 295 
This reasoning applies to adopted Appellate Body Reports as well.116 
 
A panel ruling does not provide an ‘authoritative interpretation’ of a provision. While 
dispute panels are authorized to ‘clarify’ provisions by applying the rules of interpretation 
of the Vienna Convention,117 interpretations by panels are not the same as interpretations 
under the WTO Agreement. DSU Article 3(9) makes a distinction between the provisions 
of the DSU and ‘the rights of Members to seek authoritative interpretation of 
provisions…through decision-making under the WTO Agreement’. The WTO Agreement 
gives the Ministerial Conference and the General Council ‘exclusive authority to adopt 
interpretations’ of the WTO Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements. 118 
Whereas a panel interpretation only binds the parties to the dispute and does not have the 
effect of stare decisis, an ‘authoritative interpretation’ would be binding on all members 
in future disputes. Thus, the two avenues of interpretation have distinct legal effects.  
 
Moreover, the ability of panels to provide innovative interpretations of substantive 
obligations is limited by DSU Article 3(5) and 3(8). A panel ruling must ‘not nullify or 
                                                
116 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 by 
Malaysia, WTO Doc WT/DS58/AB/RW (2001) (Report of the Appellate Body), paras 107-109, citing 
Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO Doc WT/DS8/10/11/AB/R (1996) (Report of the Appellate 
Body), 108. Regarding unadopted panel reports, the Appellate Body agreed with the panel in the same case 
that, ‘a panel could nevertheless find useful guidance in the reasoning of an unadopted panel report that it 
considered to be relevant’, at 15. 
117 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes , 15 April 1994, Final 
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments—
Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 2, 33 ILM 1197 (1994), art 3(2). 
118 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization , 15 April 1994, Final Act 
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —
Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 ILM 1125 (1994), art IX:2. 
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impair benefits accruing to any Member’.119 An infringement of obligations ‘is 
considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment’.120 Read 
together, these provisions restrict the ability of panels to interpret GATT Article XI as not 
applying to trade restrictions imposed under MEAs, since such an interpretation would 
impair the market access provided under Article XI and thus run counter to DSU Article 
3(5). Such an interpretation of Article XI would affect WTO members whether or not 
they were signatories to the MEA. Thus, a panel would not be in a position to make such 
an interpretation of GATT Article XI. Such an interpretation of Article XI could only be 
made by the Ministerial Conference or the General Council, through the decision-making 
procedure of the WTO Agreement. 
 
However, a panel may interpret and apply GATT Article XX(g) so as to permit the use of 
MEA trade restrictions between WTO members who are parties to the MEA on the basis 
that the parties themselves had already agreed to the restrictions. The ruling would not be 
the source of the restriction, but rather the parties themselves.121 Moreover, DSU Article 
3(8) presumes that the infringement of obligations constitutes nullification or 
impairment, but allows the presumption to be rebutted, under exceptions to the 
obligations such as those contained in Article XX. While DSU Article 3(5) prohibits 
rulings that nullify or impair benefits’, it also prohibits rulings that ‘impede the 
attainment of any objective of those agreements’. Since the WTO preamble sets out 
                                                
119 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes , 15 April 1994, Final 
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments—
Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 2, 33 ILM 1197 (19 94), art 3(5). 
120 Ibid art 3(8). This provision may be viewed as a codification of a GATT panel ruling. However, the fact 
of the codification does not counteract the arguments being made here.  
 297 
sustainable development and environmental protection as objectives, along with trade 
liberalization, and Article XX serves the role of ba lancing these potentially competing 
objectives, DSU Article 3(5) cannot be read to prohibit such an interpretation of Article 
XX. 
 
The Shrimp decisions indicate the openness of the Appellate Body to considering MEAs 
in its interpretation of the GATT.122 Indeed, it was the reference to such agreements in 
the Decision on Trade and Environment that seems to have encouraged the Appellate 
Body to consider the provisions of MEAs in reaching its decisions. However, a MEA (or 
other agreement between parties to a dispute) need not be mentioned in a WTO 
agreement to be considered by a dispute panel. Panels are required to address ‘the 
relevant provisions in any covered agreement or agreements cited by the parties to the 
dispute’. 123 
 
Panel reports are adopted by the DSB,124 unless there is consensus not to adopt the 
report125 – a condition that is met if no member present at the meeting of the DSB 
                                                                                                                                            
121 Pauwelyn also makes this point. See Pauwelyn, above n 43, 566. 
122 The Appellate Body reviewed provisions of the following MEAs to support its argument in favour of 
multilateral solutions to resolve transboundary enviromental issues: Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, adopted 14 June 1992, Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development 3, Rio de Janeiro 3-14 June 1992, UN GAOR, 47th Sess., 4 UN Doc A/Conf 151/5/Rev.1 
(1992) 31 ILM 874, Agenda 21, Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development 9, Rio de Janeiro 3-14 June 1992, UN Doc A/Conf.151/26/Rev.1, Convention on Biological 
Diversity, opened for signature 5 June 1992, UNEP/bio.Div./CONF/L.2, 31 ILM 818 (1992) (entered into 
force 29 December 1993), Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals and the 
Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles, opened for signature 1 
December 1996, 37 ILM 1246.  
123 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes , 15 April 1994, Final 
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments—
Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 2, 33 ILM 1197 (1994), art 7:2. 
124 Ibid art 2(1). 
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formally objects to the decision not to adopt the report.126 While the DSB consists of the 
General Council wearing a different hat127, the adoption of panel reports by the DSB 
cannot be viewed as raising the status of a panel’s interpretation to the same level as an 
authoritative interpretation of the General Council. Such a view would render 
meaningless the provisions that distinguish between panel interpretations and 
authoritative interpretations and that set up distinct procedures for deciding the two types 
of interpretation. 
 
The scope of panel rulings are limited to ‘achieving a satisfactory settlement of the 
matter’128 and ‘cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations’129 of WTO members.  
In sum, authoritative interpretations under the WTO Agreement can be more intrusive 
than panel interpretations with respect to the rights of the WTO members.  
 
The Statute of the International Court of Justice sets out a hierarchy130 of sources of 
international law, in Article 38(1): 
The Court, whose function it is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are 
submitted to it, shall apply: 
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting States; 
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted by law; 
                                                                                                                                            
125 Ibid art 16(4). 
126 Ibid art 2(4), and footnote 1. 
127 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization , 15 April 1994, Final Act 
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —
Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 ILM 1125 (1994), art IV:3. 
128 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes , 15 April 1994, Final 
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments—
Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 2, 33 ILM 1197 (1994), art 3(4). 
129 Ibid art 3(2). 
130 There is growing agreement among legal scholars that the order in which these sources are listed 
indicates the importance to be accorded to each. Thus, the opinions of publicists would be secondary to 
judicial decisions in this hierarchy. See J Starke, Introduction to International Law  (5th ed, 1963), 52. 
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the general principles of law recognized by civilised nations; 
(c) subject to the provisions of Article 59131, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of 
rules of law.132 
 
This provision is not directly applicable to the legal effect of different avenues of 
decision making in the WTO context  However, it is consistent with the view that the 
rulings of the WTO judiciary, while an important part of WTO law, rank below the 
provisions of international agreements (which includes WTO agreements and MEAs) and 
customary international law. Maintaining broad, ambiguous language in GATT Article 
XX facilitates the role of the WTO judiciary in developing a body of jurisprudence that 
reconciles inconsistencies between these various sources of law as each evolves. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
The use of trade measures to address environmental concerns can be addressed at several 
different points in GATT. Where such measures do not violate national treatment or 
MFN obligations, either because they do not discriminate or because they apply different 
measures to distinguishable products, there may be no need to justify them under Article 
XX. However, where such measures take the form of import or export restrictions, they 
fail to meet the obligations set out in Article XI and have to be justified under Article 
XX. 
                                                
131 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art 59 states: ‘The decision of the Court has no binding 
force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.’  
132 Cahier argues that this provision should be interpreted to accord greater weight to judicial decisions 
than to publicists. However, he notes that, in theory, judicial decisions are not really a source of law, 
though they are treated as such in practice. See Philippe Cahier, ‘Le role du juge dans l’élaboration du droit 
international’ in 21st Century, above n 19, 353.  ‘La tache du juge est d’appliquer le droit existant et non de 
le créer….Telle est la téorie, mais la réalité est beaucoup plus complexe….’ 
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Arguing that Article XX should remain ambiguous is counter-intuitive. The task of the 
DSB is to clarify the provisions of WTO agreements in accordance with the customary 
rules of interpretation of public international law. 133 However, ambiguity facilitates an 
evolutionary interpretation of Article XX that takes developments in scientific knowledge 
and other branches of international law into account. The customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law amplify the range of interpretative methods that 
may be employed when the meaning of a provision is ambiguous.134 Ambiguity permits 
Article XX to be used to promote greater coherence between WTO law and other 
branches of international law. Ambiguity also leaves the WTO judiciary with more room 
to fill in the gaps left by the WTO legislative branch at a time when the members have 
difficulty reaching agreement. However, these arguments in favour of ambiguity in 
Article XX do not apply across the board—the appropriate degree of ambiguity depends 
on the function of a particular provision. 135 
 
While it is clear that Articles XX(b) and (g) cover environmental trade measures, what 
remains unclear is the division of subject matter between these two headings. Where a 
measure does not clearly fit into one or the other, then the subject matter should be 
                                                
133 DSU art 3(2). 
134 Vienna Convention art 32(a) provides that ‘[r]ecourse may be had to supplementary means of 
interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order 
to confirm the meaning when the interpretation according to Article 31 leaves the meaning ambiguous or 
obscure’. 
135 A good example is the right to issue compulsory licenses for patents in TRIPS. The ambiguity 
surrounding the manner in which countries that lack pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity could exercise 
this right created legal uncertainty that prevented countries from taking action to address serious health 
crises such as the HIV/AIDS epidemic. An agreement to amend TRIPS was needed to eliminate legal 
uncertainty in order to overcome the political inaction that resulted from the threat of legal action. 
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assigned based on the location of the environmental concern, with domestic concerns 
dealt with under XX(b) and transnational or global concerns dealt with under XX(g). This 
interpretation of Article XX—based on a doctrine of proximity of interest—is generally 
consistent with the case law, avoids redundant interpretations of the two subparagraphs, 
and is consistent with customary international law regarding the jurisdictional nexus 
required to invoke necessity. Article XX(b) and (g) leaves WTO members free to choose 
their environmental policies. However, once it is determined that the policy falls within 
the subject matter of one of these subparagraphs, the tests of the chapeau will determine 
whether the implementation of the policy goal is consistent with GATT. 
 
Under the Article XX exceptions, the burden of proving that a measure qualifies for 
justification is on the country enacting the measure. To demonstrate that a trade 
restriction is necessary to achieve its stated environmental goal, an importing nation must 
prove that it is the least-trade -restrictive measure reasonably available to achieve the 
policy goal. While this test has not been applied by WTO panels in Article XX(g) to 
determine whether a measure ‘relates to’ conservation, in practice it has been applied 
under the chapeau. Since many aspects of the least-trade-restrictive test ultimately turn on 
the range of choices available to implement a particular policy goal, considerations 
related to this test are best placed in the chapeau analysis. 
 
While Article XX has to be applied on a case-by-case basis, the body of cases to date 
provide a basis for summarizing the types of factors that are relevant to the analysis of the 
manner in which a policy goal is implemented. First, compliance with the measure must 
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be possible. The measure must therefore be clear as to what constitutes compliance. This 
may be viewed as an aspect of transparency. Second, there should be international 
consensus that trade restrictions are the most effective means available to achieve the 
measure’s environmental goal.  At the very least, there should be no international 
consensus that the trade restrictions are unnecessary. Third, where international 
cooperation is possible, genuine efforts to resolve the problem through international 
cooperation should have failed. Fourth, the measure must address a problem connected 
with the environment of the territory of the country enacting the measure. A measure is 
unlikely to qualify for justification under Article XX if it addresses a problem that does 
not affect the importing nation. Nor will it qualify if it purports to address a domestic 
problem, but does nothing to restrict domestic activities that are a cause of the problem.  
 
In principle, the analysis under the chapeau should be the same whether the measure has 
been provisionally justified under Article XX(b) or (g). In practice, however, the facts of 
each case must dictate the appropriate factors to consider in  a given situation. When an 
importing country uses trade restrictions to induce a change in the laws of another 
country, the importing country may have to take differences between countries into 
account. This factor might not come into play where the aim is only to protect the 
domestic environment of the importer.  
 
With respect to their parties, MEAs fulfil the key requirements that were imposed on the 
unilateral measure in the Shrimp case. Most MEAs can be characterized as addressing 
transboundary or global resource conservation. Where a country does not have a 
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territorial nexus with the environmental problem, the MEA provides a legal nexus and 
may provide evidence that the subject matter is global, if not transnational. MEAs thus 
provide the jurisdictiona l nexus and cover subject matter that qualifies MEA trade 
measures for provisional justification under Article XX(g). The conclusion of the MEA 
fulfils the duty to negotiate. However, the fulfilment of the requirement for flexible and 
transparent application of the measure can not be assumed with respect to the 
implementation of MEA obligations in national law. MEA trade measures must therefore 
remain subject to WTO scrutiny under the chapeau analysis. 
 
The general conclusion that can be drawn from WTO jurisprudence is that trade measures 
taken pursuant to MEAs would be consistent with GATT if implemented in a non-
discriminatory and transparent manner between parties the MEA. However, WTO 
jurisprudence regarding unilateral measures does not apply to resources that are located 
entirely outside the jurisdiction of the importing country and some MEAs, notably 
CITES, require such ‘extraterritorial’ measures. However, the existence of a MEA that 
has been accepted by at least all of the WTO members that are parties to a dispute may be 
sufficient to categorize an environmental issue as global, rather than extraterritorial, thus 
providing a sufficient jurisdictional nexus in customary international law. With respect to 
international environmental law, both the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 indicate that 
multilateral agreement can justify the use of trade measures with respect to otherwise 
extraterritorial environmental problems. Thus, the MEA categorizes a problem as global 
or transnational and provides the necessary jurisdictional nexus. On this view, the 
jurisdictional nexus would be legal rather than territorial. 
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Where WTO parties agree in a MEA that trade restrictions may be employed to pursue 
specific environmental objectives, it is reasonable to assume that they intend the MEA 
obligations to prevail over the general prohibition of GATT Article XI. With respect to 
the implementation of MEA obligations, it is reasonable to assume that WTO parties 
intend MEA trade measures to remain subject to the Article XX chapeau requirements in 
order to prevent abuse. The implementation of MEA trade measures thus remain subject 
to the least-trade-restrictive test.  
 
The application of MEA trade measures to third parties and the use of unilateral trade 
measures in the international environmental context are more controversial than MEA 
measures taken among parties. MEA trade measures applied against non-parties are 
analogous to the type of unilateral measure the United States applied against Malaysia in 
Shrimp II. Thus, they could be justified under Article XX(g) in the same fashion where 
they address transboundary or global environmental concerns. However, if they are 
aimed at extraterritorial environmental concerns, it is difficult to see how they could 
comply with customary international law or international environmental law. As a result, 
they would not be justifiable under any GATT interpretation that is consistent with these 
other branches of international law. However, if the subject matter and degree of global 
acceptance of the MEA permits the problem to be characterized as global, rather than 
extraterritorial, the measure could be justified under Article XX(g) as addressing a global 
issue. 
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A conflicts clause provides one method of clarifying the relationship between MEAs and 
trade obligations. However, it is not the best way to resolve this question in the WTO 
context. The conflicts clause is a less flexible approach than leaving panels to apply the 
broad language of Article XX on a case-by-case basis. The conflicts clause requires 
negotiation each time a new MEA or international environmental issue arises, whereas 
the language of Article XX is sufficiently broad to obviate the need for ongoing 
negotiation. Moreover, a conflicts clause may close off options to take unilateral actions 
in situations of urgency that are consistent with customary international law and 
international environmental law. The size and diversity of the WTO membership, 
together with the increasing difficulty of achieving consensus among the members, would 
make it difficult to make a conflicts clause work in practice. A conflicts clause leaves 
insufficient flexibility to maintain consistency among the different branches of 
international law as they evolve. 
 
To meet the requirements of the Shrimp  case, the implementing country must have a 
jurisdictional nexus to apply unilateral measures or MEA trade restrictions against third 
parties. To invoke the doctrine of necessity in customary international law, a 
jurisdictional nexus is required to establish that the environmental problem affects the 
‘essential interests’ of the importing country. The analysis of the necessity principle 
should take place in the chapeau, where it can be applied in a uniform manner to 
measures under both Articles XX(b) and (g).  
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In the context of Article XX(g), the principles of sovereign equality and extraterritoriality 
limits the range of permissible policies. The factors that the Appellate Body considered in 
permitting the unilateral measure in Shrimp II are not inconsistent with international 
environmental law or general international law. However, interpreting Article XX(g) as 
providing a right to use unilateral trade measures to address transboundary or global 
environmental problems is inconsistent with the customary rule of international law 
regarding the jurisdictional nexus that is required for a State to regulate, the principle of 
sovereign equality, and differential treatment of least-developed and developing countries 
in WTO law. 
 
International law is not entirely clear regarding the legality of unilateral trade measures 
aimed at changing the internal law of another State or inducing acceptance of MEA 
obligations. The inconsistency of economic coercion with the principle of non-
intervention has not been established as a customary rule of international law. 
Nevertheless, the intended purpose of such measures is clearly to intervene in the internal 
affairs of the targeted State. Moreover, such measures can not be considered consistent 
with the principle of non-intervention, given the divergence in the views of States on the 
issue. Thus, such measures violate the spirit, but not the letter of the law. 
 
In the WTO context, unilateral measures may be viewed as a legitimate exercise of the 
sovereign right of States to control the entry of products into their territory with respect to 
the policy areas covered in Article XX. When economic coercion is used to induce 
acceptance of MEA obligations, those obligations do not become void. Nevertheless, 
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when MEA obligations are accepted under duress their legitimacy and effectiveness are 
undermined. If trade and environmental obligations are to be mutually supportive, then 
economic coercion can not be considered acceptable in the WTO. 
 
Even if the illegality of such measures is uncertain in the context of general international 
law, they may be found inconsistent with WTO law. Regardless of whether economic 
coercion violates customary international legal obligations, unilateral import bans violate 
the legal obligations of GATT Article XI. Since the pr inciple of non-discrimination may 
be viewed as a concrete expression of the principle of sovereign equality, indirect attacks 
on sovereign equality generally should be considered unjustifiable discrimination in the 
Article XX chapeau. 
 
However, a finding that such measures are generally inconsistent with WTO law does not 
require that they be disallowed in all cases. The principle of necessity may be invoked 
under customary international law to excuse the non observance of international 
obligations in exceptional circumstances. The jurisdictional nexus that the importing 
country has with the environmental problem is relevant to determining whether necessity 
applies. This provides a link between the ruling in Shrimp II and the general body of 
international law that provides a way to reconcile the divergent views of WTO members 
and the international community and promote greater coherence between different 
branches of international law. 
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The Shrimp case represents a contribution on the part of the WTO judiciary to the 
development of the doctrine of necessity in international law, not just WTO law. 
Generally speaking, the necessity doctrine is consistent with the least-trade-restrictive test 
that has been applied in WTO jurisprudence. However, the application of both the 
necessity doctrine and Article XX to international environmental concerns would benefit 
from further development. 
 
It would be useful for the WTO judiciary to make explicit reference to the necessity 
doctrine when interpreting Article XX. Indeed, it would be useful for the WTO judiciary 
to systematically address the relevant rules of international law when interpreting WTO 
obligations and exceptions in order to ensure coherence. This would facilitate the 
coherent evolution of WTO law and other branches of international law, as well as the 
internal coherence of WTO law. 
 
The interpretive role of the principle of sovereign equality in WTO law requires further 
development in both WTO jurisprudence and the academic literature. The most concrete 
expression of this principle in WTO law is the WTO practice of decision making by 
consensus. Moreover, the concept of equality is implicit in the WTO principle of non-
discrimination and differential treatment based on the developmental status of WTO 
members. In order to achieve de jure equality among WTO members, WTO rights and 
obligations need to be designed or interpreted to compensate for the de facto inequality 
that exists among the members.  
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On their face, WTO provisions may apply equally to all members but not apply equally in 
practice. The right to issue compulsory licenses on patents under TRIPS was available in 
practice only to members that had sufficient pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity. 136 
To achieve de jure equality, TRIPS had to be amended. 137 Similarly, the right to use 
countermeasures under the DSU may not be effective for small developing countries.138 
How to rectify this lack of de jure equality is one of the subjects of negotiation in the 
Doha Round. Both of these examples show that de facto inequality must be taken into 
account in order to achieve de jure equality. 
 
The preferential treatment accorded to developing and least-developed countries in the 
WTO may be viewed as a means to compensate for inequality of circumstances in order 
to promote legal equality. Preferential treatment implicitly recognizes that the 
development status of WTO members affects access to WTO rights. The developing and 
least-developed countries generally do not have the market power to use unilateral trade 
measures as effectively as the United States or the European Union. This creates a 
situation of unequal access to the right to use unilateral trade measures under GATT 
Article XX(g). 
 
                                                
136 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994, Final Act 
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments —
Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 1C, 33 ILM 1197 (1994). 
137 Decision of 30 August 2003, Implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health, WTO Doc IP/C/W/405, 
<www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm> at 10 September 2003. 
138 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes , 15 April 1994, Final 
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments—
Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 2, 33 ILM 1197 (1994), art 22. See discussion of this point in 
Chapter 4. 
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Unilateral measures are inconsistent with preferential treatment for developing countries, 
the promotion of equal access to WTO rights, and, more generally, the goal of governing 
trade relations pursuant to multilateral rules. In exceptional cases, necessity may be 
invoked to address urgent environmental issues where the acting State has a jurisdictional 
nexus to the environmental problem. The requirement of an ‘essential interest’ makes 
such a jurisdictional nexus mandatory. This means that unilateral measures can only be 
justified for transnational or global environmental issues where the acting State has a 
territorial connection. Otherwise an applicable MEA obligation must provide the 
jurisdictional nexus through the legal interest that the MEA gives the acting State. Where 
there is no geographic or legal jurisdictional nexus, unilateral measures will not meet this 
requirement of the necessity doctrine and will be incapable of justification in Article XX. 
 
The broad language of Article XX leaves interpretative room available to achieve the 
coherence that is necessary for both WTO law and general international law to stand the 
test of time. Ambiguous language leaves room for the WTO to take into account the 
evolution of de jure equality and the necessity doctrine in both WTO law and general 
international law. It also leaves room for the WTO to take into account shifts in the 
allocation of decision making authority as international environmental laws and 
institutions evolve. Finally, broad language in Article XX lessens the need to employ 
legislative mechanisms to resolve conflicts among WTO members and gives the WTO 
judiciary greater latitude to resolve conflicts on a case-by-case basis. 
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This thesis has sought to clarify the relationship between WTO law, international 
environmental law and general international law in order to avoid conflicts between trade 
liberalization and global environmental protection. I have concluded that these three 
branches of law are generally consistent with each other in this field. However, WTO 
jurisprudence would benefit from a more explicit analysis of the way that panel decisions 
fit into the general framework of international law. No law reforms are currently needed 
to facilitate this task. The current WTO rules are adequate to resolve conflicts between 
GATT and MEA provisions and to determine the circumstances in which unilateral 
measures should be permitted.  
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